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EXHIBIT 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT 
Defendant. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Counterclaim defendant. 
MAV 2S 2 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 970907879 MI 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
May 22, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
the following motions: (1) "Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment;" (2) "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of the Buchi 
Children;" (3) "Counter-claimant, JoAnne Buchi's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition, in Part, and in Support, in Part, to Defendants' and 
Counter-Claimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;" and (4) 
"Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence Relied on by Joanne Buchi 
in Opposing Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." The Court heard 
oral argument with respect to these motions on March 24, 2000. 
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Following the hearing the matter were taken under advisement. 
The Court, having now considered the motions, memoranda, 
exhibits attached thereto, the oral argument of the parties and the 
good cause that has been shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. In this case, plaintiff, Glade Leon Parduhn ("Parduhn"), and 
Brad Buchi ("Buchi") were partners in a partnership known as 
University Texaco. The partnership was formed in 1979 
pursuant to a written Partnership Agreement. 
2. At some point after the Partnership Agreement was signed, 
Parduhn and Buchi typed in language at the end of the 
Agreement, which both signed. The addendum stated: 
It is understood by all people concerned, that in 
the event of the death of either of the partners, 
Brad K. Buchi or Glade L. Parduhn, that the 
partnership will end, and all obligations to the 
deceased's survivors financially will be released 
by paying off the deceased's persons [sic] 
survivors. Both partners are insured for $20,000 
and all of which will go to the deceased persons 
wife or survivors. When the survivors receive 
their $20,000, they release the other partner of 
any obligation in the business. The surviving 
partner will own the business and may do with the 
business as he see's [sic] fit.... 
3. Parduhn and Buchi acquired the necessary life insurance to 
fulfill the "Buy-Sell" provision of the Partnership Agreement. 
4. Five years later, on January 25, 1984, Parduhn and Buchi 
amended the Partnership Agreement to provide for $100,000 of 
insurance coverage. That amendment states: 
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The partnership agreement will have the following 
amendment for insurance. The buy-sell insurance 
will be $100,000. In the event of a death by either 
partner the remaining partner shall pay $100,000 to 
the survivors of the deceased with the proceeds of 
the $100,000 insurance policy which each own on 
each other. 
In accordance with the amended Partnership Agreement, Parduhn 
and Buchi each purchased from Northern Life Insurance Company 
a $100,000 life insurance policy on the other. 
Parduhn owned and was the beneficiary of a $100,000 policy on 
Buchi's life; Buchi owned and was the beneficiary of a 
$100,000 policy on Parduhn's life. 
In 198 9, Parduhn and Buchi each made another application with 
Northern Life Insurance Company for insurance on the other's 
life. 
Parduhn was named as both owner and beneficiary of a policy 
that insured Buchi's life for $300,000; Buchi was owner and 
beneficiary of a policy that insured Parduhn's life for 
$250,000. 
Parduhn and Buchi did not, however, again amend the 
partnership Buy-Sell Agreement. 
In early August 1997, Brad Buchi died. 
However, prior to his death, Parduhn and Buchi entered into an 
agreement to sell the Partnership's assets and wind up its 
affairs. To this end, University Texaco sold both its service 
stations to Blackett Oil Company on July 14, 1997. 
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Following Buchi's death, Parduhn made a claim on the $300,000 
life insurance policy on which he was the beneficiary. 
However, before Parduhn presented his claim, defendant and 
counter-claim plaintiff, Natalie Buchi Bennett ("Bennett"), 
instructed Northern Life Insurance Company not to pay any 
proceeds to Parduhn because she was entitled to them. 
Northern Life Insurance Company has interpleaded into this 
Court the $300,000 due under the policy. 
Parduhn filed this action seeking a declaration that, as the 
designated beneficiary of the insurance policy, he is entitled 
to the $300,000 payable under the policy. 
Bennett counterclaimed, asserting that as a survivor of Brad 
Buchi, she and her siblings are entitled to the $300,000 
proceeds. Specifically, Bennett argues that although Buchi 
and Parduhn did not expressly amend their partnership Buy-Sell 
Agreement when they increased their insurance coverage in 
1989, the increase was intended to be pursuant to the 
Partnership Agreement and, therefore, Parduhn has no interest 
in the proceeds of the $300,000 life insurance policy. 
BACKGROUND 
Parduhn has now filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" 
king a declaration that if the Buy-Sell Agreement were 
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applicable at the time of Buchi's death,lhis maximum liability for 
the purchase of Buchi's partner's interest, in accordance with the 
terms of the Partnership Buy-Sell Agreement, is $100,000. 
Additionally, Parduhn seeks a declaration that whatever sum the 
Buy-Sell Agreement requires him to pay in order to purchase Buchi's 
former interest in University Texaco, it must be paid over to 
Buchi's estate, and not to Buchi's wife or children directly. 
In response, Bennett has filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment, asserting the Buchi children are entitled to an 
order that, at a minimum, $100,000 of the insurance proceeds must 
be paid to Buchi's "survivors" in accordance with the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, not to Parduhn, the partnership or Buchi's estate. 
Moreover, Bennett argues that if there is no credible evidence that 
the remaining $200,000 was intended to be paid to Parduhn, the 
partnership or Buchi's estate, an order to that effect should be 
entered. 
Subsequent to the filing of the cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment, counter-claimant, JoAnne Buchi ("JoAnne"), filed 
1
 It is Parduhn's position in this lawsuit that the Buy-Sell 
Agreement is not applicable at all. Parduhn argues that the 
partnership was dissolved by the parties' mutual consent prior to 
Buchi's death, and therefore, dissolution should be governed by 
Section 11 of the Partnership agreement and Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 48-1-26 to 48-1-37. However, for the limited purpose of 
this motion, Parduhn has assumed that the Buy-Sell Agreement was 
in full force and effect at the time of Buchi's death. See 
"Glade Parduhn's Reply Memorandum in Response to *JoAnn Buchi's 
Memorandum" at 7. 
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a "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition, in Part, and in Support, in 
Part, to Defendants' and Counter-Claimants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment." With this motion, JoAnne asserts that Bennett's 
motion for partial summary judgment should be denied to the extent 
it asks for the proceeds of the life insurance policy to be 
distributed to the Buchi children alone. JoAnne argues she was 
Brad Buchi's wife at the time of his death and, therefore, is 
entitled to share in the proceeds of the life insurance policy 
pursuant to the Partnership Agreement. In addition, JoAnne 
contends that under the Partnership Agreement, as amended, Brad 
Buchi's "wife and survivors" are entitled to the entire $300,000 of 
the insurance proceeds. 
Finally, Parduhn has filed a motion to strike certain 
statements and evidence relied upon by JoAnne in her memorandum 
filed in opposition to Parduhn's motion for partial summary 
j udgment. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Cross-Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
There are two core issues in the parties' cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment: first, the sum, if any, the Buy-Sell 
Agreement requires Parduhn to pay Buchi's "survivors" in order to 
buy out Buchi's partnership interest in University Texaco; and, 
second, whatever sum Parduhn should pay to purchase Buchi's 
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partnership interest, whether that sum be paid directly to Buchi's 
"survivors" or to Buchi's probate estate. Each of these issues 
will be discussed in detail below. 
A. What sum, if any, does the Buy-Sell Agreement 
require Parduhn to pay Buchi's "survivors?" 
Parduhn and Buchi entered into a written Partnership 
Agreement, which provides, in part: 
It is understood by all people concerned, that in the 
event of the death of either of the partners, Brad K. 
Buchi or Glade L. Parduhn, that the partnership will end, 
and all obligations to the deceased's survivors 
financially will be released by paying off the deceased's 
persons [sic] survivors. Both partners are insured for 
$20,000 and all of which will go to the deceased persons 
wife or survivors. When the survivors receive their 
$20,000, they release the other partner of any obligation 
in the business. The surviving partner will own the 
business and may do with the business as he see's [sic] 
fit.... 
On January 25, 1984, the Partnership Agreement was amended to 
provide for $100,000 of insurance coverage. The amendment states: 
The partnership agreement will have the following 
amendment for insurance. The buy-sell insurance will be 
$100,000. In the event of a death by either partner the 
remaining partner shall pay $100,000 to the survivors of 
the deceased with the proceeds of the $100,000 insurance 
policy which each own on each other. 
None of the parties to the present action dispute that Parduhn 
and Buchi clearly and unambiguously agreed in the aforementioned 
amendment to increase the life insurance policies for the Buy-Sell 
provision to $100,000. This, combined with Parduhn's concession, 
for the purpose to this motion, that the Buy-Sell provision was in 
full force and effect at the time of Buchi's death (and not 
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affected by dissolution of the partnership) leads to the conclusion 
Brad Buchi's "survivors'' are entitled to, at a minimum, $100,000 of 
the insurance proceeds. 
Concerning the remaining $200,000 of the insurance proceeds, 
the Court finds genuine issues of material fact have been 
established which preclude summary judgment, including but not 
limited to whether the partners intended to increase the Buy-Sell 
life insurance on Buchi's life to $300,000. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Parduhn's motion for 
partial summary judgment on the aforementioned issues and grants, 
in part, the Buchi children's cross-motion for partial summary 
j udgment. 
B. Whatever sum Parduhn should pay to purchase Buchi's 
partnership interest, should that sum be paid 
directly to' Buchi's "survivors" or to Buchi's 
probate estate? 
Parduhn seeks a ruling that any sum he should have to pay to 
acquire Buchi's prior partnership interest should be paid over to 
Brad Buchi's probate estate. According to Parduhn, when Buchi 
died, all his property, including his partnership interest in 
University Texaco, instantly became part of his estate, to be 
administered in accordance with the Utah Probate Code. The 
Partnership Agreement, however, provides for payment of all the 
insurance proceeds to the decedent's "survivors," not to the 
partnership or the deceased's probate estate. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-201(1) specifically authorizes 
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agreements, like the Partnership Agreement in this case, which 
provide for non-testamentary transfers of money and property at 
death. Section 75-6-201(1) states in part: 
Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, 
. . . conveyance, or any other written instrument effective 
as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust are considered 
nontestamentary, and this code does not invalidate the 
instrument or any provision: (a) that money or other 
benefits previously due to, controlled, or owned by a 
decedent shall be paid after his death to a person 
designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a 
separate writing . . . executed at the same time as the 
instrument or subsequently. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-201(1) (emphasis added). 
Indeed, the official comments to that Section provide: 
Because the types of provisions described in 
the statute are characterized as non-
testamentary, the instrument does not have to 
be executed in compliance with Section 75-2-
502; nor does it have to be probated, nor does 
the personal representative have any power or 
duty with respect to the assets involved. 
Based upon the forgoing, it is clear the Utah Probate Code 
specifically allowed the Partnership Agreement to transfer, upon 
Buchi's death, his interest in the partnership to Parduhn and the 
insurance proceeds to the Buchi children and his widow. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that any sum Parduhn should have 
to pay to acquire Buchi's prior partnership interest should be paid 
directly to Buchi's "survivors," pursuant to the terms of the 
Partnership Agreement. Consequently, Parduhn's "Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment" is denied regarding this issue and the Buchi 
children's cross-motion for partial summary judgment is granted, 
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consistent with this ruling. 
II. Counter-Claimant JoAnne Buchi's Motion 
With this motion, JoAnne seeks a ruling that she is entitled 
to share in the proceeds of the insurance policy at issue in this 
case. Specifically, JoAnne argues the 1979 Partnership Agreement 
stated that all the proceeds from the "Buy-Sell" insurance should 
be paid directly to Buchi's "wife or survivors." Moreover, the 
1984 amendment to the Partnership Agreement contains similar 
language. Based upon the forgoing, it is JoAnn's position that as 
the wife of Buchi at the date of his death, she is entitled to at 
least some of the proceeds of the life insurance policy. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court agrees 
with JoAnn. Although she and Buchi filed for divorce in March of 
1996, no Divorce Decree had been entered at the time of Buchi's 
death. Consequently, JoAnne was Buchi's wife at all relevant 
times. Under the clear and unambiguous language of both the 1979 
Partnership Agreement as well as the 1984 amendment to that 
agreement, Buchi's "wife or survivors" are entitled to share in the 
insurance proceeds. Accordingly, JoAnn is entitled to a portion of 
the insurance proceeds 
Based on the foregoing, JoAnne Buchi's motion is granted to 
the extent it seeks to have the proceeds of the life insurance paid 
to her and the Buchi children, not to the Buchi children alone. 
JoAnne Buchi's motion is denied, however, wherein it asks that the 
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full $300,000 be distributed to Buchi's "wife and survivors.''2 
III. Parduhn's Motion to Strike 
With this motion, Parduhn seeks to strike evidence relied on 
by JoAnne Buchi in her memorandum filed in opposition to his motion 
for partial summary judgment. However, Parduhn's motion has not 
been fully briefed by the parties, nor has it been properly 
submitted for decision. Consequently, the Court does not address 
this issue. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court's decision regarding 
the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment remains 
unchanged. Regardless of the admissibility of the statements which 
are the subject of Parduhn's motion to strike, JoAnne and the Buchi 
children are entitled to, at a minimum, $100,000 of the insurance 
proceeds as a matter of law, pursuant to the terms of the 1984 
"Buy-Sell" Agreement. Furthermore, the Court remains convinced 
that summary judgment is not warranted concerning the remaining 
$200,000 of the insurance proceeds, as genuine issues of material 
fact have been established which preclude summary judgment, 
regardless of the outcome of the motion to strike. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of M o U j , 2000. 
2As the Court has previously stated, although JoAnne Buchi 
and the Buchi children are entitled to, at a minimum, $100,000 of 
the insurance proceeds in accordance with Partnership Agreement, 
genuine issues of material fact have been established, which 
preclude summary judgment concerning the remaining $200,000 of 
the insurance proceeds. 
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BY THE COURT 
I 5> ANNE M. 3TIRBA 
THIRD DISTRICT JUDGE 
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EXHIBIT 2 
AUG 29 2001 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN. 
Plaintiff and 
Counter claim 
defendant, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT et.al. 
Defendants and 
Counter claimants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 970907879 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thome 
August 27, 2001 
The above matter came on before the court, sitting without a 
jury, for trial on August 21 and 22, 2001. Plaintiff was present 
with his attorney P. Brian Fishburn, defendant JoAnne Buchi was 
present with her attorney Tim Dalton Dunn and the Buchi children 
(Natalie Buchi Bennett, Allison Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Lance 
Buchi, and Jessica Buchi) were present through their attorney 
Martin S. Tanner. 
The court heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, and 
received and reviewed the exhibits. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff file'd suit claiming, the. cdurt^should enter 
judgment and direct that the death benefit of "a-$300,000 life 
insurance policy should be paid to him as the named beneficiary 
and surviving business partner of Brad K. Buchi (Buchi). 
Defendant Natalie Buchi Bennettl is' a^  child of Buchi and she'Vi-
advised the insurance company that it should not pay Plaintiff 
but should pay she -and her siblings, as the proper beneficiaries, 
(Plaintiff's exhibit 15, 16.) The insurance company, Northern 
Life Insurance Company, (Northern) has interpleaded the death 
benefit and deposited the $3000,000 with the court. The wife of 
Buchi at the time of his death, JoAnne Buchi, and other children 
of Buchi were later joined as parties. 
FACTS 
In this matter Plaintiff was a business partner with Buchi 
for many years. They called the business University Texaco. 
(Plaintiff's exhibit 1) (Plaintiff $nd Buchi will be referred to 
herein as "partners" or the "partnership.") They entered a 
partnership to run gas stations and signed a written partnership 
agreement in 1979. They entered a typed amendment to that 
agreement, actually typed at the end of the agreementf on a date 
unknown and made a "buy-sell" agreement part of the partnership 
agreement. That amendment is signed by both partners and their 
wives but it is undated. It provided that each would take out a 
$20,000 life insurance policy on the other, to be paid to the 
surviving partner for the benefit and use of the deceased 
partner's wife or survivors. The insurance proceeds would be 
used so-that-the deceased's partner's interest could be purchased 
and the surviving partner would then own the entire business to 
do with the business as he saw fit. (Plaintiff's exhibit 1, p. 4) 
In 1984 the partners increased the amount of insurance and 
in a hand written note signed by each partner January 25, 1984, 
indicated that the increased amount of insurance on each other, 
$100,000, was for the purposes of the buy-sell agreement and for 
paying the survivors of the deceased partner and that the 
partnership agreement was amended. (Plaintiff's exhibit 2) 
Defendant's exhibit 3 was received by stipulation. It was the 
same note as Plaintiff's exhibit 2, but there was an additional 
small note at the bottom which stated that the amounts were to be 
changed to $300,000 and $250,000, and a date of 9-11-90. Lisa 
Buchi testified that addendum was in Buchi's handwriting. The 
court does not find the evidence with respect to that addendum 
convincing by ^ .preponderance and does not consider Defendant's 
exhibits iLin £his_discussion. The court considers only 
Plaintiff's exhibit 2. 
Further, the court does not consider any other evidence 
other than discussed below. Specifically/ the testimony of Lisa 
Buchi as to the divorce decree -entered in 1992 between she and 
Buchi is not:, considered T>y the" courtfT' 
In 1989 the partners again increased their insurance. The 
partners called the insurance agent through.the then-wife of . . 
Buchi, Lisa Buchi/ and she told the agent the partners wanted to 
increase. the amount of insurance for the Jbuy-sell agreement«._ 
Buchi took out a policy on his life in the sum of $300,000 with 
Plaintiff as the owner and beneficiary. (Northern # 00989085, 
Plaintiff's exhibit 3.) Plaintiff took out a policy on his life, 
with Buchi as owner and beneficiary, in the sum of $250,000. 
(Northern # 00989086, Plaintiff's exhibit 4.) In the 
applications for such policies each partner indicated the purpose 
of the insurance and insurable interest was ubuy sell/partner." 
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(Paragraph 31(f) of the application, Plaintiff's exhibit 3 and 
4•) That was written by the insurance agent Sheldon Hansen who 
testified he wrote the application based on what his client told 
him. Hansen said he was not told to write that some of the 
insurance was payable to Plaintiff and some for the buy-sell 
agreement. Hansen did not recall specifically being told the 
increase was for purposes of the buy-sell agreement but he was 
told what he wrote in paragraph 31(f). He wrote both policies the 
same day, on Buchi and Plaintiff. Plaintiff knew that provision 
was in the application and was made aware by the agent that it 
was necessary so each partner could have insurance on the other's 
life. The partners did not execute any further writing at that 
time or ever indicating their intentions and did not formally 
amend the partnership agreement in 1989. 
Also at the same time Buchi took out another policy on his 
life in favor of his wife Lisa Buchi in the sum of $250,000. 
(Northern # 00989084, Plaintiff's exhibit 5.) 
Sometime in 1997 the partners decided to sell the business 
and on July 14, 1997, sold the two service stations owned at the 
time by the partnership, by closing with Associated Title. The 
sale price of the stations was $1,000,000. The two service 
stations were their business. The partners had not performed an 
accounting, had not divided assets or debts, and had not 
discussed the insurance policies each owned after the sale. They 
had met in early August, 1997, and signed off on some of the . 
partnership debts but not all of them. Some of the partnership 
debts were paid. No formal documents had been executed to 
terminate; the partnership except the sale of. the gas stations. 
Buchi died on August 7, 1997, or at least was found deceased on 
that date. (Plaintiff's exhibit 6.) 
Since the death of Buchi Plaintiff has been properly 
responsible for approval of the ^ release of funds from the 
Associated Title, which "holds the remainder of the funds from the 
sale of the service stations in escrow. O.C.A. 48-1-34. Plaintiff 
has also approved the payment of further debt from that escrow 
fund. 
Plaintiff then claimed he was entitled, as named 
beneficiary, to the proceeds of the policy. Defendants claim 
that they are the proper beneficiaries as the survivors of 
Buchi. Defendant are Buchi's wife at the time of his death, 
though they were in the process of divorce, and the five children 
of Buchi. 
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DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff claims that the buy-sell agreement was ended upon 
the sale of the businesses on July 14, 1997, and so at the death 
of Buchi Plaintiff was the named beneficiary and is entitled to 
the proceeds. It is clear that at the death of a partner, the 
partnership was dissolved. Further, when the "termination of the 
definite term or particular undertaking specified in the 
agreement" is accomplished, the partnership is dissolved. U.C.A. 
48-1-26, 48-1-28. Plaintiff argues that because the purpose of 
the partnership was to run gas stations, when those were sold in 
July, 1997, the purposes of the partnership had ended, thus the 
a dissolution of the partnership was effected. Thus, he argues, 
as there can be only one cause of dissolution, upon the later 
death of Buchi Plaintiff was the named beneficiary and he should 
be entitled to the proceeds of the policy 
Defendants argue that even if there was in fact a 
dissolution, there was not a termination of the partnership nor a 
winding up of the partnership at the sale of the stations or at 
the death of Buchi. U.C.A. 48-1-27. 
The court is convinced that while the service stations were 
sold and that was the reason for the partnership, the partnership 
had not been terminated though it had beep dissolved on July 14, 
1997. The court concludes that the rights of the partners are not 
fully determined at the time of dissolution. The partnership was 
still extant after July 14, 1997, the date of sale of the service 
stations5to Blackett Oil* The buy-sell agreement, .if it existed, 
'Was^ Jti^ LjL^ in effect ,aftei^ fcjie^ sale.,of the service ^stations .„' 
There was still an accounting to be performed, there were still 
assets and debts to be fully divided, and there was still the 
matter^ tissue in this^ case \to beA resolved-what were the 
partners^going to do about the life insurance policies they had? 
No discussion had- occurred about those items before Buchi's 
d^eath;^  
Thus, the partnership was not wound up and was still in 
effect at the time of Buchi'5 death. Because it was'still'-in »: 
effect at Buchi/s death, the buy-sell agreement, if it existed, 
.was ^sjbill .in effect. 
The court need not find whether the insurance contract was, 
integrated. If it is an integrated contract, the court finds and 
concludes it is ambiguous. If it is not fully integrated, the 
application clearly becomes part of the contract and the evidence 
from that application can be considered. In either event, the 
court can and does examine parol evidence to determine the rights 
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of the parties. 
The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence from the 
documents and the testimony that the parties did not intend that 
Plaintiff be the beneficiary of the policy and the proceeds 
should be awarded to defendants. 
At the formation of the partnership the partners 
specifically stated that the buy-sell provision was for the 
benefit of the survivors of the deceased partner. It was 
intended that the partnership agreement be amended to allow the 
surviving partner to receive the insurance proceeds, to be given 
to the survivors for the benefit of the survivors of the deceased 
partner, so the surviving partner could run the business as he 
saw fit and so that the surviving partner would not have to 
deplete partnership assets to take over the business and purchase 
it from the heirs of the deceased partner. 
It is also abundantly clear and the court finds that in 1984 
when the partners increased the policy amounts that the same 
intent existed. The hand written amendment, signed by both 
partners, specifically mentioned the amendment of the partnership 
agreement again and mentioned the insurance proceeds were to go 
to the survivors of the deceased partner. 
In 1989 the partners again increased the amount of insurance 
on each other, this time to different amounts. Plaintiff was 
insured for $250,000 and Buchi for $300,000- Plaintiff argues 
that the difference is significant and shows an intent other than 
.defendant/^ -argue. Plaintiff,argues that fact shows an intent to 
have Plaintiff benefit because Plaintiff's survivors would only 
benefit $250,000 while Buchi's survivors would benefit $300,000. 
However/,=i:he -same reasoning of Plaintiff makes the disparity 
unexplainable. Why would Buchi-want to accept $250,000 if 
Plaintiff died but be willing to give Plaintiff $300,00 if Buchi 
e«di^ d^ 5The'<:ourt' is convinced -by '>fche evidence .there * is-good "reason 
for the difference in insurance amounts. The payments on those 
amounts were equal because of the age and health of the partners-
Buchi could get the higher death benefit for the same cost as 
Plaintiff could get the lower amount due to the risk. That is 
because Plaintiff was older and was a smoker. Plaintiff himself 
testified that the reason for the varying amounts was to retain 
the equal amount of payment. The intent was to keep the cost 
equal for the partnership. The partnership in fact paid the 
premiums. 
Significantly, in the applications each signed, the partners 
indicated the purpose and nature of Owner's insurable interest 
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was "buy sell/partner." The court is convinced that is clear 
evidence that the parties both intended the increased amounts of 
insurance to be used for the same purposes as the lower amounts-
namely, for the benefit of the survivors of the deceased partner. 
Even though being a partner may itself be an insurable interest, 
the reason behind the insurance was not for personal protection 
of the partners, but for the survivors and so the surviving 
partner could proceed with the business without depleting 
partnership resources. In this case the fact that the 
partnership was in financial troubles at the death of Buchi and 
thus Plaintiff does not receive much from the partnership does 
not change the legal conclusion. Sheldon Hansen testified he 
asked Buchi when the insurance was applied for to provide the 
buy-sell agreement and Buchi would not or did not provide it 
despite Hansen's multiple requests. Plaintiff argues that is 
evidence that Buchi did not intend to amend the buy-sell 
agreement. The court concludes otherwise and finds just the 
opposite. The court finds it is some evidence that Buchi himself 
intended to increase the buy-sell agreement amount because Buchi 
indicated there was such an agreement. Defendant argues that 
when Sheldon Hansen wrote "buy sell/partner" he was indicating 
multiple purposes and insurable interests-one based one the buy-
sell agreement and one based purely on the status of being a 
partner. The court concludes that Hansen wrote what he wrote as 
a shortcut to describe the intent of the partners, that is, the 
buy-sell agreement as partners was the purpose of this insurance. 
Plaintiff argues that Buchi's purchase on the same day of 
another policy in favor of his wife Lisa Buchi, as well as 
proffered evidence that. Lisa
 41Buchi benefitted from a child 
support settlement, is strong evidence Buchi intended to provide 
for his family in other ways beside this $300,000 policy. The 
court finds that the intent of the parties and their agreement is 
otherwise and clear, Buchi had previously purchased a $572,000 
- policy for the benefit of his wife Lisa and their children. He 
valso 4iad previously purchased a separate-$100,^000 policy for his 
wife and children• Those facts simply show his desire to protect 
his family, they do not lead to an inference that Buchi thus must 
have intended Plaintiff benefit from this insurance policy* 
Plaintiff argues that the absence of a writing such as 
occurred in 1979 and 1984 indicates the parties did not intend to 
increase the buy-sell amounts in 1989. They knew how to do it, 
even though perhaps crudelyr based on the amendments in 1979 and 
1984, and they did not do so in 1989. Thus, argues Plaintiff, 
they must have not intended it. The court finds the argument has 
some merit but it does not overcome the other evidence 
demonstrating the partners did intend to amend the buy-sell' 
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agreement. 
By similar reasoning Plaintiff has provided no writing 
showing Buchi intended him to have the proceeds of this policy. 
Indeed, from a common sense standpoint, why would Buchi, as 
argued by defendants, want to insure his partner for such a sum. 
Even if the court lends credence to the evidence and argument 
that Buchi did buy other protection for his family, Plaintiff has 
provided no cogent explanation as to why Buchi would want to give 
his business partner an equal or even greater amount of personal 
protection than he gives his family. Even under Plaintiff's 
alternative argument that if the 1984 amendment is effective but 
not the 1989 amendment, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that 
Buchi intended or would want his survivors, a wife and five 
children, to have $100,000 but his partner have $200,000. 
Plaintiff suggests that as a contract the insurance policy 
and application make clear that the beneficiary last named in 
writing is to be paid the proceeds. The court finds and 
concludes that while the application itself names Plaintiff as 
beneficiary, the other aspects of the insurance application make 
it ambiguous and allow the other evidence outside the insurance 
contract to be considered by the court. The language of the 
contract that the beneficiary will be paid is not an "either/or" 
proposition but paragraph 31 of the application explains the 
beneficiary and the purposes of naming Plaintiff as the 
beneficiary. The application can certainly be considered in 
determining what the contract itself means, indeed, the 
application .is part of the contract. The owner of a policy-can 
1 designate ^another ^beneficiary^than JLs. set fort^in^the^^iS4v. r... 
application. That can be done by any number of:methods. -,• The 
parties, by increasing the amounts of the buy7sell agreement, and 
by^ agreeing .that .the ^purpose jwas for .the ,-buy-sell agreement, 
intended to alter the ultimate beneficiary. Even if Plaintiff 
remains the named ""beneficiary"*he was to <be a beneficiary only 
•infitthfe *se»se>*>f^ fche^ touy-sell^ agreement^ ;>,ffhat ^ L«, -*he^ *was to J*A 
receive the proceeds but those proceeds were•to pass through him 
to the survivors of Buchi. While the proceeds were to go to v 
Plaintiff as beneficiary, he in turn was to give the proceeds to 
the survivors of Buchi. Plaintiff was certainly, without doubt, 
the written beneficiary in the application,^  but it was for^the 
purposes agreed on by the partners-namely, to fund the buy-sell 
agreement. Even though Buchi had what appears to be other 
protection for his family in the event of his death, there is 
nothing presented by Plaintiff that convinces the court that 
Buchi intended to benefit Plaintiff with other than the business 
after Buchi's death. Again, Plaintiff has provided no evidence 
indicating Buchi wanted Plaintiff to have the insurance proceeds 
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as well as the partnership. The court finds the evidence cogent 
and clear that Buchi intended that Plaintiff not be the actual 
beneficiary but the beneficiary only to pass on the proceeds to 
Buchi's survivors. 
The court finds and concludes that Plaintiff, whether 
explicitly or impliedly, agreed to the buy-sell amendment. That 
was the reason for the insurance in the first place and no 
evidence was presented satisfactorily showing Buchi and Plaintiff 
intended something else when they purchased the larger policies 
in 1989. Plaintiff is not being deprived of anything he is 
entitled to. The insurance contract and the accompanying buy-
sell agreement provided that the money would go to the surviving 
partner for the benefit of the survivors of the deceased partner. 
Plaintiff has full claim to all of the partnership business. 
Even though Plaintiff was credible and is a hard working 
veteran deserving of better, the facts show that the insurance 
proceeds should not be given to Plaintiff but to the wife and 
survivors of Buchi. Plaintiff provided no persuasive evidence 
Buchi intended Plaintiff rather than his survivors to receive any 
insurance proceeds in any policy taken on Buchi's life. 
Defendant JoAnne Buchif the wife of Buchi at the time of his 
death, argues that Utah statutory law, U.C.A. 31A-21-104, gbverns 
here and as a matter of law Plaintiff is not entitled to any 
proceeds from the policy* Plaintiff argues, and did in a pre-
-trial, .motion filed the day before Jthe triaJU^that such defense 
was waived as it was an affirmative defence and was not pleaded 
and was thus waived. The court ruled pre-trial that notice had 
been given in the amended counterclaim and in a Motion in Limine 
filed in October, 2000, and thus Plaintiff was not disadvantaged. 
Plaintiff knew at least from that time of the Motion in Limine 
-.that ^ JoAnne iBuchi contended that U.G.4L .^ 31AH21*yL«04 precluded ^ any 
relief to Plaintiff. The parties agreed that the trial evidence 
factually would not be altered by the argument of JoAnne Buchi 
but Plaintiff argued that the court should not consider it as a 
defense. The court ruled the trial would go forward and agreed it 
would give Plaintiff additional time to prepare for the argument 
against JoAnne Buchi's argument. After the evidence on August 21 
the court granted Plaintiff's request to argue the matter the 
next afternoon. The court is of the opinion that whether the 
statutory defense is an affirmative defense or not, Plaintiff had 
notice of it. Notice is the basic premise of the rules on 
pleading. 
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The court does not find it necessary to reach the 
application of the statute cited and relied on by Joann Buchi 
given the ruling concerning the facts- However, the court is of 
the opinion that U.C.A. 31A-21-104 does deny relief to Plaintiff. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not have an insurable 
interest simply because he was a partner. Plaintiff argues that 
being a partner gives him an insurable interest, even if there 
was not a buy-sell agreement. The court believes that the Utah 
statute does not give Plaintiff an insurable interest merely 
because of his status as a partner. However, even if it does the 
court7s reading of the statute precludes relief for Plaintiff. 
Defendant JoAnne Buchi also argues that there was no consent 
by Buchi for his life to be insured and thus Plaintiff fails. 
Even if Plaintiff had an insurable interest as a partner, 
his only claim to the proceeds was because of the buy-sell 
agreement. U.C.A. 31A-21-104(1)(b) provides that "a person may 
not knowingly procure, directly, by assignment, or otherwise, an 
interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy unless he has or 
expects to have an insurable interest in the subject of the 
insurance." The statute goes on in subsection (2) to discuss 
what an insurable interest is and states that "a . . . partner 
has an insurable interest in the life of other . . . partners 
that are an integral part of a legitimate buy-sell agreement 
respecting . . . a partnership interest in the business." If 
Plaintiff had an insurable interest because he was a partner, his 
claim to the proceeds was only as a result of the buy-sell 
agreement. The buy-sell agreement;allowed him to procure the 
proceeds but not in the nan^ei^^ Plaintiff was 
entitled only to obtain the proceeds and then pass them on to the 
survivors as agreed in the buy-sell agreement. 
If the partnership does give Plaintiff an insurable 
interest, the partnership itself was not the reason, as concluded 
rabove, that 1:he insurance was-obtained-in -1989.' 'The only 
legitimate reason the partners had to obtain insurance on each 
other was for the buy-sell agreement. Thus, Plaintiff's claim 
and his attempt to "procure" the proceeds by filing a claim for 
himself was not authorized by law. That being so, under 31A-21-
104(5) the court could and would order that Plaintiff did not 
have an insurable interest that allowed him to procure the 
proceeds of the policy as he attempted for himself. If he had an 
insurable interest he could have procured the proceeds for the 
purpose of passing the proceeds on to the survivors. The court 
could and would order that the proceeds be paid on an equitable 
basis to the surviving wife and children of Buchi, namely, 
defendants and counter claimants herein, who did have an 
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insurable interest in Buchi's life. 
Defendant JoAnne Buchi's arguments with respect to consent 
are subject to the same analysis as above, Buchi clearly signed 
the application and thus consented to the issuance of the policy. 
However, Buchi did not consent to the issuance of the policy that 
would provide for Plaintiff to receive the proceeds- Buchi 
consented to the issuance of a policy that was for the purposes 
set forth above, namely, as part of a legitimate buy-sell 
agreement. 
For the above reasons, Plaintiff's complaint is not well 
founded. The proceeds of the interpleaded amounts plus the 
accumulated interest are directed to be released to defendants 
and cross claimants JoAnne Buchi, Natalie Buchi Bennett, 
Annabelle Buchi, Allison Buchi, Lance Buchi, and Jessica Buchi. 
Plaintiff is entitled to the partnership interests. 
3*'« DATED this<2L__ day of August, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
HJCEVC. BRtt . LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 970907879 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail TIM DALTON DUNN 
ATTORNEY 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST 
460 MIDTOWN PLAZA 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
Mail P BRYAN FISHBURN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
4505 SOUTH WASATCH BLVD 
SUITE 215 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124 
Mail MARTIN S TANNER 
ATTORNEY DEF 
340 BROADWAY CENTRE 
111 EAST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-5250 
Dated this, day of 20 QL. 
Deputy rt Clerk 
EXHIBIT 2 
EXHIBIT 3 
/NORTHERN Mbb 
^SUR^'CE'CIO. 
aboac-. P.O.Bo>c'i2530.Seattte.'WA 98111 
AfmUAIIUIV 
PARTI 
rMut 
GACode 
2. Social Security ^.^L^I^^^L-Sl JLD-Z 
3 . Marital Status D Single J&Married D Widowed D Separated DOivorced 
4. Sex GKfole D Female 5. Birthplace (State) 
6, Oate of Birth (Mo.-0-Yr.) Hf<?f>~7 7. Age 7 - > ^ 
8- Height ft £ In ^ Weight Ibs^O 
d. O Waiver of Premium or Waiver of Monthly Oeduction 
c. D Accidental Oeath Benefit- Amount $ 
f. D famiy Rider: Units O ChSdren Rider: Units, 
g. D Additional Insured Rider 
on . Amount $ 
Beneficiaries, (if rider on other than primary insured) 
9 . Residence (S 
(City) 
(State) (Sj^aA, 
? ) / v - y o frs/^/>r/Jf *> s£J Address 
(Zip) fVf*-t 
10a. Occupation _ 
b. Describe Duties 
< * < ^ ^ 4 ^ t ^ {0^/**W &/-
y^ ^si^ A^, JP^J^. e-i^'h 
c How Long in Occupation? SO *f?A< 
11a. Annual Income from Occupation $ 
(re: parent if this is juvenile app.) 
or Net Income After Expenses (for self-employed persons) $ £&GaQ 
I I Income From Other Sources 
List Other Sources 
12. Employer Ci / t^^t^^S^ < 7 ^ > i ^ <ZA 
Occupation (if rider on other than primary insured) 
h. D Other 
16. Class of Hi RiskJVpplied Epi r: (Standard unless otherwise shown here.) 
17a. Premium Payment Mode: Annual D 
ABC J i Sal Sav • Other 
Semi D Quarterly D 
h. Universal Plans Only: Stipulated Modal Premium? $ / ^ f f ' - ^ j f e * 
c. Billing Address (Street) *?n/ ^ * (~<* - ~7~7r~*-M>/e> 
(City) <T/r r (State) (^^A (Zip) ^ / t f T 
d. Do you plan to suspend premium payments when qualified? 
^ _&L^j*4bz£\ 
13a. Beneficial nrShttv name. Social Security No. and relationship to Proposed Insured 
D Yes 'JZHIo D N / A If yes. at start of which year? 
18. Life Insurance or Annuities in Force (If None So State) 
<rz~sr- Lt>- 7 r*-? 
equally, or to the survivorfs) unless otherwise stated. 
(If address is different than Proposed Insured show in Agent's report) 
fa. Contingent Beneficiary: Show name and relationship to Proposed Insured 
equally, or to the survivors) unless otherwise stated. 
Benefictaryfies) have the right to change setdemem mode uviess you request 
otherwise here. ' 
14. Name and Address of Proposed Insured's Personal Physician 
Name [^<?<y* <^</« < M JTX^
 ta 
V 
D 
P 
P 
D 
r Id 
Company 
(Check if being replaced.) 
Insured yCo sz/Z <*^^ 
/ ^ ~ r s <TVi <->.//• «^<" 
SpOOSe /S^. f> C^/^rv,. | 
' I 
Year 
!^6 
tr 
%^ 
l ife Amt 
\2*>0,acK: 
\y^ZrCUi 
Po&ov^ 
AOB Amt 
Aririn^  2&& fd <* /?jZ-^ r ^ c , ^ / - ^ 
Oate and Reason last consul ted?. . {^H^i f 
15a. Plan of InsuranceJState Plan Trtle Exactly) 
O/i^cs^fin^- S*/<s r 
FY ^ &*~* 
fa. Amount 
Automatic Premium Loan, if available?. JS-Yes O N o 
c. Benefit Option (Universal Plans Only) J2H\ Level D B Increasing 
19. Replacement (Check each policy above to be replaced and attach required 
replacement forms.) 
a. Are any of the currently in force life insurance orannuity policies to be replace* 
by the insurance applied for? D Yes £^No 
~ fa. Have any Sfe insurance or annuity policies on the life of the Proposed Insurec 
lapsed witMn the last 12 months? DYes ffrf lo 
20 . For Juvenile Insurance (ages 0 thru 14) (complete Ownership section also) 
a. Amount of insurance in force on Sfe of father? •• 
mother? ! (If none on either, give particulars.) 
fa. Number of siblings? 
c. Amount of insurance in force on each brother or sister? 
2 1 . Family Members (If family rider, chriden rider or purchaser benefit applied for) 
Proposed for Insurance Relationship to 
Proposed Insured 
Birthplace 
(State) 
Oate of Binh 
Mo.-Day-Yr. 
Age Height Weight 
a. Spouse's former names 
fa. Are there any children under age 18 on whom coverage is not being requesied? 
c. Are there any children shown above who do not live with the applicant? 
. Details to "Yes" Answers. 
DYes 
DYes 
DNo 
QNo 
-4VVGE2 
22. Foreign Travel Aviation and Military 
a. Oo you intend to travel outside the US. or Canada within the next two years except for vacation tnps? 
b. Do you intend to fly other than as a passenger or have you flown other than as a passenger 
during the past two years? If "YesVcomplete Aviation Questionnaire 
c. Are you a member, or do you intend to become a member, of the armed forces, including reserves? 
23. Avocation and Sports Do you participate in recreational activities involving.-
a. Aeronautics (including hang-gliding, ultralight soaring, sky diving, ballooning}? 
b. Competitive racing of powered vehicles (including motorcycles, automobiles and boats)? 
c. Recreational vehicles over open terrain, trails, sand, snow or ice (including snowmobiles, dirt 
bikes and dune buggies)? 
d. Any of the following — skin or scuba diving, mountain climbing, rodeos, competitive siding? 
24. Other Insurance 
a. Have you had a request for life or health insurance declined, postponed, rated or restricted 
in any way? 
b. Is any application for tfe insurance pending with any either company? Give name of company. 
Proposed Proposed ttemarits & a 
Insured Additional Insured to "yes~*anst 
.State JA 
. 
25. Driving Record Driver's license No 
Within the past 3 years have you been convicted of or pleaded guilty to: 
a. Three or more moving violations and/or accidents? 
b. Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs? 
26. Have You Ever. 
a. Had a family member with diabetes, heart or circulatory disease or cancer? 
b. Had a weight change over 10 lbs. in the past year? If "Yes", pounds gained or lost and reason? 
c. Received treatment;; or joined an organization for alcoholism or drug addiction? 
d. On a regular basis used amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, codeine, hallucinogens, heroin. 
ISO. marijuana, sedatives, tranquilizers or habit forming drugs except as prescribed by a physician? 
e. Been convicted of a felony in the past 10 years? 
1 Yes 
D 
D 
D 
No 
P-
0-
& 
Yes 
D 
D 
D 
No 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
• 
D 
• 
D 
D 
D 
12-
D 
D 
D 
EF 
P 
P 
© 
& 
e 
0 
Ek 
D 
B 
D-
m 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
• 
a 
D B-
27. Oescribe any athletic program(s) you engage in 30. Special Instructions 
a a 
. How often?. 
28 . What is your alcohol consumption? 
(Drink = one 12 oi beer, one 5 oi glass of wine or 1 to. of hard spirits] 
Proposed Insured (drinks per week) 
JZ^Nooe D 1 - 5 D 6-14 D15-30 • More 
Proposed Additional Insured (drinks pet week) 
• None D 1 - 5 • 6-14 Q15-30 QMote 
29. Smoking Statement 
I do not now smoke cigarettes. I have not smoked any cigarettes for at 
least the past twelve months. I do not use tobacco in any other form except: 
31. Ownership Section ^  , / ^y / , 
a. Owner's Name < O y ^ / ^ / ^ / n s / c / A ^ 
b. Social Security or Tax No. jTZ* ¥ T 6o -t/T * 
c. Relationship to Proposed ^mA^rSt^^A-*^ &<~ 
d. What amount of insurance in question 18 of this application c 
with other companies is payable to Owner as Beneficiary? 
Company Amount 
PAGES 
3 2 . Has aox Proposed insured ever had or been advised that h e / s h e had: 
a. Any disorder of the circulatory system, heart disorder, heart murmur, high 
blood pressure or persistent frequent or severe chest pain? 
fa- Cancer or tumor of any type or location? 
c . Any nervous, mental or brain disorder, seizure or convulsion or fainting spells 
or persistent frequent or severe dizziness? 
d. Any disorder of the lungs, bronchial tubes, or respiratory system? 
c . Any disorder of the nose, throat mouth, eyes or ears? 
f. Diabetes or any disorder of the thyroid or any other gland, or swollen or 
enlarged lymph nodes? 
g. Any disorder of the stomach, gall bladder. Gvet intestines, rectum or other 
abdominal disorder? 
fa. Any disorder of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, or urinary system? 
L Any disorder of the breasts, uterus or ovaries? 
j . Syphilis, herpes, recurrent gonorrhea or other sexually transmitted diseases? 
k. Any disorder of the bones or joints.- or any form of rheumatism, arthritis or gout? 
L Any physical impairment deformity, paralysis or amputation? 
m. An immune deficiency disorder. AIDS, or AIOS Related Complex (ARC), or 
test results indicating exposure to the AIDS virus? 
During the past five years has any Proposed Insured: 
n. Consulted, been examined or been treated by any physician or practitioner 
not listed above? 
o. Had an X-ray. electrocardiogram or any laboratory test or study? 
Show results, if known. 
p. Had observation or treatment at a clinic, hospital or institution? 
q . Had or been advised to have a surgical operation? 
Please ctrde appropriate item and give details including Doctor's name 
and address, date, duration, and present condition. Specify Person 
Yes 
a 
a 
D 
D 
D 
D 
No 
a 
a 
o 
D 
o 
D 
D D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
a 
a 
a 
a 
n 
D 
D 
a 
D • 
D • 
a 
D 
D 
D 
Additional medical information: 
3 3 . To the best ol your knowledge and belief, is each person proposed for insurance free from mental and physical disorder? G R f e s ^ O No 
If "No", give details : '. : ; : 
OECIARATIOH 
I/We declare to my/our best knowledge and belief, the answers shown in this application are complete and true. I/We agree: 
1 . Afl of the following are the basis for and. shall be part of any insurance contract: (a) this application,- (fa) any amendment(s) to this application; (c) any 
statements made in any Medical Examination, part JL 
2 . Except as shown in this application's Conditional Receipt no insurance will be effective until all of the following occur: (a) all persons to be insured are 
.alive and in the same health as shown herein when the following (b) and (c) happen- (fa) a polity is delivered and any required amendment(s) to the application 
ts signed; (c) full payment of the first premium has been made to the Company. 
3 . Any policy or rider issued on this appfication will belong only to the Owner. 
4 . Accepting a policy will ratify any change made by the Company in the space entitled: "for Home Office Endorsements". But no change can be made as 
to amount premium, classification, insurance plan or benefits, or issue age without my/our written consent 
APPLICANT, fftitfii if Proposed Insured is a rr.mori 
OFFICER SIGNING FOR CORPORATION OR FIRM (GIVE TITLE) IF PROPOSEO INSURED (IF FAMILY RIOER INCLUOEO) 
-^ ..... '+J£" 
PROPOSEO AOOITIONAL INSURED 
MAKE CHECKS PAYABLE ONLY TO NORTHERN LIFE. 
WITNESS — LICENSED AGENT 
SIGN AUTHORIZATION ON NEXT PAGE. 
PAI 
AGENTS REPORT 
1 . Concerning all persons proposed for insurance: 
a. Were you unable to see any of them? O Yes prffo If. "Yes" please state circumstances. 
b. Are you aware of anything unfavorable about the health, character, habits, occupation or family history of any of them? • Yes £?4toJf. ~Yes~ e 
below. 
2L How long have you known Proposed Insured? $~~LfS*X— Are you related? D Yes ^ t t o Relationship 
3. To the best of your knowledge, has any proposed insured smoked cigarettes within the past year? • Yes E f t f t r 
4. Are there any other names by which any proposed insured is now or was formedy known? (Include names and changes by marriage, please state re 
for the change.) - _ _ 
5. Previous address, if any. within the past five years: 
Residence: (Street) _. : Business: (Street) 
(City) (City) 
(State) (Zip) (State)
 : (Zip). 
6- If Proposed Insured is retired, what was his/her former occupation? 
7. Oate life policy to save age? • Yes O No 
8. Special comments or additional underwriting information.-
Agent's Certification 
As required by Federal Law. did you give Pre-Notice for Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act to Proposed Insured? J2^fc— D No 
.Oo you have reason to believe that replacement of existing insurance is involved? O Yes j2-t to 
If "Yes": D Replacement / comparison enclosed D Replacement / comparison not required. 
I hereby certify that I personally solicited and secured this application and know the person(s) to be insured are the person(s) described in this applicatio 
fuaher certify that I have asked the Applicant or Proposed Insured and Proposed Additkmal Insured each of the questions in the application 8nd have com 
\tA forty recorded afi answers and personally witnessed the signature )^ herein. I know of nothing affecting these risks which is not fully set foah in these pa| 
and I recommend the acceptance of the risk. 
Oatedat &S^<£f&< SZ*-^. <s/^£ this ~ *f day of i^VV-v, 1 9 ^ 7 
. Soliciting Ageri 
^ 5 ^ < ^ < f ^ ^ : ^ - - ^ <T<&^ v £ W ^ C~>r?<*y ^ P T son 
"~~~"^ Agent's Signature Agent's Name (print) Agency # Agent U % of Interest 
TELEPHONE SUPPLEMENTAL INQUIRY 
Please complete the section below so we can contact your dient at a convenient time. 
Telephone Numbers: 
Home: ( | Oay= Yes No 
Wocfe K<£Q(\ ? £ ? - ^ I > r Day:Yes * * No 
Most convenient day. time and place lor interview cad.-
g & * 
nstnictonSji^ 
....jejhandlcd'promp^ 
.ioalnd^ipiplefe'd t 
»£*«•,. .Kemember, 
. - . .^ - . lothJl 
amount for the PAO mode i s W 0 0 |for Annuities ~ 
een^coliected/ $wlft 
Mteres|,o/|fan*| 
fieplirately^ 
UNIVERSITY TEXACO 2-82 
901 E. S. TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, VT 84103 
42 
31-273/ 
rt)c_ 
142 EAST 200 SOOTH 
SALT tAfCC CfTY. UTAH «4111 
foo i^asr i : 121,0027351:31 ooqEi E„. 
0K0RjCH.ec 
"" !CE*S WSUKAHl m 
itttfGjroH 
CONSUMER DISCLOSURE FORM DIRECTOR PLUS UNIVERSAL LIFE 
READ THIS FORM CAREFULLY. IT CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLICY YOU ARE 
BUYING. THE COMPANY WILL NOT ACCEPT AN APPUCATION FOR INSURANCE WITHOUT THIS FORM. 
This policy has a front end load. This means that a charge is deducted from the premium you pay us. A greater charge is 
deducted from the premium for the first year's coverage than for other years. We credit interest only on the amount 
remaining after the charge is deducted. 
The policy provides that interest is credited to the Accumulation Value in a manner set by our Board of Directors. If you 
use this policy as security for a loan from us, we will continue to credit interest to the Accumulation Value. However, the 
interest credited to the portion represented by the loan will be less than credited to the rest of the Accumulation Value, 
since we earn more interest on the unloaned amount Interest is credited from the time the Company receives the 
premium at its Home Office. 
You will receive a computer illustration of the policy performance on both a guaranteed and nonguaranteed (projected) 
basis. The nonguaranteed calculations include amounts of "additional interest" designed to reward long term 
policyholders. We do not guarantee to credit additional interest If additional interest is credited, it will be credited only to 
policies which have been in force at least ten years. Additional interest may also be credited at the end of the 15th and 
20th policy years. The computer illustration will explain this in more detail." 
This policy also has a declining surrender charge for the first 20 policy years. This means that if you surrender the policy 
or want a policy loan during those years, the amount available to you will be less than the full Accumulation Value. 
This policy permits you to start or stop premium payments, within certain limitations. If a premium is required and is not 
paid, insurance coverage will lapse. 
If any policy on the proposed insured's life is assigned to us, we will apply its values, if any, to the Accumulation Value 
under the policy applied for. Any such premiums and the new values biased on them will be shown in a new Policy Data 
Page sent to you on the first Policy Anniversary if our policy is in force on that date. 
YOUR POLICY CONTAINS A 20-DAY INSPECTION PERIOD so that you will have a chance to review all its provisions. 
If you do not wish to keep the policy, you may return it to us or your agent within 20 days and receive a full refund of any 
premium paid. If any policy on the proposed insured's life is assigned to us, we will assign any such policy on the 
insured's life back to our assignor, send such assignment to the applicable insurer, and pay our assignor any cash we 
received from the policy. (It may not be possible to reinstate dividends, premium deposit accounts, etc.) 
I understand that neither Northern Life nor my agent can provide tax advice, and that I must consult my own tax adviser 
regarding the tax treatment of this insurance policy. I understand that the tax status of this policy should be reviewed 
yearly. 
By signing this form, I request that Northem Life prepare for me an illustration of policy benefits based on ^ 2 - > ~ ~ %~ 
annual effective interest 
ifunO 6/clx 
( f ' Date 
NORTHERN LIFE 
INSURANCE CO. 
Signature of Owner (if other than Proposed Insured) to aox us*>. accrue «* mm 
S-1940 (6/87) Wttte copy. Home Office Canary copy. Owner 
DIRECTOR PLUS DISCLOSUI 
EXHIBIT 4 
P O L I C Y D A T A P A G E 
FLEXIBLE PREMIUM ADJUSTABLE WHOLE LIFE 
*STATUS 1 AS OF DATE 02-20-1989 
POLICY INFORMATION: 
POLICY EFFECTIVE DATE 
POLICY ISSUE DATE 
INITIAL FACE AMOUNT 
CURRENT FACE AMOUNT 
MINIMUM FACE AMOUNT 
DEATH BENEFIT OPTION 
ISSUE AGE AND SEX 
PREMIUM RATE CLASS 
PREMIUM CLASS RATING FACTOR 
PREMIUMS: 
INITIAL PREMIUM 
PLANNED PERIODIC PREMIUM 
FREQUENCY 
MINIMUM MONTHLY PREMIUM . 
NO LAPSE GUARANTEE PERIOD 
INTEREST RATES: 
GUARANTEED ANNUAL INTEREST RATE .. 4.50* 
GUARANTEED MONTHLY INTEREST RATE . 0.36748* 
EXCESS INTERST EXCLUSION AMOUNT .. NONE 
POLICY LOAN INTEREST RATE 7-40* (IN ADVANCE) 
NONFORFEITURE INTEREST RATE 5-50* 
DEDUCTIONS: 
PERCENT OF PREMIUM EXPENSE CHARGE 3-00* 
MONTHLY POLICY CHARGE NONE 
MONTHLY AMOUNT CHARGE NONE 
MONTHLY ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE $4.00 
PERCENT OF PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL 20* PER POLICY YEAR IN POLICY 
YEARS 2-20 AND 100% THEREAFTER 
*'STATUS' IS USED TO SEQUENCE ANY POLICY CHANGES. FOR EXAMPLE, A STATUS 
OF 'T INDICATES THE ORIGINAL POLICY DATE, '2' IS FOR THE DATA AFTER 
THE FikST CHANGE, ECT. 
POLICY NUMBER NL0O989084 
INSURED BRAD KEVIN BUCHI 
ORIGINAL OWNER LISSA P BUCHI 
02-20-1989 
02-21-1989 
$250,000 
$250,000 
$200,000 
OPTION A (LEVEL AMOUNT OPTION) 
35 MALE 
PREFERRED 
100* 
$87.50 
$87.50 
MONTHLY 
$87.^5 
9 YEARS 
NL8256 PAGE 3 
P O L I C Y D A T A A G E 
FLEXIBLE PREMIUM ADJUSTABLE WHOLE LIFE 
•STATUS 1 AS OF DATE 02-20-1989 
MORTALITY TABLE: 1980 COMMISSIONER'S STANDARD ORDINARY MORTALITY TABLE 
FOR NON-SMOKERS, AGE LAST BIRTHDAY 
CORRIDOR PERCENTAGE TABLE: 
ATTAINED AGE PERCENTAGE OF ACCUMULATION VALUE 00-40
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
75-90 
95 
250* 
215* 
185* 
150* 
130% 
120* 
115* 
105* 
100* 
FOR AGES NOT LISTED, THE PROGRESSION OF PERCENTAGES IS LINEAR 
BETWEEN LISTED AGES. 
TABLE OF SURRENDER CHARGES: 
FOR POLICY YEARS 1-5, THE SURRENDER CHARGE IS $1,150.00 
THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS SURRENDER CHARGES FOR THE LAST MONTH OF 
EACH OF THE POLICY YEARS 6-20. SURRENDER CHARGES FOR PRECEDING 
MONTHS IN POLICY YEAR 6-20 ARE PRORATED BY MONTH BETWEEN THE 
AMOUNT SHOWN FOR THE CURRENT POLICY YEAR AND THE AMOUNT FOR THE' 
LAST MONTH OF THE PRECEDING POLICY YEAR. 
POLICY 
YEAR 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
SURRENDER 
CHARGE # 
$4,153.32 
3,856.68 
3,560.00 
3,263.32 
2,966.68 
2,670.00 
2,373.32 
2,076.68 
POLICY 
YEAR 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
SURREN 
CHARGE 
1,780.00 
1,483.32 
1,186.68 
890.00 
593.32 
296.68 
0.00 
# IN LAST MONTH OF POLICY YEAR. 
FOR THIS STATUS, THERE ARE NO SURRENDER CHARGES AFTER THE 20TH 
POLICY YEAR. 
THIS TABLE APPLIES TO THE INITIAL FACE AMOUNT. A TABLE OF 
ADDITIONAL SURRENDER CHARGES WILL BE PROVIDED FOR EACH APPROVED 
INCREASE IN THE FACE AMOUNT. 
POLICY NUMBER NL00989084 
INSURED BRAD KEVIN BUCHi 
P O L I C Y D A T A (• „ G E 
SCHEDULE OF OPTIONAL BENEFITS 
*STATUS 1 AS OF DATE 02-20-1989 
OPTIONAL BENEFITS NONE 
POLICY NUMBER NL00989084 
INSURED BRAD KEVIN BUCHI 
Table of Monthly Guaranteed Cost of Insurance 
Rates per $1,000 — Male 
Attained 
Aee 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Preferred 
Rate 
0.21948 
0.08589 
0.08255 
0.08088 
0.07754 
0.07337 
0.06920 
0.06503 
0.06253 
0.06170 
0.06253 
0.06753 
0.07671 
0.08922 
0.10341 
0.11342 
0.12344 
0.13095 
0.13596 
0.13930 
0.14013 
0.13846 
0.13596 
0.13262 
0.12928 
0.12511 
0.12260 
0.12093 
0.12010 
0.12010 
0.12093 
0.12344 
0.12678 
0.13178 
0.13763 
Standard 
Rate 
0.21948 
0.08589 
0.08255 
0.08088 
0.07754 
0.07337 
0.06920 
0.06503 
0.06253 
0.06170 
0.06253 
0.06753 
0.07671 
0.08922 
0.10341 
0.14681 
0.16351 
0.17520 
0.18439 
0.19024 
0.19358 
0.19358 
0.19024 
0.18690 
0.18189 
0.17604 
0.17270 
0.17103 
0.17103 
0.17353 
0.17771 
0.18356 
0.19108 
0.20110 
0.21280 
Attained 
Age 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Preferred 
Rate 
0.14431 
0.15182 
0.16184 
0.17270 
0.18439 
0.19859 
021363 
0.22951 
0.24707 
0.26630 
0.28804 
0.31147 
0.33657 
0.36420 
0.39435 
0.42870 
0.46809 
0.51338 
0.56541 
0.62336 
0.68807 
0.75873 
0.83367 
0.91712 
1.01078 
1.11555 
1.23232 
1.36708 
1.51991 
1.69009 
1.87687 
2.07951 
2.29728 
2.53461 
2.79859 
Standard 
Rate 
0.22701 
0.24372 
0.26463 
0.28804 
0 J1481 
034578 
0.37927 
0.41613 
0.45636 
0.50080 
0.54778 
0.59648 
0.64940 
0.70657 
0.76883 
0.83788 
0.91627 
1.00487 
1.10541 
121539 
1.33315 
1.45789 
1.58964 
1.72843 
1.87772 
2.04442 
223291 
2.44595 
2.68460 
2.94650 
3.22493 
3.51746 
3.82160 
4.14189 
4.49090 
Attained 
1 Age 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Preferred 
Rate 
3.09817 
3.44161 
3.83999 
4.29329 
4.79447 
5.33374 
5.90739 
6.51160 
7.15074 
7.84590 
8.62093 
9.49889 
10.50136 
11.62822 
12.86210 
14.17886 
15.56507 
17.00226 
18.48644 
20.04132 
21.69371 
23.48857 
25.50430 
27.96193 
31.38386 
Standard 
Rate 
4.87787 
5.31499 
5.81208 
6.36667 
6.97905 
7.63863 
8.31871 
9.00762 
9.71026 
10.45174 
11.25817 
12.15491 
13.16081 
14.26297 
15.42768 
16.61725 
17.80318 
19.03928 
20.34824 
21.67168 
23.03012 
24.46831 
26.16956 
28.40686 
31.56339 
Table of Monthly Guaranteed Cost of Insurance 
Rates per $1,000 — Female 
Attained 
Age 
0 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Preferred 
Rate 
0.15683 
0.07004 
0.06670 
0.06503 
0.06420 
0.06253 
0.06086 
0.05919 
0.05836 
0.05753 
0.05669 
0.05836 
0.06086 
0.06420 
0.06837 
0.07171 
0.07504 
0.07754 
0.08005 
0.08255 
0.08422 
0.08589 
0.08672 
0.08839 
0.09006 
0.09173 
0.09423 
0.09590 
0.09840 
0.10174 
0.10424 
0.10758 
0.11092 
0.11509 
0.12010 
Standard 
Rate 
0.15683 
0.07004 
0.06670 
0.06503 
0.06420 
0.06253 
0.06086 
0.05919 
0.05836 
0.05753 
0.05669 
0.05836 
0.06086 
0.06420 
0.06837 
0.08005 
0.08422 
0.08839 
0.09256 
0.09506 
0.09757 
0.09924 
0.10174 
0.10424 
0.10675 
0.10925 
0.11342 
0.11676 
0.12093 
0.12594 
0.13178 
0.13679 
0.14264 
0.15015 
0.15850 
Attained 
1 Age 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Preferred 
Rate 
0.12594 
0.13429 
0.14431 
0.15516 
0.16685 
0.18105 
0.19609 
0.21113 
0.22617 
024122 
025794 
027550 
0.29474 
0.31481 
0.33741 
0.36252 
0.39016 
0.42199 
0.45719 
0.49325 
0.53184 
0.57045 
0.60824 
0.64604 
0.68891 
0.73938 
0.80167 
0.87918 
0.97448 
1.08174 
1.19761 
1.21789 
i.44091 
1.56838 
1.71054 
Standard 
Rate 
0.16769 
0.18189 
0.19859 
021781 
0.23871 
0.26379 
029055 
0.31733 
0.34411 
0J7090 
0.39937 
0.42870 
0.45887 
0.49157 
0.52764 
0.56625 
0.60740 
0.65445 
0.70657 
0.75958 
0.81430 
0.86822 
0.91880 
0.96858 
1.02176 
1.08512 
1.16461 
1.26705 
1.39168 
1.53097 
1.67817 
1.82821 
1.97342 
2.12062 
2.28097 
Attained 
Age 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Preferred 
Rate 
1.87772 
108208 
2.33335 
2.63543 
2.98461 
3.37628 
3.80234 
426157 
4.76166 
5.31946 
5.95868 
6.70043 
7.56415 
8.55015 
9.65170 
10.86110 
12.17441 
13.59464 
15.12828 
16.79399 
18.61343 
20.64005 
22.96852 
25.79734 
29.58621 
Standard 
Rate | 
147090 
2.71222 
3.00887 
3.36322 
3.76908 
4.21491 
4.69167 
5.19278 
5.72587 
6.31058 
6.97084 
7.72700 
8.59578 
9.61111 
10.72696 
11.93000 
1321417 
14.57012 
16.00842 
17J3216 
1925682 
21.15691 
23.31971 
25.93788 
29.58621 
7/X7 
DEFINITIONS 
age — The Insured's age on the Effective Date or a Policy 
Anniversary is the age at last birthday. 
Beneficiary — The person named to receive the proceeds 
payable at the Insured's death. The Beneficiary may be more 
than one person. 
Code — The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
Current Face Amount — The Current Face Amount is shown 
on the Policy Data Page.. You may change the Current Face 
Amount as described in this policy. The Current Face 
Amount following a change in Face Amount will be shown on 
a new Policy Data Page. 
Death Benefit — This policy provides two Death Benefit 
Options. The option chosen is shown on the Policy Data 
Page. 
Option A (Level Amount Option) — The Face Amount 
includes the Accumulation Value. In this case, the 
Death Benefit is the greater of: 
1. The Face Amount on the date of death; or 
2. The Accumulation Value on the date of death 
multiplied by a corridor percentage, according to 
the Insured's attained age, as shown on the Policy 
Data Page. 
Option B (Additional Amount Option) — The 
Accumulation Value is in addition to the Face Amount. 
In this case the Death Benefit is the greater of: 
1. The Face Amount on the date of death, plus the 
Accumulation Value on the date of death; or 
2. The Accumulation Value on the date of death 
multiplied by a corridor percentage, according to 
the Insured's attained age, as shown on the Policy 
Data Page. 
Effective Date — The date the first premium is due. The 
Policy Data Page shows the Effective Date. We measure 
Policy Years, Policy Anniversaries, and premium due dates 
from the Effective Date. 
in force — The terms of this policy are in effect. 
Insured — The person whose life is insured under this policy. 
The Policy Data Page shows the Insured. 
Issue Date — The date this policy is prepared. We measure the 
incontestability and suicide provisions from the Issue Date. 
ionthly Anniversary Date — The day of the month that is 
he same day of the month as your Effective Date. For 
example, if your Effective Date is March 2, 1978, then the 
second day of each month is your Monthly Anniversary Date. 
Net Premium — The Net Premium is credited to the 
Accumulation Value as described in this policy's Accumula-
tion Values provision. The Net Premium is calculated as 1 
multiplied by 2 (1*2), where: 
1. is the premium paid. 
2. is 1.0 minus the Percent of Premium Expense Charge 
shown on the Policy Data Page. 
Policy Anniversary — The anniversary of the Effective Date. 
Policy Year — Any period of twelve (12) consecutive months 
starting with the Effective Date or with any Policy 
Anniversary. The first Policy Year starts on the Effective 
Date. 
proceeds — The amount we pay when the Insured dies or 
when this policy is surrendered, provided all the policy terms 
are met. 
At surrender, the proceeds equal the Cash Value minus any 
policy loans. 
At death, the proceeds payable include: 
The Death Benefit then in force. (See Option A and 
Option B definition.) 
Plus any additional amount provided by rider on the life 
of the Insured; these benefits are also subject to the 
terms of the rider. 
Minus any policy loans and loan interest due. 
Minus any unpaid Monthly Deductions. 
The amount of the proceeds may be changed by us in 
accordance with these policy provisions: 
1. Nonforfeiture Provisions 
2. Incontestability 
3. Misstatement of Age or Sex 
4. Suicide Exclusion. 
rider — An attachment to the policy which provides 
additional benefits. 
we, us, our — Northern Life Insurance Company at its Home 
Office in Seattle, Washington. 
written, in writing — A written request or notice, signed, 
dated and received at our Home Office in a form we accept. 
Contact us or your agent for forms. 
you, your — The current Owner of this policy. The Owner 
may be someone besides the Insured. 
PREMIUMS UNSCHEDULED ADDITIONAL PREMIUMS 
The initial premium, which is shown on the Policy Data Page, 
s the amount paid on or before the delivery of this policy, 
.here is no insurance until the initial premium is paid. All 
>remiums are payable in advance of the period to which they 
ipply. 
l ie amount and frequency of premium payments will affect 
ne Accumulation Value and Cash Value and how long the 
isurance will remain in force. 
/c may require proof which satisfies us that the Insured is still 
isurable on the same basis as when we first issued the policy 
any payment, planned or unscheduled, would increase the 
fference between the Death Benefit and the Accumulation 
iluc during the current Policy Year. 
/en though Planned Periodic Premiums and Unscheduled 
iditional Premiums state otherwise, we reserve the right to 
fuse to accept any premium which would disqualify your 
licy for favorable tax treatment under the Code. If 
muums paid during any Policy Year exceed the maximum 
rmitted under the Code, we will return the excess premiums 
:h interest to you within 60 days after the end of the Policy 
ar. However, you have the right to pay the premium 
uired to keep this policy in force to the end of the Policy 
IT. 
• premiums by sending them to the address shown below, 
on request, we will send you a receipt signed by one of our 
cers. Please include your policy number. The current 
ress for payment is: 
Northern Life Insurance Company 
P.O. Box 12530 
Seattle, Washington 98111. 
kNNED PERIODIC PREMIUMS 
may pay Planned Periodic Premiums once a year, every 
inths, or every 3 months. These modes are referred to as 
tad, semi-annual, or quarterly. If you choose, we can also 
ct Planned Periodic Premiums from your bank account 
:hly. 
amount and frequency of the Planned Periodic 
iums you chose are shown on the Policy Data Page. You 
:hange the frequency and amount of Planned Periodic 
iums by notifying us in writing of the change. 
mount of any Planned Periodic Premium must be at 
S25. We reserve the right to limit the amount of any 
se. 
Premium payments other than the Planned Periodic 
Premiums may be made at any time while this policy is in 
force. We can limit the number and amount of these 
additional payments. 
GRACE PERIOD 
If, on any Monthly Anniversary Date, the Cash Surrender 
Value is less than the Monthly Deduction for the policy 
month to follow, we will give you a grace period of 61 days to 
pay a premium that provides enough Cash Surrender Value to 
cover the Monthly Deduction. 
However, under some conditions the grace period will not 
begin even if the Cash Surrender Value is less than the 
Monthly Deduction for the policy month to follow. 
During the No Lapse Guarantee Period shown on the Policy 
Data Page, the 61 day grace period will not begin if on each 
Monthly Anniversary Date during the period, 1 is greater 
than 2, where: 
1. Is the sum of all premiums paid to date minus any policy 
loans and partial withdrawals: and 
2. Is the sum of the Minimum Monthly Premium for each 
policy month since the Effective Date, including the 
month following the Monthly Anniversary Date. The 
Minimum Monthly Premium is shown on the Policy 
Data Page. The Minimum Monthly Premium is 
increased when the Face Amount is increased or when a 
new rider is added or increased. The new Minimum 
Monthly Premium will be shown on a new Policy Data 
Page. 
During the grace period, we will send you notice of the 
premium required to keep this policy in force. If the required 
premium is not paid within the grace period, we lapse the 
policy. A lapsed policy is no longer in force and has no Cash 
Surrender Value. We will send you notice of the required 
premium at least 30 days before we lapse this policy. 
If the Insured dies during the grace period, we deduct any 
unpaid Monthly Deductions from the proceeds. 
REINSTATEMENT 
Reinstatement means putting a lapsed policy back in force. 
You can reinstate this policy anytime within 5 years after it has 
lapsed as long as you have not surrendered it for its Cash 
Surrender Value. 
To reinstate this policy and any riders: 
1. You must submit proof which satisfies us that all 
Insureds are still insurable; and 
ding on the frequency of premium payment and the 
d of payment you have chosen, we will send you 
ic premium notices. In any case, we ujll send these 
s to you at least once a year. 
PREMIUMS continued 
2. You must pay a premium large enough to keep the 
policy in force for at least 2 months. 
This policy will be reinstated only as of a Monthly 
Anniversary Date. If you have met conditions 1 and 2 and an 
Insured dies before the Monthly Anniversary Date on which 
the policy would be reinstated, we will pay the Death Benefit 
as of that Monthly Anniversary Date. The Accumulation 
Value on the date of reinstatement will be the amount 
provided by the premium paid to reinstate this policy. 
Subsequent Accumulation Values will be calculated as shown 
in the Accumulations Values provision. 
After reinstatement, the Surrender Charges will be those in 
effect on the date of termination, reduced in the same 
propomon as the Accumulation Value on the date of 
termination to the Surrender Charge on that date. The 
Surrender Charge will not be less that zero. 
FACE AMOUNT CHANGE 
After the first Policy Year, you may change your Face 
Amount by notifying us in writing. Changes are allowed only 
if this policy continues to qualify as Life Insurance as defined 
by the Code. Changes listed in 1,2 and 3 below go into effect 
on the Monthly Anniversary Date that follows the date we 
receive your request. If we receive your request on a Monthly 
Anniversary Date, the change goes into effect on that day. 
The Face Amount in effect at any time must be at least equal 
to the Minimum Face Amount shown on the Policy Data 
Page. 
Increases in the Face Amount must be at least 55,000. 
Increases cannot be made after the Policy Anniversary 
following the Insured's 75th birthday. 
Decreases in Face Amount are allowed only if the Cash 
Surrender Value is greater than zero. At least 6 months must 
elapse between decreases. 
Changes are subject to the following: 
I. If a decrease in Face Amount is requested, the reduction 
will be applied in the following order. 
a. To the most recent increase in Face Amount; 
b. To the next most recent increases in Face 
Amount; then 
c. To the Face Amount on the Effective Date or the 
Current Face Amount, if smaller. 
2. If the Additional Amount Option is in effect, you may 
request in writing to change to the Level Amount 
Option. In this event, the Face Amount of this policy is 
changed so that it equals the Death Benefit in force 
immediately preceding the effective date of the change; 
3. If the Level Amount Option is in effect, you may requc 
in writing to change to the Additional Amount Optio 
This change reduces the Face Amount so that it the 
equals the Death Benefit minus the Accumulation Vah 
immediately preceding the effective date of the changt 
then 
4. An increase will require written proof the Insured is sti 
insurable. An approved increase will go into effect oi 
the Monthly Anniversary Date on or next following thi 
date. of the approval If an increase is approved 
additional Surrender Charges will be applied to tha 
increase. We will send you written notice of the amount 
and duration. The Minimum Monthly Premium will be 
increased when the Face Amount is increased. 
ACCUMULATION VALUE AND 
NONFORFEITURE PROVISIONS 
ACCUMULATION VALUES 
The Accumulation Value on the Effective Date will be the 
initial Net Premium paid on that date minus the Monthly 
Deduction for the first policy month. On each subsequent 
Monthly Anniversary Date, the Accumulation Value will be 
calculated as 1 minus 2, plus 3 minus 4 ( 1 - 2 + 3 - 4 ) , where: 
1. is the Accumulation Value on the preceding Monthly 
Anniversary Date plus one month's interest. 
2. is any partial withdrawals since the preceding Monthly 
Anniversary Date plus interest from the date of 
withdrawal to the Monthly Anniversary Date. 
3. is the total of all Net Premiums received since the 
preceding Monthly Anniversary Date plus interest from 
the date received to the Monthly Anniversary Date. 
4. is the Monthly Deduction (as described in the Monthly 
Deduction provision) for the policy month following 
the Monthly Anniversary Date. 
On any day other than a Monthly Anniversary Date, the 
Accumulation Value will be calculated as 1 minus 2 plus 3 (1 
- 2 * 3), where: 
1. is the Accumulation Value on the preceding Monthly 
Anniversary Date plus interest from the Monthly 
Anniversary Date to the date of the calculation. 
2. is any partial withdrawals since the preceding Monthly 
Anniversary Date plus interest from the date of 
withdrawal to the date of the calculation. 
3. is the total of all Net Premiums received since the 
preceding Monthly Anniversary Date plus interest from 
the date received to the date of the calculation. 
NONFORFEITURE PROVISIO continued 
INTEREST RATE ON ACCUMULATION VALUE 
The Guaranteed Annual Interest Rate applied in the 
calculation of the Accumulation Value is shown on the Policy 
Data Page. This rate is an effective annual interest rate 
compounded yearly. Interest in excess of the Guaranteed 
Annual Interest Rate may be applied in the calculation of the 
Accumulation Value in a manner which our Board of 
Directors determines. However, interest in excess of the 
Guaranteed Annual Interest Rate will not apply to any pan of 
the Accumulation Value that is less than the Excess Interest 
Exclusion Amount which is shown on the Policy Data Page. 
More than one rate of interest may apply to the Accumulation 
Value at any time. 
The Guaranteed Monthly Interest Rate is shown on the 
Policy Data Page. This rate is an effective monthly interest 
rate which, compounded monthly, is equivalent to the 
Guaranteed Annual Interest Rate. 
The interest rate applied to any portion of the Accumulation 
Value which represents a loan may be less than the interest 
rate applied to the rest of the Accumulation Value, but not less 
than the Guaranteed Annual Interest Rate. 
MONTHLY DEDUCTION 
"Monthly Deduction", as used in this policy, refers to a charge 
which is made against the Accumulation Value. It does not 
refer to your premium payment. 
The Monthly Deduction for a policy month will be calculated 
as 1, plus 2, plus 3, plus 4 (1 + 2 + 3 + 4), where: 
1. is the cost of insurance (as described below) and the cost 
of any rider benefits for the policy month. 
2. is the Monthly Policy Charge shown on the Policy Data 
Page. 
3. is the Monthly Amount Charge (shown on the Policy 
Data Page) multiplied by the Face Amount divided by 
SI.000. This charge applies to the Initial Face Amount 
and to any increases in the Face Amount during the 
Term shown on the Policy Data Page. The Term applies 
to the Initial Face Amount from the Effective Date of 
the policy and to any increases in the Face Amount 
from the effective dat^ of that increase. This charge is 
not made if the increase in Face Amount is due solely to 
a change of Death Benefit from the Additional Amount 
Option to the Level Amount Option. This charge 
applies to the Face Amount of the Additional Insured 
Rider in the same way that it applies to this policy's Face 
Amount. 
4. is the Monthly Administrative Charge shown on the 
Policy Data Page. This charge applies in all Policy 
Years. 
COST OF INSURANCE 
We determine the cost of insurance on a monthly basis. The 
cost of insurance is determined separately for the Initial Face 
Amount and any increases made later. If the Level Amount 
Option is in use and there have been increases in the Face 
Amount, then the Accumulation Value will first be considered 
to be a part of the Initial Face Amount. If the Accumulation 
Value on the Monthly Anniversary Date exceeds the Initial 
Face Amount, it will be considered to be a pan of any 
increases in Face Amount in the order of these increases. The 
cost of insurance is calculated as 1, multiplied by the result of 
2 minus 3 minus 4 [1 * (2 - 3 - 4)] where: 
1. is the cost of insurance rate as described in the Cost of 
Insurance Rates provision; 
2. is the Death Benefit at the beginning of the policy 
month, divided by 1 plus the Guaranteed Monthly 
Interest Rate; 
3. is the Accumulation Value at the end of the preceding 
policy month; and 
4. is any Net Premium received on the Monthly 
Anniversary Date minus any partial withdrawals on the 
Monthly Anniversary Date. 
COST OF INSURANCE RATES 
The monthly cost of insurance rate for this policy is based on 
the insured's sex, attained age, and premium rate class as 
shown on the Policy Data Page. If your Death Benefit is a 
percentage of the Accumulation Value as described under the 
definition of aDeath Benefit" in Level Amount Option, Item 
2, or Additional Amount Option, Item 2, the premium rate 
class with the most recent effective date will apply. Attained 
age means age last birthday on the prior Policy Anniversary. 
We will determine monthly cost of insurance rates based upon 
expectations as to future cost factors. Any change in cost of 
insurance rates will apply to all in the same insurance class 
whose policies have been in force for the same period of time. 
Except for the Face Amounts in a Special Premium Class, the 
cost of insurance rates can never be greater than those shown 
in the Table of Monthly Guaranteed Cost of Insurance Rates. 
For Face Amounts in a Special Premium Class, the 
guaranteed cost of insurance rates are calculated by 
multiplying the standard rates shown in the Table of 
Guaranteed Cost of Insurance Rates by the Premium Class 
Rating Factor shown on the Policy Data Page. 
BASIS OF COMPUTATIONS 
Minimum cash values are based on the Commissioners 
Standard Ordinary Mortality (CSO) Table and the 
NONFORFITURE PROVISION .ontinued 
Nonforfeiture Interest Rate as shown on the Policy Data 
Page. Where required, a detailed statement of the method of 
computation of cash values under this policy has been filed 
with the insurance department of the state in which this policy 
was delivered. Cash values under this policy are not less than 
the minimums required by the state in which this policy was 
delivered. 
NONFORFEITURE PROVISIONS 
CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE 
(EXTENDED INSURANCE) 
In the event Planned Periodic Premiums are not continued, 
insurance coverage under this policy and any benefits 
provided by rider will be continued until the Cash Surrender 
Value is not large enough to cover the Monthly Deduction. In 
this event, the policy will continue in force until the end of the 
grace period. (See the Grace Period provision.) The Face 
Amount and Death Benefit Option during the continuation 
of insurance will be the same as when Planned Periodic 
Premiums were last being paid unless you make later changes 
in the Face Amount. 
PAID-UP OPTION 
At any time before the Policy Anniversary following the 
Insured's 95th birthday, you may use the Cash Surrender 
Value to purchase single premium paid-up life insurance. The 
amount by which this insurance exceeds its Cash Surrender 
Value cannot be greater than the amount by which this 
policy's Death Benefit exceeds this policy's Accumulation 
Value. On the Policy Anniversary following the Insured's 95th 
birthday, the Cash Surrender Value will automatically be used 
to purchase single premium paid-up life insurance. We base 
the single premium for paid-up insurance on the Insured's sex, 
age, and premium classes at the time this option is exercised 
and the single premium life insurance rates in effect at that 
time. These rates may not exceed the net single premium rates 
based on the Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality 
(CSO) Table, and the Nonforfeiture Interest Rate, both of 
which are shown on the Policy Data Page. 
CASH VALUE, CASH 
SURRENDER VALUE, AND 
PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL BENEFITS 
CASH VALUE 
The Cash Value of this policy is the Accumulation Value 
minus any Surrender Charge. The Cash Value is never less 
than zero. 
SURRENDER CHARGE 
The Surrender Charge is a charge against the Accumulation 
Value. The amount and duration of the Surrender Charg 
are shown on the Table of Surrender Charges on the Poiii 
Data Page. 
Additional Surrender Charges will apply to any approve 
increase in the Face Amount and increases to this poiic 
resulting from the Insured's Cost of Living Rider, if attache 
to this policy. We will send you written notice of the amour 
and duration. This charge is not made if the increase in Fac 
Amount is due solely to a change of Death Benefit from th 
Additional Amount Option to the Level Amount Option. 
If Surrender Charges are shown on an annual basis, the] 
grade uniformly by policy month between the consecutivt 
yean shown. 
Any decrease in Face Amount will not reduce the original 01 
any additional Surrender Charges. 
CASH SURRENDER VALUE 
You may surrender this policy for its Cash Surrender Value by 
sending us written notice. The Cash Surrender Value is equal 
to the Cash Value minus any policy loans. 
The Cash Value within 30 days of a Policy Anniversary may 
not be less than the Cash Value on such anniversary, minus 
any subsequent partial withdrawals. 
PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL 
After the first Policy Year, you may withdraw pan of your 
policy for cash by sending us written notice. The amount of 
any partial withdrawal must be at least the minimum partial 
withdrawal we then require. The maximum partial 
withdrawal equals the Cash Value times the Percent of Partial 
Withdrawal shown on the Policy Data Page but not to exceed 
the full Cash Surrender Value. Only one partial withdrawal is 
allowed in any Policy Year. The Accumulation Value is 
reduced by the amount of the partial withdrawal. 
If the Level Amount Option is in use, the Face Amount will be 
reduced by the amount of the partial withdrawal requested. 
The Face Amount after withdrawal may not be less than the 
Minimum Face Amount shown on the Policy Data Page. We 
have the right to defer payment for up to 6 months after we 
receive notice. 
The reductions in Face Amount due to any partial withdrawal 
will be applied in the following order: 
1. To the most recent increase in Face Amount; 
2. To the next most recent increases in Face Amount; then 
3. To the Initial Face Amount or the Current Face 
Amount, if smaller. 
POLICY LOANS 
CASH LOANS 
After the first Policy Year, if this policy has a loan value, you 
may use it as security to take out a loan from us. We will not 
lend you more than the loan value. We will deduct any unpaid 
policy loans before paying the proceeds. 
The loan value is the result of 1 minus 2 minus 3 [ 1 - 2 - 3] 
where: 
1. is the Cash Value; 
2. is any unpaid policy loans; and 
3. is the loan interest to the end of the then current Policy 
Year. 
If the policy loan exceeds the Cash Value, the policy will lapse. 
LOAN INTEREST 
We charge interest at the Policy Loan Interest Rate shown on 
the Policy Data Page. 
On the date of the loan, interest is due in advance until the 
next Policy Anniversary. After that, interest for each full year 
is due in advance. Unpaid interest becomes a part of the 
existing loan, and we charge interest on it. 
REPAYMENT 
You may repay all or part of any policy loan during the 
Insured's lifetime. If not repaid during the Insured's lifetime, 
we deduct the policy loan from the proceeds. 
When you make a payment on a policy loan, you must tell us 
that you are making a loan payment. 
When there is an outstanding policy loan, we reserve the right 
to consider the sum of any payments, planned or 
unscheduled, we receive as policy loan repayments and not as 
premium payments. 
BENEHCIARY AND 
PAYMENT OF PROCEEDS 
BENEFICIARY 
The beneficiary is named in the application. You may name, 
add, or change beneficiaries by written request. 
You may name a beneficiary whom you cannot later change 
without his consent. This is an irrevocable beneficiary. 
You may change beneficiaries by written request if all of these 
are true: 
1. This policy is in force. 
2. The Insured is alive. 
3. We have the written consent of any and all irrevocablt 
beneficiaries. 
A change of beneficiary should be sent to our Home Office in 
Seattle, Washington. 
The change will take effect on the date you signed the request. 
But, it will not affect any payment or action we make before 
we receive and record your request. 
PAYMENT OF PROCEEDS 
In settling this policy, we deduct all unpaid policy loans. Then 
we pay the proceeds in this way when the Insured dies, unless 
we have agreed otherwise: 
1. We first pay any collateral assignees. 
2. Then we pay the beneficiaries last named in writing. We 
pay them in equal shares, unless you have requested 
otherwise. 
3. If there are no beneficiaries, we pay you. 
4. If you have died, we pay your estate or assigns. 
If a beneficiary dies before receiving the proceeds and: 
1. at the same time as the Insured; or 
2. within 15 days after the Insured's death; 
we will pay the proceeds as if the Beneficiary died before the 
Insured. 
We pay all proceeds from this policy at our Home Office in 
Seattle, Washington. We may require that you send us this 
policy. 
The proceeds held or paid under this policy are exempt from 
creditors to the extent allowed by law. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ENTIRE CONTRACT 
The entire contract is: 
1. this policy; and 
2. all applications, riders and amendments attached at the 
time of issue: and 
3. all later applications, riders and amendments we may 
attach or send you to attach. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS contused 
Unless fraudulent, all statements made by or on behalf of 
anyone covered by this policy are representations and not 
warranties. Only statements found in an attached application 
may be used to cancel this policy or as our defense if we refuse 
to pay a claim. 
Only our President or Secretary can change this policy on our 
behalf. No agent or other person can change this policy. Any 
change must be in writing. 
OWNERSHIP OF POLICY 
The original owner is shown on the Policy Data Page. During 
the Insured's lifetime, you have the rights and duties outlined 
in this policy. But, we need the consent of any and all 
irrevocable beneficiaries and existing collateral assignees to 
grant many of them. 
You may change the ownership of this policy. This transfers 
all your rights and duties as Owner to a new Owner. The new 
Owner may then make any change the policy allows. The 
Owner's rights end at the Insured's death. 
You may also name a contingent Owner who will own this 
policy if you die before the Insured. If there is no contingent 
Owner and you die before the Insured, your estate or assigns 
will be the Owner. 
Change of ownership must be sent to our Home Office in 
Seattle, Washington. The change must be in writing. It will 
take effect on the date you signed the request. But, it will not 
affect any payment or action we make before we receive and 
record your request. 
ASSIGNMENT 
You may assign this policy as collateral. This limits your rights 
to obtain the Cash Value. It also limits the Beneficiary's right 
to the proceeds. An assignment does not change the Owner. 
When we pay the proceeds, we need only rely on what the 
assignee states is the debt due as collateral. 
To assign this policy as collateral, we need these: 
1. a dated, written notice; and 
2. the written consent of any and all irrevocable 
beneficiaries. 
We are not responsible if an assignment is not valid. 
An assignment applies only if we receive it. It will take effect 
on the date signed. But, it does not affect any payment or 
action we make before we receive and record your request. 
INCONTESTABILITY 
the Issue Date shown on the Policy Data Page. After thi 
policy has been in force during the Insured's lifetime for \ 
years from the Issue Date, we cannot claim your policy is voic 
or refuse to pay any proceeds with respect to the Initial Faa 
Amount unless the policy has lapsed. 
If you make a Face Amount increase or premium paymem 
that requires proof of insurability, the corresponding Death 
Benefit increase has its own 2 year contestable period running 
from the effective date of the increase in Death Benefit. 
If the policy has lapsed and has been reinstated, the 
reinstatement has its own two (2) year contestable period 
running from the date of the latest reinstatement application. 
This applies to statements made in the reinstatement 
application. 
This incontestability provision does not apply to any 
disability benefits under the policy. 
MISSTATEMENT OF AGE OR SEX 
If the Insured's age or sex is misstated, the Death Benefit will 
be the amount that the most recent cost of insurance would 
purchase using the current cost of insurance rates for the 
correct age and sex. 
SUICIDE EXCLUSION 
If the Insured commits suicide, while sane or insane, within 2 
years of the Issue Date, we only refund all premiums already 
paid on this policy and any attached riders, minus any policy 
loans, and minus partial withdrawals. 
Also, if the Insured commits suicide, while sane or insane, 
within 2 years of the effective date of an increase in Face 
Amount or premium payment that requires proof of 
insurability, for the proceeds associated with that increase, we 
only refund the cost of insurance for that increase. 
TERMINATION 
This policy ends when any of the following occur 
1. The end of the grace period if the required premium is 
not paid. 
2. The Insured dies. 
3. You ask, in writing to surrender this policy for its full 
Cash Surrender Value. 
4. The policy anniversary following the Insured's 95th 
birthday. 
5. If policy loans exceed the Cash Value. 
This policy has a 2 year contestable period running from If we make a Monthly Deduction from the Accumulation 
GENERAL PROVISIONS continued 
Value after terminating this policy, the deduction is not 
considered a reinstatement of the policy or a waiver of the 
terminations. That deduction will be credited to the 
Accumulation Value as of the date of the deduction. 
ANNUAL REPORT 
Each year we will send you free of charge an annual report 
showing your cash value and accumulation value as of the 
date of the report, the premiums paid, interest credited, and 
the loans and charges since the last report. We will send you 
additional reports for a fee upon request. 
PROJECTION REPORT 
If you ask, we will provide a report which shows projected 
future results. The report will be based on the following 
assumptions: 
1. The Death Benefit Option you specify; 
2. Planned Periodic Premiums you specify; 
3. Accumulation Value at the end of the prior Policy Year, 
and 
4. Any other necessary assumptions specified by you or us. 
We will charge a fee for each report. 
DEFERMENT 
We may defer granting a loan or paying any cash surrender or 
partial withdrawals for the period law permits, but not 
beyond 6 months. We cannot defer granting a loan solely to 
pay premiums on one of your policies with us. If we defer 
paying the cash surrender or partial withdrawal for 30 days or 
more, we pay interest at 3lA% a year from the surrender or 
withdrawal date to the payment date. 
AMENDMENT 
We reserve the right to amend this policy in order to include 
any future changes relating to this policy's remaining qualified 
for treatment as a Life Insurance policy under the following: 
1. The Code. 
2. Internal Revenue Service rulings and regulations. 
3. Any requirements imposed by the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
Ve will send you a copy of any amendments promptly. 
HSCLAIMER 
/e are not liable for any tax or tax penalty you owe resulting 
from failure to comply with the requirements of the Code, 
Regulations and Rulings imposed on this policy. 
NONPART1CIPATING 
This policy does not share in our profits or surplus. No 
dividends are paid under this policy. 
SETTLEMENT 
OPTIONS 
CHOICE OF OPTION 
Settlement options are ways of paying all or part of the 
proceeds of this policy other than in one sum. 
You may choose or change an option by writing to us at any 
time before the Insured dies or before the policy matures or is 
surrendered. If no option has been chosen before the Insured 
dies, the Beneficiary may choose one. But, the Beneficiary 
cannot choose an option if we have already paid him the 
proceeds. 
An option cannot be chosen if any of these are true: 
1. The proceeds are payable to an assignee. 
2. The proceeds are not payable to a natural person who 
takes them in his own right. 
3. The total amount is less than $1,000. 
4. Each payment under the option would be less than S20. 
PAYEE 
A payee is a person to whom we pay part or all of the 
proceeds. 
The Beneficiary is the payee for any proceeds payable at the 
death of the Insured. 
You or the Insured may be the payee if: 
1. Option 1, 3, or 4 is chosen; and 
2. the option is chosen to apply at maturity or surrender of 
this policy. 
The Insured will be the payee if: 
1. Option 2 or 5 is chosen; and 
2. the option is chosen to apply at maturity or surrender of 
this policy; 
The payee receiving payments may name or change a 
SETTLEMENT OPTIONS contu^d 
contingent payee. A contingent payee is the person who will 
be paid any final amount otherwise due the payee's estate. 
If: 
1. the payee dies; and 
2. there is no contingent payee; 
we will make payment to the payee's estate or assigns. 
Payment will be in a lump sum. 
The amount paid will be as follows: 
1. Options 1 or 2 - the present value of the unpaid 
guaranteed installments, based on two and one-half 
percent (2!4%) yearly interest; 
2. Options 3 or 4 - the unpaid balance. 
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRACT 
When an option becomes effective, this policy must be 
surrendered to us. We will give the payee a Supplementary 
Contract that describes the option. The Supplementary 
Contract will be effective: 
1. on the date the Insured dies; or 
2. on the date the proceeds of the policy otherwise become 
due. 
The effective date of the Supplementary Contract is the date 
the first payment is due to the payee under Option 1,2, or 4. 
For Option 3, the due date of the first payment depends on 
how often interest will be paid. The due date for payment 
under Option 3 will be one, three, six or twelve months after 
the effective date of the Supplementary Contract. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
If you choose an option for the Beneficiary, the Beneficiary 
cannot do any of these unless you consent in writing during 
the Insured's lifetime and we approve: 
1. assign or transfer any interest in payments due under the 
option; 
2. change the option or the terms of the option. 
If money is left with us under an option, it will be part of our 
general funds. We have no duty to keep the money separate or 
invest it separately. 
INTEREST 
We guarantee yearly interest of two and one-half percent 
(214%) under all options. This amount has been included in 
the installments shown in the tables. We may decide to 
pay more than two and one-half percent (2V$%) yearly intere 
on Options 1 through 4. If we do, we will apply the exces 
interest to the money on deposit with us under the option. W 
may guarantee more than two and one-half percent (2149& 
yearly interest under Option 5. Contact us for details. 
OPTION 1. INSTALLMENTS FOR A FIXED 
PERIOD 
We will pay the proceeds in equal installments for a ccrtaii 
number of years. The length of time can be from one (1) tc 
thirty '(30) years. Installments may be paid monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annually or yearly. The Option 1 Table shows 
the amount of each installment. 
OPTION 2. INSTALLMENTS FOR LIFE WITH A 
GUARANTEED PERIOD 
We will pay the proceeds in equal installments for either ten 
(10) or twenty (20) years, plus as long after that as the payee 
lives. The amount of each installment depends on: 
1. the period of time chosen; and 
2. the payee's sex; and 
3. the payee's age on his birthday following the due date of 
the first payment. 
The Option 2 Table shows the amount of each installment. 
We require satisfactory proof of the payee's age before we pay 
under Option 2. 
OPTION 3. INTEREST INCOME 
The proceeds are left with us during the payee's lifetime. They 
bear yearly interest of at least two and one-half percent 
(2*/£%). Interest will be paid at the end of each interest period. 
The interest period may be monthly, quarterly, semi-
annually, or yearly. The least amount of interest for every 
SI,000 of proceeds left with us and not withdrawn is: 
1. vearly S25.00 
2. semi-annually S 12.42 
3. quarterly S 6.19 
4. monthly S 2.06 
The payee can withdraw any pan of the proceeds at any time. 
But, the amount of any withdrawal cannot be less than SI00. 
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OPTION 4. INSTALLMENTS OF A FIXED 
AMOUNT 
We will pay the proceeds, plus interest, in equal installments 
until they are used up. Yearly interest on the unpaid portion 
will be at least two and one-half percent (2i4%). The 
installments may be monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or 
yearly. The total amount payable each year cannot be less 
than five percent (5%) of the initial amount of proceeds left 
with us. 
OPTION 5. OTHER ANNUITY FORMS 
We will pay the proceeds under any other annuity form which 
we may offer when the proceeds become due. The amount of 
each annuity installment from the policy proceeds will be 
104% of the installment the policy proceeds would otherwise 
buy based on our rates and rules in effect on that date. 
Contact us for details. 
OPTION 1 TABLE 
YEARLY AND MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS FOR EACH S1,000 OF PROCEEDS 
No. of 
Yean 
Payable 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
AMOUNT OF 
INSTALLMENTS 
Yearly 
SI,000.00 
506.17 
341.60 
259.33 
210.00 
177.12 
153.65 
136.07 
122.40 
111.47 
Monthly 
S84.28 
42.66 
28.79 
21.86 
17.70 
14.93 
12.95 
11.47 
10.32 
9.39 
No. of 
Years 
Payable 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
AMOUNT OF 
INSTALLMENTS 
Yearly 
$102.54 
95.11 
88.83 
83.45 
78.80 
74.73 
71.15 
67.97 
65.13 
62.58 
Monthly 
S8.64 
8.02 
7.49 
7.03 
6.64 
6.30 
6.00 
5.73 
5.49 
5.27 
No. of 
Years 
Payable 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
AMOUNT OF 
INSTALLMENTS 
Yearly 
S60.28 
58.19 
56.29 
54.55 
52.95 
51.48 
50.12 
48.87 
47.70 
46.61 
Monthly 
S5.08 
4.90 
4.74 
4.60 
4.46 
4.34 
4.22 
4.12 
4.02 
3.93 
The amount of semi-annual and quarterly installments per S1,000 of proceeds may be figured by multiplying the 
amount of the yearly installments shown above by .5031 and .2523, respectively. 
NL-XMA ?/X7 n it 
SETTLEMENT OPTIONS continued 
OPTION 2 TABLE 
MONTHLY INCOME FOR EACH $1,000 OF PROCEEDS 
AGE OF PAYEE 
Male 
7 and 
under 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Female 
12 and 
under 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
GUARANTEED 
PERIOD 
IN YEARS 
10 
2.64 
2.66 
2.67 
2.69 
171 
2.73 
174 
176 
178 
181 
183 
2.85 
188 
190 
193 
195 
2.98 
3.01 
3.04 
3.08 
3.11 
3.14 
3.18 
3.22 
20 
163 
2.65 
166 
2.68 
2.70 
2.71 
2.73 
2.75 
177 
2.79 
2.81 
184 
2.86 
188 
191 
2.93 
196 
199 
3.02 
3.05 
3.08 
3.11 
3.15 
3.18 
AGE OF PAYEE 
Male 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Female 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
GUARANTEED 
PERIOD 
IN YEARS 
10 
3.26 
3.30 
3.34 
3.39 
3.43 
3.48 
3.53 
3.59 
3.64 
3.70 
3.76 
3.82 
3.88 
3.95 
4.02 
4.09 
4.17 
4.25 
4J3 
4.42 
4.50 
4.60 
4.69 
4.79 
4.90 
20 
3.22 
3.25 
3.29 
3.33 
3.37 
3.41 
3.45 
3.50 
3.54 
3.59 
3.64 
3.69 
3.74 
3.79 
3.84 
3.90 
3.95 
4.01 
4.07 
4.12 
4.18 
4.24 
4.30 
4.36 
4.41 
AGE OF PAYEE 
Male 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Female 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
GUARANTEED 
PERIOD 
IN YEARS 
10 
5.01 
5.12 
5.23 
5.35 
5.48 
5.61 
5.74 
5.87 
6.01 
6.16 
6.30 
6.45 
6.60 
6.76 
6.91 
7.07 
723 
7.38 
7.54 
7.69 
7.84 
7.98 
8.13 
8.26 
8.39 
20 
4.47 
4.53 
4.59 
4.64 
4.70 
4.75 
4.80 
4.85 
4.90 
4.94 
4.98 
5.02 
5.05 
5.09 
5.12 
5.14 
5.17 
5.19 
5.20 
5.22 
5.23 
5.24 
525 
526 
526 
In lieu of such monthly installments, annual, semi-annual or quarterly installments may be selected. They shall be 
respectively twelve, six and three times the monthly installments shown. The first installment is then payable five and one-
half months, two and cue-half months and one month, respectively, later than the date on which the first monthly 
installment would have been paid. 
Northern Life Insurance Company 
Seattle, Washington 98111 
"We" are the Northern Life Insurance Company. -You" are the owner of this policy according to our records. 
This Endorsement is a part of the policy to which it is attached by us. 
In the section entitled Accumulation Value and Nonforfeiture Provisions, under the Cost of Insurance provision, item 
number I in the first paragraph is changed to read as follows: 
1. is the cost of insurance rates as described in the Cost of Insurance Rates provision increased by the 
Extra Cost of Insurance Rate shown on the Policy Data Page; 
AH other terms and conditions of the policy remain unchanged. 
The effective date of this Endorsement is the Effective Date of the policy. 
Secretary / 
COST OF INSURANCE PROVISIONS ENDORSEMENT 
CONSUMER DISCLOSURE FORM 
UNIVERSAL LIFE 
READ THIS FORM CAREFULLY. IT CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLICY YOU ARE 
BUYING. THE COMPANY WILL NOT ACCEPT AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE WITHOUT THIS FORM. 
The policy you are about to buy provides that interest is credited to the Accumulation Value in a manner set by our 
Board of Directors. If you use this policy as security for a loan from us, we will continue to credit interest to the 
Accumulation Value. However, the interest credited to the Donion represented by the loan will be less thsn credited 
to the rest of the Accumulation Value s:nce we ezr: mere interest on the unioaned amount. Interest is credited from 
the time the Company receives the premium at its Home Office. 
Depending upon your policy, it will have either a 15 year or 20 year declining surrender charge. (Your ledger 
illustration will show which charge applies or you may ask your agent.) This means that if you surrender the policy 
or want a policy loan during these years, the amount available to you wiil be tess than the full Accumulation Value. 
This policy permits you to start or stop premium payments, within certain limitations. If a premium is required and is 
not paid, insurance coverage will lapse. 
If any policy on the proposed Insureds life is assigned to us. we will apply its values, if any, to the Accumulation Value 
under the policy applied tor. Any such premiums and the new values based on them wiil be shown in a new Policy 
Data Page sent to you on the first Policy Anniversary if your policy is in force on that date. 
YOUR POUCY CONTAINS A 20-DAY INSPECTION PERIOD so that you will have a chance to review all its 
provisions. If you do not wish to keep the policy, you may return it to us or your agent within 20 days and receive a 
full refund of any premium paid. If any policy on the proposed Insured's life is assigned to us, we will assign any such 
policy on the Insured's life back to our assignor, send such assignment to the applicable insurer, and pay our 
assignor any cash we received from the policy. (It may not be possible to reinstate dividends, premium deposit 
accounts, etc.) 
I understand that neither Northern Life nor my agent can provide tax advice, and that I must consult my own tax 
aoviser regarding the tax treatment of this insurance policy. I understand that the tax status of this policy should be 
reviewed yearly. 
By signing this form. I request that Northern Life prepare for me an illustration of policy benefits based on 
^ d % annual effective interest. 
f//fM Hurl/A 
Signature cf Proposed insured 
IPni NORTHERN LIFE y O V ^ ^
 }L)/ry>f< 
• I I I I N S U R A N C E CO. Signature of Owner (ff other than Proposed insured) 
3 > n L * P.O Box 1253C. S M B M WA W H . + /fy/t 9 
Date T 
s.i89o<4/87) ?l£ASE BE ADVISED, ON t-l-&7 
"«4 
EXHIBIT 5 
^I^^NORTHERNXIFE 
•^ ZL^ OC- &x>:^^2snjd&fa WA 98i t1 
1 . Proposed losurejj (Full Name) 
APPLICATION PA( 
G A Code 
IS I §££4 
2. Social Security Ne. ^ r ^ r _ Z - _ ^ - Q - *) ?T 4* 7 
3 . Marital Status D Single JSfrManied g Widowed g Separated D Divorced 
4. Sex pHtole D Female 5. Birthplace (State) l^-r^^ — 
6. Oate of Birth (Mo.-0-Yf.) 7-/^/^Y 7-
Age *rirz— 
8. Height Ft & In. _ J 2 Weight U K / 9 < ? — 
9 . Residence (Street) 5 ? / Q /£/*//<? /Ae^e 
(City) y^^*^9^ 
(State) Cy-H^i (Zip) ^ V / O ? 
d. D Waiver of Premium or Waiver of Monthly Deduction 
c. Q Accidental Oeath Benefit Amount $ 
f. D Famfly Rider Units • Children Rider. Units. 
g. O Additional Insured Rider 
Beneficiaries, (if rider on other than primary insured) 
. Amount $ 
Address 
Occupation (if rider on other than primary insured) 
fa. • Other 
10a. Occupation £^fJu,s^ C?t^/r-v^ &*— 
fa. Oescribe Duties ,Al P "«<£??*- 4-
c How Long in Occupation? /<7 ef*&-J~-
16. Class of Risk Applied For (Standard unless otherwise shown here' 
11a. Annual Income from Occupation $ 
(re: parent if this is juvenile app.) 
or Net Income After Expenses (for self-employed persons) $ ^ j y f l r l f l — 
fa. Income From Other Sources 
Ust Other Sources 
12. Employer P/v^A'S ^ 7 ^ c ^ 2 ^ ^ / ^ - ^ 
Address */0f f S * ^ A / / ^ / ^ ( / ^ | 
13a. Benefidary Show name. 
17a. Premium Payment Mode: Annual • 
ABC 0J- SalSavD Other 
Semi D Quarterly D 
nenaarybno ri ti , Sftiat Security No. and refaiwnship to Proposed Insured 
">t^<?Z-~ 
r ~ ^ ^ - p ^ - ^vO y 
equally, or to the survivors) unless otherwise stated. 
(If address is different than Proposed Insured show in Agent's report) 
Contingent Beneficiary: Show name and relationship to Proposed Insured 
fa. Universal Plans Only Stipulated Modal Premium? $ . 
c Billing Address (Street) ?Q/ ^ <*n 
(City) X ^ r <T. (State) 
d. Do you plan to suspend premium payments when qualified7 
DYes E§-Ne D N / A If yes, at start of which year? 
18. Life Insurance or Annuities in Force (If None So State) 
ii r< 67 
equally, or to the survtvorfs) unless otherwise stated. 
Benefidaryfies) have the tight to change settlement mode unless you request 
otherwise here. 
14. Name and Address of Proposed Insured's Personal Physician 
Name /^Q^^ Z 
Address : 
Oate and Reason last consulted? 
15a. Plan of Insurance (State Plan Tide Exactly] fa. Amount 
Company 
(Check if being replaced.) 
Insured jtsQts/fZn 
/f~/>^
 m /^t-o/*? c*d<*^-r 
Spouse 
Year 
<V 
<& 
Life Amt 
S&O.CKKA 
Z&ei£tAj 
ADBAr 
19. Replacement (Check each policy above to be replaced and attach require 
replacement forms.] 
a. Are any of the currently in force life insurance or annuity policies to be repla 
by the insurance applied for? • Yes O l i o 
fa. Have any fife insurance or annuity policies on the fifepf the Proposed Insu 
lapsed within the last 12 months? O Yes J Z N O 
20 . For Juvenile Insurance (ages 0 thru 14] (complete Ownership section also, 
a. Amount of insurance in force on life of father? 
mother?. . (If none on either, give particulars.) 
Automatic Premium loan, if available? l^Yes D No 
c Benefit Option (Universal Plans Only) fJftftevel D B Increasing 
fa. Number of siblings? 
c. Amount of insurance in force on each brother or sister? 
2 1 . Family Members (If family rider, chflden rider or purchaser benefit applied for] 
Proposed for Insurance Relationship to 
Proposed Insured (State) 
Oate of Birth 
Mo.-Day-Yr. 
Age Height Weight 
a. Spouse's former names 
fa. Are there any children under age 18 on whom coverage is not being requested7 
«• Am thara a«u nhtlrlran crmu/n nhnuo uihn An nnt into u/ith fho annfironrf 
• Yes D No 
n Yoc n MA 
. Details to "Yes" Answers 
PAGE 2 
22. Foreign Travel Aviation and Military 
a. Oo you intend to travel outside the US. or Canada within the new two years except for vacation trips? 
b. Oo you intend to fly other than as a passenger or have you flown other than as a passenger 
during the past two years? If 'YesVcomplete Aviation Questionnaire 
c. Are you a member, or do you intend to become a member, of the armed forces, including reserves? 
23 . Avocation and Sports Oo you participate in recreational activities involving: 
a. Aeronautics (including tang-gliding, ultralight soaring, sky diving, ballooning)? 
b. Competitive racing of powered vehicles (including motorcycles, automobiles and boats]? 
c Recreational vehicles over open terrain, trails, sand, snow or ice (including snowmobiles, dia 
bikes and dune buggies}? 
d. Any of the following — skin or scuba diving, mountain climbing, rodeos, competitive sknng? 
24. Other Insurance 
a. Have you had a request for life or health insurance declined, postponed, rated or restricted 
in any way? 
b. Is any application for Ife insurance pending with any other company? Give name of company. 
25 . Driving Record Orivers License No State C/f^£A* 
Within the past 3 years have you been convicted of or pleaded guilty to: 
a. Three or more moving violations and/or accidents? 
b. Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs? 
26. Have You Even 
a. Had a family member with diabetes, heart or circulatory disease or cancer? 
fa. Had a weight change over 10 lbs. in the past year? If "Yes", pounds gained or lost and reason? 
c. Received treatments or joined an organization for alcoholism or drug addiction? 
d. On a regular basis used amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, codeine, hallucinogens, heroin. 
LSO. marijuana, sedatives, tranquilizers or habit forming drugs except as prescribed by a physician? 
e. Been convicted of a felony in the past 10 years? 
Proposed Proposed Remarks & deta 
Insured Additional Insured to "yes" anVwei 
1 Yes 
D 
D 
o 
No 
ef 
& 
EK 
Yes 
D 
a 
a 
No 
D 
D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
& 
• 
D 
D 
tf-
^ 
Bf-
* , 
0k 
e>— 
B~ 
GC 
a 
e -
Ef^  
B~ 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
a 
D 
O 
D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
• @h D a 
27 . Oescribe any athletic program(s) you engage in 30. Special Instructions 
. How often?. 
28 . What is your alcohol consumption? 
(Orink = one 12 oz. beer, one S oz. glass of wine or 1 oz. of hard spirits) 
Proposed Insured {drinks per week) 
DNone D M R6-14 D15-30 D More 
Proposed Additional Insured (drinks per week] 
D None . D 1-5 O 6-14 D 15-30 • More 
29 . Smoking Statement 
I do not now smoke cigarettes. I have not smoked any cigarettes for at 
^ least the past twelve months. I do not use tobacco in any other form except: 
SIGNATURE Of PROPOSED AOOfflONAtINSURED 
lStgn only if this statement applies.! 
I do not now smoke cigarettes. I have not smoked any cigarettes for at 
least the past twelve months. I do not use tobacco in any other form except. 
3 1 . Ownership Section 
a. Owner's Name "flraJ &s**f 
fa. Social Security or Tax No. -
c. Relationship to Proposed Insured, 
d. What amount of insurance in question 18 of this application or pc 
with other companies is payable to Owner as Beneficiary? 
Company Amount 
/lf<r^ <?. 
SIGNATURE Of PR0P0SE0 INSURED 
[Sign only if this statement apphes.1 
e. What is the amount of insurance in force and pending on Owner's life' 
f. State puragse of insurance and nature of Owner's insurable interest 
If Juvenile application and parent ts^ not owner and beneficiary, please 
explain 
PAGE 3 
3 2 . Has a i g Proposed Insured ever had or been advised that he/she had: 
a . Any disorder of the circulatory system heart disorder, heart murmur, high 
blood pressure or persistent frequent or severe chest pain? 
fa. Cancer or tumor of any type or location? 
c Any nervous, mental or brain disorder, secure or convulsion or fainting spells 
or persistent frequent or severe dizziness? 
d. Any disorder of the lungs, bronchial tubes, or respiratory system? 
e. Any disorder of the nose, throat mouth, eyes or ears? 
f. Diabetes or any disorder of the thyroid or any other gland, or swollen or 
enlarged lymph nodes? 
g. Any disorder of the stomach, gal! bladder, liver, intestines, rectum or other 
abdominal disorder? 
h. Any disorder of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, or urinary system? 
L Any disorder of the breasts, uterus or ovaries? ~ ^ * i k . 
j . Syphilis, topes, recurrent gonorrhea or other sexually transmitted diseases? 
k. Any disorder of the bones or joints.* or any form of rheumatism, arthritis or gout? 
I Any physical impairment deformity, paralysis or amputation? 
m. An immune deficiency disorder. AIOS. or AIOS Related Complex (ARC), or 
test results indicating exposure to the AIOS virus? 
During the past ftve years has any Proposed insured: 
n. Consulted, been examined or been treated by any physician or practitioner 
not listed above? 
o. Had an X-ray. electrocardiogram or any laboratory tesi or study? 
Show results, if known. 
p. Had observation or treatment at a clinic, hospital, or institution? 
q. Had or been advised to have a surgical operation? 
Additional medical information: 
Please rirde appropriate item and give details including Doctor's name 
and address, date, duration, and present condition. Specify Person 
Yes 
D 
a 
D 
D 
a 
D 
No 
a 
a 
a 
D 
a 
a 
a o 
o 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
a 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D • 
D D 
D 
D 
D 
• 
33. To the best of your knowledge and belief, is each person proposed for insurance free from mental and physical disorder? J O Yos D No 
If T W V give details — . : . 
DECLARATION 
I /We declare to my/our best knowledge and belief, the answers shown in this application are complete and true. I/We agree: 
1:A1I of the following are the basis for and shall be part of any insurance contract- (a) this application; (fa) any amendmentfs) to this _ application; (c) ar 
: staterneoK made in any Medici . ^ ... 
3L Exeepfas diown in this application's Conditional Receipt no insurance wit be effective until all of the following occur: (a) aO persons to be insured a< 
. '.j*five and in the same health as shown herein when the following (b) and (c) happen* (fa) a policy is delivered and any required amendment(s) to the applicatio 
is signed- (c) full payment of the first premium has been made to the Company. 
3 . Any policy or rider issued on this application wflf belong only to the Owner. 
4 . Accepting a policy will ratify any change made by the Company in the space entitled: "for Home Office Endorsements*4. But no change can be made a 
to amount premium, classification, insurance plan or benefits, or issue age without my/our written consent 
Check paid with application $ 
K I THAN THE PROPOSED INSURED PROPOSED INSURED (or parent, if Proposed Insured is a mmr*! 
OFFICER SIGNING FOR CORPORATION OR FIRM (GIVE TITLE! 
PROPOSEO ADDITIONAL INSURED 
MAKE CHECKS PAYA8LE ONLY TO NORTHERN LIFE 
ISEO INSUREO (Jf/AMILY RIOERINCLUOEOJ 
WITNESS — LICENSED AGENT 
SIGN AUTHORIZATION ON NEXT PAGE. 
AGENTS REPORT 
1 . Concerning all persons proposed Jor insurance: 
a. Were you unable to see any of them? D Yes f&iko If. "Yes" please state circumstances. 
fa. Are you aware of anything unfavorable about the health, character, habits, occupation or famfly history of any of them? D Yes p 4 l o . I L "Yes" eq 
below. 
2 . How long have you known Proposed Insured? r Are you related? Q Yes 0 N o Relationship—. 
3. To the best of your knowledge, has any proposed insured smoked cigarettes within the past year? j Z I Yes D No 
4 . Are there any other names by which any proposed insured is now or was formerly known? (Include names and changes by marriage.- please state rea 
for the change.) 
5. Previous address, if any. within the past five years.-
Residence: {Street! Business: (Street) 
(City) (City) 
(State) (Zip) (State) (Zip), 
6 . If Proposed Insured is retired, what was his/her former occupation? 
7. Oate life policy to save age? • Yes EB^ffo 
8. Special comments or additional underwriting information: 
^gent's Certification 
As required by Federal Law. did you give Pre-Notice for Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act to Proposed insured?
 / fZHfe r~ D No 
Go you have reason to believe that replacement of existing insurance is involved? D Yes $&4te 
If ~Yes": O Replacement / comparison enclosed D Replacement / comparison not required. 
1 hereby certify that I personafly solicited and secured this application and know the person(s) to be insured are the person(s) described in this appKcation 
further certify that I have asked the Applicant or Proposed insured and Proposed Additional insured each of the questions in the application and have cotrei 
and (My recorded all answers and personally witnessed the signatures) herein. I know of nothing affecting these risks which is not fully set foah in these pap 
and I recommend the acceptance of the risk. 
Dated *&/£/£#£* ^?^ , <^f^A this rf day of C/<^A/ ,19 i T ^ 
! - Soliciting Ageni 
Agent's Signature Agent's Name (print) Agency # Agent # % of Interest 
TELEPHONE SUPPLEMENTAL INQUIRY 
Please complete the section below so we can contact your client at a convenient time. 
Telephone Numbers: 
Home: ( ) Day: Yes No 
Work: ( <fc(\ *2J} fr^ *) (T & Day: Yes <2±^ No 
Most convenient day. time and place for interview call.- Q\j QA*fe-—/^/TP**S*ZJL 
(emeiiiher| 
OLYMPUS COVE CHEVRON *-84 
4013 WASATCH BLVD. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
_,9fi 
\order 01 
> ?v CnY CENTER OFBCE ( ( 
GURRDIRNSTRTCBRNK 
142 EAST 200 SOOTH 
SALT IAK£ GUY. UTAH §4111 
*ooaio&«« i:iaiiOOE7asi:ai ozo».fi «••" 
$ $ * & 
ms 
ixSufflt «*s 
^ ^ S ^ ^ g ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ 2 S ^ l ^ i s 
CONSUMER DISCLOSURE FORM 
UNIVERSAL LIFE 
READ THIS FORM CAREFULLY. IT CONTAINS IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE POLICY YOU ARE 
BUYING. THE COMPANY WILL NOT ACCEPT AN APPUCATION FOR INSURANCE WITHOUT THIS FORM. 
The policy you are about to buy provides that interest is aedited to the Accumulation Value in a manner set by our 
Board of Directors. If you use this policy as security for a loan from us, we will continue to credit interest to the 
Accumulation Value. However, the interest credited to the portion represented by the loan will be less than credited 
to the rest of the Accumulation Value since we earn more interest on the unloaned amount. Interest is aedited from 
the time the Company receives the premium at its Home Office. 
Depending upon your policy, it will have either a 15 year or 20 year declining surrender charge. (Your ledger 
illustration will show which charge applies or you may ask your agent) This means that *t you surrender the policy 
or want a policy loan during those years, the amount available to you will be less than the full Accumulation Value. 
This policy permits you to start or stop premium payments, within certain limitations. If a premium is required and is 
not paid, insurance coverage will lapse. 
If any policy on the proposed Insured's life is assigned to us, we will apply its values, if any, to the Accumulation Value 
under the policy applied for. Any such premiums and the new values based on them will be shown in a new Policy 
Data Page sent to you on the first Policy Anniversary if your policy is in force on that date. 
YOUR POLICY CONTAINS A 20-DAY INSPECTION PERIOD so that you will have a chance to review all its 
provisions. If you do not wish to keep the policy, you may return it to us or your agent within 20 days and receive a 
full refund of any premium paid If any policy on the proposed Insured's life is assigned to us, we will assign any such 
policy on the Insured's life back to our assignor, send such assignment to the applicable insurer, and pay our 
assignor any cash we received from the policy. (It may not be possible to reinstate dividends, premium deposit 
accounts, etc.) 
I understand that neither Northern Life nor my agent can provide tax advice, and that I must consult my own tax 
adviser rcjgarding the tax treatment of this insurance policy. I understand that the tax status of this policy should be 
reviewed yearly. 
By signing this form, I request that Northern Life prepare for me an illustration of policy benefits based on 
& & <w> annual effective interest 
/ } Signature of Proposed Insured 
fT* NORTHERN LIFE - \jM(^ ) '?Y'' //* " 
• I I I I N S U R A N C E CO- Sign&ture of Owner (if otffef ilian Proposed Insured) 
FX> Box 12530, Seattle, WA 98111 //^A- * 
Date 
S-1890 (4 /87) White copy. Home Office Canary copy: Owner 
UNIVERSAL DISCLOS 
EXHIBIT 6 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this C^> day of jyiH'Y 
1979, by and between BRAD KEVIN BUCHI and GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
both of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
1. Name and Business. The parties hereby form a 
partnership under the name of UNIVERSITY TEXACO COMPANY, to 
conduct a service station business. The principal office 
and location of the business shall be at 901 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Term. The Partnership shall begin on the 
\£J- day of UVi/A # 1979, and shall continue 
until terminated as herein provided. 
3. Capital. The initial- capital of - the Partner-
« 
ship shall consist of certain items of personal property 
comprised of all inventory, -cash and equipment presently 
on the premises of 901 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Each partner shall be credited with having contri-
buted 50% of the initial capital of the Partnership. The 
capital accounts of the partners shall be maintained in the 
proportions in which they share in the Partnership profits 
and losses. 
4. Existing Loans. The partners hereby acknow-
ledge that Buchi Is obligated to repay $41,000 to Tracy 
Collins Bank and Trust. Said amount was borrowed to pur-
'chase those assets which are now the assets owned by the 
Partnership. Parduhn shall be jointly liable for the re-
payment of said $41,000 amount. 
5. Profits and Loss. The net profits or net 
losses of the Partnership shall be distributed or charged 
to the partners in equal proportions and shall be credited 
0G01S2 
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or c, ned, as the case may be, to the -axing*.account of 
each partner, . 
6. Salaries and Drawinc. No partner shall receive 
any salary for services rendered to the Partnership. The 
partners shall have equal drawings in such amounts as may 
be agreed upon by them. If at the end of any. Partnership 
year there is a debit balance in the drawing account of any 
partner, such partner shall, within a reasonable time, clear 
such debit balance by a payment to the Partnership. 
7. Interest. No interest shall be paid on the 
initial contributions to the capital of the Partnership or 
on any subsequent contributions of capital. Any partner may, 
however, at the time of the formation of the Partnership or 
at any later time, loan to the Partnership such additional 
funds as the partners may agree upon. 
8. Management, Duties and Restrictions. The 
partners shall have equal rights in the management of the 
Partnership business, and each partner shall devote his 
entire time to the conduct of the business. Neither partner 
shall, without the consent of the other partner, endorse 
any note, or act AS an accommodation party, or otherwise 
become surety for any person. Without the consent of the 
other partner neither partner shall on behalf of the Part-
nership borrow or lend money, or make, deliver or accept 
any commercial paper, or execute any mortgage, security 
agreement, bond, or lease, or purchase or contract to 
purchase, or sell, any property for or of the Partnership 
other "than the type of property bought and sold in the regular 
course of business. Neither partner shall, except with the 
« 
consent of the other partner, assign, mortgage, grant a 
security interest in, or sell his share of in the Partnership 
or its capital assets or property, or enter into any agree-
ment as a result of which any person shall become interested 
-2- 000153 
wi*.; him in the Partnership, or do * act detrimental zo the 
best interests of the Partnership or which would make it 
impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the Part-
nership. 
9. Banking. All funds of the Partnership shall 
be deposited in its name in such checking account or accounts 
as shall be designated by the partners. All withdrawals 
therefrom are to be made upon checks signed by either oartner. 
10. Books. The Partnership books shall be main-
tained at the principal office of the Partnership and each 
partner shall at all times have access thereto. The books 
shall be kept on a fiscal year basis. 
11. Voluntary Termination. The Partnership may 
be dissolved at any time by agreement of the partners, in 
which event the partners shall proceed with reasonable prompt-
« 
ness to liquidate the business of the Partnership. 
12
• withdrawal. Either partner shall have the 
right to withdraw from the Partnership at any time upon two 
months written notice to the other partner of the withdrawing 
partner's intent to withdraw. The remaining partner shall 
have the right to either purchase the withdrawing partner's 
interest in the Partnership or to terminate and liquidate 
the Partnership. If the remaining partner elects to pur- • 
chase the withdrawing partner's interest, he shall pay for 
said interest upon such terms and conditions as the parties 
mutually agree. If the remaining partner does not elect to . 
purchase the interest of the withdrawing partner, the partners 
shall proceed with reasonable promptness to liquidate the 
partnership-
13. Death. Upon the death of either partner, the 
surviving partner shall have the right either to purchase the 
interest of the decedent in the Partnership or to terminate 
and liquidate Partnership business. If the surviving 
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partner elects to purchase the decedent*s interest0 he 
s n a i l serve n o t i c e i n w r i t i n g of such e l e c t i o n , w i t h i n 30 
days a f ter the death of the decedent , upon the executor 
01 the decedent. I f the surv iv ing partner e l e c t s t o purchase 
the i n t e r e s t of the decedent i n the P a r t n e r s h i p , the 
purchase pr ice s h a l l be equal t o one -ha l f (1 /2 ) the va lue 
of the Partnership a t the time of the e l e c t i o n . The s u r -
v i v i n g partner and the e s t a t e o f the decedent s h a l l mutual ly 
agree upon the method of v a l u a t i o n t o be used i n v a l u i n g the 
Partnership. I f the s u r v i v i n g partner does n o t e l e c t t o 
ourchase the i n t e r e s t o f t h e decedent i n the p a r t n e r s h i p , 
he s h a l l proceed with reasonable promptness t o l i q u i d a t e the 
business of the Partnersh ip . The s u r v i v i n g partner and the 
e s t a t e of the deceased partner s h a l l share e q u a l l y i n the 
p r o f i t s and l o s s e s o f the b u s i n e s s during t h e period of 
l i q u i d a t i o n . 
IN IJITHESS WHEHEOJr the p a r t i e s "have executed t h i s 
agreement the date and year f i r s t above w r i t t e n . 
UEON PARDUHN 
I t ia understood by a l l people concerned, that in the event ' 
of death of either of the partners. Brad &• fiochi or Glade L. Pardohn, that 
the partnership wil l end, and a l l obligations to the deceaaedta auriltura * 
* financially will be released by paying off of the deceased persona aurrirora. 
Both partners are insured for $20,000.00 and a l l of which wi l l go to the 
* 
deceased persona wife or eurrirors* Khan.the ami Ivors receire their 
$20,000.00, they release the other partner of any obligation in the business* 
The eurviring partner wi l l mm the bosineas and awy do with the baaineas *e 
he aet^a f i t . In the erent the bosineas ia in Financial trouble when either 
partner dies, the deceaaedfa attrrirors anat sake a reasonable effort to reaedy 
the aitoation. In the event both partners are ki l led together* the am iltuns 
of both hare an equal interest in the baaineas and what ever ia done with the 
*»*»• «*t b. *». •*. .put •*-!*. ^Y^cSU &j ! J L 0001S* 
EXHIBIT 7 
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EXHIBIT 8 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
MICHAEL D. MISNER, ESQ. (#A8742) 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)277-3445 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant and Cross-claimant Glade Parduhn 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, 
Defendant. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, et al., 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
STIPULATION AS TO 
BIFURCATION OF ISSUES TO v-
BE TRIED 
Civil No. 970907879MI 
Judge: Anne M. Stirba 
* * * * * * * 
At a final pre-trial conference on December 1,2000, counsel for all the parties 
stipulated to a biftircation of issues to be tried, with a second trial possibly to be held 
depending on the outcome of the first. The Court, by and through the Honorable 
TCSBKSP 
Anne M. Stirba, verbally accepted the parties' suggestion and stipulation of bifurcation. 
Stipulation of bifurcation being accepted, the parties agreed that the first stage of trial 
should be completed in two days. 
The parties agree and stipulate that the two principal issues to be tried in this phase 
1 of the trial are: 
1. Who is entitled to the proceeds of Northern Life Insurance Policy NL 
00989085, and in what sums? 
2. What obligations and entitlements, if any, arise under a partnership buy-
sell agreement entered into between partners Brad Buchi and Glade 
Parduhn? 
The parties agree and stipulate that factual and legal issues related to the above two 
principal issues include: 
1. Whether a partnership buy-sell agreement first entered into in 1979 and 
amended in 1984, was again amended in 1989? (And, if again amended in 
1989, what were the terms of the amendment?) 
2. Whether the partnership (University Texaco) was dissolved on the sale by 
the partnership of its two service stations on July 14,1997, or later, on the 
death of general partner Brad Buchi? 
3. Was the buy-sell agreement triggered by the death of general partner Brad 
Buchi; or was it previously rendered a nullity by the sale'ofthe partnership's 
two service stations? ^ / / 
4. . If the buy-sell agreement was not T nullity *mri nnr triggered by Brad 
BuchFs death in early August 1997, then: (1) what sum does Glade 
Parduhn owe for the acquisition of Brad BuchFs interest in the partnership 
(discounting any claim by Parduhn for setoff); and (2) who is entitled to that 
sum? 
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5. Who is entitled to the proceeds (in whole or part) of Northern Life Policy 
NL 00989085? 
6. What portion of the insurance proceeds, if any, must be used by Glade 
Parduhn to satisfy Parduhn's obligation, if any, under the buy-sell 
agreement? 
7. To what portion of the insurance proceeds, if any, is Glade Parduhn entitled? 
Depending on the Court's adjudication of the above issues, it may or may not be 
necessary to proceed with phase two of a trial. Issues expressly reserved by the parties for 
a second trial include: 
1. Division and distribution of remaining partnership assets between Glade 
Parduhn and the probate estate of Brad Buchi, per state law, if the buy-sell 
agreement is deemed a nullity not triggered by Brad Buchi's death. 
2. Glad Parduhn's claim to a setoff against (1) any sum he was obligated to pay 
pursuant to the buy-sell agreement for the acquisition of Brad Buchi's 
interest in the partnership; or (2) that sum which would otherwise be payable 
to Brad Buchi's estate under state law. 
3. Glade Parduhn's claim against Natalie Bennett for interference with 
contract. 
DATED this Z<? day of Apfctt, 2001. 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
By: ^ ^ X - V 
P. Bryan (Fishbnrn, Esq. 
-3-
Attorneys for Glade Parduhn 
DATED this^xSday of April, 2001. f 
DUNN & DUNN / 
DATED this i ^^cS; 
>usan Black Dunn, Esq. 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Attorneys for JoAnn Buchi personally 
And as personal representative of the 
Estate of Brad Buchi 
y of April, 2001. 
HOWE & TANNER 
Martin 
Xttonu 
/Buchi. 
attorneys for Natalie Buchi Bennett, Allison 
r
 Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Jessica Buchi, and 
Lance Buchi 
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EXHIBIT 9 
PARDUHN V. BUCHI 
STIPULATION 
depending on the Court's adjudication of 
the above issues, it may or may not be 
necessary to proceed with phase two of a 
trial. Issues expressly reserved by the 
parties for a second trial include: 
1. Division of remaining partnership assets 
between Glade Parduhn and the probate 
estate of Brad Buchi, per state law, if the 
buy-sell agreement is deemed a nullity not 
triggered by Brad Buchi's death. 
2« Glade Parduhn's claim to a set-off 
against: 
(1) any sum he was obligated to pay 
pursuant to the buy-sell agreement for the 
acquisition of Brad Buchi's interest in the 
partnership; 
(2) that sum which would otherwise be 
payable to Brad Buchi's estate under state 
law. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION(S) 
• Based upon the foregoing, it is clear the 
Utah Probate Code specifically allowed the 
Partnership Agreement to transfer, upon 
Buchi's death, his interest in the 
partnership to Parduhn and the insurance 
proceeds to the Buchi children and his 
widow. Accordingly, the Court concludes 
that any sum Parduhn should have to pay to 
acquire Buchi's prior partnership interest 
should be paid directly to Buchi's 
"survivors," pursuant to the terms of the 
Partnership Agreement. 
(Judge Stiiba; May 22,2000) 
• The Court is convinced that while the 
service stations were sold and that was the 
reason for the partnership, the partnership 
had not been terminated though it had been 
dissolved on July 14,1997. The court 
concludes that the rights of the partners are 
not ftdly determined at the time of 
dissolution. The partnership was still 
extant after July 14,1997, the date of the 
sale of the service stations to Blackett Oil. 
The buy-sell agreement, if it existed, was 
still in effect after the sale of the service 
stations. There was still an accounting to 
be performed, there were still assets and 
debts to be fully divided, and there was still 
the matter at issue in this case to be 
resolved-what were the partners going to 
do about the life insurance policies they 
I had? No discussion had occuiTed about 
those items before Buchi's death. 
Thus, the partnership was not wound up 
and was still in effect at the time of Buchi's 
death. Because it was still in effect at 
Buchi's death, the buy-sell agreement, it if 
existed, was still in effect. 
(Judge Lubeck; August 27, 2001, page 4) 
• The court is convinced that is clear 
evidence that the parties both intended the 
increased amounts of insurance to be used 
for the same purposes as the lower 
amounts-namely, for the benefit of the 
survivors of the deceased partner. Even 
though being a partner may itself be an 
insurable interest, the reason behind the 
insurance was not for personal protection 
of the partners, but for the survivors and so 
the surviving partner could proceed with 
the business without depleting partnership 
resources. In this case the fact that the 
partnership was in financial troubles at the 
death of Buchi and thus Plaintiff does not 
receive much from the partnership does not 
change the legal conclusion. 
(Judge Lubeck; August 27,2001, page 6) 
• The court finds and concludes that 
Plaintiff whether explicitly or impliedly, 
agreed to the buy-sell amendment That 
was the reason for the insurance in the first 
place and no evidence was presented 
satisfactorily showing Buchi and Plaintiff 
intended something else when they 
purchased the larger policies in 1989. 
Plaintiff is not being deprived of anything 
he is entitled to. The insurance contract 
and the accompanying buy-sell agreement 
provided that the money would go to the 
surviving partner for the benefit of the 
survivors of the deceased partner. Plaintiff 
has full claim to all of the partnership 
business. 
(Judge Lube; August 27,2001, page 8) 
3. Glade Parduhn's claim against Natalie 
Bennett for interference with contract. 
• For Jhe above reasons, Plaintiffs 
complaint is not well founded. The 
proceeds of the interpleaded amounts plus 
the accumulated interest are directed to be 
released to defendants and cross claimants 
JoAnne Buchi, Natalie Buchi Bennett, 
Annabelle Buchi, Allison Buchi, Lance 
Buchi, and Jessica Buchi. Plaintiff is 
entitled to the partnership interests. 
(Judge Lubeck; August 27,2001, page 8) 
• Since the Court ruled the insurance 
proceeds belong to JoAnne Buchi and the 
Buchi children, Parduhn cannot assert a 
claim against Natalie Bennett for 
interference with contract. 
EXHIBIT 10 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys At Law 
Phone: (801) 277-3445 Fox. (801) 277-0333 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 ^ - . - . . ^ 
April 23, 2001 ':''"" 
VIA FAX AND U.S. MAIL V APR 25 2001 
Susan Black Dunn, Esq. J 
DUNN & DUNN L _ 
230 South 500 East, Suite #460 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FAX: 521-9998 
Martin S. Tanner, Esq. 
HOWE&TANNER 
111 East Broadway, Suite #340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FAX: 575-7150 
RE: Parduhn v. Bennett et al. 
F&A#: 93889.01 
Dear Susan and Martin: 
At the final pre-trial conference on December 1,2000, we agreed to a bifurcation of 
issues to be tried. The objective was to avoid the expensive time consuming accounting issues 
that would be relevant and required if, but only if, the Court rules that the buy-sell agreement is a 
nullity and that Glade is entitled to all the hfe insurance proceeds. In that case, the remaining 
assets of the partnership would be divided in accordance with their capital accounts, per state 
law, in which case we may have to delve deeply into accounting issues. We all agreed that 
evidence on the accounting issues would add at least a day to trial. 
I believe that the enclosed draft Stipulation accurately states what we before stated to the 
Court. However, I solicit your feedback with regard to any modification that the two of you 
believe needs to be made. 
Sincerely, 
HBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Fishburn 
PBF:JJS 
Enclosure (proposed Stipulation) 
cc: Glade Parduhn (letter and Enclosure) 
APR 25 2001 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN, ESQ. (#A4572) 
MICHAEL D. MISNER, ESQ. (#A8742) 
4505 South Wasatch Boulevard, Suite #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801) 277-3445 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant and Cross-claimant Glade Parduhn 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, 
Defendant. 
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, et. al., 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Counterclaim Defendant 
STIPULATION AS TO 
BIFURCATION OF ISSUES TO 
BE TRIED 
Civil No. 970907879MI 
Judge: Anne M. Stirba 
* * * * * * * 
At a final pre-trial conference on December 1, 2000, counsel for all the parties 
stipulated to a bifurcation of issues to be tried, with a second trial possibly to be held 
depending on the outcome of the first. The Court, by and through the Honorable 
DRAFT 
DATE J-~M-*l_ 
1
 ' v * - *  * 
n. ,±3*l£L — 
Anne M. Stirba, verbally accepted the parties' suggestion and stipulation of 
bifurcation. Stipulation of bifurcation being accepted, the parties agreed that the first 
stage of trial should be completed in two days. 
The parties agree and stipulate that the two principal issues to be tried in this 
phase 1 of the trial are: 
1. Who is entitled to the proceeds of Northern Life Insurance Policy NL 
00989085, and in what sums? 
2. What obligations and entitlements, if any, arise under a partnership 
buy-sell agreement entered into between partners Brad Buchi and 
Glade Parduhn? 
The parties agree and stipulate that factual and legal issues related to the above 
two principal issues include: 
1. Whether a partnership buy-sell agreement first entered into in 1979 and 
amended in 1984, was again amended in 1989? (And, if again amended 
in 1989, what were the terms of the amendment?) 
2. Whether the partnership (University Texaco) was dissolved on the sale 
by the partnership of its two service stations on July 14, 1997, or later, 
on the death of general partner Brad Buchi? 
3. Was the buy-sell agreement triggered by the death of general partner 
Brad Buchi; or was it previously rendered a nullity by the sale of the 
partnership's two service stations? 
4. If the buy-sell agreement was not a nullity and was triggered by Brad 
Buchi's death in early August 1997, then: (1) what sum does Glade 
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P.-RAFT 
Parduhn owe for the acquisition of Brad Buchi's interest in the 
partnership (discounting any claim by Parduhn for setoff); and (2) who is 
entitled to that sum? 
5. Who is entitled to the proceeds (in whole or part) of Northern Life Policy 
NL 00989085? 
6. What portion of the insurance proceeds, if any, must be used by Glade 
Parduhn to satisfy Parduhn's obligation, if any, under the buy-sell 
agreement? 
7. To what portion of the insurance proceeds, if any, is Glade Parduhn 
entitled? 
Depending on the Court's adjudication of the above issues, it may or may not be 
necessary to proceed with phase two of a trial. Issues expressly reserved by the parties 
for a second trial include: 
1. Division and distribution of remaining partnership assets between Glade 
Parduhn and the probate estate of Brad Buchi, per state law, if the buy-
sell agreement is deemed a nullity not triggered by Brad Buchi's death. 
2. Glad Parduhn's claim to a setoff against (1) any sum he was obligated to 
pay pursuant to the buy-sell agreement for the acquisition of Brad 
Buchi's interest in the partnership; or (2) that sum which would 
otherwise be payable to Brad Buchi's estate under state law. 
3. Glade Parduhn's claim against Natalie Bennett for interference with 
contract. 
-3-
DRAFT 
DATED this day of April, 2001. 
FISHBURN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
By: 
P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq. 
Attorneys for Glade Parduhn 
DATED this day of April, 2001. 
DUNN & DUNN 
By: 
Susan Black Dunn, Esq. 
Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq. 
Attorneys for JoAnn Buchi personally 
And as personal representative of the 
Estate of Brad Buchi 
DATED this day of April, 2001. 
HOWE & TANNER 
By: 
Martin S. Tanner, Esq. 
Attorneys for Natalie Buchi Bennett, Allison 
Buchi, Annabelle Buchi, Jessica Buchi, and 
Lance Buchi 
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EXHIBIT 11 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, et al., 
Defendants. 
* * * L /^^ 
Case No. 970907879 
HEARING, 8-20-01 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of August, 
2001, this cause came on for hearing before the HONORABLE BRUCE 
LUBECK, District Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake County 
Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN 
For the BUCHI CHILDREN: 
For JOANNE BUCHI: 
Court Transcriber: BILLIE WAY, CCT 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN 
Attorney at Law 
MARTIN S. TANNER 
Attorney at Law 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorneys at Law 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
II 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
III THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COORT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUVTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE LEON PARDUHM, 
Plaintiff, 
NATALIE BUCHI BBMVETT, et al., 
Dafandanta. 
Cat* No. 970907879 
HEARING, 8-20-01 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of August, 
2001, this cause came on for hearing before the HONORABLE BRUCE 
LUBECK, District Court, without a jury, In the Salt Lake County 
Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
GLADE LEON FARDUHN 
For the BUCHI CHILDREN: 
For JOANNE BUCHI: 
P. BRXAN FISHBURN 
Attorney at Law 
MARTIN S. TANNER 
Attorney at Lav 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorneys at Law 
Court Transcriber: BILLIE MAY, CCT 
page i | Page 3 
1 MR. DUNN: Yes. I may have gotten it Saturday. But I was 
2 in die office Saturday. I think it can be dealt with fairly 
3 summarily, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: well, I'm not sure that it can or can't But 
5 what is this that I've just been given? 
6 MS. HANSON: That's our opposition motion (Inaudible). 
7 MR. DUNN: opposition memorandum. 
8 MS. HANSON: Memorandum. 
9 THE COURT: oh, okay, which I, of course, haven't seen 
10 because he just gave it to me. But that's understandable 
11 because I didn't see the other one until Friday at 4:00. 
12 Okay. Well, at least I know where we arc on that. At 
13 feast you are aware of it, so we'll set that aside far just a 
14 moment and deal with the motion that was actually calendared 
15 today. And that was your motion, Mr. Dunn, to exclude an 
16 alleged conviction of Joanne Buchi. 
17 MR DUNN: YCS. 
18 THE COURT: All right Mr. Dunn, why don't you go ahead 
19 with that 
20 MR. DUNN: i think we can probably deal with this one 
21 fairly quickly, as welL 
22 Mr. Fishburn is contending that it makes some difference 
23 that there was a prior conviction that was, in fact, expunged. 
24 To get to the very heart of his memorandum, he cites Rule 
25 609C: 
1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 THE COURT: Good morning. We are here in the matter of 
3 Parduhn v. Bennett, Case No. 970907879, scheduled today for 
4 oral arguments. 
5 Counsel, state their appearances, please. 
6 MR. FISHBURN: Bryan Fishburn for the Plaintiff, Glade 
7 Parduhn. 
8 MR. TANNER: Martin Tanner appearing for Natalie Buchi and 
9 her siblings. 
10 MR. DUNN: Tim Dunn on behalf of Joanne Buchi. Also with 
11 me is a Certified Legal Assistant, Kay Hanson (phonetic). 
12 THE COURT: All right Well, we have a motion that was 
13 scheduled for today, and also I received - scheduled today for 
14 oral argument And also I received a motion from Mr. Fishburn 
15 Friday at about 4:00 o'clock. 
16 So, before we deal with that on any kind of merits, 
17 Mr. Dunn, or, Mr. Tanner, have you seen - 1 guess, Mr. Dunn, 
18 specifically, have you seen that motion that Mr. Fishburn filed 
19 Friday? 
20 MR. DUNN: is that the one with reference to fee 
21 admissibility of prior convictions? 
22 THE COURT: No. That deals with the defense based on the 
23 Statute 31A-2M04. 
24 MR. DUNN: oh, yes,, we are ready for that, sure. 
25 THE COURT: YOU got that Friday? 
Page 21 Page 4 
1 "Evidence of conviction is not 
2 admissible under this rule if the 
3 conviction has been the subject of a 
4 pardon, annulment, certificate of 
5 rehabilitation or other equivalent 
6 procedure." 
7 Expungement is fee other equivalent procedure in Utah. 
8 THE COURT- well, it says, "Other equivalent procedure 
9 based on a finding of rehabilitation." Rule 609C says feat. 
10 MR. DUNN: weQ, Judge Lyon's order expunging, which is a 
11 part of fee pleadings dated January 2nd, 2001, Subparagraph 2: 
12 "Met all fee conditions for 
13 expungement, and fee Court is satisfied 
14 feat there are no reasonable objections 
15 to fee Petitioner's petition." 
16 There were no subsequent convictions. It incorporates the 
17 statute. As I understand it, that's what fee statute calls 
18 for. And Judge Lyon arrived at his conclusion and issued his 
19 order. 
20 THE COURT igucss with respect to feat portion of at 
21 least Rule 609 fee question is, is fee Utah Expungement Statute 
22 something feat serves - something feat is only given when fee 
23 judge is satisfied you are rehabilitated.. Is feat what the 
24 Expungement Statute means? 
25 MR. DUNN: That's my understanding of what it requires. 
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1 THE COURT: or does it just require not getting arrested 
I 2 in seven years? 
I 3 MR DUNN: i think it also requires a - n o additional 
4 criminal activity. 
5 THE COURT: Right Is that the equivalent of being 
6 rehabilitated? 
7 MR DUNN: No, I mink that the statute contemplates mat 
8 the petition and the order satisfy the rehabilitation portion. 
9 THE COURT: okay. Thank you. 
10 Mr. Fishburn. 
111 MR FISHBURN: Your Honor, first, it is the intention of , 
112 the Plaintiff to offer the felony conviction record of Joanne 
113 Buchi only for the purpose of impeaching her credibility. 
114 Although motion to exclude the evidence refers to other 
115 unspecified bad acts, I don't know what those are and we hadn't 
116 intended to use those. 
117 I think mere is a certain irony in the motion thatwas 
118 brought before this Court, and that is if you were to read the 
19 motion without knowing what the convictions were for, you would 
120 have the impression that there was a singular charge and 
21 conviction and that was for Theft And the motion tries to 
22 convince the Court that that doesn't necessarily involve 
23 dishonesty and therefore should be excluded. 
124 And there is a certain dishonesty there. The convictions 
125 were for two offenses: Theft By Deception, which inherently 
Page 
I 1 involves an element of dishonesty, and also Unlawful Dealing in 
I 2 Property by a Fiduciary. 
I 3 The chronology with which this evolved was that Plaintiff 
I 4 discovered the convictions, brought those to the attention of 
I 5 the Plaintiff and - o r Defendant and Defendant's Counsel in 
I 6 the course of a mediation in October of 2000. And then, 
I 7 without disclosing or informing mis Court or the Plaintiff in 
I 8 mis matter, mere was a procedure instituted in Weber County 
9 to procure an expungement No notice, of course, ever to the 
110 Plaintiff. And the requirements, apparently, were satisfied 
111 and an expungement order was entered in January of 2001. And 
112 then four days before the trial was scheduled to go in April, 
113 mere was mis motion filed. 
114 The issue here in this case is, really: Once a civil 
15 proceeding is in process then can a party who has a criminal 
116 record that could, under Rule 609, be used for impeachment, 
117 engineer a disappearance of mat record, a criminal record, by 
18 then going out and applying for the expungement? I submit not 
19 First of all, number one, on the merits. There is n o -
20 the expungement statute, which I had reason to look at on mis 
121 and another case recently, is extremely easy to get an 
22 expungement One might say even scandalously or too easily. 
23 You don't have to prove any of the requirements that are talked 
24 about in Rule 609. There's certainly not a finding of 
25 innocence. There is not a finding of rehabilitation. Really, 
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1 all mat statute requires is depending on the offence for which 
2 you were convicted you do have to clear a period of time, and 
3 you do have to prove that you haven't been convicted of any 
4 other crimes. And at mat point the only thing that really it 
5 turns on is Werner or not me victim objects. 
6 Now, I don't know who the victims of Ms. Buchi's crimes 
I * 
1 were. Apparently, they did not object, or I assume the court 
8 in Weber County wouldn't have granted this. 
I 9 So, it is not the expungement under the current statute, 
10 which is different than the statute which was interpreted in 
11 the State v. Jones Case. It is not the equivalent of a finding 
12 of innocence or finding of rehabilitation or a finding of a 
13 judicial pardon; and mat was the difference between that case 
14 and mis situation. 
15 Secondly, there is a public policy reason why you 
16 shouldn't help parties to engineer the disappearance of their 
17 criminal record, and that is, of course, you just encourage the 
18 activity of doing it 
19 Third-
20 THE COURT: Let me ask you -
21 MR. FISHBURN: Y6S. 
22 THE OOURT: isn't it at least arguably a statutory policy 
23 to encourage people to get their expungement I mean, it is 
24 mere for anyone to take advantage of. 
25 MR. FISHBURN: it is there -
Page 
1 THE COURT: what does it matter when they do it? 
2 MR. FISHBURN: well, it - it seems to me it matters in 
3 this sense: I think there is a certain equity, especially in 
4 this case. Let me just confine it to this case, first of alL 
5 This case actually was scheduled for trial on December 11 tfa of 
6 2000. If that was the situation, it would have been used, it 
7 could have been used, for the purposes of conviction. 
8 I think expungements should be encouraged. I don't mink 
9 I can dispute mat But it does seem to me mat it is improper 
10 to engage in the activity that was engaged in mis case in 
11 which once you learn of it, then you try to engineer its 
12 disappearance. 
13 It seems to me that if you are in a civil case and Rule 
14 609 would permit the use of a conviction for impeachment, then 
15 the threshold day ought to be the date the civil proceeding was 
16 filed. 
17 There's an analogy. It is not a perfect analogy. But 
18 there is an analogy to the federal case law in which the issue 
19 comes up where it's a crime for a felon to possess a firearm. 
20 That's actually a separate offense, as I understand it And 
21 the question is: What is - if a prior conviction has been 
22 expunged for carrying a firearm, and the decision making that 
23 the federal courts have adopted is: If that prior conviction 
24 for carrying - for carrying - having a firearm illegally has 
25 been expunged before the existing proceeding has been filed, 
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1 then it is not considered. 
2 But if the expungement occurs after these charges have 
3 been filed, then it is considered. And it seems to me that 
4 that would be the pattern to be adopted in a civil case here, 
5 and that is it should be used. 
6 The other thing is that the expungement, as I said, is not 
7 the equivalent of the criterion established in Rule 609C; and, 
8 thus, it shouldn't - shouldn't be suppressed for that reason. 
9 I will concede and I think I've pointed out in the brief 
10 that this particular issue has not come before the Supreme 
11 Court since adoption of Ac new criminal statute and die new 
12 expungement provisions, so I believe it is a matter of first 
13 impression. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn. 
15 MR. DUNN: I assume Mr. Tanner doesn't have a position on 
16 this? 
17 MR TANNER: Actually, I would like to say something 
18 briefly. Whenever the Court (Inaudible) -
19 THE COURT: Go ahead. Well, actually, let me just have 
20 you both sit down. I forgot to ask Mr. Fishburn something. 
21 MR. FISHBURN: iam sorry. 
22 THE COURT: one of the - one of the issues, obviously, 
23 with any motion in limine is to keep out something (Inaudible), 
24 obviously, the context it's going to be used for. You 
25 indicated, of course, under Rule 609, which is the only proper 
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1 precisely the issue that I wanted to very briefly address, and 
2 that is: What difference does any of this make to our 
3 particular case that's coming up for trial tomorrow? 
4 Joanne Buchi, as I understand it, has no criminal history 
5 at all with this sole exception, which is distantly in the 
6 past And if one were to take the time to go and pull out that 
7 file in Ogden, go through the whole tiling, you would find that 
8 what happened is that she was acting under die direction of her 
9 boss at work who was the main taigct of die investigation and 
10 who got in serious trouble. They leaned on her very hard, and 
11 she testified against him and wound up pleading guilty. That 
12 was a single incident in her life where she was acting at the 
13 direction of her employer. It has nothing whatsoever to do 
14 with what's going on here. 
15 The sole purpose for which that incident in her life would 
16 be used in this case would be to try to undermine her 
17 credibility which we have no reason to believe is in question 
18 in this case. 
19 This specific case should stand or fall on the merits and 
20 on the facts involved. It should not involve some kind of 
21 outside miidslinging by using - if I can use Mr. Fishburn's own 
22 term - scandalous nature of the charges, deception, theft by 
23 deception, those kinds of things, when Ms. Buchi was acting 
24 under die direction of her own boss. And that was many, many, 
25 many years ago. 
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1 purpose for introduction of a criminal conviction is 
2 impeachment 
3 Impeaching - without trying the case, can you tell me 
4 briefly impeaching what? 
5 MR. FISHBURN. Her credibility. 
6 THE OOURT: Just overall (Inaudible) -
7 MR. FISHBURN: Her (credibility. If she testifies, then I 
8 believe we are entitled to bring this evidence before the Court 
9 for die purposes of impeaching her credibility. 
10 Our position is what she has to say is not believed. She 
11 doesn't take die stand, it doesn't come in. She does take the 
12 stand and testify, it should. 
13 THE COURT: so, not widi respect to any particular aspect 
14 of her testimony that you can point me to, just in general if 
15 she testifies on cross-examination -
16 MR. FISHBURN: it is hard f or me to know exactiy what she 
17 is going to testify to. But, as I understand it, a good deal 
18 of her testimony is what the deceased told her about his 
19 intention as to where this insurance money was to go. There is 
20 also some hearsay and parol evidence problems widi that But 
21 there's also a credibility problem. 
22 THE OOURT: okay. All right 
23 Mr. Tanner. 
24 MR. TANNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
125 I'll be very brief here. And, Your Honor, you've hit 
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1 Before that, no criminal activity. Since then, no 
2 criminal activity. And who was the decision left to, to 
3 expunge her record? The Judge involved, Judge Lyon. It was 
4 his discretion under the statute. And, apparently, he thought 
5 that there was no problem with it He did what he thought was 
6 appropriate. 
7 The Court's correct, timing is not something that's 
8 addressed in die statute. There is no reason why that incident 
9 should be brought up in diis court for any purposes, especially 
10 when we hear from Mr. Fishburn that it's only for vague, 
11 general purposes, only to sort of make her look bad And 
12 that's not something that I think would serve my clients or 
13 anyone in this particular case. Thank you. 
14 MR DUNN May I, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR DUNN: I agree that die clear purpose is to attempt to 
17 make Joanne look bad. That's the reason he brings up again the 
18 fact fliatflwe was a divorce filed and pending, even tiiough 
19 Judge Stirba has already ruled on that He keeps throwing that 
20 back in his memorandums, as welL 
21 What is the purpose of expungement if not for this? What 
22 is die purpose of expungement offered by the statute if it 
23 isn't - doesn't allow Joanne - and Joanne did this herself. 
24 It wasn't legal counsel tiiat got this expungement for her. She 
25 did it herself. 
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1 What's te purpose if not to go to the court and say, 
2 T v e been rehabilitated. There's no problem. There's been 
3 no other criminal acts in my history. I would like to have the 
4 court expunge it" And that's precisely what she did 
5 The rule also contemplates that this be the very thing 
6 that takes place, that if you can introduce a crime for the 
7 purpose of trying to attack someone's credibility, then you 
8 have to do it in accordance with the rule. The rule 
9 specifically says that if there's been an equivalent procedure 
10 that is like a pardon - and in our state that's what it is. 
11 That's what 77-18-1 through 14 all talk about. And, in fact, 
12 theorder of 77-18-14 is that no person shall try to introduce 
13 this kind of evidence after it's been expunged. 
14 So, other than to tell the Court - and the Court's the 
15 trier of fact in this particular circumstance - about this 
16 prior conviction, which may, indeed, need to be explained, 
17 because it's been explained to me. She said that she was 
18 charged for failure to turn her boss in when her boss made some 
19 kind of inappropriate use of public funds. And we can 
20 certainly explain that if we have to. But it seems to me the 
21 legislature has already spoken on how this should be done. 
22 Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right Thank you. 
24 Well, it's always, of course, as you well know, a very 
25 interesting proposition that the Court is the trier of fact I 
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1 So, Tm not - I ' m going to reserve on the motion to 
2 exclude and see the context in which it's attempted to be 
3 offered. 
4 So, I would ask Mr. Fishburn to give me a little heads up 
5 when you intend to either offer it or confront her with 
6 cross-examination about it 
7 All right Well, tot's the ruling on the motion in 
8 limine. 
9 With respect to the other matter, again, I saw it late 
10 Friday, Mr. Fishburn's request that the Court not allow the 
11 defense based upon Utah Code Annotated 31A-21-104. And I have 
12 just now - haven't had a chance to read - seen Joanne Buchi's 
13 memorandum in opposition. 
14 So, sit tight I'll read it right now. And we'll talk in 
15 just a minute. 
16 Okay, all right, I've read that rather quickly, but, 
17 Mr. Fishburn, it's your - again, I assume that you all want to 
18 proceed with this today. I don't think we have a tot of other 
19 times to do it 
20 MR. DUNN: well, if the Court would like, I thinkthatwe 
21 can. 
22 Martin, do you want (Inaudible)? 
23 MR. TANNER: That's fine. 
24 MR. DUNN: I believe that we can. 
25 THE COURT: I mean, I haven't had the chance to consider 
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1 am not supposed to hear about something that I've already heard 
2 about in several ways. 
3 But, actually, there is an interesting, in my opinion, 
4 interplay between these rules: First off, under Rule 609,1 
5 think I simply do not balance the prejudicial nature and 
6 probative nature of the conviction where his a crime 
7 involving dishonesty. And I find it is that 
8 I think under Rule 6X)9, ft comes m without that balancing 
9 of prejudicial versus probative value. However, that doesn't 
10 solve the problem, because there still is in my mind a bit of 
11 an issue as to whether Rule 609C has been satisfied here; that 
12 is, whether the Utah expungement statute fits within that 
13 category of cases under Rule609C that says you can admit it 
14 Moreover, I am not sure that Rule 609 A2 trumps, if you 
15 will, Rule 403, which I think just always and generally allows 
16 the Court to weigh relevance and probative versus prejudicial 
17 nature of any evidence. 
18 So, to me, it's - at this point, I am not seeing a good 
19 reason to allow the conviction. But I'm going to reserve until 
20 the time of trial and see what's - what, if anything, she 
21 testifies about And then see if, in fact, that should be 
22 admitted in any way to impeach her credibility. 
23 It's clear that if it is all that can be inquired into or 
24 admitted is the fact of a conviction and what it was for and 
25 when it was. 
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1 it that I'd probably like to, but - well, go ahead, let's hear 
2 what you have to say and TU think about it 
3 MR. FISHBURN: Thank you. 
4 Your Honor, first of all, I do apologize to the Courtthat 
5 this motion was just filed on Friday. 
6 Unfortunately, the reason that it was just filed on Friday 
7 is the issue was squarely presented to the Court and to the 
8 Plaintiff in a trial brief on Thursday. 
9 THE COURT.- I got that trial brief some time late 
10 Thursday, I think. 
11 MR HSHBURN: And I received it I uunk, maybe even late 
12 in the morning. 
13 And the reason the motion is filed before the Court is: 
14 According to the Supreme (^urt of Utah in the Case of Golding 
15 v. Ashley Irrigation (Phonetic), one can waive the objection 
16 based on failure to plead unless that objection is placed 
17 squarely before the court which is the reason for our 
18 objection. 
19 According to the trial brief filed by Joanne Buchi, this 
20 is a defense or an argument or whatever you want to call it 
21 that is based squarely on a statute, and that is Section 
22 31A-21-104 of the Utah Insurance Code. 
23 According to her interpretation of that statute, which in 
24 a trial brief we've indicated we believed to be wrong, she j 
25 interprets that to mean that this is a statute that divests 
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Glade Parduhn of certain contractual rights; and that would be 
his right as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance; that 
this somehow override!; that; that per the statute he no longer 
had an insurable interest in the life of Brad Buchi when Brad 
died; air therefore, he can't have the proceeds since he is 
beoefic y. 
Now, we've addressed (Inaudible) in a trial brief, and it 
8 is not my intention to go into that here. My intention here is 
9 to simply point out that this is an improperly raised defense 
and argument that should not be considered by the Court even 
notwithstanding the merits. 
This argument first appeared in what was called a motion 
for - motion in limine that was filed, oh, just prior to the 
14 December 2000, trial date. 
15 THE COURT. Let me interrupt you tee, I did soe that 
16 characterized as a motion in limine, and your response was that 
17 it really - it was a thinly veiled attempt at another motion 
18 for summary judgment, but their - and I don't have that file 
19 here, but it is back in chambers. 
20 MR. FISHBURN: Ufohllh. 
21 THE C»URT: Their contention is that they raised it in 
22 their amended counterclaim? 
23 MR. FISHBURN: well, I just saw that in their brief. They 
24 say it was raised in the amended counterclaim. Now, they can 
25 correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe the only pleading ever 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 MR. DUNN: No. I'm looking under paragraph - may I, Your 
2 Honor? 
3 THE COURT: Yes. 
4 MR. DUNN: First of all, in paragraph - (Inaudible) a 
5 notice pleading state. But, first of all, the most obvious one 
6 is the statement in the prayer on Page 6: 
7 "Therefore, Counterclaimants seek 
8 relief as follows: One, for declaration 
9 that Glade Parduhn has no interest" -
10 THE COURT: Right 
11 MR. DUNN:-"in the proceeds of North 
12 Insurance Life Insurance Policy No. 
13 NL00989085 on Brad Buchi's life." 
14 THE COURT: okay. 
15 MR. DUNN: m addition to that, in Paragraph 5 of the 
16 answer with respect to the allegations of Paragraph 6 in the 
17 Plaintiff s complaint 
18 "Defiendant submits that she has 
19 instructed Northern life Insurance 
20 Company not to distribute the - to the 
21 Plaintiff the proceeds under policy 
22 number (and that number); however, 
23 Defendant denies that the proceeds in the 
24 policy arc due to the Plaintiff alone." 
25 That raises it 
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filed before the Court was, really - included a claim of 
Joanne along with the Buchi Children, and that was an amended 
counterclaim filed in April of 1999. 
And I looked at that carefully before I did this motion to 
see if that was one of those arguments that was there and you 
just overlooked it and didn't see the significance of it, but 
it is not there. It is not there. There is no statute 
8 referenced in that amended counterclaim. And if I am wrong, I 
9 apologize. And perhaps my motion is not wdHakcn. 
THE COURT: Why don't we take a moment I'll walk in 
there a n d -
MK FISHBURN: Okay. 
THE COURT: The other volume's in there. 
MR. FISHBURN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And I'll grab it 
I'll look for it for just a moment, Mr. Fishburn, but -
17 maybe, Mr. Dunn, teilme when that was filed, and thatwill 
18 help a little bit as far as finding it 
19 MR. DUNN: The 9th of April, 1999. 
MR. FISHBURN: That's correct. 
MR. DUNN: it's attached to Mr. Fishburn's memorandum. 
MR. FISHBURN: oh, that's right It should be. 
THE COURT: okay. Well, I don't see a reference to the 
24 statute, and, Mr. Fishburn - 1 mean, Mr. Dunn, I assume you 
25 are looking under the relief section, Paragraph 2? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 It goes on, under the last line on the page 
2 continue to read it: 
3 "As an affirmative — 
4 affirmatively alleges that the 
5 Defendant's siblings (lists those) and 
6 claim on September 10th, 1999 letter, 
7 attached as Exhibit A to the Plaintiff s 
8 complaint and continued to claim an 
9 interest in the proceeds of the policy. 
10 "Third defense (on Page 3): By 
11 the way of affirmative defense, Defendant 
12 alleges Plaintiff s claims, if any, are 
13 barred because the Defendant and her 
14 siblings are the third party 
15 beneficiaries under the partnership 
16 agreement" 
17 Under the Counterclaim on Page 5, Paragraph 8 
18 "Suiprisingly, despite the clear 
19 language of the partnership agreement, 
20 Parduhn attempted to claim he alone is 
21 entitled to the proceeds of the policy on 
22 the Brad Buchi's life." 
23 Paragraph 9: 
24 "Directed Northern Life Insurance 
25 Company to hold the proceeds from the 
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policy on Buchi's life for the benefit of 
the children." 
It's - it's repeatedly through here that they are 
contesting that he has an interest in that policy. And the 
term "interest" is specifically used in the prayer, and it's 
specifically used in Paragraph 5. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dunn, let me have Mr. Fishburn go 
8 ahead, and then I'll hear further from you if you desire. 
9 Okay, Mr. Fishburn -
MR. DUNN: Certainly. 
THECOURT: - 1 think you 're right To that extent, it's 
12 not amended — the statute isn't cited in that amended 
13 counterclaim. 
14 MR FISHBURN: Well, in the amended counterclaim, numbeij 
15 one, the statute is not cited The terms "insurable interest" 
16 are not cited. There is no argument that contractual rights 
17 are vitiated by reference to a statute which has modified the 
18 law in insurable interest. 
19 The inference in this pleading is that if there is a 
20 defense, it overrides the statute. It is based, really, on a 
21 second contract, and that would be the buy/sell agreement. 
There is no fair notice in this pleading that there is a 
defense based on a statute which is going to override the 
contractual rights of Glade Parduhn. 
In the enumerable memoranda filed throughout the history 
10 
11 
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1 get in a situation somewhere Mr. Parduhn is accused of waiving 
2 that 
3 This is clearly - there's an ironic statement in this 
4 memo I just read, and it says that, "This statute is not a 
5 statutory defense." Well, "this statute," 1 don't see how you 
6 can say that There's an allegation that says, "Well, 
7 Mr. Paiduhn's waived the objection because he didn't raise it 
8 in a motion for summary judgment by, I think, the August 2000 
9 deadline." How can you raise an argument that you don't know 
10 — or a motion for summary judgment on a defense or an 
11 argument that you don't know exists? Never been mentioned 
12 prior to that date. 
13 Frankly, I think what has happened is that this is an 
14 argument I don't think it has merit, but it was an axgument 
15 that was first thought of about November of 2000. And it was 
16 tossed out in a motion for limine. That was withdrawn. But it 
17 is now back before the Court It is not the issue that was 
18 pleaded either as an affirmative claim or a counterclaim or a 
19 defense or anything. There is no notice of it And, 
20 therefore, according to Rule 8C, according to the Supreme Court 
21 in the Golding Case, that argument has been waived. 
22 THECOURT: Thank you, 
23 All right, Mr. Dunn, again, you don't need to recite 
24 obviously those things in the counterclaim. B u t -
25 Mr. Tanner? 
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1 of this case on probably two or three motions and cross-motions 
2 for summary judgment and partial summary judgment, this issue 
had never been raised. The first time it was raised within the 
guise of a motion in limine, which really wasn't a motion in 
limine before the December 2000 trial date, and in response to 
Mr. Paiduhn's objection, that was past the deadline to do a 
motion for summary judgment, it was withdrawn. 
So, the first time this has really been presented squarely 
to the Court for determination is with the trial brief, in 
10 which that now argument is front and center. That is a number 
one argument presented at least by Joanne Buchi, that this 
statute overrides it 
There is - there is no - 1 don't see how one can 
14 distinguish the facts in this case from the case in the Golding 
15 Case. Now, the Golding Case involved a statutory based 
16 offense, which was immunity. A landowner has immunity under 
17 certain circumstances. And that was a situation where it 
18 hadn't been pleaded. Now, the irony in that case was the 
19 Supreme Court says, 'If it hasn't been pleaded and it is - if 
20 it's based on a statute and the statute has the effect of 
21 avoidance as in Rule 8C, it is an affirmative defense and it's 
22 waived." 
23 The irony in that case was that the other party didn't 
24 object when it was raised, and therefore the objection was 
25 waived. And that's why I filed the motion. I don't want to 
11 
12 
13 
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1 MR. TANNER: Yeah, I'll kind of briefly jump in here in 
2 the middle, Your Honor, but Mr. Dunn came into the case a 
3 little bit later and so wasn't involved in the pleading that 
4 happened early on. 
5 Your Honor, what happened-a little bit of history of 
6 this case - was that - of course, there was a dispute between 
7 Mr. Parduhn and my clients initially about whether or not my 
8 clients or Mr. Parduhn were entitled to the proceeds. One of 
9 the tilings that we raised in our initial pleadings was that 
10 there ought to perhaps be a third parry involved who was 
11 Ms. Buchi, who was Brad Buchi's wife at the time. 
12 Another item that we raised in our pleadings was that we 
13 didn't believe that Mr. Parduhn had an interest in the policy 
14 or the proceeds to the policy. Notwithstanding, he was named 
15 beneficiary, and the reason for that is, of course, because the 
16 parties' buy/sell agreement which says what should happen to 
17 the proceeds. 
18 THECOURT: NOW, you are saying you plead that. You are 
19 referring to that amended counterclaim? 
20 MRTANNER: Yes. Yes. From there - from there the 
21 issues were fine-tuned. And the reason that this insurable 
22 interest question, rather than statements that are more general 
23 about no interest, became specifically an uninsurable interest 
24 claim was because part way through the pleading process 
25 Mr. Parduhn first came up — not in his initial pleadings, but 
liYT T m mr A -WT *~%nnr* 
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1 part way through the process, with the idea that if a contract 
2 to sdl flic gas stations had been signed, then all of a sudden 
3 the buy/sell agreement disappeared. 
4 And our specific response, which I believe fit within the 
5 umbrella of the no interest to Mr. Parduhn concept, directed at 
6 that specific issue was: "Well, gee, if, in fact, that 
7 occurred (which we don't think it did) but if that, in fact, 
8 occurred, then there's no longer any insurable interest for 
9 Mr. Parduhn, anyway. If the partnership really went away, then 
10 why are we insuring him anyway? How can he possibly be 
11 insured?" 
12 And so, we fine-tuned our claim of no interest based on 
13 Mr. Parduhn's bringing up in the middle of the process here the 
14 idea that somehow the sale made the buy/sell agreement 
15 disappear. 
16 And that would be the entire context, Your Honor. This 
17 didn' t show up for the first time here on the eve of trial or 
18 even part way through the process to blindside Mr. Parduhn. It 
19 came up in specific response to his claims that he thought of 
20 some time after this process began. 
21 That's the history, Your Honor. 
22 MR. DUNN: May I, Your Honor? 
23 THE COURT: Yes. 
24 MR. DUNN: First, it is our position that it's pled. 
25 Notice state - you don't have to cite the statute by statutory 
Page 27 
1 available to the public for recreational 
2 purposes by limiting the owners' 
3 liability towards persons entering the 
4 land and water areas for those purposes." 
5 Indeed, if it is asserted that that somehow applies, they 
6 must satisfy the requirements of demonstrating that they have 
4 
7 made this recreational property available for some other 
8 purposes. 
9 So, it's a negligence, comparative negligence, comparative 
10 liability format that this statute contemplates. 
11 The Insurance Code is quite different The Insurance Code 
12 is a prohibition on acts of this kind by Mr. Parduhn. 
13 Indeed, in 1983, '84, '85 and '86, when the Insurance 
14 Recodification Commission chaired by Spencer W. Kimball, Jr. -
15 Governor Leavitt sat on that commission at that time as did a 
16 number of other citizens. And this specific issue was 
17 examined. 
18 The statute is located in Chapter 21, "Insurance Contracts 
19 In General," which sets out the generalrules under 21-101 -
20 31A-21 -101 - makes this applicable to people in this 
21 circumstance: 
22 "This chapter applies to all 
23 insurance policies, applications and 
24 certificates (dropping down to C) on 
25 persons residing in this state when the 
1 provision, by statutory citation. 
There's certainly notice to Mr. Parduhn that there's a 
challenge to his claim to Ac proceeds of that insurance 
policy. And that was known from the very beginning. Indeed, 
there can be no argument that this is a surprise, because, as 
he admits, even he dawned — even Mr. Fishburn had it dawn on 
him back when we filed the partial motion for summary judgment, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 which was not tossed out 
9 In addition, this is dramatically distinguishable from the 
10 case that he cites, the Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation 
11 Company statute. 
12 To start with, the statutes themselves are dramatically 
13 different The statute tthat is cited in Golding is that 
14 landlord protection in actions where it is alleged that the 
15 landlord, in a liability action, a negligence action, has 
16 breached a duty of care. 
17 And in that regard, 57-14-1, which is found in the Real 
18 Estate Section of the Code, Limitation on Landowner Liability, 
19 Chapter 14 - and if you read those specific provisions, it 
20 allows tiiis to be asserted as a defense in a liability -
21 negligence liability circumstance. 
22 The legislative purpose, for example: 
23 "The purpose of this Act is to 
24 encourage public and private owners of 
25 land to make kind and water areas 
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1 policy is issued." 
2 It goes on into the operative section, Section 31A-21-104, 
3 and specifically mandates that: 
4 "Number 1, an insurer (that's the 
5 insurance company end of this) may not 
6 knowingly provide insurance to a person 
7 who does not have or expect to have an 
8 insurable interest in the subject of the 
9 insurance. 
10 "And, B, a person may not 
11 knowingly procure, direct by assignment 
12 or otherwise, an interest in the proceeds 
13 of an insurance policy unless he has or 
14 expects to have an insurable interest in 
15 the subject of the insurance." 
16 Mr. Parduhn made an attempt to procure the interests in 
17 the proceeds of an insurance policy after the death of 
18 Mr. Buchi in violation of that statute. 
19 THE COURT: why isn't it - why isn't it an affirmative 
20 defense, then? Why isn't (Inaudible)-
21 MR. DUNN: Because it is a prohibition. If the court 
22 l e a r n s - i f the court learns of an activity which is violated 
23 by a statute, the c^urtc^n't sancdon it regardless of wheliter 
24 or not it is pled And, of course, we take the position that 
25 it's pled. But the court can't sanction an illegal act upon 
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first learning of the illegal act And this is clearly 
demonstrated as being an illegal act 
Statute is important because it is specifically tailored 
to deal with those circumstances where a partner, a person with 
greater economic power in me relationship - the surviving 
partner still lives. The deceased partner and everything he 
knew about the business and how the business ran is gone. 
8 Therefore, the partner that now has the disparate 
9 compared to the widow and children is prohibited from making 
10 use of mis statute to then say what was obviously going to be 
a buy/sell agreement is - has to be interpreted as a buy/sell 
agreement 
The legislature mandated mat the only time a person like 
14 Mr. Parduhn could have an insurable interest in the life of 
15 Mr. Buchi is: 
"2A. 'Insurable Interest1 in a 
person means for persons closely related 
by blood or by law, a substantial 
interest engendered by love and 
affection. Or in the case of other 
persons, a lawful and substantial 
interest in having the life, health and 
bodily safety of the person insured 
continued" 
I'll skip the sentence about "Policyholders in a Group 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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1 participate in some incentive to bring about that death, unless 
2 the statute -unless the legislature mandates it? Mister -
3 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you. I mean, I am not going, 
4 obviously, to pass on whether mat is a meritorious or strong 
5 or medium argument -
6 MR. DUNN: okay. 
7 THE COURT: - in terms of the triaL The question is -
8 to me is: It is, obviously, as Mr. Fishburn puts it, going to 
9 be at front and center of your defense, and it's obviously, 
10 important Then, again, I'm not saying it does or doesn't have 
11 merit But the point simply is: Is he unfairly surprised? 
12 Now, I've got your argument on the fact that it was pled. 
13 But ought he to have to deal with mis at a trial where, 
14 in fact, it wasn't pled by statute? That's clear. 
15 MR. DUNN: The statutory numbers were not cited. 
16 THE COURT; Right 
17 MR. DUNN: The statutory indication - the - the same 
18 basis mat the statute sets forth is included in -
19 particularly in the prayer of the cross-claim. 
20 THE COURT: so, put a - if you can, put a label on it 
21 It's not an affirmative defense. You put in your brief memo 
22 mat I just read mis morning it is not a statutory defense. 
23 MR. DUNN: it is a prohibition. 
24 THE COURT: YOU are calling it a "prohibition?" 
25 But, in fact, if I were to buy it as an argument, and I'm 
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1 Insurance Policy," because it doesn't apply. 
2 "Each person has an unlimited 
3 insurable interest in his own life and 
4 health." 
5 And men critical for our purposes: 
6 "A shareholder or partner has an 
7 insurable interest in the life of other 
8 shareholders or partners for the purpose 
9 of insurance contracts mat are an 
10 integral part of a legitimate buy/sell 
11 agreement respecting shares or a 
12 partnership interest in the business." 
13 So, the only legitimate insurable interest that the Court 
14 can allow Mr. Parduhn to have is the interest that exists by 
15 virtue of a buy/sell agreement where he gets all of the 
16 business and the heirs get the policy. 
17 Indeed, mere are public policies that were, in 1983, '84 
18 andf 85, argued as to why this should be the case and still 
19 exist Why should a partner-why should some essentially 
20 business stranger, if Mr. Fishburn's argument is to be 
21 accepted, have any right to have an interest in the death of 
22 someone else? Why would we encourage partners to benefit from 
23 the death of another partner except through the buy/sell 
24 arrangement? Why have people - why let people insure someone 
|25 else's life and hope mat they would die and perhaps even 
R T T . T T F W A V rrr £01-3*4-404? MKQ14QA0 
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1 thinking, NI am not dealing with it," I would - I'm just 
2 having trouble characterizing why 
3 defense such as anything else, estoppel or something. Why 
4 isn't it an affirmative defense? 
5 MR. DUNN: m my opinion, because of the way that it's 
6 laid out by the legislature in the sections of the code that 
7 deal with prohibitions. 
8 The one just preceding it has to do with capacity to 
9 contract An 18-year-old cannot have capacity to contract 
10 The court can't enforce a contract against that individual. 
11 Indeed, I was going to cite some subsequent sections 
12 within the insurable interest section. But rather than argue 
13 the points of the insurable interest section itself, you can 
14 also see that in the Golding Case, it is dicta but strong dicta 
15 - 1 acknowledge it's dicta since they did consider it. I 
16 note in Paragraph - on Page 899: 
17 "The act certainly constitutes an 
18 affirmative defense or avoidance inasmuch 
19 as it denies liability, not because the 
20 allegations of the complaint are true but 
21 because the legislature is claimed to 
22 have relieved the irrigation company from 
23 the liability associated with 
24 negligence." 
25 So, it's distinguishable as being a negligence action and I 
n « ~ ~ ^ A n ^ 1 1 
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1 a liability action as opposed to an attempt to violate the 
2 statute that prohibits Mr. Pairiuhn fnxn attempting to collect 
3 such insurance in the absence of having some insurable 
4 interest 
5 Indeed, if the insurance company were to appear and by 
6 their tendering of the limits of the policy into court, clearly 
7 establishes that the Court has the obligation of making a 
8 determination as to who has the legitimate insurable interest 
9 in the life of Mr. Buchi at the time of his death. 
10 You can certainly see in Golding how it came as a surprise 
11 to them. Mr. Fishburn knew at least, gosh, what would you say, 
12 April? But well before; that when the filing of the memorandum 
13 relative to this issue came up and Judge Stirba's health 
14 intervened again with reference to getting this matter 
15 resolved. 
16 THE COURT: wdl, Rule 12A talks about waiver of defenses, 
17 and it says - 1 won't read it to you, but, in essence, if 
18 something is brought up at trial it can be disposed of as per 
19 Rule IS. In other words, allow an amendment, allow a 
20 continuance. 
21 What's your position on that? He's saying that he is 
22 simply not prepared And, again, you don't need to repeat 
23 those. But whatever we call it, why shouldn't I treat it in 
24 that way as something that is, in fact, being raised now at 
25 trial in the evidence with respect to that, allowing an 
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1 And at the end of Rule 8C it s^s: 
2 "Or any other (let me tee if I 
3 can turn to the Rule) included as an 
4 affirmative defense and any other matter 
5 constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
6 jefense." 
4 
7 And it was that concept of avoidance that was addressed in 
8 the Golding Decision. 
9 What is an avoidance? Well, it is a reference to a 
10 statute or something else that overrides the rights or 
11 allegations as they would otherwise stand. This is an 
12 avoidance. Mr. Dunn calls it a "prohibition." It's an 
13 "avoidance." 
14 And it goes to the right to present this as a substantive 
15 defense or a substantive argument on which the claims of 
16 Mr. Parduhn versus Mrs. Buchi are to be evaluated. 
17 Now, I believe the Court asked: "Could we consider this 
18 to be amendment to conform to the evidence?" Well, that would 
19 be found in Rule 15B. Now, 15B says: 
20 "That when issues not raised by 
21 the pleading are tried by the express or 
22 implied consent of the parties, then they 
23 shall be treated in all respect as if 
24 raised by the pleadings." 
25 THE OOURT: we don't have that 
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1 amendment? 
2 MR DUNN: It's not a surprise to them. If the Court 
3 found that it was a surprise, I think perhaps we would have to 
4 allow him to prepare for i t But he's had that opportunity. 
5 And he knew about i t It's pled there. But the statute cannot 
6 just simply be ignored. If we have to delay the trial, it will 
7 be a hardship, again, on the parties. But the statute can't 
8 just be ignored. I think - 1 don't think that the Court is 
9 inclined to just ignore a statute that constitutes a 
10 prohibition. It is certainly not one of the listed items in 
11 what constitutes an affirmative defense. 
12 TOECOURT: Allrigjit Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
13 Mr. Fishburn, your response? 
14 MR. FISHBURN: First, the pleading that was filed by 
15 Joanne Buchi in April of 1999, makes no reference to the 
16 statute by number. It makes no reference to a defense or 
17 countervailing argument based on any kind of statute, and it 
18 doesn't allude to the concept of insurable interest It simply 
19 talks about Mr. Parduhn is not entitled to claim these 
20 proceeds. And to the; extent they offer a distinct reason, it 
21 is because of a buy/sell agreement not because of a statute. 
22 Rule 8C defines what is meant by an affirmative defense. 
23 And there is that list that all of us litigation attorneys are 
24 familiar with including all the statutes of limitations, et 
25 cetera, et cetera. 
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1 MR. TANNER: YOU don't have that We don't have our 
2 express consent or our implied consent 
3 I think a large part of Ms. Buchi's argument today really 
4 is going to the merits of this statute, and that is: Does -
5 if a statute is valid at the outset and ten the relationship 
6 which gives rise to the insurable interest disappears, then 
7 does that change it? That's going to the merits, and I really 
8 don't want to get into that right now. 
9 But clearly this is an argument that was not presented in 
10 any pleadings or for that matter until it was first mentioned 
11 in mis motion in October. 
12 Now, we'd like to respond to just one point mat 
13 Mr. Tanner raised, and that was - and mis is true. He says 
14 that in lawsuits there is sometimes an evolution of thought and 
15 thinking by attorneys. 
16 Mr. Parduhn did raise the argument in me course of mis 
17 proceeding that the buy/sell agreement is not triggered in mis 
18 case because the partnership was dissolved three wedes before 
19 Brad Buchi died. Now, that's obviously a hotly-contested issue 
20 which can't be ruled on until we hear the facts. However, that 
21 argument was first presented to UK Court, my recolkction 
22 would be, October/November of 1999. It was mentioned in 
23 various motions for summary judgment, at least two. In 
24 response to those arguments from Mr. Parduhn thathewas 
25 contractually entitled to the proceeds and he was not required 
~ T> 1 1 Tfc 1 ^ 
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1 to give any of the proceeds, pass it through, under a buy/sell 
2 agreement It was never, never responded that,'Well, no, you 
3 can't have them or keep them because there is a statute which 
4 eviscerated your insurable interest and/or you never had an 
5 insurable interest to begin with." 
6 If that was mentioned in any memorandum filed prior to 
7 August 2000, which was the summary judgment cut-off date, I 
8 would not have made this motion. 
9 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you there and get to that, 
10 because - 1 mean, I am obviously troubled by the timing of it 
11 MR. FISHBURN: SUTC. 
12 THE COURT: And I recognize that no one's - I'm not 
13 finding any fault at this point But it does seem to me that 
14 it may well be dispositive. Okay. It may well be a 
15 dispositive argument I am not ruling that it has merit And 
16 I am sure we will have arguments that it doesn't and isn't 
17 But why should we - why should we try this if, in fact, that's 
18 a dispositive -
19 MR. FISHBURN: well, I'd certainly say this, and that is 
20 if the interpretation of the statute is as Joanne Buchi reads 
21 it — 
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR.FISHBURN: -Ithink it is dispositive. I think 
24 that's the argument that's being offered here, is that it is 
25 dispositive. 
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1 issues that are reserved because they are determinative on the 
2 outcome of certain threshold issues. 
3 If we try the case and the Court were to rule in favor of 
4 Joanne Buchi, then we've wasted two days of court time, 
5 frankly. So, I guess, that's the risk to take. 
6 My client, obviously, would like to get these issues 
7 resolved. He certainly believes that he's entitled to the 
8 insurance proceeds and would like a day in court 
9 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, there is an important part of that 
10 Rule 15B that was not read The latter part that addresses the 
11 question of if an objection is raised -
12 THE COURT: (inaudible) objection to the evidence, this 
13 Rule 15B reads. Does it not 
14 MR. DUNN: well, it says that if there's no objection, 
15 there's one course. And then it about halfway through- and 
16 this dovetails with what Mr. Fishburn just said: 
17 "If evidence is objected to at 
18 time of trial on the grounds that it is 
19 not within the issues made by the 
20 pleadings, the court may allow the 
21 pleading to be amended when the 
22 presentation of the merits of the action 
23 will be subserved thereby (and that's 
24 clearly true here % and the objecting 
25 party fails to satisfy the court that the 
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1 THE COURT: And I'm not saying - I'm not ruling or saying 
2 it is, but it certainly -
3 MR. FISHBURN: I hope not 
4 THE COURT: But it certainly seems to me to be something 
5 that - that needs to be explored at some time. And does it 
6 matter -
7 MR. FISHBURN: wedl, let me say this ~ 
8 THE COURT: -a t the time of trial or sameother time? 
9 MR. FISHBURN: I will defer to the Court on how the Court 
10 wishes to handle this. 
11 I am not contending that the argument being raised has 
12 somehow compromised my ability or the Plaintiffs ability to 
13 prepare for the case. I think the presentation of the evidence 
14 is going to be approximately the same. I don't see that being 
15 altered by this argument being raised. My objection is to it 
16 being raised at all as a defense. It's presented as a 
17 substantive defense. And I believe under the ruling of 8C, 
18 reading of Rule8C, 12H and the OoldingCase that that is 
19 improper. It can't be considered as a substantive defense or a 
20 substantive argument or basis for summary judgment, frankly, 
21 because it's been waived. 
22 If we have the trial tomorrow, it is going to take about 
23 two days. One of the issues we haven't mentioned is that by 
24 stipulation reached back in December, this is a bifurcated 
25 triaL I don't know if that appeared, but there are certain 
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1 admission of such evidence would 
2 prejudice him in maintaining his action 
3 or defense upon the merits." 
4 It goes on to say: 
5 The court shall grant a 
6 continuance if necessary to enable the 
7 objecting parry to meet such evidence.1' 
8 But Mr. Parduhn, himself, should have known, when he made 
9 that application to get the proceeds of that insurance policy, 
10 that he was violating a statute. It should not have been 
11 required for anybody to give him notice even at that very 
12 stage. He is considered to have knowledge of the law that 
13 prohibits that act, and that's the act that he engaged in. And 
14 that is the act that is attacked in the answer and die 
15 counterclaim. They specifically say: "He's going after the 
16 insurance policy." He's not entitled to go after die insurance 
17 policy. We are entitled to the insurance policy. 
18 The word "interest" in the insurance policy is used both 
19 in the answer and in the counterclaim. And the Court's 
20 latitude to make sure the statutes that specifically were 
21 enacted by the legislature to prohibit the kind of activity 
22 that Mr. Parduhn has engaged in should certainly comply with 
23 the Rules. These - we are not playing games here. We are 
24 trying to get to the bottom of the truth on what is the right 
25 way to determine how these assets should be distributed. j 
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1 THE COUKT: Let me ask you, Mr. Dunn - again, you know, 
2 I'm struggling for a label, and I don't know that Til use 
3 yours or the rule one, but whatever - whatever this statute 
4 is, prohibition, affirmative defense, legal defease, whatever 
5 i tk somewhere, if you have a great deal of confidence in it, 
6 recognizing, "Well, maybe that's misplaced," why do we want to 
7 try tins if - 1 mean, it is, is it not, simply purely legal 
8 argument that this statute governs and therefore the Buchi 
9 Children and Joanne (Inaudible) proceeds. And no matter what 
10 die facts are, no matter what the agreement was or wasn't, no 
11 matter how many times h was amended, no matter what they 
12 meant, if, in fact, it is a purely kgal matter, what's the 
13 point of having a trial on it? 
14 MIL TANNER-Your Honor, can I junq> in here for just a 
15 moment, please, with Mr. Dunn's indulgence. There is a factual 
16 issue that this statute deals with, and that's the one that was 
17 raised earlier in the pleadings by Mr. Fishburn on behalf of 
18 his client And that's what honed in this specific issue, was 
19 the dissolution question. And there is a factual question 
20 there. 
21 And I also believe that Mr. Fishburn is correct, this 
22 statute's existence is not going to change the facts that are 
23 presented one way or the other. It will affect the kgal 
24 arguments that arise from those facts, but nobody's going to 
25 change testimony or witnesses or introduce new testimony or 
Page 43 
1 specific reference to interest in insurance policies. 
2 THE COURT, okay. 
3 MR. DUNN: And that's what the statute addresses. 
4 THE COURT: Allrjght Allright I think I understand 
5 your positions, Counsel, and ~ it seems to me that I have got 
6 to deny the motion to - the Plaintiffs motion to bar 
7 reference to that defense. I don't think it is perfect 
8 notice. I don't know whedier to call it an affirmative defense 
9 still or not, but it does not seem to me that it's something 
10 that's going to interfere with - by both parties' agreement, 
11 interfere with the presentation of evidence. Whedier it has 
12 merit or not, it can be argued. 
13 And if, in fact, Mr. Fishburn, you fed that at trial, at 
14 the conclusion of trial, whenever it's argued, you need 
15 additional time to brief the issue - that's true of either 
16 party-I'd certainly allow that But it doesn't seem to me 
17 it's going to affect the evidence we have scheduled to hear 
18 over the next couple of days. 
19 And so I think there is, given the motion in limine in 
20 October of 2000, whether properly characterized as that or not, 
21 that certainly did refer to the statute by statutory citation, 
22 s o - and then the pleading of the amended counterclaim, I 
23 think in combination, did give fair notice, and that is the 
24 purpose of our - and tenor of our rules of pleading is that 
25 you have some fair notice. 
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1 witnesses based on this statute. There will be kgal arguments 
2 based on the evidence that's presented. And there are some 
3 facts pertaining to this statute and the timing of dissolution 
4 or dissolving of the partnership that will pertain to this 
5 statute. It is not solely a legal argument in and of itself. 
6 MR. DUNN: May I answer your specific question, Your 
7 Honor? 
8 THE COURT: certainly. 
9 MR. DUNN: m my opinion, the statute is critical. On my 
10 first involvement in this case, it appeared to me, having sat 
11 on the Insurance Recodification Commission, that the Insurance 
12 Code specifically addressed this. My first response is: He 
13 can't do that The law does not allow a partner to take 
14 advantage of widows and orphans and cheat tern out of their 
15 just desserts. And the reason is that we allow partners to 
16 insure their partners, only for the purpose of buy-sell 
17 arrangements. 
18 THE COURT: Then why didn't you file an amended answer? 
19 MR. DUNN: well, there is certainly notice. There is no 
20 surprise. There is no surprise (Inaudible) -
21 THE COURT: There would be even less if you had just filed 
22 an «n*»n^ answer and put that statute in there; wouldn't 
23 tine? 
24 Yes. 
125 MR. DUNN: it would be clearer, but the - it is pled by 
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1 Where it doesn't alter the presentation of evidence, I 
2 think that Til allow it to be argued. And, again, if the 
3 Plaintiff needs additional time to brief it as a response to 
4 the kgal argument, I'll allow that 
5 But we will go ahead with the trial tomorrow; ask Mr. Dunn 
6 to prepare the order denying this motion. 
7 Don't need an order cm the motion to exclude the 
8 conviction, again, having reserved on that 
9 Anything else we need to accomplish today, Counsel? We 
10 arc scheduled to start at 9:30 tomorrow? 
11 MR. DUNN: we may be able to compare exhibits and see if 
12 we can just stipulate to the admission of a great number of 
13 torn. 
14 THE COURT: i did notice that that scheduling order from 
15 whenever it was did call for a proposed findings and 
16 conclusions a week before thetriaL I've got your trial 
17 briefs, but I haven't seen any of those. But I wouldn't expect 
18 you to spend the rest of the day doing that, but -
19 I suppose no one has them in their back pocket? 
20 MR. DUNN: NO, Your Honor, I do not Ours would be fairly 
21 simple. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, there is one other thing, and 
23 that is that we had signed a stipulation of what issues are to 
24 be tried in tins phase and which ones are specifically 
25 reserved. That was an agreement that was reached back in 
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1 December of 2000. We'vejust reduced it to writing, and 
2 everybody's signed it 
3 THE COURT: okay. 
4 MR.PKHBURN: so, I think it's ready to file if -
5 MR DUNN. Actually, we don't have much of a disagreement 
6 except for perhaps the exact language of one of the 
7 subsections, Subsection 4. 
8 It's consistent with - our understanding as to what the 
9 bifurcation is about is consistent with Mr. Fishburn's 
10 statement at the beginning of his trial brief, so it is not 
11 like anything else is to be brought in. It's just a 
12 (Inaudible) and tome about what is a nullity and what's not 
13 But the gist of it is all there. And I'm quite sure that 
14 Mr. Tanner and I will be signing it 
15 MR.FISHBURN: okay. I'm sorry. I thought we had an 
16 agreement 
17 MR. DUNN: well, I think we have agreement 
18 MR. TANNER: We do. 
19 MR. DUNN: n is just not necessarily we have an agreement 
20 to use the exact words that Mr. Fishburn proposes. 
21 THE COURT: wdl, get it to me soon, if you can. 
22 Now, let me - again, let me pause just a moment and make 
23 sure I understand it If the ruling is in favor of the Defense 
24 in this case, there would be no second phase. But if it is 
25 not, there would be; is that correct? 
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MR. DUNN: Your Honor, the judges on this bench are 
uniformly good, so I'm... 
THE COURT: Thank you for that 
MR. DUNN: It's really true. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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1 MR. FISHBURN: Yes. 1 
2 MR. DUNN: Correct If it is decided by the Court that 1 2 
3 the widow and children are entitled to the proceeds of the 3 
4 insurance policy, they'll make no further claim against the 4 
5 assets of the previous existing and continuing existing 5 
6 partnership. 6 
7 THE COURT: Is it — and I should know the answer to this, 7 
8 but Ijust want to make sure. It doesn't matter who's going to] 8 
9 hear this, correct? Either the first or second phase? I mean, 9 
10 it may matter to you. I didn't mean to phrase it in such a 10 
11 broad way. Is i t - i f there is a second phase, is it going to 11 
12 matter if it is someone different than hears the firstphase? 12 
13 MR. DUNN: NO, not to me. 13 
14 THE COURT: Not as economical, but.* 14 
15 MR. FISHBURN: That would certainly be my preference, to 15 
16 have the same judge hear i t 16 
17 MR. TANNER: I think we would all agree on that. 17 
18 MR. FISHBURN: I don't know that it's an absolute 18 
19 necessity, but I think any time there is a change of judges, 19 
20 there's always an interruption of the understanding of the 20 
21 issues and (Inaudible) — 21 
22 THE COURT: Right, which you've and many others have 22 
23 suffered through for some time, I recognize that 23 
24 Okay. Well... All right, well, give me that as soon as 24 
25 you can. 25 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 THE COURT: Good morning. We air hoe and on the record 
3 in the casecrf Parduhn v. Bennett. It is Case No. 970907879. 
4 This is the day for trial 
5 Counsel, state their appearances, please. 
6 MR. FISHBURN: Bryan Fishburn for the Plaintiff, Glade 
7 Paiduhn. 
8 MR. TANNER Martin Tanner for the Defendant, Natalie 
9 Buchi and her siblings. 
10 MR DUNN: Tim Dunn for Joanne Buchi as Defendant and 
11 Counterclaimant 
12 THE COURT: All right Counsel, are we ready to proceed? 
13 MR DUNN: Yes, sir, we are. 
14 THE COURT: Any unresolved matters that we need to take 
15 care of before we begin? 
16 MR DUNN: i am not aware of any, Your Honor. 
17 MR FISHBURN: The only thing - it is not an unresolved 
18 matter, it is a resolved matter - and that is, we did meet 
19 yesterday and agreed that certain of the exhibits proposed be 
20 received by the Court, and I was going to mention that in my 
21 opening argument 
22 THE COURT: All right I have a binder that has a lot of 
23 exhibits in it I assume that's what you are talking about 
24 MR FISHBURN: well, there should be two binders the Court 
25 has. There is a smaller binder, one inch, which is a set of 
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1 courtesy copies for the Court, and also I have put the original 
2 exhibits in a similar binder. And then there should be a 
separate larger binder with the exhibits of the Defendants and 
Counterclaimants in it 
Based on our meeting yesterday, 1 believe we've agreed 
that the following Plaintiffs Exhibits may be received by the 
Court into evidence, and that is Number 1 , 2 - actually 1 
8 through 6. 
No? 
MR. DUNK: Number 5,1 believe, Martin had a concern 
about. 
MR. FISHBURN: Okay. 
Well, then, 1 -
MR. DUNN: on relevance grounds. 
MR. FISHBURN: okay, then 1 through 4 and 6 - I'm sorry. 
MR, DUNN: correct 
MR. FISHBURN: with the caveat, incidentry, and on Exhibit 
18 No. 4, although it says here in the list that it is a policy, 
19 what it is is the application for the insurance policy. And 1 
20 believe we've all stipulated that the form language of the 
21 contract itself would be the same as the one on Brad Buchi's 
22 life. 
23 We've stipulated to 15 and 16 being received. And Numbers 
24 28 and 29. 
25 And then I stipulated as to the Defendants' Exhibits Nos. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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1 Mr. Fishburn. 
2 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, it's my privilege in this case 
3 to be representing the Plaintiff, Glade Parduhn. The facts 
4 that underlie the legal decisions that must be made have been 
5 previewed, 1 think, quite adequately in the trial briefs 
6 presented to this Court; however, 1 think it probably will not 
7 hurt to recount those in their chronology very quickly just to 
8 lay the framework for the evidence the P l a i n t 
9 believes will be proven. 
10 As the trial briefs indicate, this case does involve 
11 basically two contracts and their legal effects and the facts 
12 underlying those. And one of those is a contract of insurance, 
13 and the second is a buy/sell agreement 
14 The basic time line for the most pan is not disputed. A 
15 partnership by the name of University Texaco was created in 
16 1979 with two partners, Glade Parduhn and Brad Buchi, with the 
17 stated purpose to run a service station business. 
18 Some time later- and the evidence I don't think will 
19 resolve an exact date - the partners did type on to the last 
20 page of the partnership agreement what would be described as a 
21 buy/sell agreement 
22 It recognized that the partnership could be dissolved by 
23 the death of some partners; recited that each partner had 
24 $20,000 insurance on the life of the other; aiid if teothff 
25 partner died those proceeds would be used to pay to the partner 
1 4 and 5 and Numbers 10 and 11. 
2 MR. DUNN: I believe Mr. Tanner had some concern about the 
3 relevance of the notice and intent to default and the notice of 
4 cancellation, 28 and 29. 
5 MR. TANNER: That* s true. They were just relevancy. 
6 But with that small exception, it is as Mr. Fishburn has 
7 stated. 
8 THE COURT: All right Well, based upon that stipulation, 
9 those will be received. 
10 MR. DUNN: And by "those," I take it you mean 1,2,3,4, 
11 6,15 and 16 from Plaintiffs designated list of trial 
12 exhibits. And Exhibits -
13 THE COURT: well, stop there. You do not then stipulate 
14 to 28 and 297 
15 MR. TANNER: No, Your Honor, we have a relevancy objection 
16 to those. 
17 THE COURT: okay. So, yes, ending with 15 and 16, and 
18 then from the Defendants'4 and 5 and 10 and 11. 
19 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. 
20 THE COURT: All right Those are all received. (Plaintiffs 
21 Exhibit Nos. 1 to 4, 6,15 and 16; 
22 Defendants' Exhibit Nos. 4 and 5 and 10 and 11 
23 admitted into evidence.) 
24 THE COURT: AUri^t Counsel, you may make opening 
25 statements. 
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1 - decedent's partner's wife and survivors. 
2 The time line will indicate that in 1984 there was a 
3 handwritten amendment to the amount, at least, recited under 
4 the buy/sell agreement signed by both partners; and that 
5 purported to increase the buy -purchase obligation under the 
6 buy/sell agreement, if it was activated, to $100,000. 
7 TTie evidence will indicate that in 1989, the next 
8 significant date, that the partners applied for insurance each 
9 on the life of the other. And it will indicate that the 
10 insurance amounts were not equivalent, they were different 
11 There was a $300,000 policy purchased on thelifeof Brad 
12 Buchi, and Glade Parduhn was made the owner and beneficiary of 
13 that policy. 
14 There was a $250,000 policy applied for on the life of 
15 Glade Parduhn, and Brad Buchi was made the owner and 
16 beneficiary of that policy. 
17 Now, the evidence will indicate - and this is where we 
18 get into the factual dispute, but -Plaintiff bdfcves that 
19 the evidence will clearly indicate that there was no subsequent 
20 amendment after 1984 of the buy/sell agreement itself. 
21 The evidence will reveal no amended written agreement or 
22 written agreement amending that 1984 modification. And Glade 
23 Parduhn denies that he ever did agree to pay more than a 
24 hundred thousand dollars. 
25 The evidence will also indicate that in 1989 there was a 
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1 third policy applied for on the life of Brad Buchi, and mat 
2 was a policy in which Lisa Buchi was listed as the primary 
3 beneficiary, and she was the owner. 
4 The evidence will indicate that mis partnership, which 
5 was created for the purpose of running a service station 
6 business, functioned up until Jury 14th, 1997; on which date 
7 the stations were sold; irae sold to a company called Blackett 
8 Oil Company. 
9 After that date, the partnership did no further business 
10 in me nature of a service station. It embarked, even while 
11 Brad was still alive, in me process of paying its bills; some 
12 of which were paid before Brad Buchi died 
13 Brad Buchi[ died, unfortunately, in August of 1997. He did 
14 so before all the bills and all the obligations of partnership 
15 presale were taken care of . And me evidence will indicate 
16 mat subsequent to his death the partnership has continued in 
17 me process of trying to resolve the presale liabilities. It 
18 has functioned as a defendant in three lawsuits and plaintiff 
19 in, I believe, two; and is generally engaged in the process of 
20 winding up the affairs of the partnership business; although, 
21 those affairs are not yet completed. 
22 The evidence will indicate mat Mr. Parduhn, subsequent to 
23 the death of his partner, did make an application to Northern 
24 Life Insurance for the proceeds on his partner's life. But he 
25 was not allowed to have? those proceeds because Northern had 
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1 amounts of insurance went up again, $250,000 on the life of 
2 Mr. Parduhn and $300,000 on the life of Mr. Buchi, is that Brad 
3 Buchi's wife, at the time, Lisa Buchi - the parties have since 
4 divorced - suggested to her husband that it would be 
5 important, since they had a whole bunch of kids, family to take 
6 care of, lots of financial obligations, mat the insurance 
7 amounts should be bumped up again. And it was at her 
8 instigation. She will testify mat the insurance agent in this 
9 case, Mr. Sheldon Hansen, was contacted and mat the amounts 
10 were increased. 
11 Now, Mr. Fishburn is indicating that there was no 
12 amendment, and so the existing buy/sell agreement should apply 
13 in the lower amounts. We would state mat if, indeed, as 
14 Mr. Parduhn now claims, mere was some radical departure from 
15 me original buy/sell agreement - and by "radical departure," 
16 I am talking about the concept that he now brings forth without 
17 any documentation, without any revision, without any amendment, 
18 without any piece of paper mat says, "Gee, instead of all of 
19 me insurance money going to the family of a deceased and all 
20 of the business going to the partner, we are going to sort of 
21 cut and paste and change all of mat" He's saying that mat 
22 took place with no amendment to the buy/sell agreement 
23 And intei Lisa Buchi - the mom,will testify mat it was 
24 at her insistence that the amounts were bumped up under the 
25 existing buy/sell agreement That will be her testimony. And 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
received a letter from Natalie Buchi-Bennett claiming mat the 
proceeds rightfully belonged to her and her family members and 
not to Mr. Buchi (sic). 
And the Court record will indicate that that money has 
been deposited with the Third District Court in an interest 
bearing account where it is still held and awaiting a 
resolution of the Court as to whom is entitled to that money. 
THE COURT: Thank >OlL 
Mr. Tanner. 
MR. TANNER: Thank you. Your Honor, I represent the 
children of Brad Buchi, who is now deceased. And as 
12 Mr. Parduhn's Counsel indicated, Mr. Buchi and his partner, 
13 Glade Parduhn, did on May 23 of 1979 enter into a partnership 
14 agreement And mat partnership agreement provided that mere 
15 wouldbeS20,000ofininirance,anditwouldbeiisedto--be 
16 used to give to the survivors, to the family of either partner, 
17 should they pass away; and then the other partner would 
18 automatically get the business. That's the way they intended 
19 it They intended it so that the surviving partner would have 
20 the business, and the family would have all of the insurance 
21 proceeds. 
22 On January 25th of '84, there was an amendment to mat 
23 agreement in only one way, and mat was that the amount of 
24 insurance was bumped up, $100,000. 
25 What happened subsequent to mat and the reason mat me 
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1 mat makes sense under the circumstances and facts in which the 
2 parties found themselves at the time. 
3 What docs not mala sense is the pattern of facts that will 
4 be expressed by Mr. Parduhn, mat somehow up until that point 
5 bom of the partners thought it was a rcaUy important thing 
6 for the surviving partner to have the business, for their 
7 family to have the insurance. But at that point in time, 
8 somehow for some reason everything changed and it was 
9 Mr. Buchi's intent that if he passed away, not his family, but 
10 his partner would get all of the insurance proceeds; or at 
11 least the excess above a hundred thousand dollars depending on 
12 which point in time, I guess, that you ask Mr. Parduhn. 
13 That doesn't make sense, ft doesn't make sense that 
14 Mr. Buchi -
15 MR HSHBURN: Your Honor, may I just interpose an 
16 objection? I hate to do this in opening argument, but my 
17 understanding is that's for preview of fact I mink when we 
18 get into comments over "what makes sense," "what doesn't make 
19 sense," that's clearly argument and should be reserved. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fishburn. 
21 I think - I ' l l try to discern the difference. 
22 But, Mr. Tanner, just try to restrict yourself to what you 
23 intend to prove. 
24 MR TANNER: I will do that, Your Honor. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 MR TANNER: There was no writing. There is a void on 
2 that issue, that somehow there was a change to the contract in 
3 the way that Mr. Parduhn claims. 
4 Further bolstering our position are several important 
5 facts, and that is that during Lisa Buchi's subsequent divorce 
6 from her husband, the judge at the time, Judge Michael Murphy, 
7 ordered that the entire $300,000 policy remain unencumbered. 
8 Why would he do that if it were a policy that were solely for 
9 the benefit, not of the family, but for the partner? 
10 Further, bolstering our position the facts will show that 
11 the children involved here, Allison Buchi and Natalie Buchi, 
12 remember their father telling them that if anything happened to 
13 him, they would be taken care of by a $300,000 insurance 
14 policy. 
15 Subsequently, Mr. Buchi passed away. There are arguments 
16 about the important timing of his passing. Suffice it to say 
17 that the facts will show that the business was in the process 
18 of being sold, but as Mr. Fishburn has stated, there were a 
19 number of business dealings that have yet to be wound up even 
20 at this late date. 
21 And in the absence of an agreement between the partners to 
22 the contrary - and there is also a void on this specific point 
23 - the partnership agreement would certainly control the 
24 winding up process of the business. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tanner. 
Page 15 
1 significant amount of wrapping up that neodod to be done. 
2 There had been no decision as to how these insurance policies 
3 would be dealt with, for example. And, indeed, after 
4 Mr. Buchi's death, Mr. Parduhn operated the residual assets of 
5 the corporation as if he were, in fact, the sole owner of those 
6 assets. And if there would not have been an effective buy/sell 
7 agreement, he would have had a half interest instead of total 
8 interest and total control 
9 There is evidence that is admissible and clearly 
10 demonstrates the intent of the parties with reference to the 
11 larger total amount of the buy/sell agreement and the $300,000 
12 policy. That is the application to the policy itself. 
13 Now, the policy by its terms, and the application by its 
14 terms both state that the forms of the policy, the terms of the 
15 policy, the declaration paid to the policy and the application 
16 for the policy are part of the policy. And we have, in the 
17 application for die policy, signed statements by both 
18 Mr. Parduhn and Mr. Buchi. 
19 I show this to the Court because it has now been received 
20 in evidence under the stipulation that Mr. Fishburn announced 
21 as we commenced today. And with reference to each of these 
22 gentlemen, they signed that they were applying for this 
23 insurance for the purpose of buy/sell partners, and that is on 
24 both policies. 
25 Given that admissible clear intent of the parties, the 
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1 Mr. Dunn. 
2 MR. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, in this opening 
3 statement I intend to be fairly brief. First, I don't feel the 
4 necessity to reiterate what was said by Mr. Tanner, almost all 
5 of winch I agree with. And though it is my opinion that this 
6 case is controlled by the statutes, I am not going to argue the 
7 statute in the opening statement I'd just like to address the 
8 facts that I think legitimately can come before the Court 
9 Number one, this is a simple, simple case. There will in 
10 my opinion, be numerous attempts to introduce into evidence 
11 inadmissible bits and pieces of evidence that really do not go 
12 to the question of whether or not this buy/sell agreement 
13 insurance should go to the heirs of Brad Buchi, which was its 
14 intent 
15 I intend to raise those objections during the course of 
16 the trial because the evidence that is proposed with reference 
17 to a number of items really makes no difference to the decision 
18 that this Court has to make, and is irrelevant in many, many 
19 respects. 
20 Without going into those particulars and anticipating what 
21 might be introduced or attempted to be introduced which is 
22 inadmissible, I would like to address what Mr. Fishburn said in 
23 his opening statement about the service stations being sold, 
24 they're still paying the bills. 
25 The facts will demonstrate thattherc was still a 
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1 rest of this case is simply residual. By "residual/' I mean, 
2 that the intent of the parties is clearly shown by the 
3 documents. We don't have to go searching about through 
4 testimony that somebody can remember from some time about 
5 hearing from Mr. Buchi, what his intent might have been; which, 
6 1 suggest, may be objectionable. 
7 We don't have to go from the documents. But if we need 
8 to, we can. And that will prove the point equally as welL 
9 Given the evidence in this case, we'll take the position 
10 at the close of the matter that there really is no alternative 
11 but to do what these gentlemen had intended to do from the 
12 beginning and with each successive change, and that is to 
13 comply with the law. 
14 Indeed, Mr. Buchi testified in his deposition that he was 
15 told by the agent, when they went in and made the application 
16 for this policy, that it had to go down as a buy/sell agreement 
17 between those partners because that was the way the law 
18 required them to do it And, in fact, that is true. 
19 MR. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT. Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
21 Mr. Fishburn, call your first witness. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: Just one moment if I may? 
23 Plaintiff willcall Glade Parduhn as his first witness. 
24 THE COURT, step forward, Mr. Parduhn. i 
25 i 
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GLADE PARDUHN, called as a witness on 
his own behalf, after having been duly sworn, testified as 
follows: 
MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, if I may put the notebook with 
the original exhibits in front — deliver that to the witness. 
Is that acceptable? 
THE COURT, certainly. 
DIRECT EXAMIHATION 
BY MR. FISHBURN: 
Q. Would you please state your full name for the record, 
please? 
A. Glade Leon Parduhn. 
Q. Mr. Parduhn, where do you live? 
A. Sandy. 
Q. And how old are you? 
A. Fifty-seven. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To whom? 
A. Nedra. 
Q. And is she in the courtroom? 
A. Yes, she is. 
Q. When did you and Nedra get married? 
Don't blow this, Glade. 
A. June 10th, 1968. 
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Q. Are you currently employed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. By whom? 
A. Alta View Hres & Service. 
Q. What do you do as a job at Alta View Tires Sales & 
Service? 
A. Just maintenance, repair, auto repair, tire 
salesman. 
Q. Okay. Are you paid a wage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any ownership interest in that business? 
A No, sir. . 
Q. Who did you work for prior to Alta View? 
A Vera Madsen. 
Q. And what was the nature of that job? 
A Same. Same business, same location. 
Q. Oh, okay. 
A It was sold, and I stayed on with the new ownership. 
Q. So, your job was the same, just under a different 
20 owner? | 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Correct. 
Q. How long did you work for Vera Madsen? : 
A Two years. ! 
Q. Who did you work for before Vera Madsen? h 
A Self-employed : 
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Q. As what? 
A Service station operators. 
Q. Okay. And that was what location? 
A University Texaco, South Temple; Olympus Cove 
Chevron, Wasatch Boulevard 
Q. Mr. Parduhn, did you graduate from high school? J 
A Yes. 
Q. From - J 
A American Fork. 1 
Q. And when? 1 
A '62. 
Q. You - all of this job experience you mentioned so 1 
far has been in the service station business; is that correct? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. During high school, did you work in the service 1 
station business? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. And what did you do during that period? 1 
A Same thing. 1 
Q. After high school did you work in the service station 
business? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you serve in the military? 1 
AYes,Idid. 
Q. What branch of service? 1 
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A Army. 1 
Q. What were the years of service? 1 
A May of'66 through May of'68. 1 
Q. And do you recall what your rank was? 1 
A I come out as a staff sergeant 1 
Q. Did you receive an honorable discharge? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. Did you serve overseas? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. Where? 
A Vietnam. 1 
Q. And what did you do there? J 
A I was on tanks on the DMZ. 1 
Q. After you were discharged from the military, the 1 
army, what did you do in terms of providing yoursdf a living? 1 
A After I got back from Vietnam? J 
Q. Right J 
A I went to work for Roy Palmer and Vera Madsen. 1 
Q. That's the same Vera Madsen you just mentioned a 1 
moment ago? 1 
A Yes. 
Q. And, again, that was in the service station business? 1 
A Sugarhouse, yes. 1 
Q. Now, there was a point in which you entered into a 1 
25 partnership with Brad Buchi, correct? 1 
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1 A. Yes. 
I 2 Q. Could you just briefly recant for the Court your 
I 3 employment history starting with Vern Madsen after discharge 
1 4 from the army and entering into a partnership with Brad Buchi? 
I 5 A. I went into business for myself for awhile, a couple 
I 6 of years, two years. And then Brad approached me and wanted me 
I 7 to come in partnership with him. 
I 8 Q. Okay. Who were you work - you say you were working 
I 9 for yourself. What do you mean by that? 
110 A. I had a service station in Sugarhouse, also. 
111 Q. Did you own that station? 
|12 A. I was leasing it, yes. 
113 Q. But you operated it yourself? 
14 A. Yes. 
115 Q. During this time period you made the acquaintance of 
116 Brad Buchi; is that correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
118 Q. How was it that you came to know Brad Buchi? 
119 A. Well, through the business, really, and his father, 
120 which was a service station operator. And I had a front end 
121 machine, and he used to run his cars up, his customers' cars. 
122 And I'd align them for him. We just got to be friends. 
123 Q. And then there came a time in which you went into 
124 business with Brad Buchi; is that correct? 
|25 A. Yes. 
Page 
I 1 Q. And do you recall when that was? 
2 A. '79. 
I 3 Q. How - okay, how did it come about that the two of 
I 4 you decided to go into a partnership? 
I 5 A. He just come to me and wanted me for a partner to 
I 6 help him run the service station cm South Temple. 
1 7 Q. Had either you or Brad before that worked for one 
8 another? 
I 9 A. Brad did work for me a couple of - well, Fm going 
110 to say, probably three weeks while he was working with his 
111 father. They got in a little spat, and he come down and worked 
112 for me for about three weeks. 
13 Q. Okay. 
114 A. That was before he married Lisa. They were going 
15 together at the time. 
116 Q. Let me direct your attention to - in the notebook in 
17 front o f y o u - t o Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1. Would you please 
18 take a look at that? 
19 A. Okay. 
20 Q. Now, you recognize this document, correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And this would be a partnership agreement that you 
123 and Brad prepared and signed; is that right? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And you and Brad's signature appears on Page 3 of 
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1 that agreement, correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Now, what was the basic business purpose of your 
4 partnership to be? 
5 A. To run Shell gas, auto repairs. 
6 Q. Okay. At that time, in 1979, at the time Jthis 
7 agreement was entered into, what stations or station did the 
8 partnership own? 
9 A. One, up on Wasatch - or South Temple, Ninth East 
110 Q. And then that was the University Texaco Station; is 
111 that correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Now, did the partnership thereafter, after 1979, 
14 acquire an interest in any other stations? ( ^ 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Could you just summarize for the Court what stations, 
17 through its history, that the partnership you recall had an 
18 interest in? 
119 A. Wdl, we leased a station on Vine Street and 13th j 
20 East for a few years. And then we purchased a property on 
21 Simpson Avenue in Sugarhouse and ran it for a couple of years. 
22 Sold it And then we acquired the Olympus Cove Chevron. 
23 Q. Do you recall the approximate date that you acquired 
24 the Chevron? 
25 A.'84--1 can't really remember. I can't put a date on 
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I l that 
2 Q. Okay. Did you own the Chevron and Texaco stations in 
3 1989? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And did you own them in 1997? I 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. How would - with the recognition that this relation I 
8 - this may have changed over time, how would you describe the I 
9 allocation of responsibilities in the partnership between you ] 
110 and Brad, who did what? I 
111 A. Wdl, Brad was the money man, he would be the I 
12 business end of it, and I would basically just the PR man as I 
13 far as taking care of customers and what have you. I 
I14 Q. Okay, day to day, who had the responsibilities for I 
15 what items? I 
16 A. Same, Brad had the (Inaudible) bookkeeping and - I 
17 Q. Okay. Did one of - who had the primary I 
18 responsibility for running the Texaco Station? I 
19 A. WeU, he was, he was running the Texaco. I was I 
120 running Ac Olympus Cove Chevron. I 
21 Q. Pram 1979 to 1997, what were the principal sources of 
22 partnership income? How did you make money? I 
23 A. Selling gas, auto repairs, tires, shop; whatever, you j 
24 know, service station, automobile related. j 
25 Q. Okay. Let me direct your attention back to Exhibit I 
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1 No. 1, if I may. That's the partnership agreement And could 
2 you turn to the last page? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Now, on the last page of the partnership agreement, 
there's some typewritten material at the top, two signatures, 
typewritten material at the bottom and more signatures; do you 
see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The information at the bottom, do you remember when 
that was added? Was that added later? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember when it was added? i 
A. I can't remember for sure, no. I can't put a date on 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
u 
12 
13 
14 it 
15 
16 
Q. Do you recall who prepared the language? 
A. I can't answer that Maybe Marv, Brad's brother, 
17 which was an attorney. 
18 Q. But that's speculation? 
19 A. That's speculation. L.. 
20 Q. Do you recall why there were four signatures down 
21 below? 
22 A. I can't remember why we had to have four signatures 
23 there. 
24 Q. There is a recitation at Line 5 in that bottom part 
25 that says, "Both parti©; are insured for $20,000." Do you see 
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1 Q. Do you recall what company issued those policies? 
2 A. Northern, I believe. 
3 Q. And do you recall who took the application? 
4 A. Sheldon Hansen. 
5 Q. Now, that was in 1984; is that correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Now, in 1989, did you and Brad each purchase 
8 additional insurance on the lire of each other? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And who - what company issued the 1989 policies? 
11 A. Is that the big policy we are talking about, or... 
12 Q. Of 300 and 250. 
13 A. Northern Life. 
14 Q. And who took the applications, if you recall? 
15 A. Sheldon Hansen. 
16 Q. What happened to the two pohcies that were purchased 
17 in 1984? 
18 A. I took the one over that was on Brad's life. He 
19 signed that over to myself. And I made my wife beneficiary, 
20 which I still own. 
21 Q. Okay. Do you know what happened to the other policy? 
22 A. I believe Lisa took it I think Now, I'm not going 
23 to - that's speculation, bm I do think she had it 
24 Q. Do you recall the reason why you and Brad decided to 
25 get two additional new pohcies in 1989? 
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that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember if you and Brad each got the policies 
of $20,000 on each other's life? 
A. We probably did, yes. I don't have it now. 
Q. Okay. Let me direct your attention next to what's 
been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2. And do you recognize 
8 this as basically some handwriting on a note pad? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you, in fact, sign at the bottom of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you witness Brad Buchi sign? 
A. I don't know if I was there when he signed it and 
14 wrote that up or not That is Brad's signature and Brad's 
15 writing. 
16 Q. You recognize the handwriting? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. In nine - now, this is dated 1984, January, is that 
19 to the best of your recollection approximately the date this 
20 was signed? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Do you recall whether or not you and Brad, at that 
23 *my% purchased a hundred thousand insurance pohcies on each 
24 other's life in the amount of a hundred thousand dollars? 
25 A.Yes,wedid. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 A. Well, we were making a little bit more money at the 
2 time, and we decided just to get bigger pohcies on each 
3 other. And we went to Sheldon, or he come to us. And the way 
4 it worked out is to keep the payments equal, as close as we 
5 could, is how we had to - what the split difference was on the 
6 pohcies. 
7 Q. Okay. Is that the reason, in your recollection, that 
8 the amounts of the two insurance pohcies were different? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. At the time that you and Brad acquired the new 
11 pohcies or applied for them in January of 1989, did you again 
12 amend the terms of the original buy/sdl agreement as amended 
13 in 1984? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Did you sign any writings in 1989 or thereafter that 
16 you recall which purported to amend the terms of the buy/sell 
17 agreement? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Do you recall ever discussing with Brad raising the 
20 buy-out commitment to more than a hundred thousand dollars if 
21 the partnership should be dissolved by the death of a partner? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did you ever agree to pay more than a hundred 
24 thousand dollars to purchase Brad's partnership interest if the 
25 partnership dissolved because of Brad's death? j 
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MR. DUNN: Objection; calls for a conclusion; addresses 
the ultimate issue in the case. 
MR. TANNER: join the objection. 
THE COURT: I think - restate the question. I think the 
question was, "Did you" -
MR. FISHBURN: I think the question - 1 think the 
question was: "Did you ever agree" -
THE COURT: (inaudible). He can certainly answer what his 
intent was. And I thought thatfs what you asked him. So, Pllj 
overrule the objection. 
MR. FISHBURN: Well, just to repeat the question: Did you 
12 ever agree to pay more than a hundred thousand dollars to 
13 purchase Brad's partnership interest if the partnership was 
14 dissolved because of Brad Buchi's death? 
A. No. 
MR. DUNN: Your Honor, that calls for a legal conclusion, 
as well. 
MR. TANNER: same objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. I think he can tell us his intent, 
which is the way I interpret what he's saying. 
MR. FISHBURN: Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs 
22 Exhibit No. 3. And I believe this has already been received, 
23 so just very quickly: Mr. Parduhn, on Exhibit No. 3, do you 
24 recognize this? It's a policy that was issued by Northern life 
25 Insurance on Brad Buchi's life? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
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1 about; is that correct? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q. And that was an insurance policy on you; is that 
4 right? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q. And in which case application made was for Brad to be 
7 the owner and the beneficiary of mat policy? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q. And, again, the information, at least in terms of 
10 answers to the questions, does that appear to you to be Brad's 
11 writing? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Brad's writing? 
14 A No, it's all Sheldon's writing. 
15 Q. And men on mis policy you signed as a proposed 
16 insured rather than the applicant; is mat correct? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q. Now, in 1989 when these last two policies were 
19 applied for - wdl, first of all, they were applied for in 
20 January of 1989; is mat consistent with your recollection? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q. Is your recollection the policies were, in fact, 
23 issued by Northern life Insurance? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q. At that time was Brad still married to Lisa Buchi? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q. And at the end of this exhibit there is a three-page 
3 application; do you recognize that? Well, four pages of 
4 application. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And you did sign the application in this case as the . 
7 applicant; is that correct? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. There's - the handwriting here in terms of 
10 information on the partner - or on the application starting 
11 with the "Proposed Insured" on Page 1; is that your j 
12 handwriting? 
13 A. Whereabouts are we? 
14 Q. Well, just starting right at die first of the 
15 application, going through all these answers to the 
16 questions -
17 A. Okay. 
18 Q. - written answers; is that yours? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. You did have - or sign it after it was filled out, 
21 correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit 
24 No. 4. Now, that consists of the application. This is the 
25 other policy that we have been talking about, had been talking 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q. At the same time as you and Brad in 1989 applied for 
3 policies on each other's lives, were you at mat time aware 
4 that Lisa and Brad at the same time applied for $250,000 
5 insurance on Brad's life with Lisa? 
6 MR. DUNN: objection; relevance, materiality. 
7 MR. TANNER: Join the objection. 
8 THE COURT: overruled 
9 MR. HSHBURN: At that time, were you aware that there was 
10 an application for a third policy or second policy on Brad 
11 Buchi's life? 
12 A No, I was not aware of mat 
13 Q. Up until what date did the partnership operate its 
14 service stations as a business? 
15 A. Until -well, actually, July 13th, 1997. Wewentto 
16 closing, the title company, Associated Title, July 14th. 
17 Q. And what happened on July 14th? 
18 A That was the closing. That was where we all met at 
19 the title company. Or we were supposed to. I made it there. 
20 Q. What was the fate of the service stations on that 
21 date? What happened to mem? 
22 A They were sold. 
23 Q. To whom? 
24 A Blackett Oil Company. 
25 Q. To the best of your recollection, when did the 
T1TT T XT* n r A xr n / v r 
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1 partnership or its partners first undertake efforts to sell the 
I 2 station? 
3 A. Probably six, seven months prior. 
4 Q. And why? 
5 A. We were going broke. 
I 6 Q. And what do you mean by "going broke"? 
1 7 A. We were running out of money. 
I 8 Q. Were you facing any other pressures from third 
9 parties? 
110 A. Yes. 
111 Q. Such as? 
12 A. The bank was. ready to foreclose on us. 
113 Q. Let me direct your attention to what's been marked as 
14 - a second - Exhibit No. 28. 
15 A. Twenty«ght? 
116 Q. Yes. Do you recognize this as a letter dated April 
17 30th, 1997? 
18 A. Yes. 
119 Q. Addressed to University Texaco? 
20 A. Yes. 
121 Q. And you recall having received this letter? 
22 A. Yes. 
123 Q. Was this letter, to your recollection, received in 
124 the ordinary course of business? 
|25 A. Yes. 
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I 1 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, I would move mat mis exhibit 
I 2 be received 
I 3 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, Til object on me basis of 
I 4 materiality and relevance. This is beyond the scope of the 
I 5 stipulation mat was signed yesterday as to what would be 
I 6 covered during this phase of the trial. This isn't relevant to 
I 7 determining whether or not tbe buy/sell agreement was 
I 8 enforceable, nor is it relevant to determining who is entitled 
I 9 to the proceeds of the life insurance policy. 
10 MR. TANNER: I would join me objection, Your Honor. We 
111 are here to determine S]xcificalry what is the meaning and 
112 import of me buy/sdl cigrcement and me insurance policy. And 
13 we are now far afield of that 
114 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, what we reserved was accounting 
115 issues. This is not being offered for an accounting issue. 
16 It's simply being introduced to present part of the pictureto 
17 the Court that there was a sale. It was a sale under 
18 circumstances wheretbere was default pending. It is just part 
119 of the circumstances mat led up to the decision to sell the 
20 stations. 
121 THEOOURT: I don't think we are too far afield. Iwill 
122 overrule the objection. Twenty-eight is received. 
23 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 28 admitted.) 
24 MR. FISHBURN: Now, I believe you indicated that 
125 Associated Title handled the closing of the sale? 
•^-•nr- r^ • • • www * w^ *imv% A M *% S A A*\.M*% A T A A A T O H 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And me last date in which business was done as a 
3 service station was July 13th, 1997; is that correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Now, on that date Brad Buchi was still alive; is that 
6 correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Did the partnership conduct any business in terms -
9 after July 14th, 1997? 
10 MR. DUNN: objection. Lacks specificity. It is vague and 
11 ambiguous as currently asked; may be interpreted as calling for 
12 a conclusion. 
13 THE COURT: I'll sustain i t 
114 Why don't you rephrase it? 
15 MR. FISHBURN: Okay. 
16 Well, let me just ask you this - let's just back up -
17 you've indicated you operated the service station business up 
18 until about July 13th, 1997, correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And men on July 14th the service stations were sold 
21 to Blackett Oil Company, correct? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. What did you and Brad as partners men do in terms of 
24 the partnership after the sale? 
125 A. Well, I was trying to get ahold of Brad, which was 
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1 like pulling teem. I didn't ever locate him, find him. He I 
2 would never answer my phone calls. I 
3 MR. DUNN: objection. Move to strike. Non-iesponsive to I 
4 the question. I 
5 MR. TANNER: Join the objection. I 
6 THEOOURT: overruled. I 
7 THE WITNESS: I needed all of his signatures on all my I 
8 outstanding bills, our outstanding bills, before I 
9 Title would cut checks. I 
10 I did meet with Brad. He finally come to my home. I'm I 
111 thinking it was right around the 4th or 5th of August And he I 
12 did make an appearance. He signed, initialed a lot of, lot of I 
113 bills I did have ready for payment But mere was still a lot I 
14 of outstanding cuws that I m'dn't get him to irntiaL And I 
115 mat's when I got ma mess with lawsuits a n d - I 
16 MR. FISHBURN: okay. Now, were mere some bills that were ] 
17 approved for payment by both you and Brad? I 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Were you able to approve all of what you understood ( 
20 to be the outstanding bills? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Was there any money left over after the payment of I 
23 lien holders and mortgages following the sale of the j 
24 partnership? I 
25 A. I think there was about 100,000. 
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Q. And what was done with that money? 
MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor. That's not relevant to 
this portion of this case. The stipulation as mentioned before 
is to - that this case is to address the buy/sell agreement 
and the question of who's entitled to proceeds of the policy, 
not how much there was residual in the business and who is 
entitled to it 
THE COURT: overruled. I think there is - still is an 
issue as to when the partnership was over. I'll hear it in 
10 that regard. 
Overruled. 
MR. FISHBURN: i forgot the question. I'm sorry. 
A. How much money was left over. 
Q. Well, my question, really, was - well, regardless of 
15 how much, what was done with that money that was left over? 
A. It is sitting still at Associated Title. 
Q. Okay. Was that held by Associated Title? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there money still held by Associated Title? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Subsequent to July 14th, do you recall if the 
22 partnership has generated any income? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Has there been any income associated with escrow 
25 account at Associated? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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1 A. - Guardian State Bank -
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. - Snap On TooL 
4 Q. Okay. Have those lawsuits been resolved? 
5 A. All except one, I think 
6 Q. Okay. And do you recall any other lawsuits filed by 
7 the partnership after the stations were sold? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit 
10 No. 11. First of all, is your signature on Page 2? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And also the signature of Mr. Buchi? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And do you recognize what this document is? Can you 
15 identify it for the Court? 
16 A. That is the Associated Title's report of where the 
17 money was distributed. 
18 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, move for admission of 
19 PlaintifFsExhibitNo.il. 
20 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, we do have an objection as 
21 previously stated as to relevance and materiality. We don't 
22 think this is part of the issue currently before the Court 
23 MR. TANNER: I would join the objection. 
24 THE COURT: All right That's overruled; 11 is received. 
25 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 11 admitted.) 
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A. I don't understand that question. 
Q. Okay. Has there been any income relative to that 
account itself? 
A. No. 
Q. What other activities have you - first of all, has 
there been litigation involving the partnership after July 
14th, 1997, the partnership? 
MR. DUNN: Again, Your Honor, it is not relevant to this 
inquiry. 
THE COURT. Overruled I think it is. 
THE WITNESS: say that question again. 
MR. FISHBURN: Okay. After the stations were sold — 
A. Yes. 
Q. - after that date, has the partnership been involved 
15 in litigation? Lawsuits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall the partnership having been sued? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall the entities which sued the partnership 
after the sale of the stations? 
A. Tlie people you mean or -
Q. The Plaintiffs, yes. 
A. Ohio Casualty — let's see, who was it? One of the 
24 insurance - or a lien company, Republic Leasing -
25 Q. Okay. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Page 40 
1 MR. FISHBURN: Do you recall about when Brad Buchi died? 
2 A. I believe it was August 8th, 7th or 8A. 
3 Q. Subsequent to his death, did you make a claim for 
4 insurance proceeds? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And who did you direct that claim to? 
7 A. Northern Life. 
8 Q. And what was the response to the claim that you made? 
9 A, They put a hold on it 
10 Q. Why did you make a claim for that insurance? 
11 A. I was the beneficiary of the policy. 
12 MR FISHBURN: NO further questions. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fishburn. 
14 Cross-examination, Mr. Tanner. 
15 MR. TANNER: Sure. 
16 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR TANNER: 
18 Q. Mr.Parduhn, you indicated that the way you started 
19 to work in the partnership capacity with Mr. Buchi was that he 
20 came to you and asked if you would like to work for him; is 
21 that correct? 
22 A. Go into partners with him. 
23 Q. Correct Okay. And at that point in time did 
24 Mr. Buchi already own the Texaco station? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you pay anything for your portion of the 
2 partnership interest at that point? 
3 A. I took over some; obligations that he owed. 
4 Q. Okay. And subsequent to that you entered into this 
5 partnership agreement, which is - is Exhibit 1; is mat 
6 correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. And thee later on you bumped up the amount of 
9 insurance and both you and Brad signed Exhibit 2, is that 
10 correct, indicating that the amount of insurance had been 
11 bumped up in connection with the buy/sell agreement; is that 
12 true? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. Let me ask you if you would take a look at the 
15 very last page of Exhibit 1, if you would, please. That's 
16 where, I believe, all four of you-and by'four of you" I'm 
17 talking about you, your partner and your wives - at the time 
18 wound up signing? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. It indicates there that,'In the event of the death 
21 of either of the partners, Brad - Brad K. Buchi or Glade L. 
22 Parduhn, that the partnership will end and all obligations to 
23 the deceased's survivors financially will be released by paying 
24 off the deceased person's survivors." 
25 What did that mean to you at the time? 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you ever amend that language in the 
2 partnership agreement at any point in time? 
3 MR. FISHBURN: objection in terms of clarity, which 
4 portion. 
5 THE COURT: why don't you rephrase that 
6 MR. TANNER: okay. Let me try a little bit better. 
7 At any point in time did you and Mr. Buchi change the 
8 language in mis agreement to provide that on somebody's - on 
9 your death or his death something different would happen to the 
10 money man it would be provided to the survivor - or the 
11 family of the deceased? Did you ever change the writing? 
12 A. On the handwritten one. 
13 Q. Okay. And what does the handwritten one say mere? 
14 How would mat change? What would happen? 
15 A. Well, on mis one says: 
16 "The partnership agreement has 
17 the following agreement for insurance: 
18 The buy/sell insurance will be 100,000 in 
19 the event of death of either partner. 
20 "The main partner shall pay 
21 100,000 to the survivors of the deceased 
22 with the proceeds of the $100,000 life 
23 insurance policy which each cany on each 
24 other." 
25 Q. Rigfrt 
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A. If Brad died I'd give his family $20,000,1 guess. 
Q. Okay. And the next portion down there indicates that 
there is a $20,000 pollicy on each, and then the next sentence 
says: 
"When the survivors receive their 
$20,000, they release the other partner 
of any obligation in the business. The 
surviving partner will own the business 
and may do with the business as he sees 
fit" 
Do you see that language? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what did that mean to you at the time? 
A. Same thing, what it says. 
Q. Okay. So, if at that point in time Brad had died, 
16 what would you have done with the $20,000 on his life? 
17 A. Give it to his family. 
Q. And what would have happened with the business? 
A I have no idea. 
Q. What does it say in this language here that would 
happen ~ 
A. That I could sell it or run it 
Q. But, basically, it would be yours to do with as you 
24 saw fit, correct? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 A Amen. That's it 
2 Q. Okay. So, basically - and on the original 
3 partnership agreement if somebody died, their family would get 
4 all of the proceeds of the policy, correct? 
5 A. Up to $100,000 right thar-
6 Q. Wdt I'm talking -
7 A. - i n 1984. 
8 Q. I'm talking about Exhibit 1, now, I'm sorry. Let me 
9 be a little more clear. In Exhibit 1, which was the original 
10 partnership agreement, one of you dies, the other, the 
11 surviving partner has to pay your family all of the proceeds; 
12 is that correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. And in Exhibit 2, which is the amendment, mat 
15 happens as well; does it not? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. And I guess my question boils down to mis: 
18 Did you and Brad ever write down somewhere that when one of you 
19 died your family would only get part of the insurance money? 
20 Did you ever write something like that down anywhere? 
21 A No. 
22 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
23 Do you know why you didn't write that down? 
24 A No. I 
25 Q. Okay. In the application that you filled out for the 
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1 $300,000 policy on Brad's life - do you see that document in 
2 front of you, Mr. Parduhn? 
A. Which one are we on? What.. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 3, Mr. Parduhn, toward the end of it. 
MR. TANNER: Exhibit 3. I'd like to ask you to take a 
look at item 31. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Okay, it talks about the ownership section? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then there's a little "A, B, C, D, E, P . Do you 
see "Item P there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Does it not indicate that the purpose of the 
14 insurance and nature of your insurable interest — does it not 
15 say "buy/sell" there? 
A. It does. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Slash "partner." 
Q. Okay. And does the buy/sell portion there that's 
indicated refer to this buy/sell agreement that we've just been 
talking about? 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. What other buy/sell agreement would it refer to, sir? 
A. I'm not saying a buy/sell, just partnership insurance 
16 
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1 Q. Do you recall that the reason that you bumped up the 
2 amounts on everyone's life to $300,000 being at the insistence 
3 of Brad's wife, Lisa? 
4 A. No, 1 did not know that 
5 Q. Would that surprise you if that were the case? 
6 A. It wouldn't surprise me, no. 
7 MR. TANNER: Okay. 
8 I have nothing further of this witness. 
9 MR. DUNN: May I, YOUT Honor? 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn. 
11 MR. DUNN: Thank you. 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. DUNN: 
14 Q. Mr. Parduhn, it was, in fact, the partnership that 
15 paid for the premiums on both the policy on your life and me 
16 policy on Brad's life, correct? 
17 A. Correct 
18 Q. Direct deposits out of the accounts of the 
19 partnership, correct? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Those policies continued to be paid for right up to 
22 Brad's fife on his policy; did they not? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And that was after this sale to Blackctt Oil Company, 
25 correct? 
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Q. So, you don't think it has any reference to the 
buy/sell agreement even though it says "buy/sell"? 
A. Not on the big policy, no. 
Q. Okay. 
A. We never talked about that Only thing me and Brad 
discussed on that ~ 
MR. DUNN: objection to any discussions involved with 
Mr. Buchi. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parduhn, just answer his question as best 
1 
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10 as you can. 
11 THE WITNESS: Excuseme. 
12 THE COURT: It's all right. 
13 MR. TANNER: okay. You signed this, didn't you, on the 
14 next page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you read it before you signed it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew it said "buy/sell" at the time you signed 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 You can't explain what other buy/sell agreement it might 
23 have reference to than the one that would provide payment to 
24 the survivors of the family? 
25 A. No. 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Didn't it - didn't it continue to pay your policy, 
3 as well? 
4 A. The policy -
5 Q. The policy on your life? 
6 A. Whatever was left in the cash value was making the 
7 payments; the businesses was not 
8 Q. Do you recall testifying in your deposition, which 
9 was taken on March 3rd of the Year 2000, when asked: 
10 "Do you know when the last 
11 premium payment was made on the life 
12 insurance policies, the one on your life 
13 for 200,000 and the one on Brad's life 
14 for 300,000?" 
15 Your answer then, was it not: 
16 "Well, the one on my life is 
17 probably still being paid. There was 
18 some equity in it or some cash value. 
19 The other one on Brad's life, I don't 
20 know/ 
21 That's the way you testified, correct? 
22 A. I could have said that. 
23 Q. You went on to say that there were automatic 
24 withdrawals. And then the response to the question: I 
25 "Were they automatically 
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withdrawn from both the Chevron account 
and the Texaco account?" 
You answered: "Yes." Correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then to the question: 
"At the tune of the sale of the 
business, did you or Brad execute any 
kind o f " -
Well, that's actually a new question. But the policy 
continued to be paid for right up until Mr. Buchi's death, 
correct, on the policy relative to his life? 
A. Apparently. 
Q. And the policy on your life was continued to be paid 
for some substantial time after that, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It's true, is it not, that you and Brad never signed 
17 any kind of a partnership dissolution document? 
A I don't understand what you are trying to ask me. 
Q. Did you and Brad ever sign a partnership dissolution 
agreement or document? 
A. No. 
Q. There is nothing in writing that says the partnership 
was dissolved, is there? 
A. I thought when you sold a business that dissolved the 
25 partnership. I don't know. I -
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1 MR. DUNK: (Handing) I'd like to ask you if you have had 
2 occasion to see that document on any prior occasion? 
3 A. The only time I seen it was right here and during the 
4 deposition. 
5 Q. So, the only time you've seen it is today -
6 A. No, I've seen it -
7 Q. - and on the occasion of your deposition on March -
8 A. I seen it the day I -
9 Q. - 2000? 
10 A. - the day I signed it in 1984,25 January. The 
11 bottom part was not attached to this. 
12 Q. Hie bottom part is what I'd like to address your 
13 attention to. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, let me pause just a moment here. 
15 You referred him to Exhibit 3? 
16 MR. DUNN: Yes, for -
17 THE COURT: Defendants' Exhibit 3? 
18 MR. DUNN: Correct 
19 THE COURT: How are we - are we calling them Plaintiff's 
20 1,2 and 10 and Defendants' 1,2 and 10? 
21 MR. DUNN: How were they marked? 
22 THE COURT: (inaudible) doing that? 
23 Okay, so you are showing him Defendants' Exhibit 3? 
24 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT: All right. 
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1 Q. But there's nothing in writing to dissolve it, 
2 correct? 
3 A. I guess. 
4 Q. Okay. You filed no documents with any governmental 
5 agency indicating that the partnership was dissolved, correct? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. At the time of Brad's death, it is also true that you 
8 had not decided how basse t s of the partnership would be 
9 divided, had you? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. That's correct, that you had not yet decided how the 
12 partnership assets would be divided? 
13 A. I didn't know if there was going to be any assets 
14 left after the bills were paid. 
15 Q. Okay. But there was never an agreement between you 
16 and Mr. Buchi as to how the assets of the partnership would be 
17 divided, was there? 
18 A No. 
19 Q. Do you have your deposition up there? 
20 A. No. 
21 MR. FISHBURN: I will gO get it 
22 MR. DUNN: okay. UA me draw your attention, if I could, 
23 to Exhibit No. 3 from Defendants' Exhibit l i s t You have -
24 May I approach, Your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. DUNN: Thank you. 
Defendants' Exhibit 3 is, Mr. Buchi (sic), similar to 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 with the exception of the additional 
handwritten note on the bottom quarter of the page; isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you read it, what it says there? I'm not asking 
you to read it at this moment, but can you read it? 
A. I can make it out 
Q. Okay. Does that appear to you to be in Brad's 
handwriting? 
A. You know, I don't think it is. 
Q. Can you identify the handwriting? 
A. No, I cannot 
Q. You cannot? 
A. No, I do not know who wrote that 
Q. Can you identify the handwriting at the top of the 
page? 
A. That's Brad's writing. 
Q. And you can identify that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you signed the document which has been received 
as part of the policy, specifically the application in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, on January, I think, that's 4th of 
1 9 8 9 -
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. - did you also at that time speak with the agent, 
3 Mr. Sheldon Carter? 
4 A. Hansen. 
5 Q. Hansen? 
6 A. I probably said something to him when he brought it 
7 up for me to sign. I don't know. 
8 Q. When he gave it - you did sign it, correct? 
9 A. I did. 
10 Q. And when you signed it, it bore that portion that 
11 says, "buy/sell/partner"? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And he told you at that time, did he not, that they i 
14 - that he had to put it in there so you could buy the policy 
15 on one another? 
16 A. I don't recall. 
17 Q. Do you remember in your deposition when you were 
18 asked was it: 
19 "Was that your understanding of 
20 what the purpose of these two insurance 
21 policies were as of that time?N 
22 And your answer was: 
23 "I think that we had to. Weil,I 
24 can't answer that. No, I think Sheldon 
25 put that there so we could get a policy 
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1 may, and then if you would read the response on Lines 24,25 
2 and 1 on 55. 
3 "Question: Was that your 
4 understanding of what the purpose of 
5 these two insurance policies were as of 
6 that time?" 
7 And what was your answer? 
8 A. "I think we had to. Well, I can't answer 
9 that, no. I think Sheldon put that there 
10 so we get the policies on each other." 
11 Q. So, Mr. Hansen explained to you that in order to buy 
12 a policy on another person's life such as Mr. Buchi, it had to 
13 be purchased, under the law, under a buy/sell agreement with 
14 the partnership, correct? That's what he told you, right? 
15 A. No, I -
16 MR. DUNN: No further questions, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT. All right. Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
18 Mr. Fishburn, any redirect? 
19 MR. FISHBURN: JUSt a COUple. 
20 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BV MR. FISHBURN: 
22 Q. Prior to the sale of the stations, the - or the 
23 partnership must have had some bank accounts, correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Have one or two checking accounts? 
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on each other." 
Isn't that correct? 
A. (Inaudible). 
MR. FISHBURN: objection, Your Honor, I think if we arc 
going to cross-examine over what was said in a deposition, 
there ought to be a reference to page number and line and -
MR. DUNN: Absolutely. 
MR. FISHBURN: - he ought to be able to look at it before 
he says, "yes" or "no," 'that's what I said." 
MR. DUNN: Page 54, Lines 21 through 25 and Page 55, Line 
1. 
MR. FISHBURN: (inaudible) again? 
A VOICE: Here's his original 
MR. DUNN: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DUNN: May we move to publish the deposition? 
THE COURT. Yes. 
MR. DUNN: And do you want to mark it (Inaudible) or not? 
THE COURT, GO ahead, Counsel 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. DUNN: May I, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you. 
As indicated on Page 54, Lines 21 through 25 and then on 
25 the top of Page 55,1 would-I'll read the question, if I 
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1 A. Two. 
2 Q. Were those attached to the two stations? 
3 Well, was one for one station, one for the other? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. After die stations were sold, what happened to those 
6 bank accounts? 
7 A. They were emptied 
8 Q. How soon after the sale? 
9 A. I can't answer. I think the Texaco account was — 
10 just ran itself out There was a little bit of money in it 
11 Q. To the best of your recollection after the sale of 
12 the stations, have any checks ever been drawn by the 
13 partnership to pay debts of the partnership? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Has there been held any money of the partnership in 
16 any account other than Associated Title Company? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. To the best of your recollection, have all the 
19 expenditures out of that account been with your approval, the 
20 Associated Title? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: No further questions. 
23 MR. DUNN: May I? 
24 
25 
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1 RECR0SS-EXAMINAT10N 
2 BY MR. DUNN: 
3 Q. Were every one of the withdrawals out of that account 
4 approved by the children of Brad Buchi or his wife? 
5 A. What account? 
6 Q. Associated Tide account. 
7 A I have no idea. 
8 Q. You are the one that approved them, right? You said 
9 "yes" or "no" on what would happen to the money in that 
10 account, didn't you? 
11 A. I had to sign, yes, for Associated Title -
12 Q. Okay. And who took the -
13 A. - and so did Brad 
14 Q. And Brad died? 
15 A. Brad signed. 
16 Q. And after -
17 A. Before he died. 
18 Q. Okay. And after he died were any funds distributed 
19 out of the Associated! Title account? 
20 A. The ones he signed and there was a few little, bitty 
21 ones on the lawsuits and what have you. 
22 Q. And you ran that, correct? 
23 A.Iranit? 
24 Q. You did that, correct 
25 You didn't consult with all of the Buchi children or with 
1 don't know exact 
2 Q. And you arc the ODC that controlled those funds, 
3 correct? 
4 A. Apparently. 
5 MR. DUNN: No further questions. 
6 MR. TANNER: Mr. Parduhn, I just had one follow-up. It's 
7 a bit of a hypothetical. Let's assume, then, instead of 
8 Mr. Buchi passing away that somehow it had been you that had 
9 passed away, what would you expect Mr. Buchi to have done with 
10 the insurance money on your life? Would that have been all 
11 his? Did you want him to get it? Or did you want it - would 
12 you have wanted it, intended it according to the policies to go 
13 to your wife, Nedra? 
14 MRFISHBURN: i object on the grounds it goes beyond the 
15 scope of redirect. 
16 MR. TANNER: He asked him questions about the policy. 
17 THE COURT: rll sustain the objection. 1 just don't 
18 think it is relevant 1 don't think it's helpful what his 
19 belief would be, Counsel 
20 MR. TANNER: okay. Nothing further. 
21 THE COURT: All right You can step down, Mr. Parduhn. 
22 Thank you. 
23 Counsel, let's take a brief recess for ten minutes. 
24 We'll resume at 11:05. 
25 (Recess) 
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1 Joanne Buchi, did you? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Okay. So, you operated on the basis that after 
4 Brad's death, you were the one that ran the partnership, 
5 correct? 
6 A. I was just trying to wind up affairs, trying to get 
7 this mess taken care of . 
8 Q. And you are the one that did the winding up, correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Without consultation with the heirs of Brad Buchi, 
11 correct? 
12 A. Correct 
13 Q. So, you took the business and ran it as if you had 
14 received it under the buy/sell agreement, didn't you? 
15 A. No. There was; not a business. The business was 
16 broke and gone. There was nothing to operate. All I was 
17 trying to do is tie up loose affairs. 
18 Q. You testified in your deposition there was a hundred 
19 thousand dollars in that account — 
20 A. Approximately. 
21 Q. - January of 2000,1 think? 
22 And it's - there are still assets in there, correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. It is not broke, then, right? It's got money, right? 
25 A. There is still a little money left, I believe. I 
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1 MR. FISHBURN: Plaintiff calls Larry Johnson, Your Honor. 
2 THECOURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Fishbum. 
3 MR. FISHBURN: Come right this way, sir. 
4 Please raise your right hand, be sworn in by the Clerk. 
5 LARRY JOHNSON, called as a witness on 
6 behalf of the Plaintiff, after having been duly sworn, 
7 testified as follows: 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. FISHBURN: 
10 Q. Could you state your name, please? 
11 A. Larry Johnson. 
12 Q. Mr. Johnson, where do you live? 
13 A. I live at 883 Spartan Drive in Sandy. 
14 Q. What is your occupation? 
15 A. Bookkeeper/Accountant 
16 Q. Do you work for someone else? 
17 A. Currently, I work for myself. 
18 Q. How long have you functioned in that self-employment 
19 capacity? 
20 A. Two years. 
21 Q. Who did you work for before that? 
22 A. I worked for two different individuals - Leroy Lee, 
23 who established an E.K. Williams franchise in the area. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. And then I worked for Delwin Cox, who bought that 
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1 franchise in 1990. 
2 Q. And during those two periods of employment, what was 
3 the nature of your job? 
4 A. I was the field representative for that firm. My job 
5 was to go out and pick up client's accounting work and bring it 
6 in and deliver it when it was finished 
7 Q. What kind of work do you do in your self-employed 
8 business currently? 
9 A. I do accounting, tax work. 
10 Q. How long have you been involved in accounting and tax 
11 work? 
12 A. Since 1973. 
13 Q. Has any portion of that accounting and tax work 
14 focused on service station businesses? 
15 A. Most of it has. 
16 Q. During that entire time period? 
17 A. Yes. EJC Williams was a company mat designed a 
18 bookkeeping system for service stations specifically, so that's 
19 what we specialized in. 
20 Q. Incidentally, do you have a college degree? 
21 A. Yes, sir. 
22 Q. From what institution? 
23 A. BYU. 
24 Q. Year of graduation? 
25 A. 1973. 
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1 A. Brad worked for his dad, and I did his dad's 
2 accounting and boakwork. 
3 Q. Did the scope of your responsibilities, vis-a-vis the 
4 partnership, change over time? 
5 A. Not really. 
6 Q. In working for the partnership, have you had reason 
7 to review the expenditures made by the partnerstiip? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And would mat be both before and after the sale of 
10 the stations in July of 1997? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Have you bad reason to review the income of the 
13 partnership? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And, again, would mat be both before and after the 
16 sale of the stations in 1997? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Now, are you aware that the stations were sold to 
19 Blackett Oil Company on July 14th, 1997? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What kinds of professional services have you provided 
22 to the partnership since mat date? 
23 A. We have recapped all of the income and disbursements 
24 from Associated Title where the balance of the money was kept 
25 Q. Other activities? 
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1 Q. Is that a Bachelor's Degree? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Are you familiar with the partnership known as 
4 University Texaco? 
5 A. Yes, sir. 
6 Q. Have you had occasion to provide professional 
7 services to University Texaco? 
8 A. Since its inception, yes. 
9 Q. And its inception being what date, about? 
10 A. 1979, approximately. 
11 Q. What kind of services have you personally provided 
12 that partnership? 
13 A. I've done the tax work, all of the consulting, helped 
14 them with their bookkeeping processes. 
15 Q. You say you first began work for the partnership at 
16 or about the time of its inception; is that correct? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 Q. Did you know either of the partners prior to the 
19 creation of the partnership? 
20 A. Yes, sir. 
21 Q. Which one? 
22 A. Both. 
23 Q. You knew Brad Buchi before? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And in what capacity? 
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1 A. Beyond that, no. 
2 Q. Have you been involved in the preparation of tax 
3 returns since the sale of the stations? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Since the sab of stations, what type--and I am not 
6 asking about - but what type of income has been earned by the 
7 partnership since the stations were sold? 
8 A. Interest 
9 Q. Interest on what? 
10 A. Interest on that escrow account 
11 Q. Any other income of which you are aware? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Have there been expenditures out of that account at 
14 Associated since the stations were sold? 
15 A. Yes, there has. 
16 Q. Of what nature, basically? 
17 A. Accounting, settlement of small problems. I think 
18 there was a Snap-On situation. There was a check disbursed for 
19 that 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. Bills that were paid that were outstanding. 
22 Q. Is there money still held in escrow at Associated 
23 Title? 
24 A. Yes, there is. 
25 MR. FISHBURN: No further questions, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Tanner, any cross-examination? 
MR. TANNER: Just very briefly. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TANNER: 
Q. Sir, are you aware of any kind of agreement at any 
point in time to dissolve or terminate the partnership between 
Mr. Parduhn and Mr. Buchi? 
A. I am not aware: of any agreement, no. 
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any efforts on the part of 
Mr. Parduhn to consult with Mr. Buchi's widow or children 
11 before making any of the disbursements after the sale to 
12 BlackettOil? 
A No. 
MR. TANNER: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. DUNN: 
17 Q. Then given the fact that it's just Mr. Parduhn that 
18 says what goes out of that Associated Title account, it's not 
19 truly an escrow account, is it? 
20 A I have no idea. It's title is an escrow account, so 
21 - they send to me the disbursal records. I don't - 1 don't 
22 get them from Mr. Parduhn. I get them from Associated Title. 
23 Q. Does Joanne Buchi have any right to say - as you 
24 understand it, have any right to say whether expenditures are 
25 made out of that account? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q. Who did sign them? 
3 A Mr. Parduhn signed them 
4 Q. As the sole operator of the ongoing, existing 
5 business? 
6 A (Inaudible) partner. 
7 MR DUNN: Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Any redirect, Mr. Fishburn, on those matters? 
9 MR. FISHBURN: NO, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Johnson, you can step down. 
11 Thank you. 
12 MR. FISHBURN: The Plaintiff rests, intends to call no 
13 more witnesses. 
14 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, we have a motion for the Court 
15 then. 
16 THE COURT: All right I'll hear your motion. 
17 MR. OUNN: I believe that Mr. Tanner may precede me in 
18 right here since he is the (Inaudible) bef ore me. 
19 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, I would move at this point for a 
20 directed verdict based on the evidence that's been presented 
21 just by the Plaintiffs case. 
22 I believe it is undisputed at tins point in time that 
23 Mr. Buchi and Mr. Parduhn entered into a partnership agreement, 
24 that it provided that upon the death of one of the partners -
25 and then, of course, in this case Mr. Buchi - that the entire 
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1 A. Couldn't tell you. 
2 Q. Isn't it true that they arc made on Mr. Parduhn's 
3 instruction alone? 
4 A. I don't know. I couldn't tell you. 
5 Q. Okay. So, you do not know whether or not it is an 
6 escrow account You just used that term because somebody else 
7 used that term with you? 
8 A. The paper that comes that tells me what was disbursed 
9 says, "Escrow Account." 
10 Q. All rigbt You also indicated that there's interest 
11 on that account? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. So, were you present earlier when Mr. Buchi-excuse 
14 me -when Mr. Parduhn testified mat there was nomingbeing 
15 earned on that account? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. He was in error there, right? 
18 A. I guess, if you want to -
19 Q. Confusion, error, on his part? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. Okay. When you file these Internal Revenue Service 
22 filings subsequent to the death of Mr. Buchi, were any of those 
23 IRS filings signed by Joanne Buchi? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Were any of them signed by the Buchi Children? 
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1 proceeds of the policy would be paid by the other partner to 
2 the survivors who, in this case, would be the widow and 
3 children. 
4 It is undisputed mat there was no writing mat changed or 
5 amended that result It is also undisputed that in the 
6 application mat was signed by Mr. Parduhn and Mr. Buchi that 
7 the stated purpose was buy/sell. And based on mat sequence of 
8 facts alone, which have been presented by the Plaintiffs case, 
9 I believe mat a directed verdict would be in order. 
10 Thank yoiL 
11 MR. DUNN: May I, Your Honor? 
12 THE COURT: why don't we do that, why don't you go ahead, 
13 Mr. Dunn, and then I'll hear from Mr. Fishburn. 
14 MR. DUNN: ihank you, Your Honor. 
15 Based on the facts currently before the Court, it is our 
16 opinion that the Court would, could and should appropriately 
17 grant the directed verdict in favor of the Defendants here to 
18 the effect that the buy/sell agreement was enforceable and that 
19 the policy of insurance issued on the life of Brad Buchi should 
20 be paid consistent with that agreement and the provisions of 
21 the policy itself. 
22 I make this motion on two grounds: First, that on the 
23 facts, alone, totally aside from an evaluation of the law and 
24 the Insurance Code, totally on the facts alone, Mr. Parduhn 
25 himself has established that the policy was purchased for the 
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1 purpose of furthering a buy/sell agreement. In particular, on 
2 the application received into evidence as part of Plaintiffs 
3 Exhibit No. 3, the ownership section, Subsection F: 
4 "State the purpose of an 
5 insurance and the nature of owner's 
6 insurable interest.*1 
7 It is stated there as: "Buy/sell/partner." 
8 That has been acknowledged as having been accepted and 
9 signed by Mr. Parduhn at the time of the execution of the 
10 application. 
11 The application itself, of course, also states that -
12 this is on page - what's designated as Page 3 in the 
13 application: 
14 "All of the following are the 
15 bases for and shall be part of any 
16 insurance contract: 
17 "A. This application." 
18 The other parts aren't relevant for our inquiry. 
19 So, we know that the policy contains the application. The 
20 application specifically contained the provision that states 
21 that the purpose of the insurance was for a buy/sell agreement 
22 relative to the partnership; and states that the only insurable 
23 interest that is identified on the part of the owner, Glade 
24 Parduhn, for the purpose of purchasing this insurance is that 
25 buy/sell/partner arrangement 
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1 the Buchi Children, DO participation by Joanne Buchi. He moved 
2 forward as if, "Yes, I get the entirety of the business, but, 
3 no, I don't want to give them what the clear implication of fee 
4 policy itself provides"; that being that it funds a buy/sell 
5 agreement for fee purpose of fee partnership and those assets 
6 should go to fee heirs. 
7 Second point Totally aside from fee factual 
8 determination feat 1 think compels this Court to grant the 
9 directed verdict, in addition the law compels it I'm sure 
10 feat fee Court's had an opportunity to read through the 
11 provisions of fee statute feat addresses the issues of 
12 insurable interest The Court, I am sure, reviewed them in 
13 anticipation of the arguments feat were held yesterday on how 
14 significant those statutes play a role in this - in fee 
15 decision making in this case. Rather than to read to you the 
16 provisions of those statutes, I'll defer to your judgment and 
17 interpretation of those statutes. It's my contention feat 
18 those statutes really leave us no room, feat those statutes 
19 create fee circumstance feat everyone expected was going to be 
20 fee case here. 
21 It is unreasonable to expect feat - it is unreasonable to 
22 expect feat Mr. Buchi, based on any status of fee evidence 
23 feat's existent feus far, had any intent other than feat his 
24 heirs would benefit from the provisions of fee buy/sell 
25 agreement Indeed - and I may reserve this for response after 
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1 In addition to feat, factually, we have fee testimony of 
2 Mr. Parduhn himself feat at fee time of fee signing, he said 
3 feat Sheldon Hansen, "Put in - put feat in there so we could 
4 get each other fee policy." What he put in there was an 
5 insurable interest The insurable interest is the funding of 
6 fee buy/sell agreement 
7 Purely factually, still, not even resorting to the 
8 Insurance Code, these kinds of agreements exist by the 
9 thousands through this state. It is fee common and ordinary 
10 expectation of people in these kinds of arrangements in 
11 partnerships, in LLCS, in Professional Corporations, in 
12 Chapter S Corporations, even in same regular Chapter C 
13 Corporations, feat the owners of fee business or fee owners of 
14 fee shares of fee business very often set up an arrangement 
15 under which, when the partner feat dies leaves heirs, those 
16 heirs, instead of running a service station business in which 
17 they have no experience, get fee benefit of fee insurance 
18 policy feat the partners themselves purchased, so feat the 
19 remaining surviving partner gets fee assets of fee corporation 
20 and gets to run it as though it was his business and his 
21 business alone. 
22 Mr. Parduhn, here, in his own testimony and in fee 
23 testimony of Mr. Johnson, has clearly established in their case 
24 in chief feat Mr. Parduhn ran those assets subsequent to 
25 Mr. Buchi's death as if he controlled them; no participation by 
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1 Mr. Fishburn addresses the points I've already addressed. But 
2 if it were fee case feat fee intent was feat there be some 
3 portion of fee insurance feat go to fee buy/sell and fee 
4 remainder of the insurance go to Mr. Parduhn or - on the 
j reverse side, to Mr. Buchi, then it would have been 
6 inappropriate and illegal for fee partnership to have paid 
7 those premiums. As I understand fee federal law in this 
8 regard, it only authorizes fee deductibility of expenses of 
9 feat kind in buy/sell kinds of arrangements to purchase life 
10 insurance on someone else; aside from fee question of whether 
11 or not one has an insurable interest, does not justify 
12 deducting fee cost of fee purchase of fee insurance, which 
13 would make a subsequent illegality, which I don't think any -
14 either of these partners intended. 
15 The intent of fee partners is clear from fee document 
16 itself. We don't have to go to any other corners. We can stay 
17 wife fee insurance agreement, fee insurance contract, fee 
18 insurance application and arrive at fee conclusion based on the 
19 facts. If necessary, we can turn to fee law and see that the 
20 law was established for the purpose of protecting people who 
21 have less power than fee partner feat survives. 
22 And in this case, the intent all along of these parties is 
23 what fee Court should order. And that is that Mr. Parduhn gets 
24 fee assets of fee business and that fee Buchi heirs get the 
25 benefit of fee insurance policy. 
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1 Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
3 Mr. Fishbum. 
4 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, 1 confess that I did not 
5 anticipate this motion being raised at this time; nonetheless 
6 it is procedurally proper, although it is not a motion for a 
7 directed verdict, but a motion to dismiss under Rule 41. 
8 1 don't see any reason of this basis for granting this 
9 motion; quite to the contrary, I think the Plaintiff has proven 
10 its case on a prima facie basis, which is his duty. 
11 As I mentioned at the outset of this trial, there's two 
12 contracts at issue: Thar is an insurance contract, and there 
13 is a buy/sell agreement They are two separate contracts. And 
14 to a great extent have to be analyzed separately. Although, if 
15 the buy/sell agreement is deemed triggered and applicable, then 
16 a portion of the proceeds payable to Mr. Parduhn under that 
17 first contract might be routed to survivors, whoever those 
18 survivors may be. 
19 The first question is the rights under the contract of 
20 insurance. Now, this as a contract is to be evaluated 
21 according to the citations in our trial brief by contract law; 
22 not by intestate law, not by equity* It's what does the 
23 contract say? 
24 This was a contract entered into between the applicant, 
25 the insured and the insurance company. And that contract is 
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1 The answer on Question No. 1 - or Contract No. 1 is Glade 
2 Parduhn is entitled to all the benefits by contract 
3 Going into this trial, there was an argument made by 
4 Joanne Buchi that she was a proper beneficiary. Natalie said 
5 the same thing. The other children, they all claim to be 
6 proper beneficiaries. There's been no support certainly 
7 through this phase of trial offered through that 1 don't 
8 think that there can be, but there is not So, this answer to 
9 the first contract, that all goes to Glade Parduhn. 
10 Now, that doesn't end the inquiries as the Court is 
11 well-aware. And that is the next contract to address is the 
12 buy/sell agreement The evidence before this Court is: There 
13 was created in 1979 and appended to the last page of the 
14 partnership agreement language that would be properly construed 
15 as a buy/sell agreement It recognized, consistent with the 
16 law in this state, that a partnership can be dissolved by the 
17 death of a partner. In that eventuality, both partners recited 
18 that they had $20,000 and they'd give all of that to the other 
19 person. 
20 In 1984 that was amended. Not in total, but the amount 
21 And that was changed to a hundred thousand. And consistent 
22 with that, they purchased two new policies, each for 100,000 on 
23 the other's life. 
24 In 1989, they purchased polices in higher amounts. 
25 There's no amendment in the buy/sell agreement Now, when they 
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1 clear. I agree with Mr. Dunn it's clear. But it doesn't 
2 support the interpretation that he wants to derive from this 
3 contract, and that is to «et this contract on ahead. 
4 If you look at the pedicy-and I win direct the Court 
5 to Page 10. I wasn't sure I could find it quickly enough. But 
6 the contract says that, "In settling this policy, we deduct 
7 unpaid policy loans, and then we pay the proceeds in tins way 
8 when the insured dies unless we have agreed otherwise. One, we 
9 pay - first pay any collateral assignees." There were 
10 none. "Second, then we pay the beneficiaries last named in 
11 writing." 
12 Now, the beneficiary named in the application is Glade 
13 Parduhn, and the contract says, "We are going to pay the 
14 beneficiary designated in the contract We are not going to 
15 pay the person who was designated as the owner. We are not 
16 going to pay according to whatever it says on 31F. We are not 
17 going to pay somebody else. We are going to pay the 
18 beneficiary." Unambiguously. There is no question. Glade 
19 Parduhn is the beneficiary. On the other policy, Brad Buchi 
20 was the beneficiary on Glade's life, but on this one the 
21 designation of the beneficiary was by name, Glade Parduhn; not 
22 the partnership, not Brad's wife, not Brad's family, not Joanne 
23 Buchi, who 1 presume lie didn't even know at this point It was 
24 Glade Parduhn. There :ls no ambiguity. The policy says it goes 
25 to the beneficiary, and that's Glade Parduhn. 
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1 amended it before, they did it in writing. This time there was 
2 no writing. 
3 Mr. Parduhn has indicated that he never amended that 
4 agreement There was simply no agreement And although it is 
5 not really before the Court in, at least, opening, it was 
6 indicated the idea to apply for more policies was the idea of 
7 Lisa, which was Brad's wife. 
8 Now, in filling out the application for the insurance 
9 policies - and if you look at the applications for both those 
10 policies - that information was filled out by Mr. Hansen, who 
11 is an insurance agent, charged with the responsibility of 
12 determining whether or not there was an insurable interest at 
13 fee outset And he wrote down - l e t me just look so we don't 
14 mis-look. He wrote down in response to Question 3IF "buy/sdl 
15 slash partner." 
16 Now, what did feat question ask? It asked: "State the 
17 purpose of insurance and UK nature of the owner's insurable 
18 interest11 It was a threshold question. 
19 And I think we can infer that the purpose of filling out 
20 that information was to determine whedier there existed an 
21 insurable interest It wasn't to determine who received the 
22 proceeds because the contract says the person who receives the 
23 proceeds is the person named as the beneficiary. 
24 Now, either one of those two statements on 31F will j 
25 satisfy an insurance company's requirement that there be an | 
1 insurable interest 
2 THE COURT: Being a partner would satisfy that interest? 
3 MR. FISHBURN: Absolutely. Being a partner in the total 
4 unequivocal absence of a buy/sell agreement, according to the 
5 law, is grounds for an insurable interest And that has long 
6 been the holding of courts interpreting insurance policies. I 
7 specifically recited the Ridley Case (Phonetic) in the trial 
8 brief referring to other sections. 
9 Partnership itself is a grounds for an insurable 
10 interest There's also a case Narad v. Graves (Phonetic), 
11 Alabama case, and I can cite that to the Court in a moment. 
12 That says: 
13 "The existence of the partnership 
14 relationship is grounds for an insurable 
15 interest apart from the buy/seU." 
16 And the reason for that is: If you had decided to forsake 
17 a hundred business opportunities and go into business with your 
18 partner, you have certain expectations concerning the future 
19 and income and all of these things, which are grounds for an 
20 insurable interest. 
21 Now, it is perhaps true that most cases you have the 
22 buy/sell agreement Sometimes we have buy/sdl agreements that 
23 talk about a specific dollar amount Sometimes, and more 
24 commonly, you have buy/sell agreements that are variable. You 
25 have a buy/sell agreement that talks about, "How do we value 
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1 filed, that the argument really was that the insurable interest 
2 existed at the outset, but it had disappeared by the time Brad 
3 died, because there was a cessation of the partnership 
4 interest And, clearly, on the merit side in the trial brief, 
5 that's wrong. That's not what the law is. The law is: Do you 
6 have an insurable interest at the time the policy is taken 
7 out 
8 And according to the Herman Case (Phonetic) in the Second 
9 District Court, including the several other cases I cited, that 
10 if you had an insurable interest, as a partner does on the life 
11 of a partner, even absent a buy/sell agreement, then it's valid 
12 at the outset and it is valid at the end 
13 Had Brad Buchi not died, several things could have 
14 happened. They weren't discussed. There wasn't a resolution 
15 of the policy. They could have, since they had cash values, 
16 each owner on the others lives, cashed out the policy and took 
17 the proceeds. They could, as they had done in 1994, have 
18 exchanged ownership. Or they could have continued the policies 
19 in force notwithstanding the cessation of the partnership 
20 interest 
21 And the law is quite clear, there is no public policy to a 
22 partner receiving benefits on a partner's life - or when he 
23 died even if he died after the dissolution of the partnership. 
24 Think of it in terms of the marriage relationship. That's 
25 also an insurable interest under Utah law, and Utah law is 
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1 the partnership? And what's the methodology we use? We 
2 determine a cash value. Maybe we divide it with half with 
adjustments." That's not uncommon. And in either way, you 
have a buy/sell agreement That's one agreement 
Well, where are you going to get the money? Well, you buy 
insurance. There is no law that says a partner cannot apply 
far more money on the life of his partner than is needed to 
8 fund that buy/sell agreement There is no law to that effect 
9 And the statute doesn't - that Mr. Dunn has applied to doesn't 
say that 
No, it doesn't I'm sorry, Tim, it doesn't 
What it says is: This is an insurable interest 
Now, Ms. Buchi's interpretation of that statute is that it 
14 is somehow illegal for a partner in applying far the -
15 insurance on the life of another to apply for one penny more 
16 than they are going to need to fund the buy/sell agreement 
17 Now, that is absurd. It's absurd, first of all, if you think 
18 of it in terms of the variable buy/sell agreement where you 
19 don't even know what the partnership is worth. You have a 
20 methodology, but you don't have a dollar figure. Thatwouldbe 
21 catastrophic policy consequences to interpret it in that 
22 fashion. 
23 Now, that seems to be the fashion that this statute has 
24 been interpreted as we go into the last couple of days before 
25 trial here. I thought, based on the trial brief that Joanne 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 quite clear in the case law that even though two spouses have 
2 died, unless there's been a change in the beneficiary, the 
3 person designated by name during the pendency of the marriage 
4 still receives those benefits years later if that's not been 
5 chflngr^ 
6 Indeed, in this situation - well, I guess it is not 
7 before the Court in terms of who received the third policy 
8 yet 
9 The argument is also waived on an insurable interest I 
10 made that argument before. I would point out to the Court that 
11 I also raised that argument when it was first raised in October 
12 that it was waived. I went back after the hearing yesterday 
13 and noted that It's an affirmative defense. It has never 
14 been pleaded. And I don't think it's proper, certainly, as a 
15 basis far a motion to dismiss. 
16 One other - as I'm doing this, impromptu, it is not as 
17 organized as I might like. And that is on the buy/sell 
18 agreement, the threshold issue on that agreement is: Was it 
19 triggered? Was it triggered at all? 
20 According to Utah law in the Partnership Code -
21 MR. DUNN: what section? 
22 MR. FISHBURN: i don't know. This is impromptu. It's in 
23 the trial brief. 
24 Basically, there is three points, key points in a 
25 partnership's existence: It's creation, it's dissolution and 
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1 it's termination. And the dissolution is that point in time 
2 which defines the rights of the partners vis-a-vis each other 
3 in terms of wrapping up the business. It marks a point in time 
4 in which the partnership ceases to function as a business. 
5 According to the Pitrtnership Code there are various causes 
6 of dissolution. There's actually about a dozen. One of them 
7 is a death of a partner. One of them is the termination of the 
8 business purpose for which the partnership existed. Another is 
9 the mutual agreement of the partners. 
10 Arnt v. First Interstate makes clear Dissolution is an 
11 event And according to AmJur., dissolution - well, actuaUy 
12 according to the Dce/Wanless Case, dissolution happens one 
13 time. It doesn't happen multiple times. It's one time. And 
14 according to AmJur., k is the first time that counts. That's 
15 the point in time in which you define the rights. 
16 Now, the threshold question legally based on the facts 
17 before the Court is: When did this partnership dissolve? I 
18 submit it dissolved on the sale of the stations. This was not 
19 one of those partnership agreements that said,"We can engage 
20 for any legal purpose imaginable." This is a partnership 
21 agreement that said: "This is created to conduct a service 
22 station business." 
23 Those service stations were sold after that point The 
24 partners entered into what's called a winding-up phase. They, 
25 in fact, together started to pay the presale expenses. 
Page 83 
1 than a contingent agreement. It is contingent only if the 
2 partnership is dissolved because of a death of a partner. If 
3 it's dissolved by some other cause, sale of the stations, by 
4 mutual will of the partners or as it was in the Nebritch Case, 
5 by judicial decree, then it's dissolved And you can't 
6 thereafter go enforce the terms of a buy/sell agreement that 
7 was contingent on death. 
8 Now, does this leave the heirs of Brad Buchi bereft of any 
9 recovery? No, it does not. If that's die situation, if the 
10 buy/sell agreement is not applicable, then at the end of the 
11 winding-up phase, i.e., termination of the partnership, after 
12 all of the liabilities of the partnership have been paid and 
13 all outstanding debts owed to the partnership have been 
14 collected, there then is an accounting. And that accounting, 
15 which we have reserved for phase two of a trial, involvesthe 
16 determination of the partners'capitd accounts and then 
17 distribution of what's left in accordance with those capital 
18 accounts. 
19 So, there is a right of the heirs through the Estate of 
20 Brad Buchi to get that recovery. 
21 So, that - on the buy/sell, that's a threshold issue, 
22 dissolution, relative effect of that agreement, is it t r igged 
23 at all? We submit it's not 
24 If it is triggered, if the Court concludes the law still 
25 says the buy/sell agreement survived the dissolution, then the 
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1 Mr. Parduhn, since the death of Mr. Buchi, has functioned in 
2 the capacity as the surviving legal partner, and under the 
3 Partnership Code not only has theright but the duty to 
4 continue in that winding; up capacity and to try to bring the 
5 affairs of the partnership to conclusion. 
6 Now, I would submit, contrary to what Mr. Parduhn said, he 
7 hasn't operated that as if it were his own, because if it were 
8 his own, there wouldn't be money still in an account at 
9 Associated Title Company. But he's certainly entitled to do 
10 that 
11 Now, this partnership has not yet terminated. We agree on 
12 that, I think It's still in the winding-up phase. But I've 
13 cited three cases to the Court, all of which talk about 
14 buy/sell agreements and the effect of which comes first, death 
15 or some other event And I think those cases are clear. You 
16 look at the first event Li this case the first event of 
17 dissolution and the one that could cause dissolution is the 
18 sale of the stations. And on that date, it was dissolved. At 
19 that point in time this buy/sell agreement, which was made in 
20 recognition - in the first sentence you look at in the 
21 buy/sell agreement, that this partnership could end if one of 
22 the partners dies. That contingency wasn't realized before the 
23 partnership dissolved. 
24 It was dissolved on July 14th, 1997. And on that date 
25 Brad Buchi was still alive. A buy/sell agreement is never more 
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1 question is how much. And it is unambiguous that the only 
2 agreement Mr. Parduhn ever made in terms of if it should be 
3 dissolved because of Brad Buchi's death, what would he pay, it 
4 was a hundred thousand dollars. There's no agreement by these 
5 partners to the contrary. 
6 What exists is speculation, pure and simple speculation by 
7 Joanne Buchi and by the Buchi Children that this is what 
8 Mr. Parduhn and Mr. Buchi must have agreed to. They tried to 
9 infer it from the insurance contract 
10 I would refer that - this case to the Ogilvie's Case 
11 (Phoncdc) that's ched in our memorandum. It's almost 
12 identical facts. Partners started out with ten grand in 
13 insurance. And then that was doubled to 20,000 life 
14 insurance. And it also doubles some accidental death that they 
15 hadn't even mentioned in the buy/scU agreement And that 
16 became 40. 
17 Now, in the trial brief, Joanne Buchi has argued that, 
18 "Well, that was de facto. The partners had no decision." I 
19 would ask the Court to read mat case. 
20 What happened is five years after they had an opportunity 
21 given to them to purchase more insurance, and they did. They 
22 doubled it And the Court said the amount that each partner 
23 agreed to pay the other, if the partnership was dissolved on 
24 death, was 10,000. It's pure speculation to imply something 
25 more just by virtue of the fact that they took out more 
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1 insurance. It is the same degree of speculation in this case. 
2 I would also submit to the Court this - and I apologize 
3 that I'm kind of scrambling all over- thetheory of the 
4 Defendants is: "There was an amendment of the buy/sell 
5 amount Now, we can't point the Court to any agreement to that 
6 effect All we can do is imply it from the existence of these 
7 two insurance policies." 
8 Their assumption is undercut and belied by the fact that 
9 the face amounts of the two policies arc not equal There is 
10 no logic to saying the entire amounts of these two policies 
11 were necessarily and absolutely committed in toto to the 
12 funding of a buy/sell agreement that's been amended. 
13 Why is it that this partnership would be - or half 
14 interest in the partnership, theoretically, would be $300,000 
15 if Brad Buchi died and it's only $250,000 if Glade died? 
16 Under their interpretation, if it had been Glade who 
17 passed away of a heart attack before Brad died, then they would 
18 say NedraParduhn should only get 250,000. 
19 Now, when you have buy/sell agreements and you assume that 
20 the partnership interests are equal, then there is no logic in 
21 having different amounts. The amounts were always equal 
22 before. It was 20,000 to bqgin with. It was a hundred 
23 thousand dollars in 1984. 
24 THE COURT: what would be the logic -
25 MR. FISHBURN: They are not equal. 
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1 interest in the absence of a buy/sell agreement" And if it is 
2 interpreted in that way, I would submit that it stands the 
3 common law on its head and the common law followed in Utah up 
4 until this time. 
5 The amount agreed that Glade Parduhn agreed to pay should 
6 his partner ever die, and that dissolved the partnership, is 
7 100,000. He's never agreed to pay any more. And it would be 
8 wrong for this Court, I believe, to impose upon him an 
9 obligation to pay that he never agreed to. 
10 Second, he shouldn't have to pay anything under the 
11 buy/sell agreement because the partnership was dissolved, not 
12 by Brad Buchi's death, it was dissolved before he died. And in 
13 that case, since it wasn't dissolved on that contingency, we 
14 should be following the partnership law which regards 
15 distribution of assets and determination of residual assets in 
16 determining what share goes to Mr. Parduhn and what share would 
17 go to Mr. Buchi's estate. 
18 The insurance pohcyhsdf is just absolutely 
19 unambiguous, and that is that all the proceeds, all 300,000, 
20 phis the interest on deposit at this court, should go to 
21 Mr. Buchi - or not Mr. Buchi, Mr. Parduhn because he's the 
22 designated beneficiary. 
23 And 1 respectfully ask the Court to deny the motion for 
24 dismiss that has been thoroughly presented to the Court 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fishburn. 
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1 THE coimT: what would be the logic in having differing 
J 2 amounts if just the mere fact of the partnership is whatgives 
3 an insurable interest? 
4 MR. FISHBURN: well, I thiiik the rauonal is that given by 
5 Glade Parduhn: "We got to 1989 (at least as he understood 
6 it). We have some more money running into the partnership. We 
7 had the ability to increase policy limits on each other's 
8 life. It was something we just decided to do as a benefit for 
9 each other." There's no public policy prohibition against 
10 that That's perfectly acceptable. 
11 It is apparently whatthe partners agreed to, because that 
12 is the amounts that they applied for on each other's life. 
13 Now, I'm going to go back- I am jumping all around I 
14 want to go back to that Insurance Code statute. Again, it's 
15 been waived. I believe I made that argument before. But 
16 assuming the merits. It does not say that a partnership is 
17 precluded from buying more insurance on the life of a partner 
18 than at that time is needed. It does say: 
19 "Insurable interest is defined 
20 for the purposes of this statute as a 
21 relationship between two people." 
22 And then it goes on to say that 
23 "A buy/sell agreement is evidence 
24 of an insurable interest" 
25 It doesn't say, "The partners do not have an insurable 
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1 Mr. Tanner, response? 
2 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, Mr. Parduhn's Counsel, 
3 Mr. Fishburn, correctly points out that there are two 
4 contracts. If we look solely at the buy - excuse me, at the 
5 partnership agreement with its buy/sell provisions, we are 
6 struck by one point and that's an undeniable point, that 
7 nowhere at any point in time is the partnership agreement or 
8 its buy/sell provision ever provide that a single penny be paid 
9 to Mr. Parduhn. That's contract number one. That's the 
10 partnership agreement and its buy/sell provisions. 
11 Ixl'stakeakx^atAgreoixjitNo. 2thatMr. Fishburn's 
12 talking about here. That would be the insurance contract for 
13 $300,000. Mr. Fishburn likes to mention and point out the fact 
14 that Mr. Parduhn is listed as beneficiary. What he does not 
15 like to mention and what he left out of his arguments here is 
16 that the purpose stated on that policy, unambiguously, was the 
17 buy/sell provisions of the partnership agreement We can't 
18 just say that ftat insurance contract goes to the beneficiary 
19 in a vacuum without looking at Section 31F. That's why the 
20 policy was purchased. 
21 Mr. Parduhn, in his own testimony, said that he reviewed 
22 it, he signed it, that Sheldon Hansen, the insurance agent, 
23 included that language. We can't just put our blinders on and 
24 pretend, as Mr. Parduhn would like, that that language does not I 
25 exist 
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1 proceeds of the insurance is paid to family and children. 
2 Under the insurance contract itself you have reference to 
3 mat same agreement That's where me money by the evidence 
4 presented so far should go. Thank you. 
5 THE COURT. Thank you, Mr. Tanner. 
6 Mr. Dunn, brief response. 
7 MR. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor, I believe I can'wrap this up 
8 in seven minutes. First, our motion is made under Rule 50A 
9 relative to directed verdicts. The Court, of course, can treat 
10 it in its own fashion, but it is a motion for a summary 
11 conclusion of mis matter. But 50A is the applicable section. 
12 Second, the buy/sell agreement mat the partners had, 
13 clearly, as was stated by Mr. Tanner, has no provision in it to 
14 allow for somebody in the partnership to insure one another for 
15 some amount above and beyond what would be paid in the buy/sell 
16 provisions of the agreement 
17 There's nothing in the policy that says that a portion -
18 and the policy is, of course, the application. There's nothing 
19 in the policy or the application mat says that a portion will 
20 be paid for the purpose of satisfying the buy/sell agreement 
21 and some other portion is going to be reserved to the remaining 
22 partner as some direct benefit to him. 
23 I'm afraid that it is important to read some provisions of 
24 our Insurance Code relative to insurable interest The cases 
25 that Mr. Fishburn cites are inapplicable because we are not in 
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1 Mr. Parduhn would like to separate the partnership 
I 2 agreement with its buy/sell provision and the insurance 
3 contract, but Utah Code, Section 75-6-201,1 provides 
4 specifically for buy/sell partnership agreements like mis and 
I 5 that a separate writing from the insurance contract can provide 
I 6 for payment of me monies to beneficiaries. In other words, in 
7 other words, in other wards, the stated beneficiary by 
8 reference to a partnership agreement or a buy/sell agreement 
9 can be required to pay the money to a third party as happens 
110 over and ova and over again in this state. And mat was what 
111 was clearly intended. 
112 The last question that I was going to ask Mr. Parduhn that 
113 did not happen is the very question mat Mr. Fishburn sort of 
114 referenced in his arguments in reverse. Pie talked about what 
115 happened if Glade passed away. Does anyone really believe that 
116 the partnership agreement with its buy/sell provisions and the 
117 policies on these two partners read together as a whole - does 
118 anyone really believe that when Mr. Buchi died, mat it was the 
119 intent of the parties that the insurance money all go to 
120 Mr. Parduhn? I think that's impossible to believe. He had a 
121 wife, he had five kids. That's why his policy amount was 
122 bigger. 
123 Does anybody believe that if Mr. Parduhn had passed away, 
124 that he would have intended all of the money on his life to not 
125 go to his wife, Nedra, but to go off to Brad Buchi? I don't 
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I 1 believe mat's what they intended. If they had intended mat, 
I 2 mat language in the policy application, "buy/sell," would not 
I 3 be mere. Andifmey intended, as at a different point in his 
I 4 arguments, Mr. F%hbum pomted out mat mere was supposed to 
I 5 be somehow this bifurcation of amounts, first $100,000 is 
I 6 subject to me buy/sell but the rest isn't? Why isn't that 
I 7 stated anywhere? Why isn't it divided up? Why doesn't the 
8 policy say, 'The first 100,000 funds the buy/seU. The rest 
I 9 goes to the other partner." We don't have any language like 
110 that There we are jumping off a precipice without any writing 
111 into the realm of complete speculation, as we also are with the 
112 notion that somehow, somehow, somehow, the partnership was 
113 terminated prior to Brad Buchi's death. There was no written 
14 contract that terminated it No dissolution agreement 
15 Nothing of mat nature. And the partnership agreement itself 
16 says, as a contingent contract, mat if one of the partners 
17 dies the other partner pays all the proceeds to the survivors, 
18 to the wife and kids. There is nothing that would change 
119 that. There was no dissolution agreement There was no 
20 termination agreement There was nothing that revoked or 
21 changed or altered the intent of the parties. It didn't 
22 happen, didn't happen, didn't happen. 
23 The clear testimony that Mr. Parduhn gave would indicate 
24 that a directed verdict is appropriate. Why? Because under 
25 all the terms of the partnership buy/sell agreement, all the 
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Alabama, we are not in the Second Circuit, we are not in Ohio. 
Brad and Glade never were married, none of those things makes 
any difference to this case. The legislature in Utah has 
specifically addressed the question, and so there is no need to 
guess what the law of Alabama might do to a situation of this 
kind. 
What the law in Utah says is, Subparagraph 1 A: 
"An insurer may not knowingly 
provide insurance to a person who does 
not have or expect to have an insurable 
interest in subject insurance." 
That's why the application requires the provision that 
says, "Why are you buying the insurance," and, "What is your 
insurable interest?" 
The statement of "buy/sell/partner" does not just say why 
you are buying it, it says what your insurable interest is. 
The insurable interest is only the insurable interest that is 
created by the relevant buy/sell agreement 
The underwriting department of any insurance company has 
an obligation to make sure mat mis section is — this 
prohibition is not violated. They may not provide insurance 
where mere is no insurable interest. 
Moving on to Subsection B, IB: j 
"A person (Mr. Parduhn) may not I 
knowingly procure (and mat's what he 
90 
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1 attempted to do) directly, by assignment 
2 or otherwise an interest in the proceeds 
3 of an insurance policy." 
4 That's what he attempted to do by seeking collection on 
5 the policy. He may not do that He's prohibited from doing 
6 that — doing that unless he has an insurable interest in the 
7 subject of the insurance. 
8 We then turn to Subsection 2: "Insurable InterestH 
9 Again, as it applies to Mr. Parduhn: 
10 "Insurable interest in a person 
11 or persons closely related by blood or 
12 law, a substantial interest engendered by 
13 love and affection or in the case of 
14 other persons a lawful and substantial i 
15 interest in having the life, health and I 
16 bodily safety of the person insured 
17 continue." 
18 It goes on: 
19 "The shareholder or partner has 
20 an insurable interest in the life of the 
21 other shareholders or partners for 
22 purposes of insurance contracts that are 
23 an integral part of a legitimate buy/sell 
24 agreement respecting shares or a 
25 partnership interest in the business." 
Page 95 
1 the valid terms and conditions of the 
2 policy other than those relating to the 
3 insurable interest and consent" 
4 Mr. Parduhn has made a statement, through the auspices of 
5 Mr. Fishbum, that he should not have the obligation to pay 
6 this money. It is not his obligation. It is not his money. 
7 The money is money paid by an insurance company. 
8 Mr. Parduhn assumes, because Mr. Buchi is dead and no 
9 longer to stand up for the rights of his wife and children, 
10 that he has ownership in all of these assets, ownership in the 
11 remains of the corporation - o f the partnership and ownership 
12 in the insurance policy. And he is wrong by law. 
13 Two brief points: Mr. Fishbum was inconsistent in his 
14 statements about where we are with reference to the wrapping 
15 up, winding up, of the partnership regaidkss, certainly, 
16 resolving issues of this land is something that has to be done 
17 in UK winding up of the partnership. When it dissolved, when 
18 it ended, is irrelevant to this inquiry. 
19 Secondly, the argument about the size of the comparative 
20 policies: Mr. Parduhn himself testified that that related to 
21 the cost erf the premiums. Mr. Parduhn's was more expensive. 
22 Equal costs purchased slightly different total benefits. 
23 I appreciate the opportunity to address the Court 
24 THEOOURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
25 Thank you for your arguments. 
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1 The only right that Mr. Parduhn has to have an insurable 1 
2 interest in the Hfe of Mr. Buchi is specifically by decision 2 
3 of the Utah Legislature in 1985 and 1986, if they have - i f it 3 
4 is an integral part of a kgitimate buy/sdl agreement 4 
5 Now, if there is no buy/sdl agreement that is applicable, 5 
6 if Mr. Parduhn says, "I never agreed to that last notation at 6 
7 the bottom of the page. I don't - 1 think it should be 7 
8 100,000 because that's all you can pin me down to because 8 
9 that's all I ever signed," then we have another section of the 9 
10 Code that clearly comes into play. And that is Subsection 5: 10 
11 "No insurance policy is invalid 111 
12 because the policyholder lacks insurable 12 
13 interest (and Mr. Parduhn lacks insurable 13 
14 interest He has no insurable interest) 14 
15 or because consent has not been given, 15 
16 but a court with appropriate jurisdiction" - 16 
17 And that is this Court, because that insurance policy has 17 
18 been tendered into the power and control of this Court, this 18 
19 Court may order the proceeds to be paid to some person who is 19 
20 equitably entitled to them other than the one to whom the 20 
21 policy is designated to be payable. It may not be given to 21 
22 Mr. Parduhn. It must be given to somebody else. 22 
23 "Or it may create a constructive 23 
24 trust from the proceeds or a part of them 24 
25 on behalf of such persons subject to all 25 
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I - I'm - 1 am going to deny the motion for directed 
verdict on the factual basis. Whether I consider it Rule 50 or 
Rule 41,1 think the standard is basically the same mat I 
interpret the facts in favor of the non-moving party in all 
reasonable inferences in their favor. So, Til - factually, 
I'll deny the motion for directed verdict and move on with the 
facts. 
With respect to the motion under the statute mat 
Mr. Fishbum argues is waived, I'll reserve on that I need 
simply to mink about that further, and I'll do that as we 
progress and move on. 
So, we'll resume at 1:30? Have your first witness ready, 
Mr. Tanner? 
MR. TANNER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THEOOURT: All right Thank you, Counsel. 
We will be in recess until 1:30. 
(Noon Recess) 
THEOOURT: All right We are back on the record in 
Parduhn v. Bennett; parties are present; counsel are all 
present 
Mr. Tanner, you may proceed. 
MR. TANNER.* Thank you, Your Honor. For our first witness 
this afternoon, we call Lisa Buchi. 
USA BUCHI, called as a witness on her 
own behalf, after having been duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DTTTmnrAv r*r*r oi\iid:A_A{\Ai A I A A A T O I A 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR-TANNER: 
3 Q. Will you state your name for the record, please? 
4 A. Lisa Buchi. 
5 Q. And your current address? 
6 A. 2891 East Valtey View Avenue. 
7 Q. You are the former wife of Brad Buchi who is now 
8 deceased? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. You were married to Mr. Buchi on May 23rd of | 
11 1979 when he entered into this partnership agreement? 
12 A. Was I married to him then? 
13 Q. Yes. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Allright Do y o u - let me ask you if you'll take 
16 the exhibit book that's in front of you and open it up to 
17 Exhibit 1. 
18 A. Okay. 
19 Q. Do you recognize that document? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What is it? 
22 A. It's the partnership agreement 
23 Q. Let me ask you to take a look at the very last page 
24 of it, please? 
25 A. Okay. 
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1 proceeds? 
2 A. That the surviving partner would use this money from 
3 die insurance policy to give to the deceased partner's family, 
4 and it would buy them out of any interest in the partnership. 
5 Q. Okay. Did a time come when the amount of insurance 
6 mat was purchased by the partners increased? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. Do you recall that being approximately January 
9 of 1984? Does that meet with your recollection? 
10 A. Yes, it does. 
11 Q. Okay. Do you have any recollection of why mat 
12 occurred or how? 
13 MR. FISHBURN: objection; lack of foundation. 
14 THE COURT: sustained. 
15 You can lay any foundation (Inaudible). 
16 MR. TANNER: okay. Did you have any discussions with 
17 Mr. Buchi, your husband or with Mr. Parduhn, his partner, about 
18 increasing the amount of insurance from $20,000 to $100,000? 
19 A.IdicL 
20 Q. Okay. Could you state when mat occurred and the 
21 nature of those conversations? 
22 A. Yes. It was - it was - I'm trying to mink -
23 Lance was about two years old, so that would have made it about 
24 '84. And we'd been in business for a little bit, and tilings 
25 were going wdL It was, again, as it was in the next one 
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1 Q. You see the notation or the paragraph at the bottom I 1 
2 which has four signatures rather than just the two that are to 2 
3 be found above? 3 
4 A. Yes. 4 
5 Q. Is that your signature as one of the four? 5 
6 A. Yes. 6 
7 Q. Okay. Do you recognize the other three signatures? 7 
8 A. Yes, I do. 8 
9 Q. And whose signatures are those? 9 
10 A. Brad's, Nedra' s and Glade's. 10 
11 Q. Do you know why it was, if you know, that all four of 111 
12 you rather than just Brad and Glade signed that? 12 
13 A. Yes. 13 
14 Q. What is your understanding? 14 
15 A. It took all four of us to dissolve the partnership 15 
16 through that buy/sell agreement 16 
17 Q. Okay. At the time that you read through and signed 17 
18 this section of the agreement, what was your understanding 18 
19 about the amount of life insurance that was in force on the 19 
20 partners? 20 
21 A. At this time? 21 
22 Q. Yes. 22 
23 A. It was 20,000. 23 
24 Q. What was your understanding as to what was to happen 24 
25 if dther of the partna^ were to pass away vWth the insurance 25 
Page 100 
coming up, I felt like they should increase it, that the 
partnership and the stations were worm more than mat 
MR. FISHBURN: objection, move to strike the answer. I 
think we are just asking for the foundation at mis point 
THE COURT: sustained. 
MR. TANNER: okay. Do you recall when you had a 
conversation with - well, you stated you had some kind of a 
conversation in early '84,1 believe, or some time in '84, with 
your husband, Brad, and/or with Glade about the $100,000 
policy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall the nature of that conversation? 
A. Ida 
Q. Okay. Do you recall where the conversation took 
place? 
A. On the $100,000 policy? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It was at home. 
Q. Okay. Could you please state the gist of that 
conversation, please? 
MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, I object, again, on lack of 
foundation. It is not clear if this is with Brad or with 
Glade. The question was one or the other and she said, "Yes." 
MR. TANNER: Okay, who — 
MR. FISHBURN: (inaudible) who it is. It may be hearsay. 
T% ^ A T _ t > « ^ 1 AA 
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1 MR. TANNER: who was present? 
2 A. Just Brad and I. 
3 Q. Okay. And what was said? 
4 MR. FISHBURN: objection, hearsay. 
5 THE WITNESS: I said it. 
6 THE COURT: sustained - just a moment, Ms. Buchi. 
7 Sustained unless you can convince me that's not hearsay, 
8 Mr. Tanner. 
9 MR. TANNER: okay. Well, let me move on. 
10 Do you recall when the policy amount was increased to 
11 $300,000? 
12 A. Yes, I do. 
13 Q. Okay. Do you recall approximately when that was? 
14 A. It was early'89. 
15 Q. Okay. And did you have a conversation with 
16 Mr. Parduhn present -
17 A I did 
18 Q. - dealing with the $300,000 policy? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q. Where did that occur? 
21 A At the Texaco station in the office. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A The back office. 
24 Q. Okay. And who was present at that time? 
25 A Brad, Glade and myself. 
Page 103 
1 in the scope of your knowledge, to believe that the $300,000 
2 policy on Brad's life was for any purpose other than the buy 
3 out? . 
4 A. Absolutely not 
5 Q. Okay. Some statements were made earlier on about the 
6 differences in the amounts, $250,000 on Glade Parduhn's life, 
7 and $300,000 on your former husband's, Brad's, life. What was 
8 your understanding of that? 
9 MR. FISHBURN: objection, lack of foundation. 
10 THE WITNESS: it was with my conversation -
11 THE OOURT: Just a moment, Ms. Buchi. If there's an 
12 objection, just a moment and don't answer -
13 THE WITNESS: okay. 
14 THE OOURT: -until I say something, okay? 
15 THE WITNESS: You want to talk? 
16 THE COURT: NO. 
17 The objection is sustained. 
18 Lay some more foundation, if you would, Mr. Tanner. 
19 MR. TANNER: we can do that. 
20 Did you have any conversations with Sheldon Hansen about 
21 the amounts of - the policies that could -
22 AYes,Idid. 
23 Q.-beobtained? 
24 A At that same time, I called. 
25 Q. Yes, okay. And what were the nature of those 
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Q. Okay. Could you state the conversation that occurred 
then? 
A Yes. It was concerning the buyout/sell agreement, 
insurance policy. I felt like it needed to be increased again, 
because, obviously, the business and partnership was doing much 
better. We had actually even had-it wasn't-I don't 
believe it was a serious one, and it wasn't documented but 
8 someone had come and made some type of offer to buy it, and it 
9 indicated it to be well over what we had valued it at before. 
10 And I felt like we should call Sheldon and have it upped to a 
11 higher figure. 
12 Q. Okay. And so did you call Sheldon or was Sheldon 
13 called? 
A. I did, yes, right there and then. 
Q. At the station? 
A I did, on the station phone. 
Q. And what was the gist of what you told him at that 
18 point in time? 
19 A. That we wanted to up the buy/sell policy. 
Q. Okay. Subsequently, was the policy increased? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. To what amounts? 
A. 300,000 on Brad's life and 250 on Glade's. 
Q. Okay. Were you ever privy to any conversation or 
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conversations about the amounts? 
MR. FISHBURN: objection, Your Honor. Depending on who's 
involved in this conversation, it would be hearsay if it is 
Mr. Hansen. We would also object on the grounds of relevance 
given that this is not a partner; talking about these 
discussions, I don't know what relevance it has. 
THE OOURT: well, I'll sustain the objection at this 
point 
Reframe that If it was a conversation between 
Mr. Parduhn, that's one tiling. If it is someone else, that 
could be something else, Mr. Tanner. 
MR. TANNER; All right Let's back up a little bit 
You are at the Texaco station, correct? 
A. Correct 
Q. You had a conversation about raising the level of 
insurance, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And those that were present included you and 
your husband and Mr. Parduhn, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q. Okay. From there you made a phone call to Sheldon 
Hansen? 
A Yes. 
Q. And during the course of that conversation with those 
individuals present, was there a discussion made about die | 
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1 amounts of coverage? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And were those varying amounts discussed with 
4 Mr. Parduhn and with your husband present? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. And what was the nature of that discussion? 
7 A. That they wanted the premiums to be the same amount, 
8 and Glade's was going to be - and Glade's was going to be 
9 higher to cover the same $300,000 because he was older than 
10 Brad and he was a smoker. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. So, it was discussed between, actually, the two of 
13 them and me right there with Sheldon waiting on the line. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. How to handle that 
16 Q. Okay. Did you ultimately get, as has also been 
17 testified of, a separate policy on your husband's life? 
18 A. Myself? 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. I did. 
21 Q. What was the amount of that separate policy? 
22 A. 250,000. 
23 Q. And why did you obtain a separate policy beyond this 
24 buy/sell agreement policy? 
25 A. Because I felt that I needed more. I had five kids 
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1 MR. FTSHBURN: The objection is based on the Parol 
2 Evidence Rule as codified in the statute. And that would 
3 b c -
4 THE COURT: well, I think I can take judicial notice of 
5 the files of this Court She can testify what she recalls the 
6 Judge said to her, to them, as parties, I think 
7 MR. TANNER: okay. Do you recall what the Judge - what 
8 Judge Murphy said to you about the $300,000 policy in 
9 connection with your divorce? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Please state what that was. 
12 A. That it was - the $300,000 buy/sell life insurance 
13 policy was to remain unencumbered, and that it was from that 
14 time on to be proceeds to go to my children. 
15 Q. Not to you? 
16 A. No, not to me. 
17 MR. TANNER: okay. Nothing further of this witness. 
18 MR. OUNN: I think I'm next in order. Til be brief. 
19 MR. FTSHBURN. okay, that's fine. That was the question 1 j 
20 had, is who goes next. Go ahead. 
21 MR. DUNN: That's the way we occur on die pleadings, 
22 unless the Court would prefer to proceed in some other 
23 fashion? 
24 THE COURT: No, I mink that makes sense. 
25 MR. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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and was solely dependent on Brad 
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that any portion of 
the $300,000 policy on Brad's life would go somewhere else 
other than to you and the children? 
MR. FISHBURN: objection, lack of foundation; calls for 
speculation. 
THE COURT: sustained 
MR. TANNER: okay. Withdraw the question. 
Let me ask you one other question: You don't expect to 
get anything from the: proceeds of these policies personally, do| 
you? 
A. No. 
Q. There was a time when that was not the case, however, 
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14 true? 
15 A, True. 
16 Q. Okay. When did you and Mr. Buchi divorce? 
17 A. 1992. 
18 Q. Okay. Was there an order made in your divorce action 
19 pertaining to the $300,000 policy on Brad's life? 
20 A. Yes, there was. 
21 MR.FISHBURN: Objection, Your Honor. If we are going to 
22 refer to orders and that proceeding, it seems to me we ought to 
23 have the order. 
24 MR. TANNER: I think she can testify as to her 
25 understanding of the order. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes. 
2 MR. DUNN: A few questions, if I may. 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. DUNN: 
5 Q. You say you five children? 
6 A. I do. 
7 Q. What are their names? 
8 A. Natalie, Allison, Annabelle, Lance and Jessica. 
9 Q. Do you recall what their ages were on the day that 
10 Brad died? 
11 A. I could figure it out No, not exactly, I don't 
12 Q. Were any of them still minors at mat point in time? 
13 A. Oh, yes. 
14 Q. Which ones of them were still under 18 or under 21? 
15 A. Jessica, Lance, AnnabeHe. I don't think Alii and 
16 Natalie weren't, no. 
17 Q. So, Alii and Natalie were slightly older? 
18 A. Yeah. Annabelle was barely a minor. 
19 Q. As of today's date, what are the ages of the children 
20 in order of their birth, starting with the oldest first? 
21 A. Natalie's 24; Allison's 22; Anna is 21; Lance is 19 
22 and Jessica is 15. 
23 Q. At the time of Brad's death and immediately preceding i 
24 his death, were those children in any way dependent upon Brad 
25 Buchi? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. In what way? 
3 A. Well, the child support, all that kind of stuff and 
4 even some of them had lived with him. 
5 Q. Did he provide them with other benefits as well from 
6 time to time? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q. Does Mr. Parduhn have any children? 
9 A I don't know. 
10 Q. Are you aware of him having any children? 
11 A No, I don't believe he does. 
12 MR. FISHBURN: objection, relevance. 
13 TOE COURT: Overruled. I'll allow it She said she 
14 doesn't know, anyway. 
15 MR. DUNN: Okay. I can tie that in in closing if 
16 necessary, Your Honor. 
17 Let me ask you one other area of questions, if I may: In 
18 this conversation that you had in the Texaco station with 
19 yourself present and Brad present and Glade present, I'd like 
20 for you to focus, if you would, on the participation in that 
21 conversation that Glade Parduhn had, the things that he said, 
22 the involvement in the conversation that he participated in. 
23 And I would like to ask you your best recollection as to what 
24 Mr. Parduhn said about the question of whether or not the 
25 increased amount to $300,000 was for the purpose of going to 
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1 September 1990; is that correct? 
2 A Yeah, late. 
3 Q. And then I believe you indicated your divorce decree 
4 was entered in March of 1992? 
5 A I believe that's right 
6 Q. And in that proceeding there were still some issues 
7 resolved in terms of property and all that that actually took 
8 several more years to resolve, correct? 
9 A That's correct 
10 Q. Now, in that divorce proceeding, I assume it's 
11 correct to say that Glade Parduhn was not a party, just you and 
12 Brad? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q. And you didn't give Mr. Parduhn copies of motions or 
15 notice of hearings that were filed in that divorce proceeding, 
16 correct? 
17 ADidl? No, I didn't give them to anybody. 
18 Q. Well, you would have given them to Brad, I assume? 
19 A No, I didn't 
20 Q. Okay. Mr. Parduhn was never deposed in the divorce 
21 proceeding, correct? 
22 A Not to my knowledge, of course not 
23 Q. To the best of your knowledge, he never participated 
24 in any depositions or any hearings or in any way in that case, 
25 correct? 
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1 the buy/sell agreement or if any part of it was for the purpose 
2 of going to him personally, Mr. Parduhn, personally? 
A That was never an issue -
Q. Didheever-
A - o f it going to Mm, personally. 
Q. Did he ever mention anything of mat kind? 
A Nothing of that kind. 
Q. What did he say with reference to increasing the 
buy/sell agreement amount to $300,000? 
A Just mat he agreed mat we should up the buy/sell 
policy (Inaudible). 
Q. Thank you very - go ahead, I didn't mean to cut you 
13 off. 
14 A Oh, just that he agreed to it, and he also-that he 
15 agreed mat his would only 250 because of his smoking and age. 
16 MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fishburn. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. FISHBURN: 
20 Q. You still go by the last name of "Buchi"; is that 
correct? 
A.Ido. 
Q. You were married to Brad in what year? 
A 75. 
Q. And then you filed a complaint for divorce in 
17 
18 
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1 A Actually, no, that's not correct. 
2 Q. Was he in court? 
3 A. He might have been on a couple of occasions. 
4 Q. Okay. In response to Mr. Tanner's questioning, I 
5 believe you indicated that there was also a third policy that 
6 was taken out — or a second policy on Brad's life and a third 
7 policy in early January of 1989, correct? 
8 A. A third policy? What do you mean "third policy''? 
9 Q. Well, let me direct your attention in that notebook 
10 in front of you to what's been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 
11 No. 5. 
12 A Uh-huh. 
13 Q. And let me direct your attention, since I presume you 
14 haven't seen these before, to the policy data pages which are 
15 the first two pages, and then you'll find an application for 
16 insurance towards the end Now, do you see those? 
17 A Where? 
18 Q. Towards the end of this document, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
19 No. 5, there's four handwritten pages at the end. Do you see 
20 that? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q. On the four handwritten pages at the end if you look 
23 t o -
24 A. No, wait a minute I don't. Handwritten you say? 
25 THE COURT: she probably has the Defendants' Exhibit 5. 
T»TT T I T ? i rr A v r\nm 
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1 THE WITNESS: i don't have it 
2 MR. FISHBURN: May I just approach the witness? Maybe we 
3 are talking past each otlw. 
4 Oh, okay, (Inaudible) the answers. 
5 THE WITNESS: oh, the answers. Oh, okay, I got you. 
6 MR. FISHBURN: I mink we were there, but we are just 
7 talking past each other. 
8 THE COURT: she probably (Inaudible) which exhibit are we 
9 talking about? 
10 MR. FISHBURN: we are talking about Plaintiffs Exhibit 
11 No. 5. 
12 THE COURT: plaintiffs 5. And she - and you - she has 
13 mat? 
14 MR. FISHBURN: she actually has mat I was asking her 
15 about the application mat is - constitutes the last four 
16 pages of that exhibit 
17 Do you see mat now? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Now, this is the policy or the application on the 
20 policy that you were talking about when - on direct 
21 examination, correct? 
22 A. For the 300,000 one? 
23 Q. No, for me 250,000 one on Brad's life. 
24 A. No. Isn't mis on Glade's life? It says, "Proposed 
25 insured: Glade Parduhn." 
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1 THEWTTNESS: YCS. 
2 MR. DUNN:-mis pohcy is not relevant to this 
3 inquiry. Whether or not Brad Buchi decided to buy other 
4 insurance for the benefit of mis individual or other people is 
5 not relevant to a determination as to whether or not the policy 
6 that's purchased under the buy/sell agreement is due to the -
7 the existing wife and children. 
8 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, if I may? I would submit-
9 THE COURT: (inaudible). 
10 MR. FISHBURN: I would submit it's extraordinarily 
11 relevant, and it has been made relevant, if not before, by the 
12 opening comments by the Buchi Children's attorney who said that 
13 it defies logic that Brad Buchi, on me $300,000, policy could 
14 really have intended that money to go to the beneficiary he 
15 designated in that policy, and that was Glade. It's relevant 
16 to show mat Brad Buchi was making plans to provide for his 
17 family in many other ways on this policy and several others, 
18 frankly. And I think given that position we are entitled to 
19 produce evidence of mis policy. 
20 THE COURT: I think it's relevant The objection is 
21 overruled. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: DO you recognize, first of all, your former 
23 husband's signature in the lower right-hand corner? 
24 A.Ido. 
25 Q. And that's your signature as the applicant for 
Q. Okay. Let me direct your attention to the next to 
the last page of the exhibit 
A. Okay. The check? That's the next to the last page. 
MR. FISHBURN: Boy, can I approach the witness (Inaudible) 
something's wrong here? 
THE COURT: Please do. I mink we just got--1 may be 
7 wrong. We may just have some confusion on what 5 we are 
8 talking about 
9 THEWTTNESS: Oh. 
10 THE COURT: You see, that's the problem. It's pretty 
11 clear -
12 THEWTTNESS: There you go. 
13 MR. FISHBURN: Let's see -
14 THEWTTNESS: Sony. 
15 MR. FISHBURN: (inaudible). 
16 THEWTTNESS: That's 6. 
17 MR. FISHBURN: And this (Inaudible). 
18 THEWITNESS: This page. All right Sorry. 
19 MR. FISHBURN: For the record, we are now looking at me 
20 next to last page of exhibit - Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5. 
21 MR DUNN: plaintiffs Proposed Exhibit No. 5. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: Proposed Exhibit No. 5, that's correct 
23 The tower right-hand corner, you - do you recognize that 
24 as a signature of Brad Buchi? 
25 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor -
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1 insurance, correct? 
2 A. It is. 
3 Q. The answers to the questions mat appear in mis, 
4 mat's not your handwriting, is it, throughout this. 
5 application? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. That would be Sheldon Hansen's handwriting, correct? 
8 A. I don't know. 
9 Q. You don't know whose it is? 
10 But, at any rate, you acknowledge mat you did sign as an 
11 applicant for insured for mis insurance policy, correct? 
12 A. Correct 
13 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, I would move mat mis Exhibit 
14 No. 5 be received into evidence. 
15 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, Til object to the receipt of this 
16 exhibit into evidence. As it relates to my client, there's 
17 certaMy IK> opening m the door by virtue of any earlier 
18 argument on the part of Mr. Tanner. If his argument is mat it 
19 is somehow admissible on that basis, it certainly doesn't run 
20 to Joanne Buchi. This policy certainly didn't benefit her, 
21 Joanne, in any fashion. And me fact mat Brad and Lisa made a 
22 decision to acquire an additional policy really has no 
23 relevance or materiality to a determination of the question of 
24 whether or not the policy we are examining is to be interpreted 
25 in any particular fashion. It doesn't bear on the question in 
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1 any respect 
2 MR. TANNER: I would join that objection. 
3 THE COURT: well, to the extent we ait talking about his 
4 intent overall, I think it is a relevant, and overruled, and 
5 Plaintiffs 5 is received. 
6 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5 admitted.) 
7 MR. FISHBURN: Ms. Buchi, you understood - you understood 
8 you were being designated as a primary beneficiary on this 
9 policy, correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Now, at the time you filled out this application far 
12 insurance on Brad's life, mere's also other insurance that was 
13 previously put into effect on Brad's life on which you and your 
14 children were designated as the beneficiaries, correct? 
15 A. There's some term ones, yes. 
16 Q. And one of those is a policy referenced in response 
17 to Question No. 18, which was with Executive Life Insurance, 
18 correct? 
19 A. On mis? Number 18? 
20 Q. I am still talking about the same exhibit, answer to 
21 Question No. 18. 
22 A. Okay. 
23 Q. Refers to "Executive. Year '84. $572,000." Do you 
24 see that? 
25 A. I see it, yeah, but I don't know anything about it. 
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1 MR. FISHBURN: same response. 
2 MR. DUNN: (inaudible) collected from some other policy 
3 makes no difference to this policy. 
4 MR. TANNER: same objection. 
5 THEOOURT: overruled. 
6 MR. FISHBURN: Did you receive the benefits? 
7 A. IdkL 
8 Q. Now, you indicated that there - your divorce, at 
9 least in terms of the separation and the ending of the 
10 marriage, occurred in March of 1992, correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And thereafter there were still some property issues 
13 to be resolved, correct? 
14 A. Uh-huh, yes. 
15 Q. And one of those included me resolution of a 
16 previously acquired life insurance policy issued by Midland 
17 Life Insurance, correct? 
18 MR. DUNN. objection, Your Honor, not relevant or 
19 material 
20 THE WITNESS: Not that I recall, anyway. 
21 MR. FISHBURN: All right Again, Your Honor, it's the 
22 same thing, it has been made an issue of what Mr. Buchi's 
23 intent was, and the evidence will indicate mat there were 
24 still other policies by which he was providing for his family. 
25 One of those which is mentioned in the divorce papers filed in 
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Q. Now, the answer to Question No. 4ID, do you see 
that? Question is: 
"What amount of insurance in 
Question 18 of this application are 
pending with other companies is payable 
to the owner as beneficiary?" 
Do you see the answer there: 
"Executive. $572,000-? 
A. I see i t 
Q. And this information was on the application when you 
signed it in early 1989, correct? 
A. Apparently so. 
Q. And you were to be the owner of this policy, correct? 
MR. DUNN: Objection. Lack of relevance or materiality. 
MR. TANNER: Join the objection. 
MR. FISHBURN: Same response. 
TOE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. FISHBURN: You were to be the owner of this policy, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 correct? 
20 A.I guess, if that's what that part means. 
21 Q. Okay. And, in fact, subsequent to Brad Buchi's 
22 death, you did receive the policy - or $250,000 pursuant to 
23 this particular policy? 
24 MR. DUNN: Objection, lacks materiality or relevance to 
25 our inquiry, Your Honor. 
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1 the divorce between Lisa and Brad Buchi. 
2 MR. DUNN: Yes. But that assumes that there is some set 
3 number that he had in mind as a total mat he was trying to 
4 achieve, and there is no evidence to that effect of any kind 
5 The fact that he chose to make beneficial arrangements for his 
6 family and in a number of different fashions does not bear on 
7 our question. 
8 THE OOURT: I understand your argument, Counsel It's 
9 overruled I'll allow that 
10 MR. FISHBURN: Those arc not another policy issued by 
11 Midland Life Insurance, a company, mat was addressed in the 
12 course of the divorce proceeding between you and Brad? 
13 A. Not that I rccalL 
14 Q. Let me direct your attention to what's marked in 
15 those exhibits before you as the Proposed Exhibit No. 21. 
16 A. I am sorry, 21? 
17 Q. Twenty-one. 
18 A. Should I go behind it? Is that what I do? 
19 Q. Right 
20 A. All right 
21 Q. Now, this document - first of all, you recognize 
22 this as being in the form of the pleading - or not a pleading 
23 - but a paper filed in the divorce proceeding between you and 
24 Brad, correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And, in fact, I believe, Mr. Dart was your legal 
2 counsel; is that right? 
3 A. Yes, he was. 
4 MR. FISHBUFN: Your Honor, I'd move, first of all, for the 
5 admission of Exhibit No. 2 i. It is - 1 would point out it is 
6 a certified copy by the clerk of this court. 
7 MR DUNN: I sec no need for it. I don't see the 
8 relevance or materiality here, either. 
9 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, the relevance will appear. 
10 It's within the order. 
11 THE COURT: so, uic same objection on relevance? I mean, 
12 I understand it (Inaudible) -
13 MR. DUNN: I am not objecting on foundational grounds. It 
14 is the materiality and relevance, yes, Your Honor. 
15 THECOURT: All rigjit. Overruled. 
16 Exhibit 21 - Plaintiffs 21 is received. 
17 (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 21 admitted) 
18 MR. FISHBURN: Drawing your attention to Paragraphs 6 and 
19 7 of this order, Ms. Buchi -
20 A. Uh-huh. 
21 Q. - well, actually not 6, Number 7. 
22 A. Uh-huh. 
23 Q. Do you see that? 
24 A. Yes, I do now. 
25 Q. Okay. Where it says: 
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1 having received the insurance oo after your husband died? 
2 A. Did I get insurance after he died? 
3 Q. From some other companies. You said you didn't 
4 remember Midland but you remember other companies. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What other companies? 
7 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor, relevance and 
8 materiality. 
THECOURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Northern, is what I recall. 
MR. FISHBURN: Okay. Any others? 
Northern, that's the one that we just discussed, isn't 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 it? 
14 A. Yeah, but there were -
15 Q. Was there another Northern policy that you received 
16 benefits on that you recall? 
17 A. You know, I can't recall. I'm sorry. 
18 Q. I am just asking: What others do you recall, if any? 
19 A. Yes -
20 MR DUNN: Asked and answered. 
21 TOE COURT: she's answered. She says she remembers 
22 Northern and that's all. 
23 MR FISHBURN: That's correct, right? 
24 A. (Inaudible) company, yeah. 
25 Q. About a month before Brad died in June of 1997, do 
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1 "The Court awards: Midland l i f e 
2 Insurance policy in the face amount of 
3 $100,000 to Plaintiff at a value of 
4 $1,000 with this policy to be transferred 
5 to Plaintiff subject to Plaintiff 
6 maintaining the minor children as 
7 beneficiaries on the policy during their 
8 minority." 
9 Now, do you recall the Midland Policy? 
10 A. I don't recall it as Midland, but, obviously, I guess 
11 that must be part of it. There were several term insurances 
12 that were acquired and dissolved, acquired and dissolved, 
13 several. 
14 Q. Okay. And subsequent to Brad's death, did you 
15 receive the benefits as beneficiary of $100,000 from Midland 
16 Life Insurance policy? 
17 A. I received that -
18 MR. DUNN: objection, materiality and relevance. 
19 THECOURT: Overruled. 
20 MR. TANNER: Same objection. 
21 THECOURT: Overruled. 
22 TOE WITNESS: Yes, I received some, but I don't recall it 
23 being Midland. I thought was it was Northern. 
24 MR. FISHBURN: Okay. Were there other insurances that 
25 notwithstanding your prior divorce from Brad that you recall 
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1 you recall a-wel l , first of all, let me back up: Within the 
2 divorce proceeding - 1 think you alluded to this - there was 
3 an obligation by Brad reduced to court order to pay child 
4 support, correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And that would have involved paying child support to 
7 his and your children at least up until the time they reached 
8 18, right? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. About a month before Brad died, do you recall 
11 agreement, a Written agreement, that you entered into with Brad 
12 regarding his obligation for future child support? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 MR. TANNER: objection, relevancy. 
15 MR. DUNN: I will join in that 
16 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, once again, it's been the 
17 position of the Defendants, there's just no conception of how 
18 Brad Buchi could have intended the 300 go to somebody other 
19 than the designated beneficiary, and this evidence will 
20 indicate that Brad Buchi was, despite problems, doing 
21 everything he could to provide for his family in other ways. 
22 THECOURT. well, I think - 1 think you've established 
23 that sufficiently, Mr. Fishburn. I'm not sure that we need any 
24 more on that 
25 MR. FISHBURN: okay. Perhaps, after this witness is done 
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1 testifying, could I make a proffer of that evidence just for 
2 the purposes of appeal? 
3 THE COURT: certainly. 
4 MR. FISHBURN: Okay. Thank you. 
5 Let me direct your attention to what's been marked as 
6 Defendants' Exhibit 3. 
7 Where would that be? 
8 MR. DUNN: which do you have in mind? 
9 MR. FISHBURN: (inaudible). 
10 You - on that exhibit, you recognize the handwriting at 
11 the top above the signatures of Glade and Brad as being in 
12 Brad's handwriting, correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And then below the names, there's some additional 
15 handwriting that's been added. Do you see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Isn't that your handwriting? 
A. No. 
MR. FISHBURN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Redirect, Mr. Tanner? 
MR. TANNER: Yes. 
16 
17 
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23 
24 
25 
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1 of, that you haven't collected on yet? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. So, to the best of your knowledge the $250,000 
4 policy, whether it was Northern or Midland, was it, that you 
5 received, correct? 
6 A. It was split up, Martin, so I am not sure that I can 
7 say that, exactly. 
8 Q. Okay. Well, help us understand then. 
9 A. It came from Northern, but it was in two different 
10 payments. 
11 Q. And the total amount -
12 A. I'm not sure. 
13 Q. - was, approximately? 
14 A. I don't know. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. That really sounds stupid, I know. 
17 Q. Okay. Well, was it approximately mis $250,000 that 
18 we've been talking about or was it more, was it less or do you 
19 recall? 
20 A. It was approximately that 
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. 
22 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, in view of Lisa Buchi's testimony 
23 concerning Defendants' Proposed Exhibit No. D-3, I'd like to 
24 move for receipt into evidence of Defendants' Exhibit D-3, 
25 including the notation at the bottom of the page which this 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. TANNER: 
3 Q. Before we leave Exhibit 3 in front of you, whose 
4 handwriting does that appear to be at the bottom of Exhibit 3?| 
5 A. It was added quite a bit later by Brad. 
6 Q. 'That looks like Brad's handwriting to you? 
7 A. Yeah. Well, I was present. 
8 Q. So, you saw him write that? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. Not the top part 
12 Q. The bottom? 
13 A. I wasn't there when he wrote the top part. 
14 Q. Okay, the bottom portion? 
15 A. Uh-huh. 
16 Q. All right You've been questioned about life 
17 insurance policies on your husband's life you are the 
18 beneficiary of. Did you ever receive a payoff on an Executive! 
19 Life Insurance policy of $572,000 when Brad passed away? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you ever receive any amounts other than the 
22 $250,000 policy that you've already mentioned? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Okay. Are there any other policies outstanding on 
25 Brad's life which you are the beneficiary, that you are aware 
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1 witness has testified she saw Brad Buchi write out. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Fishbura? 
3 MR FISHBURN: Actually, I join in that request. I would 
4 also move for its admission. 
5 MR. DUNN: Good. 
6 THE COURT: All right Defendants' 3 is received. 
7 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 3 admitted.) 
8 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
9 BYMR.DUNN: 
10 Q. Would you turn, if you would, to (Inaudible) the 
11 Plaintiff's book of exhibits before you. 
12 It's 7 there. I'm giving her this one. 
13 MR. FISHBURN: All right 
14 MR. DUNN: I can find it more rapidly, Your Honor, in the 
15 Defendants', although, I believe there is a duplicate in 
16 (Inaudible) 7. In - or our Exhibit 6, and I believe -
17 A VOICE: It should be 4,1 believe, Tim (Inaudible). 
18 MR. TANNER: Exhibit 4. 
19 MR. DUNN: Okay. Hand me that one. 
20 All right Turn, if you would, to the Plaintiff's 
21 booklet, and specifically to Exhibit No. 4, which has been 
22 previously received into evidence by way of stipulation. If 
23 you would please turn to the second page designated as "Page 
24 2". In the lower left - excuse me, right-hand corner, under 
25 "Item 3IE," what is the amount that is listed there as the 
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1 insurance being in force on Mr. Buchi — or Mr. Parduhn? 
2 A. Am I in the right book, everybody? 
MR. FISHBURN: I object (Inaudible) characterized as to 
what it's saying. 
THE COURT: Well, first, let's straighten out the book 
A VOICE: Other book. 
TOE WITNESS: Other book, okay. 
A VOICE: Number 4. 
THE WITNESS: okay. Okay. 
MR. DUNN: I can return to this in another witness, Your 
11 Honor. I don't know that this witness actually has actual 
12 knowledge of that point. 
13 So, at this juncture, I have no further questions. 
Thank you, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
No further questions? 
MR. FISHBURN: NO further. 
THE COURT: All light. You can step down. Thank you, 
19 Ms. Buchi. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Tanner, call your next witness. 
21 MR. DUNN: I'll sort it out when we get a break. 
22 MR. TANNER: Okay. 
23 Would this be the appropriate (Inaudible) -
24 THE COURT: Oh, sure. I'm sorry. Mr. Fishburn. 
25 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, the evidence of - 1 was 
3 
4 
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7 
8 
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10 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. You woe involved in providing insurance 
3 services to those two gentlemen in connection with their 
4 partnership? 
5 A. I was. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you recall becoming involved in an 
4 
7 application on a $300,000 policy on the life of Brad Buchi and 
8 a $250,000 policy on the life of Glade Parduhn? 
9 A. Ido. 
10 Q. Let me ask you if you could take a look at the larger 
11 of the two binders immediately to your left. Take a look, 
12 please, at Exhibit 6 in there? 
13 A. Six? 
14 Q. Yes, please. It will be Defendants' Exhibit 6. Ask 
15 if you recognize that document? 
16 A. It is the same as mine, yes. 
17 Q. Excellent We would hope it's the same. 
18 Do you recall - well, let me be even more specific: 
19 Would you turn to the turn me page to Item 31 where it says: 
20 "Ownership section"? 
21 A. Okay. 
22 Q. Okay. Do you see there the owner's name is listed as 
23 "Glade Parduhn", conrct? 
24 A. That's correct 
25 Q. And if you go bdow there to Item F: 
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1 getting into- and mis would be for the purposes of proffer 
2 — is that about a month before Brad died, he called or 
3 contacted Usa,h was Ibis idea, he proposed mat he pay off 
4 all of his child support obligation in advance and that mat be 
5 done out of SOUK proceeds or his share of me proceed^ fnm me 
6 sale of the stations, mat was $69,000 and, in fact, she 
7 received a check for that amount about two weeks after the sale 
8 of the stations. 
9 THE COURT: All right Thank you, Mr. Fishburn. 
10 Mr. Tanner, next witness. 
11 MR. TANNER: call Sheldon Hansen. 
12 SHELDON HANSEN, called as a witness on 
13 behalf of me Defendants, after having been duly sworn, 
14 testified as follows: 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BYMR. TANNER: 
17 Q. Would you stats; your name, please? 
18 A. Sheldon Hansen. 
19 Q. Your occupation? 
20 A. At present I'm a banker. 
21 Q. And is there a time earlier in your life when you 
22 were involved in insurance? 
23 A. Thercwas. 
24 Q. And you knew Mr. Buchi who's since passed away and 
25 Mr. Parduhn who's present in the courtroom? 
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1 "State purpose of insurance and 
2 nature of owner's insurable interest" 
3 And it lists: "Buy/sell/partner"? 
4 A That's correct 
5 Q. Was it your understanding mis policy then was 
6 somehow issued in connection with a buy/sdl payment of 
7 parties? 
8 A. That's correct, uh-huh. 
9 Q. And is the buy/sell agreement, mat it was issued in 
10 connection with Exhibit 1, in mat same binder mere? 
11 A I don't know mat I did not, at the time I was 
12 issuing mis insurance, have access to the agreement I asked 
13 Brad about that on several occasions, and he said, ''We've got 
14 an agreement Don't worry about it" So, I'm not prepared to 
15 testify mat it relates to this agreement or some other. 
16 Q. Okay. So, your understanding was that it pertained 
17 to a buy/sdl agreement but you personally had not seen and did 
18 not know the details of that agreement? 
19 A. That is correct 
20 Q. Were you ever told anything about how the proceeds of 
21 this policy were to be distributed other than what's on the 
22 faceofit? 
23 A. Brad indicated to me -
24 MR. FISHBURN: objection, calls for hearsay. 
25 THE COURT: sustained 
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1 MR. TANNER: Did Mr. Parduhn ever indicate to you that -
2 well, let me ask it this way Other than as stated in the 
3 policy, did Mr. Parduhn ever clarify or make any statements 
4 about how the proceeds of this policy were to be paid? 
5 A. I have know recollection of that, no. 
6 MR. TANNER: okay. I have nothing further of this 
7 witness. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn, cross-examination. 
9 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
11 BYMR.DUNN: 
12 Q. Mr. Hansen, my name is Tim Dunn. How are you, sir? 
13 A. Fine, thank you. 
14 Q. I don't think we had an occasion to meet before 
15 today. 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. In Mr. Parduhn's testimony and more particularly in 
18 his deposition but also in trial, he testified that "I think 
19 Sheldon put that in thcie, the buy/scU reference in the 
20 application, so that we could get a policy on each other." 
21 Do you remember a conversation with Mr. Parduhn when you 
22 told him about the buy/sell indication having to go into that 
23 insurable interest? 
24 A. I am not sure what the Mcrencc, f,Sheldon put it in 
25 there." I wrote it I - but I write - everything in an 
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1 interesting how the dynamics of the trial change the order in 
2 which you originally thought you'd approach it 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. FISHBURN: 
5 Q. Mr. Hansen, when the applications were filled out by 
6 the two partners each on the life of the other in carry 
7 January, 1989,1 understand you bad not at that point seen a 
8 copy of use buy/sell agreement? 
9 A. That is my recollection. 
10 Q. To your recollection you don't remember ever having 
11 seen the buy/sell agreement itself? 
12 A. I don't Even though 1 asked for it on several 
13 occasions, he said, "Don't worry about that We've got it and 
14 we'll take care of it" 
15 Q. And you hadn't had the advantage of seeing the 
16 partnership agreement either? 
17 A. That - 1 may well have seen that in connection with 
18 some loan work that I did for them -
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. - but, I'm sorry, I didn't bring my loan file, I 
21 only brought my insurance file, so I -
22 Q. That's fine. 
23 A. - so I don't know that precisely. 
24 Q. Now, the application that was used for a policy on 
25 Brad's life, at least in form, and the application on Glade's 
P a g p l 3 4 
1 application I write, I write at the instruction of my client. 
2 Q. Okay. And it was written in there: "For the purpose 
3 of demonstrating the existence of an insurable interest"; 
4 correct? 
5 A. That's correct 
6 Q. And you determined that the insurable interest that 
7 needed to be noted in order for the policy to be appropriately 
8 written was that there was a buy/sell agreement in place? 
9 A. That's correct 
10 Q. And you had a conversation with Mr. Parduhn to the 
11 effect that this particular policy was being purchased with 
12 reference to that buy/sell agreement or a buy/sell agreement? 
13 A. I would presume that's correct That's a long time 
14 ago, and I don't remember every word in those conversations. 
15 But that is consistent with my understanding of the intent of 
16 these policies, and it's consistent with what I have recorded 
17 on the applications. 
18 Q. Is that also consistent with your understanding as to 
19 the requirements of insurable interest? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, sir. 
22 THE COURT: All right 
23 Mr. Fishburn, any cross-examination? 
24 MR. FKHBURN: Yes. Your Honor, just one moment I'm 
25 going to change the order of some things I did here. Always 
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1 life woe the same form, correct? 
2 A. That's correct 
3 Q. And then you, as I believe you said, filkd in the 
4 answers to the questions based on information that had been 
5 given to you? 
6 A. That's correct 
7 Q. And on each of those applications, there was included 
8 in the application questionnaire a designation of the 
9 beneficiary; is that right? 
10 A. That's rigit 
11 Q. And as an agent for Northern Life what was your 
12 understanding of what it meant to be designated a beneficiary? 
13 A. The beneficiary is the person designated to receive 
14 the death proceeds. 
15 Q. And - there is also a question in here - I'm 
16 looking at the wrong notebook. 
17 On both of those applications, a Question 31, there is a 
18 question, first of all, to identify who's to be the owner of 
19 the policy; is that correct? 
20 A. That's correct 
21 Q. And there's also a question, 3 IF: 
22 "State the purpose of insurance 
23 and die nature of the owner's insurable 
24 interest" 
25 Correct? 
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1 A. That's correct 
2 Q. And that's something that you always fill out as an 
3 agent or would have filled out as an agent for Northern in 
4 taking an application for insurance? 
5 A. That's correct 
6 Q. That would also be true for instance if there were a 
7 wife applying for insurance on a husband or a husband on a 
8 wife, you still fill it out, correct? 
9 A. That's correct 
10 Q. And your understanding at this time as an agent for 
11 Northern Life the existence of a buy/sell agreement between two 
12 partners would be the basis for an insurable interest, correct? 
13 A. Even the partnership agreement would be; either one 
14 of those. 
15 Q. Okay. In the partnership agreement, in the absence 
16 of a buy/sell agreement, would be the basis, legitimately, in 
17 your recollection for an insurable interest at that time? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor. This calls for legal 
20 conclusion. 
21 MR. TANNER: Join the objection. 
22 THE COURT: rll sustain that 
23 MR. FISHBURN: This is asking you to go back in the past 
24 I understand that How long were you an Agent for Northern 
25 Life Insurance Company? 
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1 on the life of another? 
2 A. That's correct 
3 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor -
4 THE COURT: rll overrule it at this point The question 
5 before was, 1 think 1 agreed, a conclusion. But his 
6 understanding of what he's required to do in filling out 
7 applications 1 think is legitimate. So, I'll overrule that 
8 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, his latest question as posed goes 
9 beyond that with respect to the actual application of the 
10 policy itself. And I think for that reason, perhaps, it's a 
11 little bit different objection here, I might so state. 
12 MR. DUNN: My objection, Your Honor, ran, as well, to 
13 foundation, because this gentleman testified he did not know 
14 what the instructions, or he hasn't given us any details, at 
15 least foundation, on instruction for a Northern Policy. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Til note the objection. 
17 Thank you, Counsel, but overruled. 
18 MR. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 MR. FISHBURN: rm hoping you remember the question. 
20 A. Try me again, please. 
21 Q. As of January of 1989, when these two applications 
22 were filled out by you on the lives of these two insurance -
23 or these two partners, was it your understanding that you were 
24 authorized to accept applications for insurance on one 
25 partner's life - or by one partner on the life of his 
1 A. For Northern? Fifteen years, give or take. 
2 Q. And were you an agent for other companies, as well? 
3 A. Iwas. 
4 Q. Did you receive training on how - let's say - let's 
5 confine it to Northern. Did you receive training by Northern 
6 on how you should fill out an application for life insurance 
7 with Northern? 
8 A. I received training by my general agents. At what 
9 juncture I received that specific training, it could have been 
10 from Northern. It was probably from my previous - my original 
11 company of license, which was Ohio National Life. 
12 Q. Do you recall, in your capacity as an agent, being 
13 trained or advised or receiving education on what was meant by 
14 "insurable interest1•? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Did you, as an agent in the taking of life insurance 
17 policies and filling them out, have an understanding of what 
18 was meant by "insurable interest"? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And did you have an understanding of what was meant 
21 by the term "insurable interest" as you took these two 
22 applications in January of 1989? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And was it your understanding that you were 
25 authorized to take an application for insurance by one partner 
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1 partner? 
2 MR. TANNER: objection; vague, ambiguous. 
3 MR. DUNN: (inaudible). 
4 MR. TANNER: we are not clear here who we are talking 
5 about, whether it is the two partners or whether it's by the 
6 insurance company or some combination. 
7 THE COURT: counsel, why don't you reframe it and try to 
8 restrict it to what his understanding was of what N ^ 
9 Insurance Company required by way of insurable interest, what 
10 his understanding was. 
11 MR. FISHBURN: okay, I'm trying. 
12 Confining your answer to just Northern life Insurance and 
13 as an Agent for Northern Life Insurance for the period of early 
14 1989, do you - first of all, do you recall having an 
15 understanding of what they regarded as an insurable interest on 
16 which life insurance could be written? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And do you recall an understanding that you had 
19 concerning insurable interest vis-a-vis partners and 
20 partnerships? 
21 A. That's correct 
22 Q. And do you recall whether or not their - your 
23 understanding of their instructions allowed you to write a 
24 policy by a partner on the life of another partner? | 
25 MR. DUNN: objection; lack of foundation at this juncture. 
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1 MR TANNER: Also, I would object on tbc grounds of 
2 relevancy. I'm turc that it wouldn't matter at all what 
3 Northern Life feels appropriate. What is appropriate is what 
4 the Utah Legislature and the statute deems appropriate. 
5 THE OOURT: I understand that, but it goes to the reason 
6 he wrote what he wrote, I think. 
7 I'll overrule those objections and allow the answer. 
8 MR. DUNN: so, at this juncture u% question is what? 
9 Because I - 1 was reserving my question as to relevance for 
10 what I thought would be the follow-up question. My objection 
11 ran to foundation because this gentleman testified earlier that 
12 he didn't recall exactly what they told him, but.. 
13 THEOOURT: Well, I thought -
14 MR. DUNN: rll defer to the Court, of course. 
15 THE COURT: I thought the question was simply: "What did 
16 Northern require by way of - did he write something for 
17 Northern and call it insurable interest if it was based on just 
18 a partnership?" And I'll allow that. 
19 You can answer mat -
20 THE WITNESS: okay, yes. 
21 THEOOURT: -question. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: YCS, you were allowed to? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. You were an agent for various companies for a total 
25 of, I think, 22 or 23 years, right? 
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1 recollection mat often insurance would be sold at an amount 
2 more than presently needed to fund their buy/sell agreement? 
3 A. That can happen, yes. 
4 Q. And are you personally aware of any legal restriction 
5 mat would preclude you as an Agent for Northern, in early 
6 January 1989, of selling more insurance man needed to fund, to 
7 the penny, buy/sell insurance? 
8 I'm not saying mere is or isn't Are you aware of any? 
9 MR. DUNN: object Theformof the question is vague and 
10 ambiguous. 
11 MR. TANNER: object as to relevance, as wdL 
12 THE WTTNESS: Maybe I can answer it so it will clarify h 
13 in my mind? 
14 THEOOURT: okay, again, just a moment, Mr. Hansen. 
15 The objection is overruled. I'll allow mat 
16 THE WITNESS: occasionally we did write a policy for more 
17 than the buy/sell agreement, and sometimes, not always, we 
18 would indicate what the excess proceeds were for. If the 
19 buy/sell agreement provided for a variable formula, then we 
20 would not necessarily describe what the excess proceeds were 
21 for. But if the buy/sell agreement required a specific figure, 
22 we could designate mat X number of dollars is for the buy/sell 
23 agreement, Y number of dollars is for something else. 
24 Q. Let me direct your attention to Plaintiffs Exhibit 
25 No. 5. 
A. That's correct 
Q. Would I be correct in assuming mat during mat time 
period you had many other occasions in which you wrote or took 
applications for insurance involving partners and partnerships 
and sometimes buy/sell agreements? 
A. My practice was almost exclusively with small 
businesses, yes. I wrote — most of my business had its origin 
8 with the small business relationship. 
Q. Okay. And you've had occasion, not in this case, 
maybe, but on other occasions, to actually see buy/sell 
agreements between partners? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And sometimes buy/sell agreements can take the form 
14 of an explicit fixed dollar amount, right? 
15 A. That's correct 
16 Q. And sometimes it can take the form of a variable 
17 amount depending on the value of the partnership at the time a 
18 partner might die, correct? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. And sometimes those latter categories, they will 
21 dictate a methodology for valuing the partnership, et cetera? 
22 A. Uh-huh. 
23 Q. Now, particularly with the latter category where we 
24 have a variable value or a variable amount to be paid by the 
25 surviving partner, isn't it - wasn't - isn't it your 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 A. Is that in the big book. 
2 Q. It's in the little one. 
3 A. The little one. 
4 Q. Now, that starts with Page 3 of the Northern Life 
5 policy. Do you recognize that? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And at the end of that, there is appended an 
8 application. Do you see that? 
9 A. There should be one. There is. 
10 Q. That would be standard procedure to have that 
11 application appended to the policy; is that correct? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And, again, the handwriting, the answers to the 
14 question on this policy, that's your handwriting; is it not? 
15 A. It is. 
16 Q. And, of course, you signed as the licensed Agent for 
17 Northern, correct? 
18 A.Idid 
19 Q. Now, this is a policy being applied for Brad Buchi's 
20 life but this one listing Lisa Buchi as the owner and 
21 beneficiary; is that correct? 
22 A. I know she had one. Let's see if this is the one. 
23 That's correct. 
24 Q. And your recollection is a policy was, in fact, 
25 issued? 
n r r Y -m n r A ycr **nrw 
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A. Yes. I I 
Q. Now, in the process of filling out the information on 2 
this policy, you answered questions - I am going to direct 3 
your attention to Number 18 and 19. 4 
Okay. Now, Number 18, that's a box that you as the agent] 5 
filled out as a matter of procedure for Northern life 6 
Insurance, correct? 7 
A. Tliat's correct 8 
Q. And that was life insurance in force on the insured, 9 
correct? 10 
A. Right 111 
Q. That would be life insurance then in force? 12 
A. At the time the application was being taken, yes. 13 
Q. And on 19A you were - you filled out an answer, 14 
15 whether or not this po l i cy w a s intended to replace that one, 15 
16 correct? 16 
A. That's correct 17 
Q. A n d answer to that question w a s "no"? 18 
A. That's right 19 
Q. A n d then Number 3 1 , it cal ls for the person to be 20 
21 designated as the owner, and that w a s I i s a Buchi on this 21 
22 policy? 22 
23 A. Right 23 
24 Q. A n d then on Question 3 1 E - no , 3 1 D , it said: "What 24 
25 amount of insurance in Question 18 of this application or 125 
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Q. The reference to the "572,000" means what? 
A. That's the face amount in force at the time. 
MR. FISHBURN: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: All right No further questions? 
MR. TANNER: ido. 
THE COURT: Oh, you do? 
MR. TANNER: I do, just one or two, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: YOU may redirect, Mr. Tanner. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TANNER: 
Q. 1 believe you indicated in your testimony just a 
moment or two ago that in connection with buy/sell agreements 
if there was more than one way that the proceeds were to be 
paid out or applied on the death of someone, that was described 
in the policy, is that correct? 
A. It was my practice to attempt to define that as 
clearly as possible in the application. 
Q. Okay. And is there any description in the $300,000 
policy on Brad's life which is the subject of this action in 
court that would in any way split up the way the monies are to 
be paid out? 
MR. FISHBURN: objection, vague and ambiguous. 
THE COURT: well, Counsel, 1 do have the application in 
front of mc. I mean, it's - the question is: "Is there 
anything on this application that is not on this application?" 
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1 pending with other companies is payable to the owner as 
2 beneficiaiy?" 
Now, you wrote down: "Executive 572,000"; is that right? 
A. That's right 
Q. And it would be to the best of your belief that at 
that time that insurance was still pending, correct? 
A. It was still in force. 
Q. Now, as a matter - and when we go back to Question 
18 and it says, "Year." What does that mean? Where it says, 
"84, Executive 84"? 
A. That's the year it was issued. 
Q. And as a matter of fact, in 1984, you were die agent 
13 who took the application on Brad Bucbi's life with Executive 
14 l i f e Insurance Company, correct? 
15 A. That's correct 
16 Q. And in that policy, that application for policy, 
17 designated Lisa Buchi as die primary beneficiary and her 
18 children equally as a contingent beneficiaries, correct? 
19 A. The Executive one? 
20 Q. Yes. 
21 A "Beneficiaiy: Lisa Buchi. Contingent Beneficiary: 
22 Children equally." 
23 Q. And the reference to the 572,000, as it appears in 
24 the 1989, January, application, means what? 
25 A. I'm sorry? 
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And I think the answer is pretty self-evident 
MR TANNER: I will withdraw tiie question. 
THE COURT: All right 
Mr. Dunn. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DUNN: 
Q. To follow up a little bit further on the fact that 
the policy does not include any kind of provision that part of 
it goes to buy/sell, part of it goes to Glade. Did Glade 
Parduhn ever tell you, with reference to die $300,000 policy, 
that he wanted $100,000 of it or $200,000 of it to go to apply 
to the buy/sell agreement and that some other amount was to go 
to him personally? Did he ever tell you that? 
A. I have no recollection of that 
Q. Okay. Turnif you would in the smaller of the two 
binders to Exhibit No. 3. It's actually four pages forward of 
the tab for Number 4. 
A. Start at the back and work forward; one, three, four, 
okay. 
Q. Yes. And in the lower right-hand portion of that 
policy there is an ownership section where the owner is listed 
as "Glade Parduhn", correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And did Glade Parduhn, as the owner, tell you what 
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1 other insurance he had on his life? 
2 A, Well, Question No. 31E says: 
3 "The amount of insurance in force 
4 or pending on the owner's life is 
5 $600,000." 
6 Q. That's with - is it your understanding that that was 
7 in addition to any buy/sell insurance? 
8 A. That question does not address whether or not it is 
9 in connection with the buy/sell agreement. It simply asks how 
10 much is in force on his life or pending. Now, pending would 
11 have been the application that I was taking on him at die time 
12 phis what he presently had in force. 
13 Q. So, the buy/sell insurance was aside from some 
14 addition substantial amount of insurance he had acquired in 
15 some other fashion, correct? 
16 A. That's correct 
17 Q. Is it very common in your practice and in your 
18 experience for a person to want to have a policy such as the 
19 policy that Brad Buchi purchased for Lisa and the children in 
20 addition to the benefits that they would be entitled to under a 
21 buy/sell agreement-type policy? 
22 A. Ycsjthiiiktiiat was Brad's uitcnt, tot they had 
23 their own individual coverage - 1 am sorry, a coverage on him 
24 for their specific direct benefit, coverage on him for the 
25 benefit of the partner. 
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1 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead, please. 
2 MR. DUNN: Thank you. 
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. DUNN: 
5 Q. Would you state your full, legal name for the record, 
6 please, ma'am? 
7 A. Joanne Ross Buchi. 
8 Q. Also state for us your address, residence address? 
9 A. 1688 East 11245 South in Sandy, Utah. 
10 Q. Okay. Were you at any time married to Brad Buchi? 
11 A. I was. 
12 Q. And what was die date of that marriage? 
13 A. May 18th, 1992. 
14 Q. And how long did that marriage continue? 
15 A. We were still married when my husband passed away. 
16 We were separated in - we had been separated for a year and 
17 trying to get a working arrangement to get back together. 
18 Q. Were you the legal wife of Brad Buchi on the date of 
19 his death? 
20 A. I was. 
21 MR. FISHBURN.- objection, calls for a legal conclusion. 
22 THE COURT: Overruled. 
23 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, I'd like to move at this point for 
24 the Court to take judicial notice of Judge Stirba's prior 
25 ruling in this case. 
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1 Q. Okay. So, he'd buy additional insurance and have the 
2 buy/sell arrangement insurance in addition? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And that's common? 
5 A. It was with my clients. 
6 Q. And advisable to your clients, correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 MR DUNN: Thank you very much, sir. 
9 MR. FISHBURN: No further questions. 
10 THE COURT: All right Thank you, Mr. Hansen. You can 
11 step down. 
12 THE WITNESS: is it okay to leave? 
13 THE COURT: It is Unless -
14 MR. DUNN: No objection. 
15 MR. FISHBURN: No, we consent to him being excused, that's 
16 fine. 
17 THECOURT: All right You may leave, Mr. Hansen. 
18 Mr. Tanner, call your next witness. 
19 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, I am done. 
20 THECOURT: All right. Mr. Dunn? 
21 MR. DUNN: Yes, Your Honor, I'd just like to call Joanne 
22 Buchi. 
23 JOANNE BUCHI, called as a witness on her 
24 own behalf, after having been duly sworn, testified as follows: 
25 MR. DUNN: May I proceed, Your Honor? 
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1 THE COURT: Yes, she ruled while there was something 
2 pending there had not been a decree and so Joanne Buchi was 
3 still die wife of Brad Buchi. 
4 MR. TANNER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
5 MR. DUNN: And therefore entitled to any distribution that 
6 goes to wife and survivors. 
7 THECOURT: YBS. 
8 MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, sir. 
9 No further questions. 
10 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
11 THE COURT: Any cross-examination? 
12 MR. FISHBURN: wdl, yes, I think so (Inaudible) -
13 MR. TANNER: Noncbyme. We are going in order. Go 
14 ahead. 
15 MR. FISHBURN: May I just ask the indulgence to have about 
16 five minutes to figure out what I have left to cross-examine 
17 on? I was anticipating an extensive direct, frankly. 
18 THECOURT*. well, there are lots of surprises. 
19 Well, it's about time for an afternoon recess, so why 
20 don't we - we'll be in recess until 3:00 o'clock. 
21 MR. FISHBURN: All right. Thank you. 
22 THECOURT: All right 
23 You may step down, Ms. Buchi. 
24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
25 (Recess) 
Page 153 
THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record in 
Parduhn v. Bennett. 
Ms. Buchi is on the stand. 
Mr. Fishburn, you may cross-examine. 
OlOSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FISHBURN: 
Q. Ms. Buchi, some time after your husband, Brad, passed 
8 away in August of 1997 you petitioned the Third District Court 
9 to be appointed as the personal representative of his estate; 
10 is that correct? 
A. Correct 
Q. And you, in fact, did receive that appointment? 
A. I did. 
Q. In mat capacity are you aware of any will written by 
15 Brad Buchi prior to his death mat's been found for purposes of 
16 administering in mat probate proceeding? 
17 A. That has been found? 
18 Q. Yes. 
19 A. No. 
20 MR. FISHBURN: No further questions. 
21 THE COURT: All right Any questions, Mr. Tanner? 
22 MR. TANNER: No, Your Honor, nothing for me. 
23 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Buchi, you can step down. 
24 Thank you very much. 
25 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, I have no further witnesses. 
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1 remember it. 
2 MR. DUNN: Thank you, sir. 
3 THE COURT: okay. No further questions, thank you -
4 MR. FISHBURN: NO further questions and no further 
5 witnesses. 
6 THE COURT: All right The Defendants all rest, as well? 
7 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. 
8 MR. TANNER: Y6S, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: All right 
10 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, yesterday when we were debating 
11 the motions especially on what I term a new argument, you 
12 indicated that if we felt we needed a little bit of additional 
13 time to brief the final argument to this Court and prepare it, 
14 that you would indulge that request I would certainly make 
15 that request I would like a little bit of time to basically 
16 do some research on the interpretation of that statutory 
17 provision and also to sift through the evidence mat's been 
18 received today; and, thus, I would request that, as we had two 
19 days reserved for trial, mat we defer the closing argument 
20 until tomorrow afternoon or even any time within me next 
21 week. I'd prefer h not be subsequent to that or I think we 
22 start to forget what it was that was deduced here. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Tanner, Mr. Dunn, what's your position? 
24 MR TANNER: Your Honor, I have no objection to that I 
25 would like to give Mr. Fishburn whatever time he feels is 
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1 THE COURT: All light 
2 Mr. Fishburn, any rebuttal? 
3 MR FISHBURN: Glade Parduhn. 
4 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
5 MR FISHBURN: We'd like to call Mr. Parduhn. 
6 THE COURT: oh, okay. Come forward again, Mr. Parduhn. 
7 THEWTTNESS: Do you want me to swear again? 
8 THE COURT: No, you arc still under oath in this matter. 
9 Just take the stand if' you would. 
10 GLADE PARDUHN, called as a witness on his 
11 own behalf, after having been previously duly sworn, testified 
12 as follows: 
13 REBU1TAL EXAMINATION 
14 BY MR FISHBURN: 
15 Q. Mr. Parduhn, do you recall, prior to the applications 
16 for the two policies in 1989, being present at the University 
17 Texaco station in the: presence of Lisa and Brad Buchi while 
18 Sheldon Hansen was on the phone? 
19 A. No, I do not 
20 MR FISHBURN: No further questions. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Tanner, any cross-examination on that? 
22 MR TANNER: No, nothing from me. 
23 MR DUNN: Could it have taken place though you do not 
24 recall it? Do you have an infallible memory? 
25 THE WITNESS: It could have taken place, but I sure cannot , 
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1 appropriate to prepare for closing arguments. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Dunn. 
3 MR DUNN: Mr. Fishburn actually approached me about 
4 this. And in view of the Court's prior discussion, I have no 
5 objection to it because it is important to us that this statute 
6 be applicable to this case as this Court has previously ruled, 
7 and as there is an order somewhere for your signature. And if 
8 Mr. Fishburn needs an additional day, I have no objection. 
9 THE COURT: well, I don't mean to try to be cute or 
10 anything, but if we go - 1 forget things faster than you all 
11 do. Tomorrow is as far as I want to go. But I'm certainly 
12 willing to do it tomorrow afternoon. But I am serious, if we 
13 go much beyond that, I'll start to forget things, so~. 
14 MR FISHBURN: That's fine. 
15 THE COURT: rd like to - I'd like to do it tomorrow 
16 afternoon. 
17 Give me your best estimate as to how long you think you 
18 may want to argue at this point 
19 MR DUNN: For my part I'm willing to be limited to 30 
20 minutes, maximum; probably less. 
21 MR FISHBURN: well, I try not to be verbose, but 
22 sometimes I am & has probably been my experience that 
23 usually it would probably run about 30 to 40 minutes; maybe 40. 
24 THE COURT: so, we are looking at roughly an hour and a 
25 half for closings, you think. So, if you are all wrong, it 
Page 157 
1 will go two. 
2 Well, let's - can we start at 1:30? 
3 MR. DUNN: Yes. 
4 MR. FISHBURN: That's fine. 
5 THE COURT: is that okay? 
6 MR. FISHBURN: Yes. 
J 7 THE COURT: we just had that one — we had a conference at 
8 3:30, didn't we? 
9 THE CLERK: That's right 
10 THE COURT: But we can... 
Ill Okay, well, I did indicate that - that I would give you 
12 that opportunity, Mr. Fishbura, and I think that's reasonable, 
13 so... 
14 All right. Well, if everyone is rested, let's reconvene 
15 tomorrow at 1:30 for arguments, and we'll go from there. 
16 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. 
17 THECOURT: Allright 
18 MR. TANNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Thank you, everyone. 
20 We'll be in recess. 
21 (Trial continued to 8-22-01.) 
22 
1 J TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
\ CC 
4 | County of SALT LAKE ) 
5 
6 I I, BILLIE WAY, CCT, do hereby certify that I am a 
7 Certified Court Transcriber in and for the State of Utah; 
8 That I reduced the proceedings aforesaid to print from 
9 videotape to the best of my ability; 
10 I further certify that I have no interest in the event of 
11 this action. 
12 I WITNESS MY HAND this the 21st day of December, 2001. 
13 
14 
15 j (Signature) 
16 
17 I BILLIE WAY is a Certified Court Transcriber 
18 working under my direction. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
BILLIE WAY, COH 
A 
CECILEE WILSON, CSR, RMR, CRR 
214 
EXHIBIT 13 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * ' 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, et al., 
Defendants. 
i COPT 
Case No. 970907879 
Trial, 8-22-01 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day of August, 
2001, this cause came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
BRUCE LUBECK, District Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake 
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN 
For the BUCHI CHILDREN: 
For JOANNE BUCHI: 
Court Transcriber: BILLIE WAY, CCT 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN 
Attorney at Law 
MARTIN S. TANNER 
Attorney at Law 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney at Law 
158 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
III THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COWTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff, 
-VI-
NATALIE BUCHI BENNETT, €t &1., 
Defendant*. 
Case No 970907879 
Trial, 8-22-01 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 22nd day of August, 
2001, thi» cau*« cane on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
BRUCE LUBECK, Dlatrict Court, without a jury, in the Salt Lake 
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
GLADE LEON PARDUHN 
For the BUCHI CHILDREN: 
For JOANNE BUCHI: 
P. BRYAN FISHBURN 
Attorney at Law 
MARTIN S. TANNER 
Attorney at Law 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney at Law 
Court Transcriber: BILLIE NAY, CCT 
p«ge 1581 Page 160 
1 agreement. 
2 Second, I'd like to analyze the insurance contract 
3 beginning in the absence of the Statute 31A-21-104. 
4 Third, I would like to look at that statute. And there's 
5 three subpoints to the argument I intend to cover One, it has 
6 been waived; Number two, it does not preempt the prevailing 
7 common law as Ms. Buchi argues. Third, the policy on Brad's 
8 life issued in 1989, in any event, complies with the statute. 
9 Next I will go to the buy/sell agreement What I intend 
10 to do is, first of all, on the assumption that the Defendants 
11 may enforce it, then what is the amount of money that should 
12 flow through the buy/sell agreement to the survivors? And the 
13 next question, final question, is: Is the buy/sell agreement 
14 enforceable by me Defendants. And if we argue mat it is not 
15 given the partnership was already dissolved. 
16 Now, let me go back and summarize the history and talk 
17 about the history of the partnership, again, because this is 
18 the background at which certain other legal conclusions have to 
19 be made. 
20 Clearly the partnership was created in 1979. That 
21 creation was documented by a written agreement A written 
22 agreement is not a necessity to establish a partnership, but 
23 there did exist one here. It involved two persons, Brad Buchi 
24 and Glade Parduhn. And according to the written agreement, 
25 there was a stated business purpose. And that business purpose 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 THE OOURT: Good afternoon. We are back on the record in 
3 the matter of Parduhn v. Bennett; Case No. 97097879. 
4 Counsel are all present This is me time for argument 
5 unless there arc any other matters that anyone needs to 
6 up. 
7 MR. DUNN: NO, YOUT HonOT. 
8 THE COURT: NO, all right 
9 Mr. Fishburn, why don't you proceed. 
10 MR. FISHBURN: Thank you. 
11 As I said in my opening statements, it is my privilege to 
12 represent Glade Parduhn in mis matter. 
13 At least with regard to the first contract, mat being the 
14 insurance contract, one would think mat mis should present an 
15 easy decision. Glade Parduhn as the designated beneficiary 
16 should be entitled to the proceeds. But, alas, even mat 
17 conclusion has been tenaciously challenged by the Defendants 
18 and the Countcrclaimants. 
19 There are, I think, a great many issues that need to be 
20 sorted And in terms of a forecast let me tell the Court where 
21 I intend to go with this. I would like to begin first by 
22 examining briefly a history of the partnership with a focus on 
23 what stage is the partnership presently in and when did it 
24 reach mat stage? Because mat has important implications 
25 especially to the application or enforceability of a buy/sell 
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was: To conduct a service station business. That's a quote. 
At the time, in 1979, the partnership owned one station a 
Texaco station on South Temple. It later acquired interest in 
some others. It eventually acquired an interest, an ownership 
interest, in a Chevron station on Wasatch Boulevard, which it 
had in 1989 and which it had in 1997. 
The partnership ceased conducting business, a service 
station business, on July 14th, 1997. It did so when it sold 
its stations to Blackett Oil Company. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that since mat day the 
partnership has not operated as a service station business. It 
has sold no gas. It has sold no tires. It has prepared no 
cars. It has had no income other than impassive income in the 
form of interest paid on residual monies mat remain in an 
account at Associated Tide Company. 
All activities of the partnership, since July 14th, 1997, 
have been in the character and nature of winding up the 
partnership's affairs. Liabilities arising from the prior ~ 
prior to the sale have been satisfied and bills paid. Brad 
Buchi, in fact, participated in mat process and according to 
Glade met with him on August 5 th, four days before his body was 
found, or three days before, and participated in approval of a 
number of bills; although, not - unfortunately not all of 
them. 
Since Brad Buchi's death, Mr. Parduhn has supervised the 
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1 winding up of the partnership's affairs. He has done so as the 
2 surviving partner. And as the surviving partner, given Brad's 
3 death, he has the express legal right to wind up the 
4 partnership's affairs. That is given to by the Partnership 
5 Code 48-1-34. 
6 It befalls to the surviving partner to manage the 
7 affairs. He has not, contrary to the intimations in the first 
8 day of trial, functioned in the absence of legal authority. He 
9 has n o t - h e has not, it is true, sought the opinion of the 
10 personal representative of the estate or the Buchi Children. 
11 And he does not have to under Section 48-1-34. He has been 
12 fulfilling his responsibilities. And under that statute, he is i 
13 not required to consult or obtain the approval of the personal 
14 representative. Certainly, it would have been no reason to 
15 consult with the children as they have no lqgal standing to act 
16 for the estate. At best they have a claim against the estate, 
17 but as intestate heirs. 
18 Now, certainly, Mr. Panduhn remains accountable. It is 
19 not to suggest he's not. At the termination point, the end of 
20 this process, he is accountable if we don't have this buy/sell 
21 agreement enforceable to account to the estate and prove that 
22 he has acted reasonably in the process of wrapping up. 
23 Incidentally, he has not operated this partnership or the 
24 remaining funds as if they were just his own. If that were the 
25 case, they wouldn't still be in an account at Associated 
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1 specified in the partnership agreement, 
2 mutual agreement of the partners to 
3 discontinue the partnership and death of 
4 any partner." 
5 There's still another. There's six other causes, as 
6 well Any of those, if they occur, will dissolve a 
7 partnership. 
8 Now, dissolution is defined in the Arnt Case as an event, 
9 which is a point in time in which you cease to operate as a 
10 partnership business and you enter the winding-up affairs. 
11 According to the Utah Court of Appeals in the Wanless 
12 Case, an event of dissolution occurs once and only once. It 
13 doesn't occur multiple times. And the event that counts is the 
14 one which first occurred to dissolve the partnership. That 
15 event, in this case, was the sale of the stations on July 14th 
16 1997. 
17 Now, Brad Buchi's death, to be sure, would have caused the 
18 dissolution of the partnership except for the fact that it was 
19 already dissolved. It was dissolved three weeks before that. 
20 And I will get to the implications of that when we get to the 
21 buy/sell agreement But before I do that let mc look at and 
22 discuss the insurance contract itself. 
23 Joanne Buchi has belatedly interposed the defense or 
24 argument predicated on statute that we've talked about in the 
25 Insurance Code. 
1 Title. He would have spent them if he thought without doubt 
2 that all the money was his. 
3 Now, according tothe Utah Supreme Court in the Arnt v. 
4 First Interstate Case, theright to sue and be sued remains in 
5 the partnership through the winding-up phase. The partnership 
6 has been designated as a defendant in three lawsuits. It's 
7 also been a plaintiff in at least one. That's entirely 
8 consistent with the winding-up phase. 
9 According to Section 48-1 -27: 
10 "On dissolution, a partnership is 
11 not terminated but continues until the 
12 winding up of the partnership affairs is 
13 completed." 
14 The partnership, thus, presently is in the process of 
15 winding up. It has not reached termination. That is only when 
16 all of those affairs are all wrapped up, and then we can figure 
17 out the partnership's accounts and who's entitled to what's 
18 left. 
19 This partnership has gone through dissolution. It is in 
20 the process of winding up. When did it reach - on the issue 
21 of dissolution, questions are how and when. 
22 Now, the Partnership Code, Section 48-1 -28, lists nine 
23 events that will cause a dissolution of the partnership. Among 
24 them are: 
25 'Termination of the undertaking 
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1 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor, that has been ruled on 
2 on Monday. Mr. Fishburn has in his possession a copy of the 
3 aider that he has to review for approval as to form But to 
4 raise it again, is inappropriate. 
5 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, my understanding of the Court's 
6 order was that it denied the motion for the purpose of allowing 
7 the trial to proceed I recall at the end of the evidence 
8 yesterday I believe that the Court indicated tot it still 
9 wanted to consider that issue. 
10 THE COURT: Well-
11 MR. DUNN: There was a ruling -
12 THE COURT: Just a moment, Counsel I believe - it's my 
13 understanding that I was going to allow the trial to go 
14 forward, but I'm - 1 don't want you to reargue Golding. 
15 MR. FISHBURN: okay. Well, then I'll skip right through 
16 Golding real fast I'll try to adapt Okay. 
17 THE COURT: I mean, I don't want you to try to convince me 
18 again why it's an affirmative defense and it wasn't pled and so 
19 on. But, certainly, can have you aigue the insurance contract 
20 as if it didn't apply. I mean, you indicated (Inaudible)-
21 MR. FISHBURN: okay. I will probably have to skip past 
22 someof this then. 
23 The Buchi, children, although I don't think Joanne Buchi, 
24 has promised in the opening argument and presented a defense j 
25 that they said - they indicated there would be evidence that 
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1 Brad Buchi intended them to have the 5300,000, and that it was 
2 inconceivable that one could look at the evidence and believe 
3 that Brad Buchi really meant for the person that he designated 
4 as a beneficiary on this contract to receive the proceeds. 
5 Clearly, there's an inordinate amount of evidence to 
6 indicate that Brad Buchi was actually planning consciously for 
7 his family separate and apart from the insurance policy that 
8 was at question. And we had on that account - now, I'm 
9 getting disorganized. 
10 We have the Northern Life Insurance policy. We had the 
11 Midland policy. Clearly, those were cases where he expressly 
12 designated his wife and children as beneficiaries; one of those 
13 policies issued on the very same date as the policy in 
14 question. 
15 Let's look at the insurance contract itself assuming it is 
16 not invalidated by the statute. Now, the analysis of that is 
17 determined, first of all, by contract law. It is not 
18 determined by equity or intestate law. It is not determined by 
19 general beliefs held by the decedent/survivors or for that 
20 matter Glade Parduhn a<> to what is fair and who ought to get it 
21 on that basis. 
22 This policy is a contract It is contract between an 
23 insurance company, an i^nsured who signed the application, and 
24 the applicant and who was to become the owner and the 
25 beneficiary. 
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1 saying, "The insured really meant for us to have the policy." 
2 The contrary evidence supposedly that Brad intended it 
3 really to go to someone else has never been presented in this 
4 case. 
5 Now, with regard to the statute - 1 would like to just 
6 point out one thing on Laver (Phonetic), and that is that the 
7 - when this first came up in October, at that time in my 
8 memorandum, I pointed out that it was an un-plcaded affirmative 
9 defense. 
10 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor. Retreading this ground 
11 is not of any value. I object to his continually raising it 
12 We've given him the additional day in order to prepare this 
13 argument because he requested it in view of the fact that the 
14 Court had ruled that the statute was inapplicable. And to 
15 raise it again, I think is bad faith in argument 
16 THE COURT: well, I don't think it's - 1 don't think he's 
17 trying to act in bad faith. 
18 Mr. Fishburn -
19 MR. FISHBURN: I would-let me just shorten this up. 
20 The key case, I think, is Golding. That is die only case that 
21 I'm aware of that seems to be right on point. I would refer 
22 the Court to that It would seem to me that if this were 
23 Parduhn versus the insurance company, it clearly would be an 
24 affirmative defense or deemed to be such. 
25 MR. DUNN: objection, Your Honor. This is not a case 
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The contract provides for payment of death benefits to the 
person designated as the beneficiary. According to Page 10 of 
the policy, "We will pay benefits to the beneficiary." That 
person is Glade Parduhn. It doesn't say, "We pay benefits to 
the owner." It doesn't say, "We pay benefits to the insured." 
'We pay it to the beneficiary." 
The application in this case designated Glade Parduhn as 
8 the beneficiary. It did not designate the partnership. It did 
9 not designate his wife at the time. It did not designate his 
10 children. Any of those other options were available. He chose 
to designate Glade Parduhn. By contract, he should receive 
it 
TheZokntakis Case (Phonetic), which I've quoted in my 
14 brief which is a Tenth Circuit opinion - it is a bit old but 
15 interpreting Utah law - lit said: 
"That absent clear, convincing 
and cogent expression on the part of the 
insured to the contrary, the designated 
beneficiary in a policy of insurance is 
entitled to the entire proceeds on 
maturity of the contract" 
It goes on to say that there's compelling reasons why that 
23 should be so or else the fundamental purposes of insurance 
24 would be frustrated. It would be frustrated as would be - has 
25 been the case in this case by other persons coming forward and 
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between Mr. Parduhn and the insurance company. To re-plow this 
ground continues to be inappropriate. 
THE COURT: i understand, Mr. Dunn. 
Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Fishburn. 
MR.HSHBURN: Let me just turn to the merits: There was 
an argument that I also made in the trial brief as to that the 
statute has no merit at least as interpreted by Joanne Buchi, 
and I still maintain that position. 
And die way I'd like to address this is at least in the 
absence of the statute, let's assume it hadn't been enacted, 
what is the prevailing common law on insurable interest? I 
think we have to start there. For at least a hundred and fifty 
years it has been the law in this country that an applicant 
other than an insured on an insured's life must have an 
insurable interest in that person's life. I mean, this goes 
back to Supreme Court cases in the 1850's; otherwise, courts at 
that time deemed it a sporting event, a wagering event on 
somebody else's life which they did not want to encourage 
unless there was at least at a baseline level some interest of 
one person in the other person's life. And the consequence at 
common law was that if an insurance policy was sold and the 
person acquiring it had no insurable interest, the consequence 
was that the insurance policy would be avoided by the insurance 
company. 
Now, ova the years there has been a body of law, 
T%~— i an _ T>„„A 1 an 
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1 obviously, arise as to what is an insurable interest, what kind 
2 of relationships work to the conclusion of an insurable 
interest? According to - and let me try to narrow this down, 
because this is a large body of law, down to partnerships and 
partners. According to the treatise Appleman (Phonetic) on 
Insurance at Section 871, quote: 
"A partnership itself has an 
insurable interest in the life of the 
deceased partner just as each partner has 
an insurable interest in the life of the 
other." End of quote. 
According to the treatise I cited in the trial brief 
Woodess & Keaton on Insurance (Phonetic): 
"A partner has an insurable 
interest in the life of his partner." 
According to the Missouri Court of Appeals — this is a 
17 case I did not cite - Rich v. Class (phonetic), 643 S.W.2d 
18 872. It is a 1982 case: 
"A partner has an insurable 
interest in the life of another partner 
which arises from their business 
relationship.*1 
Partnerships involve situations where two people or more 
24 have decided to forsake other opportunities and 
25 responsibilities and go into business with one another. It 
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1 indicated that insurable interest which was - existed at the 
2 outset will not avoid an insurance contract It was where the 
3 insurable interest ceased later. And we do know die State of 
4 Utah has adopted that position. It has done so within the 
5 context of marriage and divorces. And I would refer the Court 
6 to Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Company, 631 P.2d 906. 
7 According to the Second Circuit in the Herman (Phonetic) 
8 Case cited in the trial brief: 
9 "A partnership or partner named a 
10 beneficiary is entitled to the proceeds 
11 on a former partner's life who dies 
12 subsequent to the partnership's 
13 dissolution." 
14 So, that's the prevailing common law at least in the 
15 absence - oh, and one last thing: According to the Ridley 
16 Decision, there is no policy reason why a partner who has 
17 received insurance proceeds shouldn't be able to keep that 
18 amount which exceeds his obligation to purchase a deceased 
19 partner's interest under a buy/sell agreement There is no 
20 public policy bar to that 
21 Now, it is against this background of the common law that 
22 we look to this statute that's been raised. And the first 
23 tiling I'd do is look at it and say, "Well, what is it that this 
24 statute did change?" Well, the most fundamental and drastic 
25 change in the common law is that it is, of course, an 
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1 creates an expectation of income over time. It creates an 
2 interest in the well-being and health of the other person 
3 because you are depending on that other person. And that's the 
4 nature of the insurable interest 
5 According to the Idaho Supreme Court, Ridley v. Vanderbill 
6 (Phonetic) cited in the trial brief: 
7 "A partner has an insurable 
8 interest in a partner's life irrespective 
9 of whether there exists a buy/sell 
10 agreement" 
11 Mr. Hansen' s understanding, at least — now, this is not a 
12 legal conclusion, but at least his understanding as an agent 
13 for Northern in 1989 was that he could take an application from 
14 one partner on the life of another given the existence of a 
15 buy/sell agreement or even just based on the existence of the 
16 partnership itself . As he said, the partnership agreement 
17 itself would be grounds for the insurable interest at least as 
18 he understood it 
19 According to Richards on Insurance quoted in the trial 
20 brief: 
21 "The existence of insurable 
22 interest is determined when the insurance 
23 is purchased." 
24 The Supreme Court case, the old one that I cited in the 
25 brief, which is, I believe, the prevailing opinion, has 
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1 alternative other than avoidance; and that is if the insurable 
2 interest did not exist at the outset and if the insured then 
3 dies, then where as before this statute in the State of Utah, 
4 the remedy, generally to be exercised by an insurance company, 
5 would be avoidance. 
6 And at Subsection 5, this statute says that the court 
7 doesn't have to do that, that it may in equity instead order 
8 the proceeds given to someone who is equitably entftledto 
9 them. That's a fundamental change in the common law. 
10 Now, there's some other changes that this statute makes; 
11 for instance, there is a clarification with regard to what are 
12 called "viaucal settlements," which is insurance contracts on 
13 somebody who's terminally ill, there is a clarification about 
14 t h e r e o f - insurable interest rights and disability 
15 policies, et cetera. 
16 This policy does not have the extensive ramifications that 
17 Joanne Buchi would give it It defines "insurable interest" -
18 and I direct the Court's attention to Subsection 2A, and it 
19 says: 
20 'That means, or in the case of 
21 other persons other than married people, 
22 a lawful and substantial interest in 
23 having the life, health and bodily safety 
24 of the person insured continue." 
25 That's consistent with die common law definition. 
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1 And then it goes on to give a couple of examples, and what 
2 it says is: 
3 "A shareholder or partner has an 
4 insurable interest in the life of other 
5 shareholders or partners for purposes of 
6 insurance contracts that are an integral 
7 part of the legitimate buy/sell agreement 
8 respecting shares of partnership interest 
9 in the business." 
10 That's the language it's focused on. It does not say mat 
11 a partner has an insurable interest only if mere exists a 
12 buy/sell agreement It does not say a partner has an insurable 
13 interest only to the extent necessary to fund to the penny an 
14 obligation under a buy/sell agreement The word "only," which 
15 it is indicated in the trial brief must be read into mis 
16 statute, is not mere. Aid if the interpretation adopted by 
17 Joanne Buchi were adopted as law, it would set financial 
18 planners on their heads. Number one, no member of an LLC could 
19 get insurance. No obligor could get - have an assignability 
20 of insurance for security for a debt Co-obligors could not 
21 get insurance. That has. been recognized as an insurable 
22 interest in me past And in any financial planner trying to 
23 make insurance match a variable amount buy/sell agreement where 
24 you have partnership starting, hopefully, mat's going to be 
25 more valuable in time, how in the world do you match mat? 
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1 under this policy were to, in the contingent event of death of 
2 a partner, to be used for that purpose; hence, the reference in 
3 the application to dual bases for insurable interest, one of 
4 which was buy/sell, and one of which was partner. The 
5 insurance policy was part of a buy/sell plan or agreement 
6 Hence, the statute enacted in 1985, after the first - or 
7 after the amended buy/sell agreement but before these 1989 
8 policies, is satisfied. 
9 Now, hypothetically, if the partnership had been dissolved 
10 by Glade's death rather man the sale of the stations, then 
11 Brad would have received me proceeds and been obligated to pay 
12 a hundred thousand dollars to Nedra Parduhn. 
13 Had the partnership been resolved by Brad's death and not 
14 already by the sale of the stations, men Glade would be 
15 entitled to the proceeds but he'd be obligated to pay a hundred 
16 thousand dollars to Brad's survivors. It is part of a buy/sell 
17 agreement 
18 Now, let me turn to the buy/sell agreement itself, and let 
19 me begin by assuming, first of all, that it is enforceable by 
20 the Defendants. And in that case, what is the amount that each 
21 partner agreed to pay to the other if the partnership dissolved 
22 by the other's death. And the second question, which I'll get 
23 to secondly, is: Is the buy/sell agreement enforceable? 
24 Let's start with Question No. 1. Now, that's amount And 
25 this is assuming it's enforceable. 
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1 That simply can't be done. 
2 It doesn't have the radical interpretation urged by the 
3 Defendants in this case. 
4 Moreover and more importantly — and I arrived at mis 
5 conclusion finally by just looking at mis mis morning - mis 
6 is the hazard of not being- well, let me forget mat 
7 But it appears - in looking at the statute mis morning, 
8 the policy sold to Glade Parduhn - well, not sold to Glade 
9 Parduhn - but issued on Brad Buchi's life in which Glade was 
10 the owner and beneficiary complies with the statute. It 
11 complies with the express terms of the statute. What docs it 
12 say? It says: 
13 "A partner has an insurable 
14 interest in the life of other partners 
15 for purpose of insurance contracts that 
16 arc an integral part of a legitimate 
17 buy/sell agreement respecting a 
18 partnership interest in the business." 
19 That's satisfied without question. The two policies 
20 purchased in 1984 and the two replacement policies - or the 
21 two policies purchased in 1989 were part of a buy/sell plan. 
22 There was a buy/sell agreement in effect It was created in 
23 1979, and it was amended in 1984. 
24 The buy/sell agreement remained in effect as amended in 
25 1989. It didn't disappear. And, in fact, part of me proceeds 
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1 We know mat the partners did agree to pay each other's 
2 survivor a hundred thousand dollars if the partnership was 
3 dissolved because of me death of me partner. We know mat 
4 because of Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2. It is a handwriting, it 
5 was signed by bom partners, it is not real sophisticated but 
6 these were men who were operating service stations. But it is 
7 clear they agreed on the amount of a hundred thousand dollars. 
8 Now, the Defendants all contend that mis $100,000 figure 
9 was implicitly amended by the partners1 act of purchasing these 
10 two insurance policies in 1989. Now; it's not clear if they 
11 are saying it was implicitly amended to 300 or it's implicitly 
12 amended to 250 or it's implicitly amended to a different 
13 amounts depending on which partner dies, which doesn't seem to 
14 me to make any sense. 
15 Plaintiff submits that all of that evidence is speculation 
16 and there exists a considerable body of evidence to the 
17 contrary that would indicate a contrary intent and would 
18 indicate facts that undercut this speculation and supposition 
19 that the purchase of the policies necessarily meant or 
20 indicated me partners' intent that all of me proceeds had to 
21 go to fund the buy/sell. 
22 The first contrary fact is the surviving partner's 
23 denial. Glade Parduhn has denied that he ever agreed to pay 
24 more than $100,000. He never agreed to pay more than that 
25 The second indication, contrary intention, is the absence 
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1 of a writing, an absence of a writing increasing the buy/sell 
2 obligation to any more than $100,000. Now, that's 
3 significant In 1979, when the partners first added this 
4 •d<V"'*imi to the partnership agreement, they did it in writing. 
5 In 1984, when they ammded it, increased it five fold, they did 
6 it in writing. Not a typewriting, but it was in handwriting 
7 and they both signed it 
8 This time there is no such writing signed by both partners 
9 which would be necessary to make it an agreement that either of 
10 the partners agreed to pay more than a hundred thousand 
11 dollars. 
12 The third contrary indication is Brad's failure to provide 
113 a copy of the buy/sell agreement when Sheldon Hansen asked for 
14 it Now, Mr. Hansen said, **I asked several times for Brad to 
15 give me a copy of the buy/sdl agreement" 
16 Now, if there existed a written agreement that raised the 
17 insurance, that was the golden opportunity for Brad Buchi to 
18 give it to Sheldon Hansen, and it would have been supplied. If 
19 it hadn't yet been done, nut w a s t e opportunity to go to 
20 Glade and say, "Glade, we need to amend this. Do you agree? 
21 Sign this piece of paper." It was not done. 
22 Mr. Hansen indicated his recollection was that in speaking 
23 with - that Glade Parduhn never spoke about the amounts, and, 
24 in fact, Mr. Hansen did not know what they were. 
25 Contra-fact No. 4: There - it is the assumption that all 
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1 in fact, issued. And what docs it say? It has an arrow 
2 pointing up to the agreement, the prior agreement in 1984. And 
3 Brad Buchi says: This needs to be changed to 300,000 on Brad, 
4 250,000 on Glade. It needs to be changed." 
5 Now, that is the clearest, only indication we have of 
6 Brad's intentions. It would indicate, it would suggest, that, 
7 certainly, he had it in mind that they ought to amend it But 
8 it - with equal farce and unequivocally indicates it had not 
9 been done yet 
10 Now, why didn't he go to Glade? I don't know. We don't 
11 know. That's speculation. But the fact is when these policies 
12 were taken out in 1989, even according to Brad Buchi's own 
13 handwriting, it hadn't yet been done. 
14 Now, their proof consisted of an alleged conversation in a 
15 filling station that's recalled by Lisa Buchi that happened 12 
16 years ago. Glade Parduhn does not recall that It would seem 
17 from Shddon Hansen's recollection that he does not recall it, 
18 either. He certainly didn't testify to recalling discussing 
19 the terms and amounts to be paid under the buy/sell agreement. 
20 In fact, his testimony was he didn't know what the agreement 
21 was, he had never seen the agreement, he didn't know what the 
22 amounts were and that Glade never spoke. That's the words he 
23 used, "Never spoke to the amounts of the agreement" 
24 Now, the question under 3IF: "What's the purpose and 
25 nature of the owners' insurable interest?" That's on the 
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1 the proceeds are necessarily dedicated to the buy/sell 
2 agreement isn't contradicted by the disparate amounts under the 
3 two policies. Why is the partnership worth one amount if Brad 
4 Buchi dies? If Glade dies, it is worth less and his survivors 
5 get $50,000 less. That makes no sense. That - one can infer 
6 from that, that's not what they intended. 
7 Contra-fact No. 5: There is no evidence received or 
8 offered by the Defendants to show that in earryl989the 
9 partnership had an aggregate net equity-or equity of 500 to 
10 $600,000. That would be t h e - seem to be the logical 
11 prerequisite for an implied decision or agreement by the 
12 partners to dedicate up to $300,000 each for each one half 
13 interest That evidence isn't there. 
14 Contra-fact No. 5 - and this is, I think, a nail in the 
15 coffin. There's always a surprise in trial, and this was one: 
16 I was under the assumption that Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3, we 
17 didn't know who had signed it And during the trial, Lisa 
18 Buchi took the stand and she said, "I saw Brad Buchi sign 
19 this." And so it was received. And I think this is a critical 
20 exhibit 
21 This is a 1984 amendment with a note added to the bottom, 
22 which according to Lisa Buchi was added by her husband. She 
23 saw him add it It's dated "September 11th, 1990," that's 18 
24 months after the applications, the two applications for the 
25 policies in question. It's 17 months after the policies were, 
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1 application. 
2 Now, we know from Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5, that's the 
3 one on Brad's life where Lisa is the owner and beneficiary, 
4 that Mr. Hansen at least on occasion listed multiple reasons 
5 for the insurable interest, because on that policy application 
6 he wrote, quote, "Family Income, comma, wife." 
7 Now, "wife" would have been sufficient He didn't have to 
8 put both bases. He put two. And I submit that that's what he 
9 did in the case of taking toe two applications on the partners' 
10 lives. He put "buy/sell" and he put "partner." And as he 
11 said, other one of those, in his understanding at least, was a 
12 sufficient basis for an insurable interest and would allow him 
13 to take that application. 
14 This case cannot be distinguished from the Ohio Ogilvie v. 
15 Barnetts Bank Case (Phonetic) cited in the trial brief. 
16 Now, certainly, the Court is not bound to follow this case 
17 because it is from Ohio. I know that But I do think it is by 
18 analogy a very good case to look at because it is almost 
19 exactly the same case as here. This was where the - there 
20 wasn't a buy/sell agreement It started out as $10,000 on each 
21 other's life. Five years later, the partners raised the 
22 insurance. They raised the life insurance from 20, and they 
23 actually took an accidental death policy which they hadn't 
24 mentioned as part of at buy/sdl agreement and doubled that. 
25 Now, I would indicate the distinction made. I believe, is 
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1 not correct If me Court will look at me case, I believe 
2 what it will find is mat in mat case what happened was five 
3 years after the initial insurance, partners were given an 
4 opportunity because of a, I think, sale of companies or 
5 something to purchase more insure It 
6 required an affirmative act. It wasn't a default act 
7 And the Court in that case, the appellate court, concluded 
8 that it was sheer speculation to conclude just because the 
9 insurance policies were increased that mat meant mat either 
10 partner had agreed to pay more than the sum certain which he 
11 had affirmed in writing in 1949, five years before these 
12 insurance policies were increased. It is the same case. 
13 Now, let's talk about the enforceability of the buy/sell 
14 agreement Let me just offer some general observations first 
15 The buy/sell agreement is not a prerequisite to a partnership. 
16 You don't have to have one. You can have a buy/sell 
17 agreement In fact, it is prudent to do so. But you don't 
18 necessarily have to haw the insurance. Insurance is a funding 
19 mechanism to ensure mat if this contingency occurs you do have 
20 the money. 
21 Where mere exists insurance to fund a buy/sell agreement, 
22 in the final analysis, it may be proved to be more than what 
23 was needed or less. It doesn't have to be on the penny. 
24 And in every case where there is a buy/sell agreement, it 
25 is a contingent contract It is based on a contingency of 
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1 terminated me partnership. She did so by writing a letter to 
2 her partners and said, "This is over." And under partnership 
3 law in Pennsylvania, that was an adequate cause of 
4 dissolution. Several weeks later she died, and her surviving 
5 partners men said - they had an epiphany, and they said, 
6 "Let's exercise this buy/sell agreement mat was in place 
7 prior to her death, which is enforceable on her death." Why 
8 did they do it? Because they could buy her interest for less 
9 man her estate would receive if it went through natural 
10 probate procedures. 
11 And the Court of Appeals in the State of Pennsylvania 
12 said, "No, you can't do mat You can't enforce a buy/sell 
13 agreement because this partnership was dissolved when she wrote 
14 the letter several weeks before she died." 
15 Similar holding in the Gorgan v. Nebriteh Case 
16 (Phonetic). This involved a partnership dissolved by judicial 
17 decree because a court found Mr. Nebriteh to be incompetent; 
18 apparently not so incompetent that it precluded him from 
19 immediately filing an appeal He appealed it Thirteen days 
20 later he died. And Mr. Gorgan then said, "Hmm." He tried to 
21 enforce a buy/sell agreement mat they had entered into five 
22 years before. Why? Because it would have allowed him to buy 
23 the interest for less than it was worth. And the Court said, 
24 "Huh-uh. You can't do that You can't enforce this buy/sell 
25 agreement because the partnership was dissolved 13 days before 
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1 death and dissolution of the partnership by death. And one 
2 wouM hope mat you never reach that stage. 
And, in fact, I would submit, although I don't have any 
data to back this up, but I think the Court could take judicial 
notice of it, that partnerships come and go all the time and if 
those partnerships had a buy/sell agreement in place before 
dissolution, then something has to be done with the policy 
8 after dissolution. It is not automatically always covered 
9 It's always contingent in nature because it is predicated on 
10 the death of a person. 
11 Now, these partners recognize as an addendum in 1979 mat 
12 the partnership could be dissolved because of a person's death, 
13 and they tried to plan for that contingency. So, mere was a 
14 buy/sell agreement in place, and they purchased insurance to 
15 fund those obligations to provide the money if that contingency 
16 should be realized. 
However, in mis case, the partnership was dissolved 
before mat contingency happened; kind of like the Blandow 
19 Case, but in reverse. 
20 Brad Buchi, when he died, died after the dissolution of 
21 the partnership, and that's a key event This case is much 
22 like two cases mat I cite in the trial brief, and I'll close 
23 on those. 
24 The Gerard Bank v. Haley Case (Phonetic) involved a 
25 situation where Mrs. Reed, who was a partner, unilaterally 
17 
18 
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1 he died. It was dissolved when the court decreed him 
2 incompetent, and thereby was dissolved by judicial decree." 
3 Now, it is speculation, but had the partnership - or Brad 
4 not died, it is likely that the partners would have discussed 
5 what to do with the insurance policies. They didn't have time 
6 to do that As I said earlier, on August 5th Brad met with 
7 Glade for the purpose of approving bills, and they didn't get 
8 all of mat done, and he died 
9 Now, one would assume in the next several weeks meywould 
10 have gotten to a discussion of me policies. They would have 
11 had several options. Because they were whole Hfe policies 
12 with cash value, each owner could have just cashed them out 
13 They could have cross-assigned ownership as they did with 
14 the two earlier Northern $100,000 policies. Or, frankly, they 
15 could have just kept mem in force. And if both of those 
16 partners were still alive today, mere is no law, I don't 
17 believe, that precludes them from having 
18 policies if that's what both of them had chosen to do. 
19 "Whatever," however, is speculation. Before they reached 
20 that point, Mr. Buchi died. And the point in time - that's 
21 the point in time which the decisions have to be made based on 
22 a dissolution of the partnership on January - or July 14th. 
23 As of the date of Brad Buchi's death, number one, the 
24 partnership had been dissolved; three weeks before. Number 
25 two, therefore, the buy/sell agreement which was contingent on 
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1 the partnership being dissolved by the death of a partner was 
2 not triggered, and thus it is not enforceable by the 
3 Defendants. Number three, both insurance policies were still 
4 in effect on the date of his death, and they are bom valid. 
5 And with regard to the policy on Brad's life, as it designated 
6 Glade Parduhn as the beneficiary, he, as a matter of law, 
7 should be entitled to receive all those benefits. 
8 The next question is: Should some of that be passed 
9 through to the survivors? At most, that would be $100,000. 
10 But the Plaintiff submits it is none, and that's because the 
11 buy/sell agreement is not enforceable by these Defendants. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fishbum. 
Mr. Tanner. 
MR. TANNER: Thank VOU. 
Given the fact mat this is a matter where there's a 
complaint and a counterclaim, I assume each counsel has one 
argument as opposed to each counsel having an argument and a 
18 rebuttal? 
19 THE COURT: i hadn't thought about that. 
MR. DUNN: My understanding is -
THE COURT: YOU don't need to get two. 
MR. DUNN: okay, one each will be fine with me. 
I take it Mr. Fishburn has no objection? 
MR. FISHBURN: NO, I have no objection. 
THE COURT: I think he - 1 think he was very thorough, 
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1 this time to $250,000 on Glade's life, 300,000 on Brad's life. 
2 How did this happen? Well, Lisa Buchi testified that 
3 there had been some kind of passing offer that was never 
4 reduced to writing of over $600,000 to purchase the stations. 
5 She thought, "Wow, business has really grown. We should have 
6 more money. If something happens to my husband, I need to 
7 provide for myself and my kids." 
8 So, she, at the service station - I think she said it was 
9 in late '88 or early '89 - goes to the Texaco station, had a 
10 discussion, Glade's present, Brad's present They call Sheldon 
11 Hansen. They, as a result of all that, increased the insurance 
12 on Brad's life to 300,000, Glade's life to 200,000. Disparate 
13 amounts? Why? Glade's older, he smokes. Brad's younger, he 
14 doesn't smoke. Same amount approximately premiums. Premiums 
15 are paid by the business. Certainly, Lisa, when she was making 
16 mis suggestion, and the partners, as they made the suggestion, 
17 were not thinking, "Hmm, if Brad dies the money on his life 
18 goes solely to Glade." That was not the intent This was with 
19 reference to the buy/sell agreement as was referenced in the 
20 $300,000 policy. Section 31F refers to "buy/seU". 
21 Sheldon Hansen testified mat he filled out the policy, 
22 and he stated that he fills out policies by talking to his 
23 clients, getting their information, making sure that it's done 
24 thoroughly. Sheldon Hansen indicated mat he would have noted 
25 on the application if any portion of the proceeds was to be 
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so-
MR. FISHBURN: I have been known to speak two or three 
times, but I don't mink it is necessary. 
THE COURT: GO ahead, Mr. Tanner. 
MR. TANNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, we've been through several witnesses 
yesterday, and I think it's quite incontroverted mat Brad 
8 Buchi invited Glade Parduhn to become partners with him, they 
9 became partners, they entered into a written partnership 
10 agreement with a buy/sell provision on May 23rd, 1979, not only 
11 did the partners but their wives at the time signed it and it 
12 provided for $20,000 worth of life insurance and that if either 
13 partner died the surviving partner gets the whole business, the 
14 deceased partner's family gets all the insurance and the 
15 surviving partner could do with the business as he sees fit 
16 That's the language in there. 
17 On January 25th, 1984, the insurance coverage under the 
18 buy/sell provision of the partnership agreement was increased 
19 to $100,000. They made another little notation mat reinforced 
20 that previous statement, that if one dies, me other gets the 
21 whole business to do with as they saw fit and the family gets 
22 all of the insurance proceeds. 
23 Glade himself testified on the witness stand that he never 
24 changed mat agreement to provide otherwise. 
25 Then in 1989 the partners again increased their insurance; 
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1 split up or used for some other purpose than the buy/sell 
2 agreement, which was indicated on the policy. 
3 There is no dual basis indicated on me policy as 
4 Mr. Fishburn claims. If there is some dual basis, what is it? 
5 50,000,75,123,4-mere is no number to show a dual basis. 
6 It says, "Partnership," which - or it says, "buy/sell," which 
7 has reference to the partnership, and it says "partner," which 
8 also has reference to the partnership. That's what is 
9 designated. There is nothing in there that designates to Glade 
10 Parduhn as an individual any portion of the proceeds. This was 
11 a buy/seU, partnership related contract instigated by Lisa who 
12 had signed the first partnership agreement when it was put 
13 together with the $20,000 provision. 
14 It's further evidence mat the policy was for Brad's 
15 family, not his partner. Lisa testified that her understanding 
16 was that Judge Murphy,in her divorce action, ordered mat that 
17 policy would be maintained. 
18 As further evidence mat it was for the partnership 
19 agreement and its buy/sell provision, Glade Parduhn stated that 
20 he did not recall any other writing which would change or amend 
21 or undo the partnership agreement provision that provided fox 
22 payment of the proceeds to the families. 
23 Finally, the partners decided to sell their stations to 
24 Blackett Oil Company; closing takes place on July 14th of '97, 
25 after which Glade, pursuant to the partnership agreement, acts 
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1 by hisself - by himself to deal with the affars of the 
2 station - files lawsuits, defends lawsuits, continues on. 
3 He's acting by himself. Does he consult with Joanne Buchi, who 
4 is the widow of Brad who has been appointed as personal 
5 representative? No. 
6 As further evidence that the partnership did not disappear 
7 and go away, the partners never entered into any termination 
8 agreement; never entered any kind of paperwork with the Utah 
9 Department of Commerce dissolving their partnership or anything 
10 else that would show that the partnership ceased to exist 
11 The sole argument that Mr. Parduhn has that he is entitled 
12 to all of the money is that he is listed as beneficiary on the 
13 $300,000 policy on Brad's life. He reads that in a vacuum, 
14 ignoring the very partnership agreement that he signed, 
15 ignoring Section 31 of that particular insurance contract 
16 itself and ignoring Section 75-6-201A of the Utah Code, which 
17 provides that in a separate writing other than the insurance 
18 contract, you can designate someone else to be the 
19 beneficiary. 
20 In other words, do we have a problem with the idea that 
21 Glade, as designated beneficiary, gets the proceeds? No, if he 
22 does what the partnership says he's supposed to do with the 
23 proceeds, and that is give them to the survivors and kids. 
24 That's what the agreement provided for. That's what was 
25 supposed to happen. Efcad was trusting his partner, Glade, to 
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1 money goes to the family or the kids? If someone dies, all 
2 goes to the surviving partner, and then the partnership gets 
3 split in half, too. So, the surviving partner gets all the 
4 insurance money and half the business, as welL Does anyone 
5 really believe that Brad with a wife, five kids, at the very 
6 time his business had grown, at his wife's suggestion that 
7 insurance be increased to provide far his family, really 
8 intended any part of that insurance money to go to Glade 
9 Parduhn? I don't think so. I don't think that intent shows up 
10 anywhere except in the mind of Mr. Parduhn. 
11 And we'll submit it on that basis. 
12 THE OOURT: Thank you, Mr. Tanner. 
13 Mr. Dunn. 
14 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. Thank you. 
15 The purpose of what we are all engaged in here in the 
16 Court evaluation of this circumstance is to do justice, to 
17 further the interest of the parties as they intended. It 
18 strikes me that the justice that's being sought here is to 
19 implement the documents, to implement the facts and to comply 
20 with the law, to establish that these children and the widow 
21 are those that are entitled to insurance that was purchased for 
22 their benefit 
23 There are three points that I'd like to discuss in my 
24 closing statement The first is, that the documents compel a 
25 decision that the buy/sell agreement and the policy was for the 
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1 get the money, to pay it to his kids and family and then he 
2 would have the station That's what he was relying on Glade to 
3 do. Glade, now, does not want to do that 
4 And, finally, we have the question that I would like to 
5 pose, and that's kind of a common sense question about the 
6 intent I think we can look at the partnership agreement 
7 itself and at the insurance contract and glean the intent of 
8 the parties, because it's vacant and absent on anything that 
9 would give the money to Glade without reference to a buy/sell, 
10 without reference to a partnership agreement Doesn't do 
11 that It gives it to Glade with reference to a buy/sell 
12 agreement and partnership agreement 
13 But if we can't do that with just the four corners of the 
14 document and we look at the totality of the circumstances, does 
15 it make any sense to bcilieve that Glade and Brad put together 
16 an agreement for their own family members to get $20,000 worth 
17 of insurance and their partner to get the business if something 
18 happened to him? Then the business grows, they increase it to 
19 $100,000. What was fair intent? According to all fa 
20 writings we have, family gets fa insurance proceeds, allof 
21 it; surviving partner gels all of fa business. The business 
22 grows, again. Does it make sense to accept what Glade Parduhn 
23 proposes now? 
24 All of a sudden, for some inexplicable reason, I guess fa 
25 argument is that fa intrat was that now none of fa insurance 
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benefit of fa wife and children. The second is that fa 
factual estimate - fa factual evidence and fa testimony that 
has been received in fa court yesterday clearly establishes 
fat that was fa intent and fan fat fat is fa compliance 
with fa requirements with fa - with fa intent of fa 
parties in compliance with fa documents. And fa third, that 
fat statute controls. 
ff I may, Td like to start with fa second The reason 
I'd like to start with fa second with reference to fa factual 
testimony fat was given, is fat when Glade Parduhn was called 
in rebuttal and took fa stand at 3.-07 p jn. as is recorded on 
fa videotape of fa trial, Mr. Fishburn asked him: 
"I would like to call Mr. Parduhn." 
"Okay." 
The Judge says, "Oh, okay." 
May I approach fa bench? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. DUNK: I had this transcribed from fa videotape 
"You are still under oath in this 
matter. Take fa stand, if you would." 
I believe, that was fa Judge, although fa secretary 
couldn't identify it 
Mr. Fishburn's question: 
"Mr. Parduhn, do you recall, 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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10 
prior to the applications for the two 
policies in 1989 being present at the 
University Texaco station in the presence 
of Lisa and Brad Buchi while Sheldon 
Hansen was on the phone?" 
"No, I do not." 
"No further questions." 
And then I asked him if his recollection was infallible, 
and he acknowledged that it wasn't 
But, more importantly, Mr. Parduhn did not testify that he 
11 was not present during the earlier conversation with Lisa and 
12 Brad, which Lisa testified about at 1:43 pJIL, 1:43 and 45 
13 seconds. 
14 And at 1:50 p.m., 1:50 and 33 seconds, that it was, in 
15 fact, discussed with Mr. Parduhn himself and that he agreed 
16 that the $300,000 increase was for the purpose of the buy/sell 
17 agreement 
18 Mr. Fishburn did not ask him if that did not take place. 
19 He did not deny that it took place. The only thing he denied, 
20 in his rebuttal testimony, was that he doesn't remember a phone 
21 call 
22 Well — so, the established facts are, without 
23 contradiction from the witness that testified from the stand 
24 that has no interest in the outcome here, that Mr. Parduhn knew 
25 about it and acceded to it 
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1 the other partner would receive the totality - or the other 
2 partner's heirs would receive the totality of the insurance 
3 policy amount that was purchased for the benefit of those heirs 
4 and also for the benefit of Mr. Parduhn in that he no longer 
5 would have anyone to challenge his total ownership of the 
6 partnership assets themselves. 
7 All these other policies that are purchased by one side or 
8 the other for some other purpose are irrelevant That Joanne 
9 received nothing from those policies is also irrelevant 
10 The contract provides that those specific amounts as 
11 listed in the application were for the purpose of a 
12 buy/seU/partnership. 
13 To address u» question of dissolution for a moment 1 
14 thought it interesting that Mr. Fishburn did acknowledge during 
15 part of his argument that there was, in fact, in the statute a 
16 requirement - finally acknowledged by him - that winding up 
17 was necessary with reference to the remaining assets of any 
18 partnership if one had been concluded, either by the death of 
19 one party or by some agreement that the parties would enter 
20 into, to agree that the partnership would cease to exist or 
21 that one partner would send a letter to the other one saying 
22 that the partnership ceased to exist 
23 They sold the businesses, and that's all that they did. 
24 They stopped operating the businesses, but they continued to 
25 have a relationship. They had not yet established what should 
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1 And why is that so logical, too? Why is it so consistent 
2 with what the facts in the rest of the case are? The reason is 
3 that, though Mr. Parduhn doesn't recall a phone call to the 
4 insurance agent, obviously, one was made. Obviously, the 
5 follow-up to that meeting was that Mr. Hansen prepared the 
6 applications for the policy. And, as Mr. Hansen testified, his 
7 understanding was that it was a $300,000 policy as a buy/sell 
8 agreement complement 
9 He testified that if he would have been asked to have 
10 listed some amount to go to Mr. Parduhn, alone, and some other 
11 amount, $225,000 or any other amount, 100 or 50 cents, was to 
12 go to the heirsunder the buy/sell agreement, that he would 
13 specifically have identified that on the documents. 
14 And that's why the first point, as I come back to it now, 
15 is also vitally important here. Those documents do establish 
16 the intent of the parties from their own face. Mr. Parduhn and 
17 Mr. Buchi signed documents in complementary form to establish 
18 that they were, in fact, amending the buy/sell agreement to 
19 increase the amounts - the amounts that it provided. And, 
20 indeed, I think that that writing signed by both of them does 
21 constitute an amendment to the buy/sell agreement to the extent 
22 that it is necessary. 
23 The policy was purchased, it was purchased by assets of 
24 the partnership and it was purchased for the purpose of 
25 allowing one partner to get the business if one died whereas 
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1 be done with the policies. They had not yet talked about or 
2 established what should be done with the assets of the 
3 partnership. 
4 "Winding up," obviously, intends that such tilings as 
5 buy/sell agreements, in the event of a death of a partnership 
6 during that winding-up phase, would be what would be 
7 contemplated. 
8 What Mr. Fishburn argues here is that if you have just the 
9 rigfr set of circumstances of facts, you can cont^ 
10 of the law as to dissolution and winding up so that then 
11 there's no ongoing, existing partnership 
12 think factually that is established, althoughit is not 
13 necessary because the documents and the evidence are sufficient 
14 without it - but even - but the - even if the partnership 
15 ceased to exist, the entitlement to those benefits, undcrthe 
16 buy/sdl agreement continue, as I'll come back to under the 
17 statute. 
18 But for the purpose of winding up that enterprise, that 
19 partnership agreement - they had taxes they had to file, they 
20 had disputes with other entities that were ongoing, they had a 
21 significant amount of winding up that needed to be done. 
22 It's troubling to me to listen to contentions concerning 
23 what is and is not insurance law from Mr. Fishburn, which are 
24 repeatedly not consistent with the law, as I understand it, or 
25 as it is cited in our briefs. Or even as you review the cases I 
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1 that he cites themselves, they are clearly distinguishable on 
2 many, many grounds. 
3 For example, the death that occurred at a much later point 
4 in - the death that occurred, and then they wanted to wind up 
5 the partnership after the death such as that Ohio case; 
6 dramatically different from the facts that we have. I believe 
7 that is a Second Circuit case. 
8 There's no argument, even, let alone proof, that the Idaho 
9 statute or the Ohio statute or the Arkansas statute are 
10 anything like the Utah statute. 
11 It might make a difference to the Court if there was some 
12 established evidence that those statutes were identical to 
13 ours. There is none. And to my knowledge, there is no 
14 evidence thatcould be presented in that regard. 
15 What we do focus on, instead, is our statute. And our 
16 statute is not that difficult to understand. And, indeed, in 
17 my judgment, Mr. Fishburn misconstrues it, and intentionally 
18 does so. 
19 The purpose for this statute was not for the purpose of 
20 codifying common law. It does not say it's codification of the 
21 common law. The purpose of this statute is to address 
22 situations much like the one that Mr. Parduhn found himself in 
23 and decided to take advantage of by trick. And the purpose of 
24 this statute specifically was to make sure that the people that 
25 ought to receive the benefits of policies of this kind be the 
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1 means: For persons closely related by 
2 blood or law, a substantial interest 
3 engendered by love and affection. Or in 
4 the case of other persons, a lawful and 
5 substantial interest in having the life 
6 health and body - bodily safety of a 
7 person insured continue." 
8 Now, what that does allow for is certain consent 
9 situations such as those listed in Subparagraph 4: 
10 "Under which case, life or 
11 disability policy may be taken without 
12 consent" 
13 And under Paragraph A: 
14 "Without consent" 
15 And Paragraph B: 
16 "Where there is consent" 
17 There is no listing in the section that relates to policy 
18 being taken without consent There is no consent bene signed 
19 by Mr. Buchi that this buy/sell policy, instead, was to go to 
20 his former partner. There's no consent of that kind. And, 
21 indeed, nor can there be because the five items identified 
22 there don't include partnership. Indeed, the three that exist 
23 in situations where consent can be given also don't include 
24 partnership. Those are: 
25 "A parent or a person having 
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1 people that receive the benefits of policies of this kind. 
2 Starting in Paragraph 1: 
3 "The insurer has an obligation 
4 only to allow insurance of this kind to 
5 be written in favor of someone with an 
6 insurable interest" 
7 . Paragraph IB: 
8 "No person may knowingly procure 
9 the proceeds of the insurance policy." 
10 Obviously, if you are attempting to obtain the proceeds of 
11 the policy, it is not at the time of the signing of the 
12 buy/sell agreement, it's at the time of the death of one of the 
13 partners. 
14 "A person may not knowingly 
15 procure directly, by assignment or 
16 otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of 
17 an insurance policy." 
18 And at the time that he was attempting to obtain the 
19 proceeds of the policy, he had no insurable interest in the 
20 life of Brad Buchi. 
21 Now, Mr. Fishburn has contended that a partner can insure] 
22 the life of another partner. That is not, in fact, what the 
23 law says. The law specifically addresses that in Subparagraph] 
24 2: 
25 "Insurable interest in a person 
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1 legal custody of a minor or guardian. A 
2 grandparent may consent to the issuance 
3 of life or disability insurance on a 
4 grandchild. And a court of general 
5 jurisdiction may give consent to the 
6 issuance of a life or disability policy 
7 on an ex-parte application showing facts 
8 the court considers sufficient to justify 
9 the issuance of that policy." 
10 So, even though he somehow contends that a partner can 
11 insure another partner, that's not what the law provides even 
12 under consent situations. 
13 Then the law specifically addresses those situations where 
14 a partner can buy insurance on the life of another partner, and 
15 it says: 
16 "As part of a legitimate buy/sell 
17 agreement respecting shares or a 
IS partnership interest in the business." 
19 And that's all it says. Let me read the full sentence. 
20 This is 31A-21-104,2,A the last sentence: 
21 "A shareholder or partner has an 
22 insurable interest in the life of other 
23 shareholders or partners for purpose of 
24 insurance contracts that are an integral 
25 part of a legitimate buy/sell agreement 
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1 respecting shares or partnership interest 
2 in the business/' 
3 I submit that that is clear, that it's clear to this 
4 Court, that it is clear to any court that examines it 
5 hereafter. The circumstances under which a partner may buy 
6 insurance on the life of a partner are defined by statute, and 
7 they can only be for buy/sell agreement-type life insurance. 
8 Now, the statute also goes on to address die question of 
9 what the Court needs to do in die event that some trick is 
10 attempted to prevent the legitimate recipients of the insurance 
11 that was intended to be given to them is attempted to be taken 
12 by someone else. That appears in Subsection 5: 
13 "No insurance policy is invalid 
14 because die policy holder lacks insurable 
15 interest" 
16 And as an aside: In 1983,1984,1985, there was 
17 substantial law to the effect that an insurance company was not 
18 off the hook because of a lack of insurable interest There 
19 was substantial law that had decided that the insurance company 
20 having received die payment of die premiums had an obligation 
21 to pay it to someone. And those cases decided that if it is 
22 die case that it's purchased for somebody and there's a 
23 contention that it - it should go to - that it should not be 
24 paid by die insurance carrier because the insurable interest 
25 didn't exist, that the court then would take die proceeds of 
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1 interest, then the Court has to intervene to see to it diat 
2 someone diat would have an insurable interest is die recipient 
3 of the benefits of those policies. 
4 The only reason - die only reason diat Mr. Parduhn 
5 contends diat he should have the money is because he's listed 
6 as a beneficiary. Being a beneficiary is not sufficient He 
7 has to have an insurable interest And if he does not, it is 
8 necessary diat die benefits be paid to someone that does. 
9 Being a beneficiary is not die same as having an insurable 
10 interest, and it is not die same as get getting consent from 
11 the party that died to insure that person' s life so diat money 
12 would flow to his partner or someone else upon his death. 
13 What Mr. Fishburn said about gambling on the death of 
14 anodier person, the public policies against it apply in this 
15 circumstance, as wdL 
16 He did not go - Mr. Parduhn did not go to Brad Buchi and 
17 say, "Would you sign a consent under which as - you, as my 
18 partner, agree diat I can receive die benefits of any policy, 
19 diat they be paid to me instead of going to odier designated 
20 recipients such as those in die buy/sell agreements." 
21 Had he done diat, Mr. Parduhn and Mr. Fishburn could have 
22 some conceivable argument; although, the statute would still 
23 prohibit it But they don't even have die rudiments of 
24 consent, nor do they have the rudiments of an insurable 
25 interest 
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1 the insurance and decide what should be done with them. 
2 What this codification section did was to expand on that 
3 slightly and make it clearly the obligation of the court, the 
4 trial court, to establish that no insurance policy is invalid 
5 because the policyholder lacks insurable interest or because 
6 consent has not been given — no consent was given here, 
7 eitlier. 
8 "But a court with appropriate 
9 jurisdiction (and I submit that this is 
10 that Court because the insurance company 
11 has tendered it to the Court) - a court 
12 with appropriate jurisdiction, may order 
13 the proceeds to be paid to some person 
14 who is equitably entitled to them other 
15 than the one to whom the policy is 
16 designated to be payable or it may create 
17 a constructive trust in the proceeds or 
18 part of them on behalf of such person 
19 subject to all the terms and conditions 
20 of the policy other than those relating 
21 to insurable interest and consent" 
22 So, if the policy says that it is to be paid to the wife 
23 and children, it can be, because they clearly have an insurable 
24 interest as is established in Subsection B - IB and 2A. 
|25 If it is somebody else that does not have an insurable 
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1 And I submit based on die testimony diat we've heard by 
2 itself, diat diis Court should rule that die entirety ofthose 
3 policies go to die wife and children. 
4 I also submit diat based on die documents themselves and 
5 die four corners of the documents themselves, the insurance 
6 policy and the application, diat they compel that this Court 
7 find diat the intent of Brad Buchi be adhered to as is 
8 evidenced by diose documents. And that would mean that those 
9 proceeds go to the wife and children. 
10 And, indeed, under the third element of my argument, the 
11 statutory requirement, die statutory requirement is clear. If 
12 diat law applies, Mr. Parduhn has no right to claim whatsoever; 
13 neither as a claimant under insurable interest or as a claimant 
14 with some kind of consent because he never got one. 
15 And that statute also compels diat this Court find diat 
16 the legitimate recipients of the benefits of diose policies are 
17 die wife and children. 
18 Thank you very much, Your Honor. Appreciate your time on 
19 this case. 
20 THEOOURT: Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
21 WeQ, if anybody needs to be heard, again, I'll go back on 
22 my word If anybody wants t o - i f anybody feels compelled 
23 they need to take a couple of minutes, I'll be glad to hear you 
24 all (Inaudible). 
25 MR. FISHBURN: I would like to, Your Honor. 
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1 THE OOURT: And Til give you that opportunity, if you 
I 2 want to, Counsel 
I 3 MR. FISHBURN: Your Honor, selective perception and 
4 selective recall are pretty dynamic psychological constructs, 
5 and it seems to me that that's happened in this case, 
6 especially with regard to the testimony of Sheldon Hansen. It 
7 seems to my that Counsel have all heard what they wanted to 
I 8 hear. Certainly, I heard Mr. Hansen testify in ways that were 
I 9 contrary to what Mr. Dunn and Mr. Tanner have indicated, and I 
110 would - well, my memory, like Mr. Parduhn's, is not 
111 infallible, and I would certainly yield to the Court 
112 Now, that pertains to this discussion that occurred in a 
113 filling station 12 years ago. Mr. Parduhn indicated that he 
114 does not recall it My recollection of Mr. Hansen's 
115 conversation is that he did not recall that, certainly not in 
116 the vein of amounts being testified to. 
117 I would disagree that Lisa Buchi has no interest in the 
118 outcome. I would find ithat statement hard to make if it were 
19 my children with a mulu-$100,000 claim. 
20 It's been pointed out there were no articles of 
121 dissolution. That's true On the other hand articles of 
122 dissolution would only give rise to one of the nine causes of 
123 dissolution in the Partnership Code, and that's mutual 
124 agreement of the partners. You don't have to have formal 
125 articles to be dissolved. 
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I 1 For the first time, it was raised, "Well, the source of 
I 2 the funds came from the partnership." That's true. I would 
I 3 refer te Qnnt to te California case of Eswinev. Rogers 
I 4 (Phonetic), and the citation is in the trial brief, although it 
I 5 was cited for a different issue. But in that case that issue 
I 6 was examined, and Pie California Court of Appeals stated it is 
I 7 irrelevant It really doesn't matter. 
8 Now, there seems to be a new issue raised on this statute, 
9 and that's my real reason for coming to the podium. I mean, 
110 that's - 1 don't know that this has been argued before, 
111 perhaps it has and I am just too dense to have understood it 
112 Now, all of a sudden, now, we have gotten into the full 
113 concept of consent, that the insured didn't consent to the 
14 issuance and the application of the policy. Now, as I read the 
115 statute, if you'll look Subsection 3, it says: 
16 "Except as provided in Subsection 
17 4, an insurer may not knowingly issue an 
18 individual life policy to a person other 
19 than the one who's life is at risk unless 
20 that person has given written consent to 
[21 the issuance of the policy." 
22 In other words, unless the insured consents, you can't 
123 issue the policy as an insured company unless you fall into one 
24 of these five categories. Well, you never get to Subsection 4 
25 in the five categories because Brad Buchi did consent to the 
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1 issuance of the insurance. He signed the policy on his life. 
2 He signed it as the insured. Glade signed the other policy. 
3 I-IwouldyieldtotheCourtinaieadingofthe 
4 statute if, indeed, the defense applies, but it doesn't seem to 
5 nK that there is a consent problem here. 
6 Now, all that Glade Parduhn asks this Court to do, all he 
* 
7 has ever asked this Court to do, is to simply apply the law 
8 that exists to the facts of the case. And, I believe, that is 
9 what is meant by justice. It is not the subjective 
10 determination of tie parties as to what is and is not fair. 
Ill Heaven forbid that I should consciously use the Code in an 
12 effort to trick people out of their just proceeds. Certainly, 
13 that has not been my intention as counsel I assure you, it 
14 has not been Mr. Parduhn's intentions. 
15 We do believe that Die application of the law requires 
16 results that we've indicated in this case. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Fishburn, let me ask you - and I'll ask 
18 other Counsel whether they want to make a statement or not -
19 if you were to prevail completely, how would the last few lines 
20 of the order read? That the entire procedures on deposit be 
21 given to your client? 
22 MR. FISHBURN: well, this trial is not over. If we - if 
23 we prevail, first of all, my analysis of it is this: All of 
24 the insurance proceeds go to the beneficiary designated in the 
25 policy. That's Glade Parduhn. And the next question is: Do a 
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1 portion of those policies pass through to someone else? If 
2 they pass through, they would pass to the survivors. And, I 
3 believe, Judge Stirba indicated that would be Joanne Buchi and 
4 the children; although, there's been no indication how that 
5 would be split I don't know if that's important or not 
6 If there is an amount that passes through, whether it is a 
7 hundred thousand dollars or more, then there is still reserved 
8 the issue of setoff. 
9 It's been Mr. Parduhn's contention is that Mr. Buchi was 
10 taking out more than his half before he died. That's reserved 
11 for a later date. So, there's still a setoff issue. 
12 If the Court rules that the buy/sell agreement is not 
13 enforceable, then Mr. -Mr . Parduhn should be entitled to all 
14 of the proceeds immediately that are held by the Court, and 
15 then we would go through the process consistent with the - not 
16 bankruptcy- but Partnership Code of determining, first of 
17 all, what's left in terms of dollars and cents, and then how is 
18 that to be divided between the surviving partner and the 
19 deceased partner. 
20 So, that's probably not the easy, simple sentence you were 
21 looking far, but that's how we see the road map of the case. 
22 THEOOURT: Thank you, Mr. Fishburn. 
23 Okay, Mr. Tanner, did you care to make any further 
24 argument, or, if not, I would at least like you to answer that 
25 question. Do you recall it? 
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1 MR. TANNER: Yes, please, both. But the final sentence of 
2 the order, Your Honor, would be that the entire proceeds would 
3 be paid jointly to Joanne Buchi and the five Buchi Children. 
4 Mr. Dunn, has, I think, well-summarized the law of 
5 insurable interest, but I'd like to point out one tiling: 
6 Using, I believe, the logic that is argued by Mr. Parduhn's 
7 Counsel, the inference is that if dissolution occurred upon the 
8 sale to Blackett Oil, then we keep the insurance agreement but 
9 we toss out the partnership agreement with its buy/sell 
10 provision. I mean, that's - that's - 1 think what's being 
11 argued here. I am not sure it was quite stated that way, but 
12 that's the inference. 
13 Why would we want to throw that out if we are 
14 Mr.Parduhn? Wdl, because it says that the proceeds go to the 
15 family. 
16 The problem is that if dissolution really makes a 
17 partnership — or, excuse me, if a sale really equals 
18 dissolution, really equals a partnership goes away, ceased to 
19 exist and the partnership agreement goes out the window, as 
20 well, then maybe someone could explain how Mr. Parduhn, at that 
21 point in time when there is no longer a business, has any more 
22 insurable interest in the life of Brad Buchi than Mr. Buchi's 
23 neighbor down the street or me or you or anyone in this 
24 courtroom other than his children and widow? 
25 It isn't there. There is no longer a business 
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1 how the last sentence of tic order should read, it is my 
2 opinion that that should read that Mr. Parduhn is to receive 
3 the assets of the business currently held by Associated Title 
4 and that the widow and children of Brad Buchi receive the 
5 totality of the assets and the interest that has accumulated on 
6 the $300,000 buy/sell life insurance policy. 
7 THECOURT: Thank you, Mr. Dunn. 
8 Thank you, CounseL I appreciate your help. You've all 
9 done, in my estimation, a very good job and are very good 
10 advocates for your positions and have been very thorough and 
11 well-prepared And I have appreciated it 
12 1 will reserve on this, take it under advisement and get a 
13 ruling out as soon as I can. I can assure you that it will 
14 happen reasonably quickly in the scheme of things. 
15 Allrigjit 
16 MR. PISHBURN: YOUT Honor? 
17 THECOURT: Yes. 
18 MR. FISHBURN: Mr. Dunn had provided me with the form of 
19 order, an order on the - 1 guess, it was my motion to exclude 
20 a newly argued defense. 
21 THECOURT: Yes. 
22 MR. FISHBURN: i think we have — it may be my fault in 
23 terms of confusion over the import of the Court's order whether 
24 that was for the purpose of allowing the trial to proceed or 
25 irrevocably commits the Court I think it might be best if I 
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1 relationship. Maybe they were kind of friends, stilL I don't 
2 know if you can get an insurance policy on someone's life just 
3 because you are a friend. You have to have an insurable 
4 interest And if thewhole partnership and everything goes out 
5 the window with the sale to Blackett Oil, using Mr. Parduhn's 
6 own logic, that insurable interest is gone away. Thank you. 
7 THECOURT: Thank you, Mr. Tanner. 
8 MR. DUNN: Your Honor, if I may, I think I can address it 
9 from this location because I'm going to be quite brief. 
10 THECOURT: certainly. 
11 MR. DUNN: Mr. Fishburn mentioned two points in his 
12 gurrebuttal argument For the first time he'd learned that 
13 they were paid for out of the assets of the partnership. 
14 That's what Mr. Parduhn testified to; one station paid the one 
15 policy, the other station paid the other policy. So, that's 
16 nothing new. That was in the testimony. 
17 And then with reference to the consent, what the evidence 
18 in the documents is with reference to Brad Buchi's consent was 
19 that he consented that- to the issuance of a buy/sell 
20 agreement of insurance, not that he consented to insurance that 
21 would totally go to or in part go to the benefit of Mr. Buchi. 
22 I'd also invite the Court to review the videotape of the 
23 testimony of Mr. Hansen, because I think that it does clearly 
24 establish what he was doing and what he created. 
25 Lastly, with reference to your suggestion that we indicate 
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just give the order to the Court, and you can adapt it however 
you deem appropriate. 
THECOURT: All right I will do that. 
MR. FISHBURN: Would that be fine? 
MR. DUNN: That*s acceptable to me. 
THECOURT: That1 sagreeable. 
Thank you, Counsel. 
MR FISHBURN: Thank you. 
MR DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THECOURT: Thank you. 
We will be in recess. Thank you 
(Trial adjourned.) 
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1 unresolved objections to the form of the proposed aider by the 
2 Defendants, and a motion to modify a memorandum decision, which 
3 is something permitted by Rule 59; given, Number 2, there was 
4 pending and unresolved, on September 14th, a motion to stay the 
5 enforcement of the proposed order and judgment, a motion that 
6 is permitted under Rule 62; then given that prior to the trial 
4 
7 on August 21st and 22nd there was an expiessed reservation by 
8 stipulation of a plan that Mr. Parduhn has for setoff against 
9 those monies that he might be ordered and was ordered, or it 
10 was deemed he was obligated to pay under a buy-sell agreement 
11 I am not exactly sure how the signing of the order came to 
12 be, but h is my present understanding that it was on September 
13 14th that the Court signed the order in exactly the same form 
14 as it had been proposed by the Defendants. 
15 Mr. Tanner has disclosed mat he came to the Court and 
16 asked for the order to be signed. The irony of it is that on 
17 September-let me just back up. On September 27th, I made a 
18 call to Counsel for Joanne Buchi to note that the time had just 
19 lapsed for responding to the objections and responding to the 
20 motion for a stay two days before, and I was just curious if 
21 they intended to file a response. I was operating at that time 
22 in total ignorance of the order that had been signed. 
23 Later in that day I happened to review a docket sheet of 
24 the Court, and that's when I found out, much to my surprise, 
25 that the checks had already been disbursed and apparently 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 THE COURT: Good afternoon. We arc here in the matter of 
3 Parduhn v. Bennett; Case 970907879, scheduled today for hearing 
4 on motion. 
5 Would Counsel state their appearances, please? 
6 MR. FISHBURN: Bryan Fishburn for the Plaintiff, Glade 
7 Parduhn. 
8 MR. TANNER: Martin Tanner for the Buchi Children. 
9 MR. DUNN: Tim Dunn and Susan Dunn for Joanne Buchi. 
10 THE COURT: All right Mr. Fishburn, I mink -
11 MR. FISHBURN: it is my motion. 
12 THE COURT:-all of tixse arc your motion. 
13 MR. FISHBURN: Right 
14 Your Honor, the motion in issue that is presently before 
15 the Court involves due process at its most fundamental level 
16 The motion that is at issue and mat's been noticed up for 
17 hearing was filed Friday, September 28th. It was filed, 
18 admittedly, on extremely short notice, and I filed it in order 
19 to protect or at least to attempt to protect the due process 
20 rights of Mr. Parduhn guaranteed by the Rules of Civil 
21 Procedure. 
22 Immediately at issue its: Can the Court, without violating 
23 Mr. Parduhn's rights of due process on September 14th, have 
24 ordered an immediate release of all funds to the Defendants 
25 given mat, number one, tiiere at that time was pending and 
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1 disbursed on the 18th of September. 
2 Now, as I say, I was not present and I did not hear what 
3 representations were made by me Court And I hope that 
4 Mr. Tanner will correct me if I'm wrong in terms of signing the 
5 order. It's my understanding that he recalls mat he did 
6 disclose to the Court that mere was pending an objection to 
7 the form of me order and mat he did disclose to me Court 
8 that mere were other relevant motions that were pending, and 
9 mat the Court decided to enter the order anyway not 
10 withstanding that those were pending and had not been resolved. 
11 THE COURT who told you that? 
12 MR. FISHBURN: well, that was my understanding of what 
13 Mr. Tanner recalled based on our telephone conference last 
14 Friday mat Judge Burton supervised. And, again, I am not 
15 positive about that That's what I understand And I'm 
16 certainly willing to be corrected. 
17 If that-I find that hard to believe. But if, in fact, 
18 that is the accurate representation, men - and the Court for 
19 some reason concluded it did not matter that there were these 
20 pending motions, men I think that that does effect a denial of 
21 due process. 
22 Under Rule 5 - or 4-504, a losing party has the right to 
23 object to proposed findings, and mat was a right that was 
24 timely exercised by Glade Parduhn in this matter. And as of 
25 9-14 and, indeed, as of today that has not been resolved. I 
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1 Under Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a losing 
2 party has the right to object to proposed findings or to 
3 request that a decision be modified. Mr. Parduhn exercised 
4 that right in a timely fashion, I would add, even before it was 
5 filed, even before the proposed order was submitted to the 
6 Court And that objection basically challenged fee last 
7 paragraph of the memorandum decision. 
8 The last paragraph of the memorandum decision said that 
9 the Defendants were entitled to money being held in to the 
10 court and that fee clerk of the court should release it 
11 Certainly, that would be the ultimate and appropriate 
12 conclusion given fee ruling of the Court It didn't say 
13 "immediate release of fee money,11 and that was what was being 
14 challenged in fee objection, feat it was inappropriate given 
15 fee reserved issues and other issues. 
16 Now, as of September 14th, when the order was signed, fee 
17 motion to modify hadn't been resolved. Joanne Buchi at least 
18 had filed an opposition, ironically filed on the very same date 
19 that the funds were released to her and to fee Buchi Children. 
20 The Buchi children, incidentally, have not opposed fee motion 
21 to modify fee memorandum decision. 
22 Per Rule 62, a party, a losing party, has a right to move 
23 fee court to stay enforcement of an order or judgment Again, 
24 this was a right feat was timely filed. As of September 14th, 
25 it was pending and unresolved. Indeed, as of September 14th, 
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1 fortunately, of the Counsel and haven't been disbursed - but 
2 if they are released, then there is a very real danger feat 
3 they will be dissipated, they may not be recovered and at that 
4 point the unresolved claim of fee setoff against those monies 
5 becomes nothing more than an interesting hypothetical as does, 
6 really, fee right to appeal and take this to an appellate 
7 court 
8 Now, technically, fee notice of hearing did not include 
9 fee motion to stay today. But, on that issue, I would point 
10 out feat we have two questions here, I guess: One is, do we 
11 have a final judgment? And we would submit, Mr. Parduhn would 
12 submit, feat until there is a final judgment, if we don't have 
13 it yet, fee Court should stay fee release of fee money pending 
14 a final determination of fee reserve issues. 
15 If it's fee Court's belief that we do, in fact, have a 
16 final judgment and there's no point in pursuing it, certainly 
17 feat needs to be resolved But at feat point he still has a 
18 right to seek a stay of fee release of fee money on the posting 
19 of security. 
20 Now, in normal cases when we have plaintiffs and 
21 defendants, we have a plaintiff seeking a money judgment And 
22 if there is a verdict in favor of fee plaintiff, normally there 
23 is required security in the form of a bond or other types of 
24 security. And fee purpose of feat is feat fee defendant not 
25 dissipate and spend all of their assets so feat fee fruits of a 
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1 it was not even opposed That motion-to digress just a 
2 sideline -filed under Rule62H, and that gives fee Courtfee 
3 authority if there is a ruling as to lessen all of the claims 
4 in a matter, to stay fee enforcement until all of those matters 
5 are resolved Again, fee Buchi Children did not oppose fee 
6 motion and, indeed, still have not opposed it 
7 The release of the money, before these motions arc 
8 resolved, certainly has fee potential to irreparably harm 
9 Mr. Parduhn and his rights feat are guaranteed under fee Rules 
10 of Civil Procedure. 
11 I would point out feat he is guaranteed fee right of an 
12 appeal And while he does respect fee decision of the Court, 
13 it is one that he does intend to appeal. 
14 He had not anticipated having to file a notice of appeal 
15 until we had a final judgment, which is my understanding we 
16 still do not have because we have reserve issues. And, 
17 certainly, it seems it would be a denial of due process ifibc 
18 funds are immediately released, because it is those very funds 
19 against which he has a claim of setoff. 
20 Now, if fee Defendants contend that he doesn't have that 
21 right, then there should be a motion filed, as a matter of law 
22 perhaps he doesn't have it, or failing feat, we have a trial on 
23 those remaining issues. 
24 But if, in fact, those monies are just disbursed today -
25 apparently, the monies are still in fee trust accounts, 
Page 8 
1 victory, so to speak, disappear. 
2 Here, we don't have a case feat involves a money 
3 judgment We have a dispute over a res, an object, a piece of 
4 property. Plaintiff claims a right to it as does Joanne Buchi 
5 and fee Buchi Children. It is a property right feat all of 
6 them have an astute interest in, quite obviously. It is an 
7 amount of money feat I assume is quite significant to all of 
8 them and can have extremely profound consequences depending on 
9 which way feat fee order of fee Court goes. 
10 I would, if this is an issue now in terms of fee security, 
11 refer fee Court to fee case of Foster v. Halcom Manufacturing 
12 (phonetic). It is a federal case interpreting the equivalent 
13 Federal Rule 62, which is fee motion for stay. That's at 835 F 
14 -Federal- or -yeah, Fed. Sup., 1235. 
15 And that was a case where there was a dispute over royalty 
16 proceeds between fee plaintiffs and fee defendants which had 
17 been put into an escrow account during fee pendency of fee 
18 trial 
19 One side lost, fee other side maintained in lieu of a 
20 supersedeas bond that fee amounts in escrow should be kept in 
21 escrow pending resolution of fee case and feat, in essence, 
22 feat was the security for fee judgment 
23 "The purpose of a supersedeas 
24 bond as a condition to stay in a 
25 money-judgment case is to make sure that 
11TT v m wmr A *KT n / i m 
Page 9 
1 that ability to collect is still there at 
2 the conclusion of the appellate process 
3 if the appellant loses." 
4 The money will be there to whoever a court of appeals 
5 deems is entitled to it, whether this Court's judgment is 
6 affirmed or overruled if it stays in the court And if it 
7 stays in an interest-bearing account, then it is - it 
8 increases in value. In fact, it has increased in value from 
9 300,000 to over 350,000. 
10 The motion, as I say today, was filed very quickly. It 
11 was filed in a circumstance where the Plaintiff was not even 
12 aware that the order had been signed, certainly not aware that 
13 money had been released and, in fact, was waiting for a timely 
14 resolution of the pending motions. 
15 Those motions, we submit, are well-taken. We would ask 
16 the Court to, first of all, stay further release of the monies 
17 pending a final judgment in tins case; second, if the Court 
18 deems that there is a final judgment, then to stay the 
19 enforcement during the period that this case is on appeal and 
20 order that the money be returned to court and deposited back 
21 into an interest-bearing account 
22 I'm operating on the assumption right now that just for 
23 the time being that money is safe. But I doubt, if opposing 
24 Counsels'trust account is like mine, that there is any 
25 interest occurring, and so there is a depreciation in the value 
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1 record that while it seems like my memory of most things is 
2 inconsistent, I certainly can state and will state that, to my 
3 recollection, no one told me there was an objection pending to 
4 this proposed order. Now, I'm very interested in your version 
5 of events of what happened. 
6 For the record, I began sitting out in Murray on September 
7 4 t h -
8 MR. TANNER: SUTC. 
9 THE COURT: - my only recollection of this judgment is 
10 that it was presented to me and I signed it I don't recall 
11 anyone saying anything to me about anyone even being present 
12 MR. FISHBURN: Yeah, I was the only one who was present 
13 that day. 
14 THECOURT: Did I see you? 
15 MR. TANNER: No, absolutely not 
16 THEOOURT: okay. Good. I don't remember seeing you. 
17 MR. TANNER: NO, absolutely not, Judge. I spoke with the 
18 clerk of the court and mentioned that I hoped that she would 
19 take the order back, the judgment and order back for you to 
20 sign, and mentioned to her that an objection had been filed but 
21 that we had waited the appropriate time period. And that was 
22 precisely -
23 THE COURT: And did you wait — excuse me. Did you wait 
24 and it was returned to you then? 
25 MR. TANNER: Yes. 
1 of die account 
2 That is our position, and we submit it to die Court 
3 I do have a courtesy copy of the Halcom Case that I'd 
4 certainly share with the Court if die Court deems that 
5 appropriate. 
6 THEOOURT: rd be glad to take a look at i t 
7 Mr. Tanner. 
8 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, Martin Tanner for the Buchi 
9 Children. Mr. Fishburn makes h sound as though some horrible 
10 denial of due process has happened. If we take a look at what 
11 happened, he filed motion after motion, this case has been 
12 pending for approximately four years. It finally made it to 
13 trial after a number of settlement negotiations. After the 
14 trial was held, decision was rendered and Mr. Fishburn and his 
15 client lost. 
16 After waiting the appropriate period of time, I went to 
17 the Murray Court and mentioned to the front office clerk that I 
18 had a proposed order that had been prepared by Joanne Buchi's 
19 counsel. I indicated to the clerk that there was an objection 
20 pending but that I hoped that the judgment will be signed, 
21 anyway. And apparently that happened. 
22 I then took the -
23 THE COURT: Let me interrupt you there, Mr. Tanner — 
24 MR. TANNER: SUTC. 
25 THE COURT: - because I - and let me just state for the 
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1 THEOOURT: okay. Well, I certainly won't deny that I 
2 don't remember that My recollection is it was just there in a 
3 pile of papers that I often have to sign and I lead through it 
4 and I signed it And I will state - and I'm very certain of 
5 this - that I was not advised by anyone that there was an 
6 objection pending. So — 
7 MR. TANNER: Okay. 
8 THECOURT: okay. So, go on with your - and that was 
9 September 14, is that -
10 MR. TANNER: The date that it was signed, yes. Yes, Your 
11 Honor. At that point I asked the clerk i f - i f I could have 
12 some copies and if she wanted me to leave the judgment and 
13 order there or if it should be brought down to Salt Lake. And 
14 her comment to me was that she wasn't going to make copies for 
15 me and that she thought that I ought to take it downtown 
16 because that's where the case was pending and she didn't have 
17 any way to enter it or do whatever needed to be done there. 
18 So, with no diversions, I went downtown and handed it to a 
19 clerk at the counter downstairs. And that's about the sum and 
20 substance of the facts from my perspective about how the order 
21 itself was signed. 
22 THECOURT: so, you had seen his motion to modify the 
23 memorandum decision? 
24 MR. TANNER: Yes. 
25 THECOURT: where is that? 
I didn't see any of these motions pending today until 
yesterday. I wasn't aware of any of them. 
MR. TANNER; Well -
THE COURT: until yesterday. 
MR. TANNER: in some ways, Your Honor, 1 guess 1 can make 
the same comment that Judge Burton did when we had our 
7 telephone decision, and that is that the money is still 
8 around. All the procedure aside, we can decide what's 
9 appropriate to be done at this juncture. And I think that's 
true. 
from our perspective, the objection to the form of the 
order is ill-founded. And the reason that it's ill-founded is 
because the decision was appropriate based on the facts and the 
14 information. There is no setoff that would be appropriate. 
15 The whole claim for the setoff is that Mr. Buchi took more out 
16 of the partnership than he should have. Last time I checked 
17 Mr. Buchi and his estate were not part of this action at all 
18 And if Mr. Parduhn seeks reparation for some alleged purported, 
19 inappropriate distribution of funds -
20 (A really bud cellphone rings in courtroom) 
2 1 MR. TANNER: HOW d o WC turn it off? 
THE COURT.- if that's a telephone, it's the loudest -
MR. TANNER: Not only that, it sounds way better than 
mine. 
THE COURT: i am sorry. Go ahead Mr. Tanner. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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1 a decision, the lower court is certainly presumed to be correct 
2 and stands unless and until it is modified on appeal. This 
3 Court's decision was appropriate under the facts, was correct 
4 under the facts. We see no reason that a stay should occur. 
5 Frankly, we don't see a basis for an appeal despite the 
6 fact that Mr. Parduhn claims that he will seek one. 
7 He had the right to object He did. We believe that it 
8 was appropriate for the order to be signed. We think the 
9 objection was unfounded. 
10 Well, let's get to the specific issue before the Court 
11 today. And that is whether or not the extraordinary relief 
12 sought by Mr. Parduhn is appropriate. He says that there will 
13 be some kind of absolute and irreparable harm to him if a stay 
14 is not granted right now. That irreparable harm, he says, is 
15 the fact that the money has been disbursed Well, it's been 
16 disbursed according to court order and court decision. 
17 "Irreparable harm" is usually when something 
18 inappropriate has been done that is not allowed by law. And 
19 that is not the case here. 
20 Another part of the Rules of Civil Procedure to show 
21 irreparable harm is that the harm to the one seeking the 
22 extraordinary relief would outweigh the harm if the relief is 
23 granted. 
24 Mr. Parduhn would certainly not have current use of the 
25 money if UK-i f an injunction were not granted The money 
1 KIR. DUNN: That's the New World Overture. 
2 MR. TANNER: Your Honor, my arguments aren't always that 
3 lively. I requested that that be played 
4 I think the point I was making, Your Honor, is that since 
5 Mr. Buchi is not party to this action, if, indeed, a setoff is 
6 appropriate, which we would deny, anyway, Mr. Parduhn's 
7 recourse would be to go after Mr. Buchi's estate and seek 
8 setoff thane. I mean, tot would be the appropriate source. 
9 This is not the appropriate source. 
10 Mr. Buchi is not even a party to this action. So anything 
11 that he did wrong, assuming he did, is just inappropriate for 
12 setoff here. There is no allegation that his widow or his 
13 children haw done anything wrong. So, the objection, I think, 
14 is ill-founded there. And the motion to modify the order on 
15 that basis is inappropriate, as welL 
16 The motion to stay pending appeal is also something that 
17 is before the Court and has been raised by Mr. Parduhn. This 
18 case, as 1 mentioned, has been going on for four years. This 
19 has been fought like a multimillion dollar suit It is a case 
20 that has come to final resolution here not without an abundance 
21 of facts and motions coming before the Court ova and over and 
22 over again. A decision was rendered 
23 Under appropriate circumstances a court may, but it is not 
24 required to stay. As a matter of fact, the Rules of Civil 
25 Procedure specifically provide that unless an estate is granted 
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1 would not be locked up. If a stay is granted, there' s more 
2 immediate harm to our clients. 
3 Natalie Buchi will have difficulties with her home and 
4 will wind up seeking a second job to meet some of her financial 
5 obligations. Allison Buchi wiU wind up having to put off 
6 going to graduate school, something that she certainly hopes to 
7 do. The younger sister may have to move in with relatives 
8 because she won't have enough money for rent I mean, those 
9 are very immediate problems and certainly not anything that 
10 would be outweighed on the other side by Mr. Parduhn's 
11 situation. 
12 A bond or security under those kinds of situations would 
13 be appropriate, and that certainly distinguishes the case from 
14 the situation raised by Mr. Parduhn, had there (Inaudible) 
15 people who raise no such kinds of issues. 
16 So, I guess, the sum and substance of it here, Your Honor 
17 is that we believe your decision was appropriate, and that 
18 under the facts, the judgment was appropriate. There would be 
19 no right to a setoff. And we would see no reason for a stay 
20 that would place these funds back within the court for yet 
21 another two years after this case has been already pending for 
22 four years. 
23 We'd submit it on that basis. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. Tanner, let me ask y o u -
2 5 MR. TANNER: YCS. 
T*VT w Yr+ n r A «r n r m n 
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1 THE COURT: -what your belief i s - what your belief is 
2 concerning me stipulation that the parties signed August the 
3 20th. 
4 MR. TANNER: Thank you, Your Honor. I should have 
5 addressed mat I was highly surprised that mat specific 
6 issue was raised by Mr. Fishburn. My understanding was mat we 
7 had entered into a stipulation. And the gist of that 
8 stipulation was that if we lost, if our side lost during the 
9 initial phase of trial so tiiat there was - so mat mere was a 
10 question about setoffs and those other issues and the business 
11 - me nature of the business became relevant, men the 
12 accounting and the business would be brought into me picture 
13 in me second phase of a trial Why - it makes no sense to me 
14 that in view of the Court's decision and Judge Stirba's earlier 
15 decision, that this is a matter of contract pure and simple and 
16 the question of me contract being who should receive the 
17 proceeds, Mr. Parduhn or the widow and children. That was the 
18 question. 
19 It was only if the other side of the coin, which mis 
20 Court apparently did not agree with, was found to be true, that 
21 the second phase of trial was appropriate; and mat would have 
22 been if the claims mat Mr. Parduhn made, mat me money and 
23 the proceeds should be paid into the business or part of the 
24 business, and if mat had been found to be appropriate, then I 
25 can see a second phase. 
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1 reference to the Court's order. 
2 My understanding, and I think the clear reading of that 
3 document, is to the effect mat if mis Court resolves those 
4 issues relative to who's entitled to the life insurance 
5 proceeds, men those issues that were reserved thereafter 
6 relative to the question of how partnership assets might be 
7 divided up, became moot 
8 As I understand this Court's decision - and I think the 
9 Court was totally appropriate in its memorandum decision and 
10 the reasoning that supported it - there was a finding that, 
11 yes, it was the heirs that were entitled to those proceeds. 
12 And those proceeds which really should have been - and were 
13 intended for the purpose of making sure that the family could 
14 move forward shortly after Brad Buchi's death on August 7th of 
15 1997, instead of sometime much, much later, as Mr. Fishburn 
16 would effect by his repeated, inappropriate arguments, that -
17 mat the heirs got the proceeds of the life insurance policy. 
18 And the issues relating to whether or not those assets were to 
19 be distributed in some other fashion or there were subsequent 
20 remaining claims would be moot, would be dealt with. 
21 The easiest example to see in mat regard is the 
22 contention which Mr. Fishburn still makes mat Glade Parduhn 
23 has a claim against Natalie Bennett for interference with 
24 contract by going to the insurance company and telling the 
25 insurance company mat the insurance company should not release 
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1 Of what relevance me accounting of the business were to 
2 mis case, Ijust don't see it I don't see any relevance to 
3 the second phase in view of this Court's decision. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you. 
5 Mr. Dunn? 
6 MR. DUNN: Yes, sir. To start with, I cannot shed any 
7 light on the process mat led to the release of me funds 
8 because I wasn't involved in it, didn't hand deliver the 
9 proposed judgment and instruction to the Court to 
10 Mr. Fishburn. You can clearly have seen by reading it, that it 
11 was an instruction to me Court to release the funds. 
12 To add one thing to v/hatMartm said wim reference to 
13 absolute, near irreparable harm, Joanne Buchi has the threat of 
14 losing her house as of the 15th of mis month depending on 
15 whether or not she can come up with money to assist her in 
16 satisfying mat mortgage obligation. She's been borrowing 
17 extensively from her children who - one of which has recently 
18 lost his job and will need me money back to support his 
19 family. 
20 To address the real issues in the case, it strikes me that 
21 we have to take a look at that ill-taken motion in support of 
22 memorandum and motion to modify the memorandum decision. It is] 
23 based in large measure on the stipulation and Mr. Fishburn's 
24 incorrect interpretation and assumption of where the case was 
25 going, how the case was separated and what happened with 
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1 the proceeds to Mr. Parduhn. 
2 Well, this Court's decision, memorandum decision and the 
3 judgment signed thereafter, clearly disposes of any legitimate 
4 reasonable basis upon which to make any such contention. 
5 Obviously, she did the appropriate thing when she went to 
6 the insurance company and saw to it that Mr. Parduhn was not in 
7 a position to incorrectly and inappropriately obtain control of 
8 those monies. 
9 Secondly, the contention that mere is supposed to be some 
10 kind of a setoff has been disposed of not only by mis Court's 
11 ruling but also by Judge Stirba's ruling of May 22nd, 2000. 
12 Her ruling of May 22nd, 2000, reads in part 
13 "Based on the foregoing, it is 
14 clear that me Utah Probate Code 
15 specifically allowed the partnership 
16 agreement to transfer upon Buchi's death 
17 his interest in the partnership to 
18 Parduhn and me insurance proceeds to the 
19 Buchi Children and his widow. 
20 "Accordingly, the Court concludes 
21 that any sum Parduhn should have to pay 
22 to acquire Buchi's prior partnership 
23 interest should be paid directly to 
24 Buchi's survivors pursuant to the terms 
25 of the partnership agreement" 
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1 Under traditional insurance law that means that those 
2 benefits arc to be paid directly as survivor benefits, 
3 beneficiary benefits, and there's no claim that can be made 
4 against them for some kind of a setoff. 
5 Indml, one of the elements of setoff — and Mr. Tanner 
6 can address this better than I because he was involved in the 
7 litigation - had to do with a dispute with Brad Buchi's former 
8 wife, Lisa, who testified at the time of trial -
9 Who was the judge in that matter? 
10 MS. DUNN: DeVCT. 
11 MR. TANNER: Yeah, Judge Devcr. 
12 MR. OUNN: Judge Leon Dever made a ruling in that 
13 situation that Mr. Parduhn was not entitled to any kind of 
14 reimbursement of funds from that situation. And now he is 
15 attempting to get through the back door what he couldn' t get 
16 through the front door. 
17 It is my opinion that this Court should read them its 
18 decision to sign the judgment and instruction to the court to 
19 fully take into consideration all this stuff that Mr. Fishbum 
20 throws out on paper repeatedly with accusations against my wife 
21 and I, certainly, that were totally unfounded; in particular 
22 because of the fact we have nothing to do with the distribution j 
23 of the funds. Indeed, the distribution of the funds should 
24 take place. 
25 In the event that Mr. Parduhn has some appellate rights, 
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1 taking into consideration all of the paperwork that 
2 Mr. Fishbum has filed, it may. But there was compliance, as I 
3 rcadtheRuks, by Mr. Tanner with Ruk 40 -4-504 of the 
4 Operations of the Court Section of the Rules of Judicial 
5 Administration; specifically Subsection 2 with reference to the 
6 timing of the submission of such judgment 
7 The timing of the submission of the judgment struck me as 
8 being appropriate, especially in view of the fact that none of 
9 Mr. Fishbura's arguments are well-taken. 
10 I would recommend that the Court take a look at the 
11 citations in the handout that - or the production that we gave 
12 to the Court earlier. And I won't read to the Court what the 
13 Court wrote in its own decision because I am sure you are 
14 well-aware of the thought processes that you put into this 
15 matter and for which we arc gratefuL 
16 But all of those stand for the proposition that the heirs 
17 are entitled to these funds. There's no entitlement to any 
18 kind of a setoff given the fact that the heirs are entitled to 
19 these funds and therefore not entitled to the business or the 
20 business ramifications and that the appropriate way to handle 
21 this case is to let these people have the money they've been 
22 waiting so long to have. 
23 Any questions for me, Your Honor? 
24 I hope to be helpful here rather than just responsive to 
25 Mr. Fishbura's pleadings. 
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1 it's our contention that those appellate rights have to be 
2 protected in a fashion that somehow takes into account the 
3 damage that he can continue to do by preventing the legitimate 
4 recipients of these funds from getting those funds. 
5 To say to leave the money in place or put it somewhere 
6 where nobody can make any use of it - although it would gain 
7 interest on it - and that thereafter that's die only recourse 
8 against Mr. Parduhn, is inappropriate. 
9 It seems to me that there has to be a bond of substantial 
10 size. Indeed, it may well be appropriate that this Court 
11 allow, now that the decision has been made, an action for 
12 malicious prosecution against both Mr. Buchi and Mr. Fishbum 
13 for interfering with the rights that they were obviously and 
14 clearly entitled to by virtue of the Court's memorandum 
15 decision, by virtue of the law in the State of Utah with 
16 reference to who can make a claim. And that - perhaps, that 
17 should be unified with this action, and that - and penalties 
18 assessed to Mr. Buchi and Mr. Fishbum for their interference 
19 with this right, which is now into its fourth year. 
20 All the arguments that are raised by Mr. Fishbum don't 
21 challenge the decision of the Court The decision of the Court 
22 is a final decision, should be reduced to a judgment, should be 
23 reduced to an instruction to the Court — or an instruction to 
24 the clerk for the release of those funds. 
25 If the Court wants to issue an additional order. Adopt -
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1 THE COURT. No, Mr. Dunn, thank you. But I think... 
2 MR. DUNN: Yes, Sir. 
3 THE COURT: (inaudible) thank you. 
4 Mr. fishbum. 
5 MR. FBHBURN: Well, I must say that I am somewhat 
6 dismayed to hear that I might be held responsible for malicious 
7 prosecution for having brought the lawsuit by appeal This was 
8 a suit that was filed in good faith, I'll assure the Court 
9 And while we respect the decision of the Court, I honestly 
10 believe that there is a prospect at feast of it being overruled 
11 on appeal. 
12 But let me just confine myself to the issues here: First 
13 of all, the personal exigencies experienced by each of ox 
14 individuals, I didn't address that in any of the memoranda I 
15 fifed with the Court because frankly I think it is irrelevant 
16 Needless to say, this money is significant to everyone who 
17 is concerned here. It will have a deleterious, profound impact 
18 on my clients, too, if it - if the law is such that it should 
19 be awarded to the Defendants. 
20 It will have a deleterious impact on the Defendants if a 
21 court were to rule it were to go to the Plaintiff. That's -
22 that's besides the point 
23 I've been faulted because I didn't criticize the decision 
24 of the Court in motions that I now file. Well, that is not the 
25 prerogative of this motion. The Court has made a decision, I j 
D T T T TT? *9T A « r *•%***** 
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1 respect that 
2 If I'm going to seek relief on grounds that the Court was 
3 incorrect, then that is properly to be placed to a court of 
4 appeals. 
5 I would like to comment very briefly on my understanding 
6 of the stipulation. I will confess, I didn't expect to find 
7 myself in the position I am here today because I thought the 
8 decision of the trial court would be different Nonetheless, 
9 expressly reserved, expressly reserved by the parties for a 
10 second trial include: Gineg Parduhn's claim to a setoff against 
11 any sum he was obligated to pay pursuant to the buy-sell 
12 agreement for the acquisition of Brad Buchi's interest in the 
13 partnership. That is on the second page, Number 2. 
14 Now, I will confess that implicit in the Court's ruling at 
15 trial is a disposition of the interference with contract claim; 
16 I mean, logically that follows. But very clearly this claim of 
17 setoff was resolved. 
18 And let me teU you what it comes down to: The Court has 
19 ruled that under the buy-sell agreement, as implicitly amended, 
20 Glade Parduhn is legally obligated to pay the Defendants the 
21 sum of 300,000, which with interest has grown to 350. 
22 It is Mr. Parduhn's contention, which he believes he can 
23 prove on the evidence, tliat before Mr. Buchi died, he diverted 
24 partnership assets to personal ends in an amount that is way in 
25 excess of his $200,000 or his half interest in the 
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1 security (Inaudible) if it were requested by die Defendants. 
2 But if it means that there has to be a trust deed on his 
3 house for a portion of the judgment, he's willing to do that 
4 if, in fact, he can put it together. He doesn't have $300,000 
5 equity in his home, I assure you, but he would be willing to do 
6 that if that were a condition. 
7 And we submit it on that basis. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Fishburn, let me ask you (Inaudible). You 
9 mentioned it and everyone has mentioned it Supposing that he 
10 can show that Brad Buchi took money from the partnership -
11 MKFISHBURN: YCS. 
12 THECOUKT: - tdl me, again, why - why that comes from 
13 this source of funds? 
14 MR. FISHBURN: it is a (Inaudible) -
15 THE COURT: (Inaudible) because it's there and (Inaudible) 
16 can't you say it isn't there? 
17 MR. FISHBURN: well, actually, I - let me just clarify 
IS one thing: I believe that it was mentioned that the estate was 
19 not a party to this proceeding. That's not true. Joanne Buchi 
20 was joined in her capacity as personal representative of the 
21 estate of Brad Buchi. She was also joined in her personal 
22 representative. And since then I dunk she's certainly 
23 proceeded as if it was only a personal claim that was at 
24 issue. But the estate has been joined. 
25 And so in terms of quantifying a setoff against the 
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1 partnership. 
2 Now, it may be that his only recourse - and it is just 
too bad for Glade Parduhn - is against the estate of Brad 
Buchi, which happens to have no money. Or it may be that he 
has a right to setoff, against that contractual obligation, the 
excess that Mr. Buchi took out of the partnership before he 
died. 
Now, as to that last issue, I will submit this and only 
this at this time: As far as the legal consequence, does he or 
10 does he not have a right to setoff, has not ever been briefed 
11 before this Court It was not briefed in any of the trial 
briefs. There's no evidence presented to it at the trial. It 
was left in abeyance. But it has not been waived by 
14 Mr. Parduhn. And he does believe that he has a right to have 
15 that argument briefed and presented to a court 
16 As far as security is concerned, the res should stand as a 
17 security for die judgment 
18 Frankly, none of the people, including the Plaintiff, 
19 should have planned their lives on the expectation that they 
20 definitely would prevail The only way to assure the ultimate 
21 rights of all the parties to the res, including the rights of 
22 the Plaintiff, I might add, is that that money be kept 
23 Now, if die Court requires additional security, in the 
24 motion Mr. Parduhn had indicated his willingness to do that or 
25 try to do it I am sure we will never be able to post a 
12 
13 
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1 estate, if that's where it runs, then that's still an issue 
2 that's been reserved to die Court for future determination at a 
3 second triaL 
4 THE COURT: igee. 
5 MR. FISHBURN: secondly, on the right to setoff, this is a 
6 contractual obligation. But is there a setoff against that 
7 contractual obligation where it is the partner who's dissipated 
8 the value of that half interest in the partnership? Certainly, 
9 in equity there should be, and we believe there shouldbein 
10 terms of contract, as wdL 
11 I don't have die cases to cite before the Court because 
12 it's never been brought to die issue of the Court before. 
13 My recollection of Judge Stirba's ruling back in September 
14 of 2000 - there is a May order that was in part reversed, not 
15 the part Mr. Dunn talked about - was that she, in fact, said 
16 that it was premature to decide some of diese issues because 
17 diere could, indeed, be aright of setoff. She didn't say 
18 there was, she simply said that there could be; and 
19 acknowledged tiiat that was a claim that had been made by Glade 
20 Parduhn. 
21 I'd would simply say that issue has not been presented to 
22 the Court And I don't believe it's appropriate, in fact, to 
23 try to short-circuit this procedure without any analysis of the 
24 law and just pretend that it's been resolved, because it has 
25 not 
10 
11 
12 
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THE OOURT: Mr. Fishburn, let me ask you, what do you 
mink if - what do you mink would be involved in 
demonstrating that right to setoff? I know the stipulation is 
contemplated that that would be phase two of the trial, so to 
speak. 
MR. FISHBURN: Right. 
THE COURT. I mean, at least that's the way you are 
8 reading it That it would simply be a trial dealing with 
9 issues of Brad Buchi taking X amount of money out of the 
partnership and thus dissipating it 
MR. FISHBURN: Right 
THE OOURT: And if mat was a hundred thousand dollars, he 
13 would be entitled to whatever assets that are now in the 
14 partnership plus that $100,000. 
15 MR. FISHBURN: Right I am sorry, I misquoted the 
16 question (Inaudible). I think it was a verb. 
17 THE COURT: well, that's okay, Frn just thinking. 
18 MR. FISHBURN: okay. Well, "setoff' means a setoff. It 
19 doesn't - it doesn't mean give it all to the Plaintiffs. It 
20 would be a setoff against that. 
21 If the determination of me Court at phase two of the 
22 trial was mat he had diverted a hundred thousand dollars of 
23 assets in excess of his share prior to death and if the Court 
24 concluded that there was a legal right to setoff, then Glade 
25 Parduhn would receive a hundred thousand and the Defendants 
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1 And I would assert, contrary to his statements, mat there are 
2 some assets mat are part of Brad Buchi's estate. But if there 
3 are a million dollars or nothing at all, that is the 
4 appropriate place to look for the setoff. 
5 Thank you. 
6 MR. DUNN: May I, Your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: Yes (Inaudible). 
8 MR. DUNN: The final paragraph of Judge Stirba's October 
9 27th, 2000, response to Parduhn's motion for summary judgment, 
10 which was denied, reads. 
11 "After reviewing the record in 
12 mis matter, me Court is persuaded that 
13 there are disputed issues of fact 
14 regarding whether the partnership was 
15 dissolved by me sale of the two service 
16 stations to Blacken Oil (phonetic) or the 
17 death of Brad Buchi. 
18 "Furthermore, even if it is 
19 assumed that the partners were in me 
20 process of dissolution, mere are 
21 disputed issues regarding whether or not 
22 the partnership agreement and its 
23 buy-sell provisions remained in full 
24 force and effect" 
25 Dovetail that with the stipulation which — not cited on 
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1 would receive the remaining 200,000 with the, I suppose, 
2 proportionate parceling of the earned interest 
3 THE OOURT: Thank you. 
4 Mr. Tanner. 
5 MR. TANNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 Let's assume for just a minute that Mr. Fishburn has a 
7 second phase of this trial, presents all of his evidence and 
8 wins. I mean, we don't think mat would happen. But let's 
9 assume that all of that happens. And mat he establishes mat 
10 funds were inappropriately taken out of the partnership by Brad 
11 Buchi. So, what I'm saying here is: Let's assume mat the 
12 very most that Mr. Parduhn hopes for were to occur. How would 
13 that alter the decision mat mis Court has made? And the 
14 answer is: That it would not alter it at all 
15 If what Mr. Parduhn claims were true, what he would be 
16 entitled to is a judgment against the estate of Brad Buchi for 
17 his inappropriately taking money. He could not possibly get a 
18 judgment against Joanne Buchi, the widow. She has never 
19 alleged to have taken anything inappropriately; and the same 
20 way with the children. 
21 There's absolutely no basis whatsoever for a second phase 
22 of the trial on that issue given the Court's decision to this 
23 point. 
24 If Mr. Parduhn wants to sue the estate for the setoff, he 
125 has every right to do so. A probate action has been filed. 
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1 Page 2. I think the paragraph he has in mind is a subparagraph 
2 of Paragraph 7 on Page 4, it says: 
3 "Seven. To what portion of the 
4 insurance proceeds, if any, is Glade 
5 Parduhn entitled?" 
6 Next paragraph that the one, two and three fit in: 
7 "Depending on the Court's 
8 adjudication of the above issue, it may 
9 or may not be necessary to proceed with 
10 phase two of the triaL" 
11 "May or may not be necessary to 
12 proceed with the phase two of the 
13 trial." 
14 I submit that the Court in making its decision that 
15 included, in part, the language on Page 6: 
16 "In this case the fact that the 
17 partnership was in financial trouble at 
18 the death of Buchi and thus Plaintiff 
19 does not receive much from the 
20 partnership does not change the legal 
21 conclusion." 
22 Again, citing from this Court's memorandum decision, just 
23 a little bit, "Plaintiff - o n Page 8: 
24 "Plaintiff is not being deprived I 
25 of anything he is entitled to. The 
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INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 31A-21-104 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am* Jur. 2d. — 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance pending issuance of policy, 12 A.L.R.3d 1304. 
§§ 165 to 167, 219 to 222. Temporary fire, wind, or hail insurance pend-
C.J.S. — 44 C J.S. Insurance § 296 mg issuance of policy, 14 A.L.R.3d 568. 
AXJEL — Temporary automobile insurance 
31A-21-103. Capacity to contract. 
Any person 16 years of age or older who is otherwise competent to contract 
under Utah law, and who is not subject to any legal disability, may contract for 
insurance. If there is a conservator appointed under Title 75, the conservator, 
rather than the person whose property is subject to the conservatorship, may 
contract for insurance to protect the property under conservatorship. In the 
case of a conservatorship over the person or property of a person under 16 
years of age, the conservator may invest funds of the estate in life or accident 
and health insurance or annuity contracts, but only with the approval of the 
court having jurisdiction over the conservatorship. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-103, enacted by cident and health" for "disability" in the last 
L. 1985, ch- 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 136; sentence. 
2001, cb. 116, § 53. Cross-References. — Legal capacity of mi-
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- nors generally, § 15-2-1 et seq. 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted *ac-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 285. 
§ 193. 
31A-21-104. Insurable interest and consent. 
(1) (a) An insurer may not knowingly provide insurance to a person who 
does not have or expect to have an insurable interest in the subject of the 
insurance. 
(b) A person may not knowingly procure, directly, by assignment, or 
otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy unless he has 
or expects to have an insurable interest in the subject of the insurance. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsections (6), (7), and (8), any insurance 
provided in violation of this subsection is subject to Subsection (5). 
(2) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Insurable interest" in a person means, for persons closely related by 
blood or by law, a substantial interest engendered by love and affection, or 
in the case of other persons, a lawful and substantial interest in having the 
life, health, and bodily safety of the person insured continue. Policyholders 
in group insurance contracts need no insurable interest if certificate 
holders or persons other than group policyholders who are specified by the 
certificate holders are the recipients of the proceeds of the policies. Each 
person has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life and health. A 
shareholder or partner has an insurable interest in the life of other 
shareholders or partners for purposes of insurance contracts that are an 
integral part of a legitimate buy-sell agreement respecting shares or a 
partnership interest in the business. 
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(b) Insurable interest" in property or liability means any lawful and 
substantial economic interest in the nonoccurrence of the event insured 
against. 
(c) "Viatical settlement" means a written contract entered into by a 
person who is the policyholder of a life insurance policy insuring the life of 
a terminally ill person, under which the insured assigns, transfers 
ownership, irrevocably designates a specific person or otherwise alienates 
all control and right in the insurance policy to another person, when the 
proceeds of the contract is paid to the policyholder of the insurance policy 
or the policyholder's designee prior to the death of the subject. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection (4), an insurer may not knowingly 
issue an individual life or accident and health insurance policy to a person 
other than the one whose life or health is at risk unless that person, who is 18 
years of age or older and not under guardianship under Title 75, Chapter 5, 
Protection of Persons Under Disability and Their Property, has given written 
consent to the issuance of the policy. The person shall express consent either by 
signing an application for the insurance with knowledge of the nature of the 
document, or in any other reasonable way. Any insurance provided in violation 
of this subsection is subject to Subsection (5). 
(4) (a) A life or accident and health insurance policy may be taken out 
without consent in the following cases: 
(i) A person may obtain insurance on a dependent who does not 
have legal capacity. 
(ii) A creditor may, at the creditor's expense, obtain insurance on 
the debtor in an amount reasonably related to the amount of the debt. 
(iii) A person may obtain life and accident and health insurance on 
immediate family members living with or dependent on the person. 
(iv) A person may obtain an accident and health insurance policy 
on others that would merely indemnify the policyholder against 
expenses he would be legally or morally obligated to pay. 
(v) The commissioner may adopt rules permitting issuance of 
insurance for a limited term on the life or health of a person serving 
outside the continental United States who is in the public service of 
the United States, if the policyholder is related within the second 
degree by blood or by marriage to the person whose life or health is 
insured, 
(b) Consent may be given by another in the following cases: 
(i) A parent, a person having legal custody of a minor, or a guardian 
of the person under Title 75, Chapter 5, Protection of Persons Under 
Disability and Their Property, may consent to the issuance of a policy 
on a dependent child or on a person under guardianship under Title 
75, Chapter 5, Protection of Persons Under Disability and Their 
Property. 
(ii) A grandparent may consent to the issuance of life or accident 
and health insurance on a grandchild. 
(iii) A court of general jurisdiction may give consent to the issuance 
of a life or accident and health insurance policy on an ex parte 
application showing facts the court considers sufficient to justify the 
issuance of that insurance. 
(5) An insurance policy is not invalid because the policyholder lacks insur-
able interest or because consent has not been given, but a court with 
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appropriate jurisdiction may order the proceeds to be paid to some person who 
is equitably entitled to them, other than the one to whom the policy is 
designated to be payable, or it may create a constructive trust in the proceeds 
or a part of them on behalf of such a person, subject to all the valid terms and 
conditions of the policy other than those relating to insurable interest or 
consent. 
(6) This section does not prevent any organization described under 26 
U.S.C. Sec. 501(c)(3), (e), or (f), as amended, and the regulations made under 
this section, and which is regulated under Title 13, Chapter 22, Charitable 
Solicitations Act, from soliciting and procuring, by assignment or designation 
as beneficiary, a gift or assignment of an interest in life insurance on the life of 
the donor or assignor or from enforcing payment of proceeds from that interest. 
(7) This section does not prevent: 
(a) any policyholder of life insurance, whether or not the policyholder is 
also the subject of the insurance, from entering into a viatical settlement; 
(b) any person from soliciting a person to enter into a viatical settle-
ment; or 
(c) a person from enforcing payment of proceeds from the interest 
obtained under a viatical settlement. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), an insurer authorized under this title to 
issue a workers' compensation policy may issue a workers' compensation policy 
to a sole proprietorship, corporation, or partnership that elects not to include 
any owner, corporate officer, or partner as an employee under the policy even 
if at the time the policy is issued the sole proprietorship, corporation, or 
partnership has no employees. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-104, enacted by cident and health" for "disability" in Subsec-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 137; tions (3), (4Xa), and (4Kb). 
1991, ch. 21, § 1; 1993, ch. 305, § 27; 1994, Gross-References. — Group contracts and 
ch. 60, § 1; 1996, ch. 190, § 1; 2001, ch. 116, dependents' coverage, §§ 31A-22-501 to 31A-
§ 54. 22-511. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- Group disability insurance defined, § 31A-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted ttac- 22-701. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Substantial economic interest. 
A v .. . Insured, by selling farm but retaining posses-
a £ S ^ ^ d c interest s i o n o f b u i ^ B * v o l v e d "* b y «*£*hig 
himself to be responsible for it to buyer for the 
Application or consent. time retained, met the statutory requirement of 
Any consent in lieu of an application must be having a "substantial economic interest." Na-
in writing to effectuate a life insurance policy; tional Farmers* Union Property & Cas. Co. v. 
life insurance policy was not effectuated where Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 61 
the application therefor was not signed and AX.R.2d 635 (1955). 
there was no consent thereto in writing. 
Alleman v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 
1195 (10th Cir. 1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Legislative Am. Jur. 2d. — 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance 
Developments in Utah Law: Workers' Compen- §§ 938 to 1002. 
sation Coverage Amendments, 1996 Utah L. C.JUS. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 218 to 221. 
Rev. 1350. AJLR. — Insured's ratification, after loss, of 
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policy procured without his authority, knowl- Fire insurance: insurable interest of one ex-
edge, or consent, 52 A.L.R.3d 235. pecting to inherit property or take by will, 52 
Insurer's tort liability for wrongful or negli- AX.R.4th 1273. 
gent issuance of life policy, 37 A.LJl.4th 972. Insurable interest in property of lessee with 
Automobile fire, theft, and collision insur- option to purchase property, 74 AJLR.4th 883. 
ance: insurable interest in stolen motor vehicle, 
38 A.L.R.4th 538. 
31A-21-105. Representations, warranties, and conditions. 
(1) (a) No statement, representation, or warranty made by any person 
representing the insurer in the negotiation for an individual or franchise 
insurance contract affects the insurer's obligations under the policy unless 
it is stated in the policy or in a written application signed by the applicant. 
No person, except the applicant or another by his written consent, may 
alter the application, except for administrative purposes in a way which is 
clearly not ascribable to the applicant. 
(b) No statement, representation, or warranty made by or on behalf of 
a particular certificate holder under a group policy affects the insurer's 
obligations under the certificate unless it is stated in the certificate or in 
a written document signed by the certificate holder, and a copy of it is 
supplied to the certificate holder. 
(c) The policyholder, his assignee, the loss payee or mortgagee or 
lienholder under property insurance, and any person whose life or health 
is insured under a policy may request, in writing, from the company a copy 
of the application, if he did not receive the policy or a copy of it, or if the 
policy has been reinstated or renewed without the attachment of a copy of 
the original application. If the insurer does not deliver or mail a copy as 
requested within 30 days after receipt of the request by the insurer or its 
agent, or in the case of a group policy certificate holder, does not inform 
that person within the same period how he may inspect the policy or a copy 
of it and application or enrollment card or a copy of it during normal 
business hours at a place reasonably convenient to the certificate holder, 
nothing in the application or enrollment card affects the insurer's obliga-
tions under the policy to the person making the request. Each person 
whose life or health is insured under a group policy has the same right to 
request a copy of any document under Subsection (l)(b). 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5), no misrepresentation or breach of 
an affirmative warranty affects the insurer's obligations under the policy 
unless: 
(a) the insurer relies on it and it is either material or is made with 
intent to deceive; or 
(b) the fact misrepresented or falsely warranted contributes to the loss. 
(3) No failure of a condition prior to the loss and no breach of a promissory 
warranty affects the insurer's obligations under the policy unless it exists at 
the time of the loss and either increases the risk at the time of the loss or 
contributes to the loss. This Subsection (3) does not apply to failure to tender 
payment of premium. 
(4) Nondisclosure of information not requested by the insurer is not a 
defense to an action against the insurer. Failure to correct within a reasonable 
time any representation that becomes incorrect because of changes in circum-
stances is misrepresentation, not nondisclosure. 
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31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures. 
(1) (a) A person who violates any insurance statute or rule or any order 
issued under Subsection 31A-2-20K4) shall forfeit to the state twice the 
amount of any profit gained from the violation, in addition to any other 
forfeiture or penalty imposed. 
(b) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, ad-
juster, or insurance consultant who violates an insurance statute or 
rule to forfeit to the state not more than $2,500 for each violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an 
insurance statute or rule to forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 
for each violation. 
(c) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, ad-
juster, or insurance consultant who violates an order issued under 
Subsection 31A-2-20H4) to forfeit to the state not more than $2,500 
for each violation. Each day the violation continues is a separate 
violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an 
order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20H4) to forfeit to the state not 
more than $5,000 for each violation. Each day the violation continues 
is a separate violation. 
(d) The commissioner may accept or compromise any forfeiture under 
this Subsection (1) until after a complaint is filed under Subsection (2). 
After the filing of the complaint, only the attorney general may compro-
mise the forfeiture. 
(2) When a person fails to comply with an order issued under Subsection 
31A-2-20K4), including a forfeiture order, the commissioner may file an action 
in any court of competent jurisdiction or obtain a court order or judgment: 
(a) enforcing the commissioner's order; 
(b) (i) directing compliance with the commissioner's order and restrain-
ing further violation of the order; and 
(ii) subjecting the person ordered to the procedures and sanctions 
available to the court for punishing contempt if the failure to comply 
continues; or 
(c) imposing a forfeiture in an amount the court considers just, up to 
$10,000 for each day the failure to comply continues after the filing of the 
complaint until judgment is rendered. 
(3) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern actions brought under 
Subsection (2), except that the commissioner may file a complaint seeking a 
court-ordered forfeiture under Subsection (2)(c) no sooner than two weeks after 
giving written notice of the commissioner's intention to proceed under Subsec-
tion (2)(c). The commissioner's order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20K4) 
may contain a notice of intention to seek a court-ordered forfeiture if the 
commissioner's order is disobeyed. 
(4) If, after a court order is issued under Subsection (2), the person fails to 
comply with the commissioner's order or judgment: 
(a) the commissioner may certify the fact of the failure to the court by 
affidavit; and 
(b) the court may, after a hearing following at least five days written 
notice to the parties subject to the order or judgment, amend the order or 
judgment to add the forfeiture or forfeitures, as prescribed in Subsection 
(2)(c), until the person complies. 
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(5) (a) The proceeds ofall forfeitures under this section, including collection 
expenses, shall be paid into the General Fund. 
(b) The expenses of collection shall be credited to the Insurance Depart-
ment's budget. 
(c) The attorney general's budget shall be credited to the extent the 
Insurance Department reimburses the attorney general's office for its 
collection expenses under this section. 
(6) (a) Forfeitures and judgments under this section bear interest at the 
rate charged by the United States Internal Revenue Service for past due 
taxes on the: 
(i) date of entry of the commissioner's order under Subsection (1); 
or 
(ii) date of judgment under Subsection (2). 
(b) Interest accrues from the later of the dates described in Subsection 
(6Xa) until the forfeiture and accrued interest are fully paid. 
(7) A forfeiture may not be imposed under Subsection (2)(c) if: 
(a) at the time the forfeiture action is commenced, the person was in 
compliance with the commissioner's order; or 
(b) the violation of the order occurred during the order's suspension. 
(8) The commissioner may seek an injunction as an alternative to issuing an 
order under Subsection 31A-2-20H4). 
(9) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that person: 
(i) intentionally violates: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20K4); 
(ii) intentionally permits a person over whom that person has 
authority to violate: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20K4); or 
(iii) intentionally aids any person in violating: 
(A) an insurance statute or rule of this state; or 
(B) an order issued under Subsection 31A-2-20K4). 
(b) Unless a specific criminal penalty is provided elsewhere in this title, 
the person may be fined not more than: 
(i) $10,000 if a corporation; or 
(ii) $5,000 if a person other than a corporation. 
(c) If the person is an individual the person may, in addition, be 
imprisoned for up to one year. 
(d) As used in this Subsection (9), "intentionally" has the same meaning 
as under Subsection 76-2-103(1). 
(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissioner may, in whole or in part, revoke, 
suspend, place on probation, limit, or refuse to renew the licensee's license 
or certificate of authority. 
(i) when a licensee of the department, other than a domestic 
insurer: 
(A) persistently or substantially violates the insurance law; or 
(B) violates an order of the commissioner under Subsection 
31A-2-20K4); 
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceedings against the 
licensee under Section 31A-27-301 or Section 31A-27-307; or 
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the conduct of the 
licensee's business endanger, or the licensee's financial resources are 
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inadequate to safeguard, the legitimate interests of the licensee's 
customers and the public, 
(b) Additional license termination or probation provisions for licensees 
other than insurers are set forth in Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 
31A-23-216, 31A-23-217, 31A-25-208, 31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-
214, 31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503. 
(11) The enforcement penalties and procedures set forth in this section are 
not exclusive, but are cumulative of other rights and remedies the commis-
sioner has pursuant to applicable law. 
History: C. 1953,31A-2-308, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 204, § 25; 1987, ch. 91; § 6; 1987, 
ch. 161, 5 78; 1991, ch. 241, § 23; 1994, ch. 
316,$ 5;1998,ch.293,§ 2; 1999, ch. 130, § 2; 
1999, ch. 131, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenuctments. — Laws 
1986, ch. 204, § 25, repealed former § 31A-2-
308, as enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 7, relat-
ing to enforcement penalties and procedures, 
and enacted present § 31A-2-308. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4,1998, updated the refer-
ences at the end of Subsection (10), making a 
related change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
No right of private action. son v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 996 F. 
Neither Subsection (lXa) nor state case law Supp. 1105 (D. Utah 1998). 
provides for any private action in the case of Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
violation of the state insurance regulations, nor meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
do they provide for any private remedy. John-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 91 et seq. 
§§ 25, 54. 
31A-2-309. Service of process through state officer. 
(1) The commissioner, or the lieutenant governor when the subject proceed-
ing is brought by the state, is the agent for receipt of service of any summons, 
notice, order, pleading, or any other legal process relating to a Utah court or 
administrative agency upon the following: 
(a) all insurers authorized to do business in this state, while authorized 
to do business in this state, and thereafter in any proceeding arising from 
or related to any transaction having a connection with this state; 
(b) all surplus lines insurers for any proceeding arising out of a contract 
of insurance that is subject to the surplus lines law, or out of a certificate, 
cover note, or other confirmation of that type of insurance; 
(c) all unauthorized insurers or other persons assisting unauthorized 
insurers under Subsection 31A-15-102(1) by doing an act specified in 
Subsection 31A-15-102(2), for a proceeding arising out of the transaction 
that is subject to the unauthorized insurance law; 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 130, effective 
May 3, 1999, substituted "Sections 31A-19a-
303, 31A-19a-304" for "Sections 31A-19-303, 
31A-19-304" in Subsection (10) (Subsection 
(10Xb) in the reconciled version) and made a 
stylistic change. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 131, effective 
May 3,1999, rewrote Subsections (9) and (10), 
redesignated subsections, and made stylistic 
changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
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48-1-17 PARTNERSHIP 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 
S$ 962 to 967. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 91. 
48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. 
Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things 
affecting the partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any 
deceased partner, or partner under legal disability. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-17. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Partner acquiring other partner's inter-
est. 
Partner's failure to disclose voluntarily to the 
other partner the value of the other partner's 
limited partnership interest before acquiring 
such interest from him was not a breach of 
fiduciary duty where the other partner man-
aged and kept the financial records of the 
primary partnership asset and had ample ac-
cess to information about the value of his inter-
est. Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 
§S 409 to 410, 425. 
CJUS. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership $ 76. 
AXJL — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty 
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
Am. 
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48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. 
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as 
trustee for it any profits, derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct or 
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. 
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner 
engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal 
representatives of the last surviving partner. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, $ 21; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-18. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Employee's actions. 
Partnership income. 
Relations inter se. 
Secret profits. 
Cited. 
Employee's actions. 
Where employee of one member of a group of 
joint adventurers seeking to buy and sell cer-
tain contiguous lands having valuable clay de-
posits discovers clay on other adjoining land, 
obtains option thereon, and enters into a con-
tract with the group for a share of the proceeds 
and upon consideration of his option being 
turned over to the group, his employer is not 
chargeable with breach of trust toward other 
original adventurers for failing to inform them 
of employee's discovery until after he obtained 
option. Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 P. 
374(1926). 
Partnership income. 
Where partnership was organized for pur-
pose of furnishing supplies to laborers em-
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ployed by power and light company, and one 
partner was to act as treasurer and furnish all 
foreign labor on construction work, for which he 
was to receive in full payment one-third of net 
profits of partnership, money received for fur-
nishing labor was partnership income. Paggi v. 
Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P. 739 (1919). 
Relations inter se. 
The relation of partners between themselves 
is fiduciary, that of trustee and cestui que trust, 
and this fiduciary relationship exists between 
surviving partner and legal representative of 
deceased partner. Sharp v. Sharp, 54 Utah 262, 
180 P. 580(1919). 
Secret profits. 
Member of partnership will not be permitted 
to take advantage of any secret agreement to 
receive private or personal gain for work or 
business carried on by partnership. Paggi v. 
Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P. 739 (1919). 
Cited in Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. (In 
re Granada, Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jiir. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership 
§§ 420 to 426. 
C.J.S. — 68 CJLS. Partnership $$ 76, 378. 
AJLR. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty 
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
Civil liability of one partner to another or to 
the partnership based on partner's personal 
purchase of partnership property during exist-
ence of partnership, 37 A.L.R.4th 494. 
48-1-19. Right to an account. 
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership 
affairs: 
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or 
possession of its property by his copartners. 
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement. 
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18. 
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 22; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-19. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for accounting. 
Estates of decedents. 
Statute of limitations. 
Action for accounting. 
Before one partner can compel another part-
ner to jpay what is claimed to be indebtedness to 
partnership, it must be first ascertained that 
amount owed by debtor partner is greater 
amount than he would be entitled to receive 
upon striking balance and finding interest of 
each partner in assets of partnership; ag-
grieved parties must bring action for account-
ing rather than action on claimed debt. Bank-
ers' Trust Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah 525,190 P. 1113 
(1920). 
Estates of decedents. 
Administrator of deceased partner held en-
titled to maintain an action against heirs of 
another partner for general accounting of part-
nership affairs, where it appeared that account-
ing was necessary, coupled with additional fact 
that estate of other partner had been closed and 
personal representative released from further 
duty in administration of estate. Bankers'Trust 
Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah 525, 190 P. 1113 (1920). 
After a deceased partner's daughter, who 
acted as one of the personal representatives of 
her father's estate, had held the partnership 
assets in trust for the surviving partner and 
had control of her father's accounts and the 
records of those accounts before she died, the 
estate had the burden of (1) proving which 
accounts were partnership accounts and which 
were not, (2) identifying the source of the funds 
contained in nonpartnership accounts if pos-
sible, and (3) proving that the funds which had 
been in partnership accounts and had been 
removed from those accounts by the personal 
representatives had been adequately accounted 
for. In re Estate of Harris, 728 P.2d 1003 (Utah 
1986). 
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EXHIBIT 18 
GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS 48-1-26 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership AXJt. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty 
§§ 833 to 837, 970. to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
CJJS. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 102, 103, another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
244, 245. 
48-1-25. Partner's interest subject to charging order. 
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a 
partner the court which entered the judgment, order or decree, or any other 
court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the 
unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon and may then 
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits and of any other money due 
or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and make all other orders, 
directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner might have made 
or which the circumstances of the case may require. 
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure, or, 
in case of a sale being directed by the court, may be purchased without thereby 
causing a dissolution: 
(a) with separate property, by any one or more of the partners; or, 
(b) with partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with 
the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged or sold. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if 
any, under the exemption laws as regards his interest in the partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 28; R.S. 1933 & Cross-References. — Exemptions gener-
C. 1943, 69-1-25. ally, Title 78, Chapter 23. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59AAm. Jur. 2d Partnership C.J.S. — 68 C.JJS. Partnership $ 189. 
§§ 790 to 795. 
48-1-26. "Dissolution* defined. 
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners 
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as 
distinguished from the winding up, of the business. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 29; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of dissolution. action or suit against the other. Kimball v. 
Dissolution does not, in itself, necessarily McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). 
give either of the parties an immediate cause of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 331. 
§§ 808 to 810. 
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EXHIBIT 19 
48-1-27 PARTNERSHIP 
48-1 -27, Par tnership not terminated by dissolution. 
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the 
winding up of partnership affairs is completed. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, $ 30; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-27. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Cited. 
In general. 
Where a partner's conduct constituted acts of 
dissolution, the partnership was not thus ter-
minated and its affairs had to be wound up. The 
services of an accountant in preparing an ac-
count of the partnership's business should have 
been paid for by the partnership. Pantages v. 
Arge, 1 Utah 2d 105, 262 P.2d 745 (1953). 
A partnership at will was not terminated 
when one partner notified the other he was 
ending the partnership and expelled him from 
the business. Ferrin v. Ferrin, 7 Utah 2d 5, 315 
P.2d 978 (1957). 
Cited in McCune & McCune v. Mountain 
Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914 (Utah 1988). 
Am. Jur. M, 
$ 889. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
- 59AAm. Jur. 2d Partnership I J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 351. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertak-
ing specified in the agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or 
particular undertaking is specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned 
their interests, or suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, 
either before or after the termination of any specified term or 
particular undertaking. 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in 
accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between 
the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the 
circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of 
this section, by the express will of any partner at any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the 
partnership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in 
partnership. 
(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. 
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, $ 31; R.S. 1933 & 
C 1943,69-1-28. 
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EXHIBIT 20 
GENERAL AND LIMITED LI A BILITY PARTNERSHIPS 48-1-35 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur.2d.-—59AAm. Jur. 2d Partnership operated under tradename for supplies fur 
$^ 906 to 913 rushed to successor by one without notice of 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership $ 352. transfer, 70 A.L.R.3d 1250. 
AX.R. — Liability of transferor of business 
48-1-34. Right to wind up. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved 
the partnership or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, not 
bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, 
that any partner, his legal representatives or his assignee upon cause shown 
may obtain a winding up by the court. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 37; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-34. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur, 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership $$ 273, 355. 
§§ 1100, 1180 
48-1-35. Rights of partners In application of partnership 
property. 
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the 
partnership agreement, each partner, as against his copartners and all persons 
claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless 
otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its 
liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the 
respective partners. But if dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona 
fide under the partnership agreement, and if the expelled partner is dis-
charged from all partnership liabilities either by payment or agreement under 
Section 48-1-33(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount due him from 
the partnership. 
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership ajtijiee-
ment the rights of the partners shall be as follows: 
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have: 
(i) All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section; and 
(ii) The right as against each partner who has caused the dissolu-
tion wrongfully to damages for breach of the agreement. 
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if they 
all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by themselves 
or jointly with others, may do so during the agreed term for the partner-
ship, and for that purpose may possess the partnership property; provided, 
they pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully the 
value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, less any 
damages recoverable under clause (2XaXii) of this section or secure the 
payment by bond approved by the court, and in like manner indemnify 
him against all present or future partnership liabilities. 
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have: 
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EXHIBIT 21 
75-6-201 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
PART 2 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO EFFECT ON DEATH 
75-6-201. Provisions for payment or transfer at death. 
(1) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of em-
,
u l „ / ClJ^ morteaee promissory note, deposit agreement, pension plan, 
^ a ^ e e m ^ n v ^ c r " any^other written instrument effective as a 
cTtraTSf t , conveyance, or trust are considered nontestamentary, and this 
Zle does^ot invalidate the instrument or any provision: 
S Tat money or other benefits previously due to, controlled or owned 
by a decedent shall be paid after his 'leath to a person designated by the 
decedent in either the instrument or , separate writing, including a will, 
eScuted at the same time as the instrument or subsequently; 
to£* any money due or to become due under the instrument shall 
cease to be payable in event of the death of the promisee or the promisor 
^ f r t n ^ T U ^ w M c h i s the subject of the instrument shall pass 
to a person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a 
sepLSe writingrincluding a will, executed at the same time as the m-
( 2 r S S g ? n V S E S S L * the rights of creditors under other laws of 
^ A n t provision in a lease of a safety deposit repository to the effect that 
two or more persons shall have access to the repository that purports to create 
a i o i n t ^ n l n ^ in the repository or in the contents of ihe repository, or that 
ourXtetovest ownership of the contents of the repository m the surviving 
S S A s ^effective to create joint ownership of the contents of the repository 
or SVanlferWnership at death of one of the lessees to the survivor. Owner-
snip SZ ZnZ^of tne repository and devolution of title to these contents 
L determined according to rules of law without regard to tiie lease provisions, 
^ c o n t e n t s of the repository may be delivered on request to any person who 
has access to the repository by the terms of the lease agreement without 
uSiUtyTn the part of the financial institution or other person where the 
T f S ; m o ^ h i c l e , trailer, semitrailer, or boat registration m the 
names rftwo or more individuals shaU be deemed to be held in joint tenancy 
with right of survivorship unless otherwise indicated. 
H W » ~ - r 1953 76-6-201, enacted b> I. of holding the provisions testamentary is usu-
, J S 8 * ^ , ™ 8 7-' IMS chl l f f l T l ally to invalidate them because not executed in 
" ^ t o ^ S o a U c o ^ e t t . - T t L section accordance with the statute of wills. On the 
Editorial TO^°T"
 x a-range. other hand the same courts have for years up-
n ^ T h U h^Tel I ' ^ S n ' t r e S e a Z held beneficiary designations in life insurance 
^ ^ r n t a n r For e^ampUTmost courts treat contracts. Simdar kinds of problems are ans-
testamentary. ror C«UUF nmrniaaorv ine in regard to beneficiary designations in 
as testamentary a P ™ 8 ™ £ * £ Z e n 7 £ SLton funds and under annuity contracts, 
note that if the ^ Z * A^Zti^L* K X y of the power of appointment pro-
made the note shall ^ ^ " ^ " H f ^ ^ m f h i s t o r i c a V base fo/solving some of 
E X S K C T l S i S * £ £ £ * < £ these problems aside ft. avalidating statute, 
the seller dies Deiore pay ^mputf However, there appear to be no policy reasons 
^ T L ^ t h H e n d e e ^Theseprovisions for continuing to treat these varied arrange-
o K t S R S X a r ^ e m e ^ . C e result ments as testamentary Tne revocab.e living 
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